

PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS IN BEAUTY AND THE BEAST MOVIE

REFERENCES DETAIL

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Principles of Pragmatics

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more positive form of seeking opportunities for comity. Positive politeness means observing the PP in that, for example, if you have an opportunity to congratulate *h* on his 100th birthday, you should do so. In the third category are COLLABORATIVE illocutionary functions (c), for which politeness is largely irrelevant. Most written discourse comes into this category. And in the fourth category of CONFLICTIVE functions, politeness is out of the question, because conflictive illocutions are, by their very nature, designed to cause offence. To threaten or curse someone in a polite manner is virtually a contradiction in terms: the only way to make sense of the idea is to suppose that the speaker does so ironically (see 6.3). Presumably in the course of socialization children learn to replace conflictive communication by other types (especially by the competitive type), and this is one good reason why conflictive illocutions tend, thankfully, to be rather marginal to human linguistic behaviour in normal circumstances.

Hence, in considering polite and impolite linguistic behaviour, we may confine our attention mainly to competitive and convivial illocutions, with their corresponding categories of negative and positive politeness.

5.2 Searle's categories of illocutionary acts

The above classification is based on functions, whereas Searle's classification of illocutionary acts (1979[1975a]) is based on varied criteria.² Before proceeding, however, we will find it useful to relate the two classifications, and show how politeness affects Searle's categories. Roughly speaking, Searle's categories are defined as follows (for further discussion, see 9.2-3)?

1. ASSERTIVES commit *s* to the truth of the expressed proposition: *eg* stating, suggesting, boasting, complaining, claiming, reporting. Such illocutions tend to be neutral as regards politeness, *ie* they belong to the *collaborative* category (c) above. But there are some exceptions: for example, boasting is generally considered to be impolite. Semantically, assertives are propositional.
2. DIRECTIVES are intended to produce some effect through action by the hearer: ordering, commanding, requesting, advising, and recommending are examples. They frequently belong to the *competitive* category (a), and therefore comprise a category of illocutions in which negative politeness is important. On the other hand, some directives (such as invitations) are intrinsically polite. To avoid confusion in using the term 'directive' in relation to 'direct and indirect illocutions', I have preferred to use the term IMPOSITIVE for competitive illocutions in this class.
3. COMMISSIVES commit *s* (to a greater or lesser degree) to some future action; *eg* promising, vowing, offering. These tend to be *convivial* rather than competitive,

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commas, and in such cases we refer to the phatic and not the rhetic act.

The case (*b*), of miscellaneous acts falling outside our classification, is more difficult. A possible test would be the following: where we can put the *y*-verb¹ into a non-continuous tense (preterite or present) instead of the continuous tense, or equally where we can change the 'in' into 'by' while keeping the continuous tense, then the *y*-verb is not the name for an illocution. Thus, for 'In saying that he was making a mistake', we could put, without change of sense, either 'In saying that he made a mistake' or 'By saying that he was making a mistake': but we do not say 'In saying that I protested' nor 'By saying that I was protesting'.

(2) But on the whole we might claim that the formula does not go with perlocutionary verbs like 'convinced', 'persuaded', 'deterred'. But we must qualify this a little. First, exceptions arise through the incorrect use of language. Thus people say 'Are you intimidating me?' instead of 'threatening', and thus might say 'In saying *x*, he was intimidating me'. Second, the same word may genuinely be used in both illocutionary and perlocutionary ways. For example, 'tempting' is a verb which may easily be used in either way. We don't have 'I tempt you to' but we do have 'Let me tempt you to', and exchanges like 'Do have another whack of ice-cream'—'Are you tempting me?'. The last question

¹ [That is, the verb substituted for '*y*' in 'In saying *x* I was *y*-ing'. J.O.U.]

would be absurd in a perlocutionary sense, since it would be one for the speaker to answer, if anyone. If I say 'Oh, why not?' it seems that I am tempting him, but he may not really be tempted. Third, there is the proleptic use of verbs such as, for example, 'seducing' or 'pacifying'. In this case 'trying to' seems always a possible addition with a perlocutionary verb. But we cannot say that the illocutionary verb is always equivalent to trying to do something which might be expressed by a perlocutionary verb, as for example that 'argue' is equivalent to 'try to convince', or 'warn' is equivalent to 'try to alarm' or 'alert'. For firstly, the distinction between doing and trying to do is already there in the illocutionary verb as well as in the perlocutionary verb; we distinguish arguing from trying to argue as well as convincing from trying to convince. Further, many illocutionary acts are not cases of trying to do any perlocutionary act; for example, to promise is not to try to do anything.

But we may still ask whether we may possibly use 'in' with the perlocutionary act; this is tempting when the act is not intentionally achieved. But even here it is probably incorrect, and we should use 'by'. Or at any rate, if I say, for example, 'In saying *x* I was convincing him', I am here accounting not for how I came to be saying *x* but for how I came to be convincing him; this is the other way round from the use of the formula in explaining what we meant by a phrase when we used the 'in saying' formula, and involves another sense ('in the

In programme of finding a list of explicit performative words, notably verbs, we made a fresh start by considering the senses in which to say something is to do something. Thus we distinguished the locutionary act (and within it the phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic acts) which has a *meaning*; the illocutionary act which has a certain *force* in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is *the achieving of certain effects* by saying something.

We distinguished in the last lecture some senses of consequences and effects in these connexions, especially three senses in which effects can come in even with illocutionary acts, namely, securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting responses. In the case of the perlocutionary act we made a rough distinction between achieving an object and producing a sequel. Illocutionary acts are conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are *not* conventional. Acts of *both* kinds can be performed—or, more accurately, acts called by the same name (for example, acts equivalent to the illocutionary act of warning or the perlocutionary act of convincing)—can be brought off non-verbally; but even then to deserve the name of an illocutionary act, for example a warning, it must be a

How to do things with Words 121

conventional non-verbal act: but perlocutionary acts are not conventional, though conventional acts may be made use of in order to bring off the perlocutionary act. A judge should be able to decide, by hearing what was said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were achieved.

LECTURE V

AT the end of the previous lecture we were reconsidering the question of the relations between the performative utterance and statements of various kinds which certainly are true or false. We mentioned as specially notable four such connexions:

(1) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy, then the statement that I am apologizing is true.

(2) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain conditions obtain—those notably in Rules A. 1 and A. 2—must be true.

(3) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be happy, then the statement that certain other conditions obtain—those notably in our rule *F*. 1—must be true.

(4) If performative utterances of at least some kinds are happy, for example contractual ones, then statements of the form that I ought or ought not subsequently to do some particular thing are true.

I was saying that there seemed to be some similarity, and perhaps even an identity, between the second of these connexions and the phenomenon which has been called, in the case of statements as opposed to performatives, 'presupposition': and likewise between the third of these connexions and the phenomenon called (sometimes and not, to my mind, correctly) in the case of statements,



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the context in which they occur, and some pre-existing knowledge of what would be a likely message as we work toward a reasonable interpretation of what the producer of the sign intended it to convey. Our interpretation of the “meaning” of the sign is not based solely on the words, but on what we think the writer intended to communicate.

We can illustrate a similar process with our second example (Figure 10.2), taken from a newspaper advertisement. If we only think about the meaning of the phrase as a combination of the meanings of the words, using *Furniture Sale* as an analogy, we might arrive at an interpretation in which someone is announcing the sale of some very young children. Of course, we resist this possible interpretation and recognize instead that it is advertising a sale of clothes for those young children. The word *clothes* doesn’t appear in the message, but we can bring that idea to our interpretation of the message as we work out what the advertiser intended us to understand. We are actively involved in creating an interpretation of what we read and hear.

Context

In our discussion of the last two examples, we emphasized the influence of context. There are different kinds of context. There is obviously the **physical context**, which can be the location “out there” where we encounter words and phrases (e.g. the word *BANK* on a wall of a building is understood as a financial institution). There is also the **linguistic context**, also known as **co-text**. The co-text of a word is the set of other words used in the same phrase or sentence. If the word *bank* is used with other words like *steep* or *overgrown*, we have no problem deciding which type of *bank* is meant.

Or, when someone says that she has to *get to the bank to withdraw some cash*, the co-text tells us which type of *bank* is intended.

Deixis

There are some very common words in our language that can’t be interpreted at all if we don’t know the context. These are words such as *here* and *there*, *this* or *that*, *now* or *then*, *yesterday*, *today* or *tomorrow*, as well as pronouns such as *you*, *me*, *she*, *him*, *it*, *them*. Some sentences of English are virtually impossible to understand if we don’t

PERSON DEIXIS: *me, you, him, her, us, them, that woman, those tables*

Spatial deixis: *here, there, beside you, near that, above your head*

Temporal deixis: *now, then, last week, later, tomorrow, yesterday*

All these deictic expressions have to be interpreted in terms of which person, place or time the speaker has in mind. We make a broad distinction between what is close to the speaker (*this, here, now*) and what is distant (*that, there, then*). We can also indicate whether movement is away from the speaker (*go*) or toward the speaker (*come*). Just think about telling someone to *Go to bed* versus *Come to bed*. Deixis can even be entertaining. The bar owner who puts up a big sign that reads *Free Beer Tomorrow* (to get you to return to the bar) can always claim that you are just one day too early for the free drink.

Reference

In discussing deixis, we assumed that the use of words to refer to people, places and times was a simple matter. However, words themselves don't refer to anything. People refer. We have to define **reference** as an act by which a speaker (or writer) uses language to enable a listener (or reader) to identify something. To perform an act of reference, we can use proper nouns (*Chomsky, Jennifer, Whiskas*), other nouns in phrases (*a writer, my friend, the cat*) or pronouns (*he, she, it*). We sometimes assume that these words identify someone or something uniquely, but it is more accurate to say that, for each word or phrase, there is a "range of reference." The words *Jennifer*

or *friend* or *she* can be used to refer to many entities in the world. As we observed earlier, an expression such as *the war* doesn't directly identify anything by itself, because its reference depends on who is using it.

We can also refer to things when we're not sure what to call them. We can use expressions such as *the blue thing* and *that icky stuff* and we can even invent names. For instance, there was a man who always drove his motorcycle fast and loud through my neighborhood and was locally referred to as *Mr. Kawasaki*. In this case, a brand name for a motorcycle is being used to refer to a person.

Inference

expressions such as *the blue thing* and *that icky stuff* and we can even invent names. For instance, there was a man who always drove his motorcycle fast and loud through my neighborhood and was locally referred to as *Mr. Kawasaki*. In this case, a brand name for a motorcycle is being used to refer to a person.

Inference

As in the "Mr. Kawasaki" example, a successful act of reference depends more on the listener/reader's ability to recognize what the speaker/writer means than on the listener's "dictionary" knowledge of a word that is used. For example, in a restaurant, one waiter can ask another, *Where's the spinach salad sitting?* and receive the reply, *He's sitting by the door*. If you're studying linguistics, you might ask someone, *Can I look at your Chomsky?* and get the response, *Sure, it's on the shelf over there*. And when you hear that *Jennifer is wearing Calvin Klein*, you avoid imagining someone called Calvin draped over poor Jennifer and recognize that they're talking about her clothing.

These examples make it clear that we can use names associated with things (*salad*) to refer to people, and use names of people (*Chomsky, Calvin Klein*) to refer to things. The key process here is called **inference**. An inference is additional information used by the listener to create a connection between what is said and what must be meant. In the *Chomsky* example, the listener has to operate with the inference: "if X is the name of the writer of a book, then X can be used to identify a copy of a book by that writer." Similar types of inferences are necessary to understand someone who says that *Picasso is in the museum, We saw Shakespeare in London, Mozart was playing in the background* and *The bride wore Giorgio Armani*.

Anaphora

We usually make a distinction between how we introduce new referents (*a puppy*) and how we refer back to them (*the puppy, it*).

*We saw a funny home video about a boy washing a puppy in a small bath.
The puppy started struggling and shaking and the boy got really wet.
When he let go, it jumped out of the bath and ran away.*

In this type of referential relationship, the second (or subsequent) referring expression is an example of **anaphora** ("referring back"). The first mention is called the **antecedent**. So, in our example, *a boy, a puppy* and *a small bath* are antecedents and *The puppy, the boy, he, it* and *the bath* are anaphoric expressions.

Presupposition

When we use a referring expression like *this*, *he* or *Jennifer*, we usually assume that our listeners can recognize which referent is intended. In a more general way, we design our linguistic messages on the basis of large-scale assumptions about what our listeners already know. Some of these assumptions may be mistaken, of course, but mostly they're appropriate. What a speaker (or writer) assumes is true or known by a listener (or reader) can be described as a **presupposition**.

If someone tells you *Your brother is waiting outside*, there is an obvious presupposition that you have a brother. If you are asked *Why did you arrive late?*, there is a presupposition that you did arrive late. And if you are asked the question *When did you stop smoking?*, there are at least two presuppositions involved. In asking this question, the speaker presupposes that you used to smoke and that you no longer do so. Questions like this, with built-in presuppositions, are very useful devices for interrogators or trial lawyers. If the defendant is asked by the prosecutor, *Okay,*

Mr. Buckingham, how fast were you going when you went through the red light?, there is a presupposition that Mr. Buckingham did in fact go through the red light. If he simply answers the *How fast* part of the question, by giving a speed, he is behaving as if the presupposition is correct.

One of the tests used to check for the presuppositions underlying sentences involves negating a sentence with a particular presupposition and checking if the presupposition remains true. Whether you say *My car is a wreck* or the negative version *My car is not a wreck*, the underlying presupposition (*I have a car*) remains true despite the fact that the two sentences have opposite meanings. This is called the "constancy under negation" test for identifying a presupposition. If someone says, *I used to regret marrying him, but I don't regret marrying him now*, the presupposition (*I married him*) remains constant even though the verb *regret* changes from affirmative to negative.

Speech acts

We have been considering ways in which we interpret the meaning of an utterance in

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CONTENTS

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<i>Preface</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgements</i>	xiv
<i>Notation conventions</i>	xv
1 The scope of pragmatics	1
1.1 The origin and historical vagaries of the term <i>pragmatics</i>	1
1.2 Defining pragmatics	5
1.3 Current interest in pragmatics	35
1.4 Computing context: an example	47
2 Deixis	54
2.0 Introduction	54
2.1 Philosophical approaches	55
2.2 Descriptive approaches	61
2.2.1 <i>Person deixis</i>	68
2.2.2 <i>Time deixis</i>	73
2.2.3 <i>Place deixis</i>	79
2.2.4 <i>Discourse deixis</i>	85
2.2.5 <i>Social deixis</i>	89
2.3 Conclusions	94
3 Conversational implicature	97
3.0 Introduction	97
3.1 Grice's theory of implicature	100
3.2 Revisions, problems and applications	118
3.2.1 <i>Tests for implicature</i>	118
3.2.2 <i>Implicature and logical form</i>	122
3.2.3 <i>Kinds of implicature</i>	126
3.2.4 <i>Generalised Quantity implicatures</i>	132
3.2.5 <i>Metaphor: a case of maxm exploitation</i>	147
3.2.6 <i>Implicature and language structure</i>	162

2.0 Introduction

The single most obvious way in which the relationship between language and context is reflected in the structures of languages themselves, is through the phenomenon of **deixis**. The term is borrowed from the Greek word for pointing or indicating, and has as prototypical or focal exemplars the use of demonstratives, first and second person pronouns, tense, specific time and place adverbs like *now* and *here*, and a variety of other grammatical features tied directly to the circumstances of utterance.

Essentially, deixis concerns the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the **context of utterance** or **speech event**, and thus also concerns ways in which the interpretation of utterances depends on the analysis of that context of utterance. Thus the pronoun *this* does not name or refer to any particular entity on all occasions of use; rather it is a variable or place-holder for some particular entity given by the context (e.g. by a gesture). The facts of deixis should act as a constant reminder to theoretical linguists of the simple but immensely important fact that natural languages are primarily designed, so to speak, for use in face-to-face interaction, and thus there are limits to the extent to which they can be analysed without taking this into account (Lyons, 1977a: 589ff).

The importance of deictic information for the interpretation of utterances is perhaps best illustrated by what happens when such information is lacking (Fillmore, 1975: 38-9). Consider, for example, finding the following notice on someone's office door:

(1) I'll be back in an hour

Because we don't know *when* it was written, we cannot know when the writer will return. Or, imagine that the lights go out as Harry has just begun saying:

54

(2) Listen, I'm not disagreeing with you but with *you*, and not about *this* but about *this*

Or, suppose we find a bottle in the sea, and inside it a message which reads:

(3) Meet me here a week from now with a stick about this big

We do not know *who* to meet, *where* or *when* to meet him or her, or *how big* a stick to bring.

The many facets of deixis are so pervasive in natural languages, and so deeply grammaticalized, that it is hard to think of them as anything other than an essential part of semantics. If semantics is taken to include all conventional aspects of meaning, then perhaps most deictic phenomena are properly considered semantic. However, by at least some of the views that we reviewed in Chapter 1, deixis belongs within the domain of pragmatics, because it directly concerns the relationship between the structure of languages and the contexts in which they are used. But all such categorizations are theory-dependent, and on the view that we have adopted for convenience, namely that pragmatics concerns those aspects of meaning and language-structure that cannot be captured in a truth-conditional semantics, the grammatical category of deixis will probably be found to straddle the semantics/pragmatics border.

The important point, wherever the pragmatics/semantics boundary is drawn, is that deixis concerns the encoding of many different aspects of the circumstances surrounding the utterance, within the utterance itself. Natural language utterances are thus 'anchored' directly to aspects of the context.

2.1 Philosophical approaches

The topic of deixis, or as philosophers usually prefer, **indexical expressions** (or just **indexicals**), may be usefully approached by considering how truth-conditional semantics deals with certain natural language expressions. Suppose we identify the semantic content of a sentence with its truth conditions, then the semantic content of

(4) Letizia de Ramolino was the mother of Napoleon

will amount to a specification of the circumstances under which it would be true, namely that the individual known as Letizia de Ramolino was in fact identical to the individual who was the mother

55

(11) will be true just in case at *some time prior to the time of speaking*

the addressee, at CT'. However this won't quite do either – one can say:

(84) When I'm in the office, you can *come* to see me

where *come* glosses as 'movement towards the location of the speaker at the time of some other specified event' (let us call this time **reference time**). Such a usage is still ultimately deictic, in that it makes reference to participant-role, but it is not directly place-deictic (in that there is no anchorage to the location of the present speech event). In narrative, we sometimes dispense with even this last vestige of deictic content, using *come* relative to the locations of protagonists rather than participants, but this non-deictic usage we shall ignore. Our third approximation to a gloss for *come* is therefore: 'motion towards speaker's location, or addressee's location, at either CT, or reference time'.

Our analysis is still incomplete, however, as there is a deictic usage of *come* that is based not on participants' actual location, but on their normative location or **home-base**. Hence the possibility of saying, when neither speaker nor addressee is at home:

(85) I *came* over several times to visit you, but you were *never there*

So we must append another clause to our gloss, namely: 'or motion towards the home-base maintained at CT by either speaker or addressee'. Very similar remarks throughout can be made for *go*, and also for verbs like *bring* and *take* (see Fillmore, 1975: 50ff).

A number of Amerindian languages encode reference to home-base in a more systematic way. Thus in Chinantec, there are four expressions to choose from if one wants to say 'Pedro moved to X', depending on the following criteria: (i) one verb form is used if the speaker S is at X at CT, and X is S's home-base; (ii) another is used if S is at X, but X is not S's home-base; (iii) a third is used if S is not at X, but X is S's home-base; (iv) a fourth is used if S is not at X, and X is not S's home-base (Fillmore, 1971b: 16).

Further complexities in place deixis arise if the speaker is in motion – it then becomes quite possible to use temporal terms in order to refer to deictic locations, as in:

(86) I first heard that ominous rattle *ten miles ago*

(87) There's a good fast food joint just *ten minutes from here*

This raises the issue about whether time deixis or place deixis is more

basic. Lyons (1977a: 669) inclines to a view that, since place-deictic terms like *this* and *that* can be used in a temporal sense (especially to refer to proximal and distal parts of an unfolding discourse), place deixis is more fundamental than time deixis. Such a view is favourable to **localism**, the theory that attempts to reduce non-spatial to spatial expressions (Lyons, 1977a: 718ff). But the usage in (86) and (87) can be used to reverse the argument, and in general each domain (space and time) provides fertile ground for metaphors about the other (see Chapter 3 below). In addition, deictic locations always have to be specified with respect to the location of a participant at *coding time*, i.e. place deixis always incorporates a covert time deixis element, while the converse is not true.

2.2.4 Discourse deixis

Discourse, or text, deixis concerns the use of expressions within some utterance to refer to some portion of the discourse that contains that utterance (including the utterance itself). We may also include in discourse deixis a number of other ways in which an utterance signals its relation to surrounding text, e.g. utterance-initial *anyway* seems to indicate that the utterance that contains it is not addressed to the immediately preceding discourse, but to one or more steps back. (Such signals are deictic because they have the distinctive relativity of reference, being anchored to the discourse location of the current utterance.) The only detailed accounts of this area of deixis are, again, to be found in Fillmore, 1975 and Lyons, 1977a: 667ff. Since discourse unfolds in time, it seems natural that time-deictic words can be used to refer to portions of the discourse; thus analogously to *last week* and *next Thursday*, we have in the *last paragraph* and in the *next Chapter*. But we also have place-deictic terms re-used here, and especially the demonstratives *this* and *that*. Thus *this* can be used to refer to a forthcoming portion of the discourse, as in (88), and *that* to a preceding portion, as in (89):

(88) I bet you haven't heard *this* story

(89) *That* was the funniest story I've ever heard

Considerable confusion is likely to be caused here if we do not immediately make the distinction between *discourse deixis* and *anaphora*. As we noted, anaphora concerns the use of (usually) a pronoun to refer to the same referent as some prior term, as in:

(90) *Harry's a sweetheart; he's so considerate*

where *Harry* and *he* can be said to be **co-referential**, i.e. pick out the same referent. Anaphora can, of course, hold within sentences, across sentences, and across turns at speaking in a dialogue. Deictic or other definite referring expressions are often used to introduce a referent, and anaphoric pronouns used to refer to the same entity thereafter. It is important to remember, however, that deictic and anaphoric usages are not mutually exclusive, as was remarked in connection with example (40) above. Nevertheless, in principle the distinction is clear: where a pronoun refers to a linguistic expression (or chunk of discourse) itself, it is **discourse-deictic**; where a pronoun refers to the same entity as a prior linguistic expression refers to, it is **anaphoric**. It follows that there is a close, but quite unexplored, relation between discourse deixis and **mention** or **quotation**; thus in the following example (from Lyons, 1977a: 667):

(91) A: That's a rhinoceros
B: Spell it for me

it refers not to the referent, the beast itself, but to the word *rhinoceros*. Here, *it* is not doing duty for a use of *rhinoceros*; but rather for a mention of it. Further, the property of **token reflexivity**, as in the following usage of *this*, is just a special case of intra-sentential discourse deixis:

(92) *This sentence is not true*

Fillmore (1971b: 240) hopes that a theory of discourse deixis will resolve the well-known paradoxes associated with sentences like (92) (if it's false, it's true; and if it's true, it's false), and indeed with token reflexivity in general.

A number of significant problems for the distinction between anaphora and discourse deixis have been thrown up by the very considerable body of work on **pronominalization** (see Lyons, 1977b; Lyons, 1977a: 662ff for a review; and for recent work, see e.g. Henry & Schnelle, 1979). Firstly, there are the so-called **pronouns of laziness** (Geach, 1962: 125ff), as in Karttunen's well-known sentence (see Lyons, 1977a: 673ff):

(93) The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man who gave it to his mistress

where *it* is not co-referential with *his paycheck*, but refers to what a repetition of that NP would have referred to (namely the paycheck of the man whose mistress got it) if it had occurred in place of *it*. One could perhaps say that the pronoun here refers successfully via a discourse-deictic reference to a prior NP. Secondly, in an exchange like the following (from Lyons, 1977a: 668):

(94) A: I've never seen him
B: *That's* a lie

the pronoun *that* does not seem to be anaphoric (unless it is held that it refers to the same entity that A's utterance does, i.e. a proposition or a truth value); nor does it quite seem to be discourse-deictic (it refers not to the sentence but, perhaps, to the statement made by uttering that sentence). Rather, such a usage seems to fall in between: Lyons (1977a: 670) calls such usages **impure textual deixis**. Thirdly, Lyons points out that if one thinks of anaphora as reference to entities already established in the domain of discourse, then the ways in which they are referred to in anaphoric reference commonly make use of the order in which they were introduced by the discourse itself. For example, the Turkish translation of (92) might be glossed as (96), where the proximal demonstrative anaphorically refers to the first referent introduced, and the distal demonstrative to the second:

(95) John and Mary came into the room: he was laughing but she was crying
(96) John and Mary came into the room: *this* was laughing, but *that* was crying

In that case, there are good arguments for considering that anaphora ultimately rests on deictic notions (Lyons, 1977a: 671). Such a conclusion would have important repercussions for the philosophical worries about the deictic nature of reference which were sketched in section 2.1.

To return to straightforward issues in discourse deixis, there are many words and phrases in English, and no doubt most languages, that indicate the relationship between an utterance and the prior discourse. Examples are utterance-initial usages of *but*, *therefore*, *in conclusion*, *to the contrary*, *still*, *however*, *anyway*, *well*, *besides*, *actually*, *all in all*, *so*, *after all*, and so on. It is generally conceded that such words have at least a component of meaning that resists

truth-conditional treatment (Grice, 1975; Wilson, 1975; Levinson, 1970b). What they seem to do is indicate, often in a way that

left-dislocated sentences (Ross, 1967) like the following seem to

Deixis

truth-conditional treatment (Grice, 1975; Wilson, 1975; Levinson, 1979b). What they seem to do is indicate, often in very complex ways, just how the utterance that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, some portion of the prior discourse. We still await proper studies of these terms, but one kind of approach will be sketched in the next Chapter under the rubric of **conventional implicature**, another will be indicated in Chapter 6 in discussion of the conversational uses of *well* (see Owen, 1981), and a third may be found in Smith & Wilson (1979: 180), elaborated in Brockway (1981).

Some languages also have morphemes that mark such clearly discourse notions as **main story line**. For example, in the Amerindian language Cubeo, the main protagonists and their actions in a story are tagged by a particle in such a systematic way that a concise and accurate précis is obtained if just those sentences containing the particle are extracted (see Longacre, 1976a for many such cases in this and other Amerindian languages; and Anderson & Keenan, in press, re the so-called *fourth person* category in Algonquian languages, really a discourse-deictic category).

It is also well known that languages like Japanese and Tagalog have **topic markers** distinct from case markers. Thus the Japanese sentence

- (97) ano-hon-*wa* John-*ga* kat-ta
That book-*topic* John-*subject* bought

means roughly 'as for that book (or, talking of that book), John bought it', where *wa* marks the topic, *ga* the grammatical subject (where topic and subject are identical, only *wa* is used; Gundel, 1977: 17). In some languages the grammatical encoding of topic is so prominent, that it is not clear that the notion of subject has the same purchase as it does in the analysis, for example, of Indo-European languages (Li & Thompson, 1976). A great deal of the discussion of such topic markers has been concerned with the sentence-internal organization of information as **given** (or the topic) vs. **new** (or comment about the topic - see Gundel, 1977 for a review). But it is clear that a major function of topic marking is precisely to relate the marked utterance to some specific topic raised in the prior discourse, i.e. to perform a discourse-deictic function.

The same function seems to be performed in English, and in other relatively fixed word-order languages, by word-order changes. Thus

88

2.2 Descriptive approaches

left-dislocated sentences (Ross, 1967) like the following seem to mark the topic of the sentence by movement into initial position:¹⁸

- (98) That blouse, it's simply stunning
(99) Vera, is she coming down then?

Studies of actual usage seem to show that items placed in this position really do correlate with discourse topic, or what the participants are talking 'about', although not always in simple ways (Duranti & Ochs, 1979). The issues that surround the topic/comment distinction are at present quite ill understood, and discussion has been confused by terminological chaos (see Gundel, 1977; Lyons, 1977a: 500ff), although the subject is clearly of considerable importance to pragmatic theory.

The remarks in this section only sketch out a province for which a proper theory of discourse deixis might provide an account. The scope, as indicated, may be very large, ranging from the borders of anaphora to issues of topic/comment structures.

2.2.5 Social deixis

Social deixis concerns "that aspect of sentences which reflect or establish or are determined by certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs" (Fillmore, 1975: 76). Fillmore, unfortunately, then proceeds to water down the concept of social deixis by including, for example, much of the theory of speech acts (see Chapter 5). Here we shall restrict the term to those aspects of language structure that encode the social identities of participants (properly, incumbents of participant-roles), or the social relationship between them, or between one of them and persons and entities referred to. There are of course many aspects of language usage that depend on these relations (see e.g. Brown & Levinson, 1978, 1979), but these usages are only relevant to the topic of social deixis in so far as they are grammaticalized. Obvious examples of such grammaticalizations are 'polite' pronouns and titles of address, but there are many other manifestations of social deixis (see Brown & Levinson, 1978: 183-92, 281-5; Levinson, 1977, 1979b).

¹⁸ Ross proposed left-dislocation as a transformation, but there are in fact serious problems with such an analysis, and it seems better to treat such topic phrases as appositional NPs, not unlike vocatives, even though there is little theory about how to handle the syntax and semantics of them (see Gundel, 1977: 46ff).

89

Deixis

There are two basic kinds of socially deictic information that seem to be encoded in languages around the world: **relational** and **absolute**. The relational variety is the most important, and the relations that typically get expressed are those between:

- (i) speaker and referent (e.g. referent honorifics)
- (ii) speaker and addressee (e.g. addressee honorifics)
- (iii) speaker and bystander (e.g. bystander or audience honorifics)
- (iv) speaker and setting (e.g. formality levels)

We can talk of **honorifics** just where the relation in (i)-(iii) concerns relative rank or respect; but there are many other qualities of relationship that may be grammaticalized, e.g. kinship relations, totemic relations, clan membership, etc., as made available by the relevant social system. The first three kinds of honorific were clearly distinguished by Comrie (1976b), who pointed out that traditional descriptions have often confused (i) and (ii): the distinction is that in (i) respect can only be conveyed by referring to the 'target' of the respect, whereas in (ii) it can be conveyed without necessarily referring to the target. Thus the familiar *tu/vous* type of distinction in singular pronouns of address (which, following Brown & Gilman (1960), we shall call T/V pronouns) is really a **referent honorific** system, where the referent happens to be the addressee. In contrast, in many languages (notably the S. E. Asian languages, including Korean, Japanese and Javanese) it is possible to say some sentence glossing as 'The soup is hot' and by the choice of a linguistic alternate (e.g. for 'soup') encode respect to the addressee without referring to him, in which case we have an **addressee honorific** system. In general, in such languages, it is almost impossible to say anything at all which is not sociolinguistically marked as appropriate for certain kinds of addressees only. In practice, though, the elaborate 'speech levels' of the S. E. Asian languages are complex amalgams of referent and addressee honorifics (see Geertz, 1960 and Comrie, 1976b re Javanese; Kuno, 1973 and Harada, 1976 re Japanese).

The third kind of relational information, that between speaker and bystander, is more rarely encoded in **bystander honorifics**. (The term *bystander* here does duty as a cover term for participants in audience role and for non-participating overhearers.) Examples include the Dyirbal alternative vocabulary, referred to above, used in the presence of taboo relatives (see also Haviland, 1979 re Guugu

90

2.2 Descriptive approaches

Yimidhir), and certain features of Pacific languages, like aspects of the 'royal honorifics' in Ponapean (Garvin & Reisenberg, 1952: 203).

To these three kinds of relational information we may add a fourth, namely the relation between speaker (and perhaps other participants) and setting (or social activity). Although most languages are used differently in formal settings, in some the distinction formal/informal is firmly grammaticalized, for example in Japanese by so-called *mas*-style, and in Tamil by a high *diglossic variant* (see below). Note that while the first three kinds of information are relative strictly to the deictic centre, here specifically the social standing of the speaker, formality is perhaps best seen as involving a relation between all participant roles and situation (but see Irvine, 1979; J. M. Atkinson, 1982).¹⁹

The other main kind of socially deictic information that is often encoded is **absolute** rather than relational. There are, for example, forms reserved for certain speakers, in which case we may talk (after Fillmore, 1975) of **authorized speakers**. For example, in Thai the morpheme *khob* is a polite particle that can only be used by male speakers, the corresponding form reserved for female speakers being *khaj* (Haas, 1964). Similarly, there is a form of the first person pronoun specifically reserved for the use of the Japanese Emperor (Fillmore, 1971b: 6). There are also in many languages forms reserved for **authorized recipients**, including restrictions on most titles of address (*Your Honour, Mr President*, etc.); in Tunicia there were pronouns that differed not only with sex of referent, but also with the sex of the addressee, so that there were, for example, two words for 'they', depending on whether one was speaking to a man or a woman (Haas, *ibid.*).

Having reviewed the main kinds of social-deictic information that are grammaticalized by different languages, we may now consider where in grammatical systems such distinctions are encoded. Note that only the first kind of relational information, i.e. that on the speaker-referent axis, imposes intrinsic limitations on the ways in which such information can be encoded - namely in referring expressions, and morphological agreements with them. For good sociological reasons, such referent honorifics are found for actors, their social

¹⁹ The difference may be more apparent than real, there may well be honorific systems encoding relations between addressee and referent, and there are the Australian 'triadic' kin terms mentioned in section 2.2.1, so the role of the speaker may not always be so central to the first three kinds of social deixis either.

91

Deixis

groups, their actions and behaviours (see e.g. Geertz, 1960 and

2.2 Descriptive approaches

grammatical phenomena (see e.g. Brown & Levinson, 1978: 16) in encoding

Deixis

groups, their actions and belongings (see e.g. Geertz, 1960 and Horne, 1974: xxi re Javanese). We find, perhaps, pale shadows of these latter in the English 'elevated' terms *residence* (for 'home'), *dine* (for 'eat' or 'eat a meal'), *lady* (for 'woman'), *stead* (for 'horse') and so on. Expressions referring to the addressee, though, are particularly likely to encode speaker-referent relationships, due no doubt to the addressee's direct monitoring of the speaker's attitude to him or her. Hence the world-wide distribution through quite unrelated languages and cultures of the T/V distinction in second person singular pronouns (Head, 1978; Levinson, 1978; for the sociolinguistics, see Brown & Gilman, 1960 and Lambert & Tucker, 1976). The fact that the form of the polite or V pronoun is often borrowed from the second person plural, or third person singular or plural, introduces considerable complexities into agreement systems (Comrie, 1975; Corbett, 1976; Levinson, 1979b). As we noted, nominal predicates tend to agree with *actual* number and person, finite verbs with the morphological person and number encoded in the polite form of the pronoun, with language-specific decisions on predicates of intermediate kind. The other way in which addressees are typically referred to, namely by titles of address, also causes agreement problems - a decision has to be made between second or third person agreement, and, where relevant, between which titles of address can co-occur with which degree of respect encoded in verbal agreements (Levinson, 1979b). In languages with honorifics, **honorific concord** can thus become an intricate aspect of morphology, which cannot always be treated formally without reference to the socially deictic values of particular morphemes. These are some of the most important, and most ignored, examples of the direct interaction between pragmatics and syntax. Finally, let us note that titles of address and all vocative forms seem invariably marked for speaker-referent relationship: there is no such thing, it seems, as a socially neutral summons or address (see Zwicky, 1974: 795 re English).

The other kinds of socially deictic information, however, can be encoded just about anywhere in the linguistic system. Addressee honorifics (including dishonorifics and intimacy markers), for example, turn up in lexical alternates or suppletive forms (in e.g. Javanese; Geertz, 1960), in morphology (in e.g. Japanese; Harada, 1976), in particles or affixes (in e.g. Tamil; Levinson, 1979b), in

Deixis

deixis is that, while the study of English may suffer no obvious penalties for such neglect, there is scarcely a single sentence of, for example, Japanese, Javanese or Korean, that can be properly described from a strictly linguistic point of view without an analysis of social deixis. The neglect of the subject as a whole is no doubt simply due to the disproportionate amount of recent linguistic work that has been done on English or closely related languages.

2.3 Conclusions

This Chapter has been very largely concerned, first, with the presentation of some useful analytical distinctions, and, secondly, with a review of some of the many intricacies of deixis in familiar and less familiar languages. The lack of theoretical discussion reflects the present state of our understanding: we have, on the one hand, only the rather simple philosophical approaches to indexicals (covering just some aspects of person, time and place deixis), and, on the other hand, a mass of complicated linguistic facts, to which some preliminary order has been brought by the work of Fillmore and Lyons in particular.

A central question that remains, though, is whether the study of deixis belongs to semantics or to pragmatics. However, even if linguists could all agree on how the pragmatics/semantics boundary should be drawn, there would be no simple answer to this question. Montague (1974) held that the study of any language containing indexicals was, *eo ipso*, pragmatics. But this has the consequence, as we noted, that natural languages will only have a syntax and a pragmatics, and no semantics. So if the semantics/pragmatics distinction is to do any work at all, we can try and shift the study of indexicals into semantics. And since at least some aspects of deixis make a difference to truth conditions, we may hope that this shift will coincide with the decision to restrict semantics to the truth-conditional aspects of meaning.

However, we shall be disappointed, for there are aspects of deixis that are clearly not truth-conditional. The semantics/pragmatics border will then cut across what is, from the point of view adopted in section 2.2, a unified linguistic field. But if we proceed to draw the line, where exactly will it fall? As we saw in section 2.1, we cannot state the truth conditions of sentences with indexicals without reference to the deictic function of indexicals; but if we allow truth conditions to be relativized to speakers, addressees, times, places,

Deixis

2.2 Descriptive approaches

segmental phonology (in e.g. Basque; Corum, 1975: 96), in prosodies (in e.g. Tzeltal honorific falsetto; Brown & Levinson, 1978: 272), and in many cases a mixture of these (in e.g. Javanese, Japanese, Madurese, Korean). Similarly, bystander honorifics are encoded in Dyirbal and Guugu Yimidjirr by an entirely distinct vocabulary as we noted (Dixon, 1972: 12ff; Haviland, 1979), and in other languages by particles and morphology. Formality levels are encoded morphologically in Japanese, but in Tamil by differences across all the levels of the grammar, including phonology, morphology, syntax and lexicon. Cases like the latter are usually termed **diglossic variants** (Ferguson, 1964), although not everything so called has either the strict co-occurrence rules distinguishing levels or the restrictions in use that formal Tamil has. Some such levels are restricted to the medium, oral or written; but formal Tamil is used in both writing and formal address or speech making.

The linguist interested in delimiting the scope of an overall linguistic theory may be concerned that the description of social deixis will simply merge into sociolinguistics, and on this ground wish to exclude consideration of social deixis from formal descriptions of language altogether. This would be unfortunate. In the first place, as noted in section 1.2, a boundary can be drawn between deictic issues and wider sociolinguistic ones. For social deixis is concerned with the grammaticalization, or encoding in language structure, of social information, while sociolinguistics is also, and perhaps primarily, concerned with issues of language usage. Despite the fact that certain approaches seem to conflate the meaning and the use of social-deictic items (see e.g. Ervin-Tripp, 1972), the possibility of regular ironic usages of, for example, honorifics to children, argues for the existence of prior and well-established meanings independent of rules of usage. Social deixis is thus concerned with the meaning and grammar (e.g. the problems of honorific concord) of certain linguistic expressions, while sociolinguistics is also concerned, *inter alia*, with how these items are actually used in concrete social contexts classified with reference to the parameters of the relevant social system (Levinson, 1979b). Thus, social deixis can be systematically restricted to the study of facts that lie firmly within the scope of structural studies of linguistic systems, leaving the study of usage to another domain.

A second reason why grammarians should not simply ignore social

2.3 Conclusions

indicated objects, etc., then it looks as if many aspects of deixis can be accommodated within truth-conditional semantics. It is a version of truth-conditional semantics, though, in which not sentences, but only utterances in context, can be assigned the propositions they express. Without such a move, the current attempts to define the notion of logical consequence more or less directly on fragments of natural language (as initiated by Montague, 1974) would make little sense as a general semantic programme.

There are, though, many obstacles to the accommodation of deixis within semantics by simply providing a list of indices or contextual points of reference relative to which truth conditions can be stated. For example, no attempt has been made to deal with the distinctions between gestural, non-gestural, and the various non-deictic usages of deictic words. For gestural usages, we seem to need, not just a list of abstract co-ordinates, but a complete monitoring of the physical properties of the speech event. For example, it will be insufficient to have merely a single deictic index for time of utterance, yet how many time indices we need seems to depend on the utterance itself:

(100) Don't shoot now, but now, now and now!

The possibility of an indefinitely long list of necessary indices or co-ordinates thus has to be faced. In answer to this, Crosswell (1973: 111 ff) produces, by a technical sleight of hand, a formulation which avoids specifying the necessary indices in advance. But this hardly solves the problem of knowing how to obtain the relevant indices just when we need them. A second problem is that utterances like

(101) Harry can only speak this loud

are *token-reflexive* to the physical properties of the utterance itself, so that not only do the enormous technical problems of dealing with token-reflexives in a logical manner have to be solved, but all the physical properties of an utterance will also have to be available as indices (requiring, again, an indefinite number of indices). These problems alone would not make the prospects for the straightforward treatment of deictic sentences within truth-conditional semantics look very hopeful. It may be more helpful to admit that what we are dealing with here are very complex pragmatic ways in which a sentence and a context of utterance interact to pick out a proposition, by reference to the audio-visual monitoring of the speech event as it unfolds.

truth-conditional treatment (Grice, 1975; Wilson, 1975; Levinson, 1979b). What they seem to do is indicate, often in very complex ways, just how the utterance that contains them is a response to, or a continuation of, some portion of the prior discourse. We still await proper studies of these terms, but one kind of approach will be sketched in the next Chapter under the rubric of **conventional implicature**, another will be indicated in Chapter 6 in discussion of the conversational uses of *well* (see Owen, 1981), and a third may be found in Smith & Wilson (1979: 180), elaborated in Brockway (1981).

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It is also well known that languages like Japanese and Tagalog have **topic markers** distinct from case markers. Thus the Japanese sentence

(97) ano-hon-tsu John-ga kat-ta
That book-topic John-subject bought

means roughly 'as for that book (or, talking of that book), John bought it', where *su* marks the topic, *ga* the grammatical subject (where topic and subject are identical, only *su* is used; Gundel, 1977: 17). In some languages the grammatical encoding of topic is so prominent, that it is not clear that the notion of subject has the same purchase as it does in the analysis, for example, of Indo-European languages (Li & Thompson, 1976). A great deal of the discussion of such topic markers has been concerned with the sentence-internal organization of information as **given** (or the topic) vs. **new** (or comment about the topic – see Gundel, 1977 for a review). But it is clear that a major function of topic marking is precisely to relate the marked utterance to some specific topic raised in the prior discourse, i.e. to perform a discourse-deictic function.

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88

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Studies of actual usage seem to show that items placed in this position really do correlate with discourse topic, or what the participants are talking 'about', although not always in simple ways (Duranti & Ochs, 1979). The issues that surround the topic/comment distinction are at present quite ill understood, and discussion has been confused by terminological chaos (see Gundel, 1977; Lyons, 1977a: 500ff), although the subject is clearly of considerable importance to pragmatic theory.

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89

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46 SURVEY

SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 47

nature of the speech event that determines the interpretation of an utterance as performing a particular speech act. On a wintery day, the speaker reaches for a cup of tea, believing that it has been freshly made, takes a sip, and produces the utterance in [3]. It is likely to be interpreted as a complaint.

[3] This tea is really cold!

Changing the circumstances to a really hot summer's day with the speaker being given a glass of iced tea by the hearer, taking a sip and producing the utterance in [3], it is likely to be interpreted as praise. If the same utterance can be interpreted as two different kinds of speech act, then obviously no simple one utterance to one action correspondence will be possible. It also means that there is more to the interpretation of a speech act than can be found in the utterance alone.

Speech acts

On any occasion, the action performed by producing an utterance will consist of three related acts. There is first a locutionary act, which is the basic act of utterance, or producing a meaningful linguistic expression. If you have difficulty with actually forming the sounds and words to create a meaningful utterance in a language (for example, because it's foreign or you're tongue-tied), then you might fail to produce a locutionary act. Producing 'Aha mokofo' in English will not normally count as a locutionary act, whereas [4] will.

[4] I've just made some coffee.

Mostly we don't just produce well-formed utterances with no purpose. We form an utterance with some kind of function in mind. This is the second dimension, or the illocutionary act. The illocutionary act is performed via the communicative force of an utterance. We might utter [4] to make a statement, an offer, an explanation, or for some other communicative purpose. This is also generally known as the illocutionary force of the utterance.

We do not, of course, simply create an utterance with a function without intending it to have an effect. This is the third dimension, the perlocutionary act. Depending on the circumstances, you

will utter [4] on the assumption that the hearer will recognize the effect you intended (for example, to account for a wonderful smell, or to get the hearer to drink some coffee). This is also generally known as the perlocutionary effect.

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Of these three dimensions, the most discussed is illocutionary force. Indeed, the term 'speech act' is generally interpreted quite narrowly to mean only the illocutionary force of an utterance. The illocutionary force of an utterance is what it 'counts as'. The same locutionary act, as shown in [5a], can count as a prediction [5b], a promise [5c], or a warning [5d]. These different analyses [5b--d.] of the utterance in [5a.] represent different illocutionary forces.

- [5] a. I'll see you later. (= A)
b. [I predict that] A.
c. [I promise you that] A.
d. [I warn you that] A.

One problem with the examples in [5] is that the same utterance can potentially have quite different illocutionary forces (for example, promise versus warning). How can speakers assume that the intended illocutionary force will be recognized by the hearer? That question has been addressed by considering two things: Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices and felicity conditions.

IFIDs

The most obvious device for indicating the illocutionary force (the Illocutionary Force Indicating Device, or IFID) is an expression of the type shown in [6] where there is a slot for a verb that explicitly names the illocutionary act being performed. Such a verb can be called a performative verb (Vp).

[6] I (Vp) you that ...

In the preceding examples, [5c,d.], 'promise' and 'warn' would be the performative verbs and, if stated, would be very clear IFIDs. Speakers do not always 'perform' their speech acts so explicitly, but they sometimes describe the speech act being performed. Imagine the telephone conversation in [7], between a man trying to contact Mary, and Mary's friend.

SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 49

- [12] a. The work was done by Elaine and myself.
 b. I hereby tell you that the work was done by Elaine and myself.

Examples like [11b.] and [12b.] (normally without 'hereby'), are used by speakers as **explicit performatives**. Examples like [11a.] and [12a.] are **implicit performatives**, sometimes called **primary performatives**.

The advantage of this type of analysis is that it makes clear just what elements are involved in the production and interpretation of utterances. In syntax, a reflexive pronoun (like 'myself' in [12]) requires the occurrence of an antecedent (in this case 'I') within the same sentence structure. The explicit performative in [12b.] provides the 'I' element. Similarly, when you say to someone, 'Do it yourself!', the reflexive in 'yourself' is made possible by the antecedent 'you' in the explicit version ('I order you that you do it yourself'). Another advantage is to show that some adverbs such as 'honestly', or adverbial clauses such as 'because I may be late', as shown in [13], naturally attach to the explicit performative clause rather than the implicit version.

- [13] a. Honestly, he's a scoundrel.
 b. What time is it, because I may be late?

In [13a.], it is the telling part (the performative verb) that is being done 'honestly' and, in [13b.], it is the act of asking (the performative again) that is being justified by the 'because I may be late' clause.

There are some technical disadvantages to the performative hypothesis. For example, uttering the explicit performative version of a command [11b.] has a much more serious impact than uttering the implicit version [11a.]. The two versions are consequently not equivalent. It is also difficult to know exactly what the performative verb (or verbs) might be for some utterances. Although the speaker and hearer might recognize the utterance in [14a.] as an insult, it would be very strange to have [14b.] as an explicit version.

- [14] a. You're dumber than a rock.
 b. ? I hereby insult you that you're dumber than a rock.

The really practical problem with any analysis based on identifying the performative verb is that it is not clear what the performative verb is.

ifying explicit performatives is that, in principle, we simply do not know how many performative verbs there are in any language. Instead of trying to list all the possible explicit performatives, and then distinguish among all of them, some more general classifications of types of speech acts are usually used.

Speech act classification

One general classification system lists five types of general functions performed by speech acts: declarations, representatives, expressives, directives, and commissives.

Declarations are those kinds of speech acts that change the world via their utterance. As the examples in [15] illustrate, the speaker has to have a special institutional role, in a specific context, in order to perform a declaration appropriately.

- [15] a. Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife.
 b. Referee: You're out!
 c. Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty.

In using a declaration, the speaker changes the world via words.

Representatives are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker believes to be the case or not. Statements of fact, assertions, conclusions, and descriptions, as illustrated in [16], are all examples of the speaker representing the world as he or she believes it is.

- [16] a. The earth is flat.
 b. Chomsky didn't write about peanuts.
 c. It was a warm sunny day.

In using a representative, the speaker makes words fit the world (of belief).

Expressives are those kinds of speech acts that state what the speaker feels. They express psychological states and can be statements of pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, or sorrow. As illustrated in [17], they can be caused by something the speaker does or the hearer does, but they are about the speaker's experience.

- [17] a. I'm really sorry!
 b. Congratulations!
 c. Oh, yes, great, mmmm, ssahh!

DECLARATIVE is used to announce a change in the world via words. It is used by a speaker in a specific context. See also [11b.] and [12b.]

SPEECH ACTS AND EVENTS 53

REPRESENTATIVE is used to state what the speaker believes to be the case or not. It is used by a speaker in a specific context. See also [16].

EXPRESSIVE is used to state what the speaker feels. It is used by a speaker in a specific context. See also [17].

DIRECTIVE is used to make the hearer do something. It is used by a speaker in a specific context. See also [11a.] and [11b.]

In using an expressive, the speaker makes words fit the world (of feeling).

Directives are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to get someone else to do something. They express what the speaker wants. They are commands, orders, requests, suggestions, and, as illustrated in [18], they can be positive or negative.

- [18] a. Gimme a cup of coffee. Make it black.
 b. Could you lend me a pen, please?
 c. Don't touch that.

In using a directive, the speaker attempts to make the world fit the words (via the hearer).

Commissives are those kinds of speech acts that speakers use to commit themselves to some future action. They express what the speaker intends. They are promises, threats, refusals, pledges, and, as shown in [19], they can be performed by the speaker alone, or by the speaker as a member of a group.

- [19] a. I'll be back.
 b. I'm going to get it right next time.
 c. We will not do that.

In using a commissive, the speaker undertakes to make the world fit the words (via the speaker).

These five general functions of speech acts, with their key features, are summarized in Table 6.1.

Direct and indirect speech acts

A different approach to distinguishing types of speech acts can be made on the basis of structure. A fairly simple structural distinction between three general types of speech acts is provided, in English, by the three basic sentence types. As shown in [20], there is an easily recognized relationship between the three structural forms (declarative, interrogative, imperative) and the three general communicative functions (statement, question, command/request).

- [20] a. You wear a seat belt. (declarative)
 b. Do you wear a seat belt? (interrogative)
 c. Wear a seat belt! (imperative)

Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a

Speech act type	Direction of fit	S = speaker; X = situation
Declarations	words change the world	S causes X
Representatives	make words fit the world	S believes X
Expressives	make words fit the world	S feels X
Directives	make the world fit words	S wants X
Commissives	make the world fit words	S intends X

TABLE 6.1 The five general functions of speech acts (following Searle 1979)

function, we have a **direct speech act**. Whenever there is an indirect relationship between a structure and a function, we have an **indirect speech act**. Thus, a declarative used to make a statement is a direct speech act, but a declarative used to make a request is an indirect speech act. As illustrated in [21], the utterance in [21a.] is a declarative. When it is used to make a statement, as paraphrased in [21b.], it is functioning as a direct speech act. When it is used to make a command/request, as paraphrased in [21c.], it is functioning as an indirect speech act.

- [21] a. It's cold outside.
 b. I hereby tell you about the weather.
 c. I hereby request of you that you close the door.

Different structures can be used to accomplish the same basic function, as in [22], where the speaker wants the addressee not to stand in front of the TV. The basic function of all the utterances in [22] is a command/request, but only the imperative structure in [22a.] represents a direct speech act. The interrogative structure in [22b.] is not being used only as a question, hence it is an indirect speech act. The declarative structures in [22c.] and [22d.] are also indirect requests.

- [22] a. Move out of the way!
 b. Do you have to stand in front of the TV?
 c. You're standing in front of the TV.
 d. You'd make a better door than a window.

One of the most common types of indirect speech act in English, as shown in [23], has the form of an interrogative, but is

indicate 'away from speaker', but, in some languages, can be used to distinguish between 'near addressee' and 'away from both speaker and addressee'. Thus, in Japanese, the translation of the pronoun 'that' will distinguish between 'that near addressee' 'sore' and 'that distant from both speaker and addressee' 'are' with a third term being used for the proximal 'this near speaker' 'kore'.

Person deixis

The distinction just described involves person deixis, with the speaker ('I') and the addressee ('you') mentioned. The simplicity of these forms disguises the complexity of their use. To learn these deictic expressions, we have to discover that each person in a conversation shifts from being 'I' to being 'you' constantly. All young children go through a stage in their learning where this distinction seems problematic and they say things like 'Read you a story' (instead of 'me') when handing over a favorite book.

Person deixis clearly operates on a basic three-part division, exemplified by the pronouns for first person ('I'), second person ('you'), and third person ('he', 'she', or 'it'). In many languages these deictic categories of speaker, addressee, and other(s) are elaborated with markers of relative social status (for example, addressee with higher status versus addressee with lower status). Expressions which indicate higher status are described as **honorifics**. The discussion of the circumstances which lead to the choice of one of these forms rather than another is sometimes described as **social deixis**.

A fairly well-known example of a social contrast encoded within person deixis is the distinction between forms used for a familiar versus a non-familiar addressee in some languages. This is known as the **TV distinction**, from the French forms 'tu' (familiar) and 'vous' (non-familiar), and is found in many languages including German ('du/Sie') and Spanish ('tú/Usted'). The choice of one form will certainly communicate something (not directly said) about the speaker's view of his or her relationship with the addressee. In those social contexts where individuals typically mark distinctions between the social status of the speaker and addressee, the higher, older, and more powerful speaker will tend

to use the 'tu' version to a lower, younger, and less powerful addressee, and be addressed by the 'vous' form in return. When social change is taking place, as for example in modern Spain, where a young businesswoman (higher economic status) is talking to her older cleaning lady (lower economic status), how do they address each other? I am told that the age distinction remains more powerful than the economic distinction and the older woman uses 'tú' and the younger uses 'Usted'.

The Spanish non-familiar version ('Usted') is historically related to a form which was used to refer to neither first person (speaker) nor second person (addressee), but to third person (some other). In deictic terms, third person is not a direct participant in basic (I-you) interaction and, being an outsider, is necessarily more distant. Third person pronouns are consequently distal forms in terms of person deixis. Using a third person form, where a second person form would be possible, is one way of communicating distance (and non-familiarity). This can be done in English for an ironic or humorous purpose as when one person, who's very busy in the kitchen, addresses another, who's being very lazy, as in [2].

[2] Would his highness like some coffee?

The distance associated with third person forms is also used to make potential accusations (for example, 'you didn't clean up') less direct, as in [3a.], or to make a potentially personal issue seem like an impersonal one, based on a general rule, as in [3b.].

[3] a. Somebody didn't clean up after himself.

b. Each person has to clean up after him or herself.

Of course, the speaker can state such general 'rules' as applying to the speaker plus other(s), by using the first person plural ('we'), as in [4].

[4] We clean up after ourselves around here.

There is, in English, a potential ambiguity in such uses which allows two different interpretations. There is an **exclusive 'we'** (speaker plus other(s), excluding addressee) and an **inclusive 'we'** (speaker and addressee included). Some languages grammaticize this distinction (for example, Fijian has 'keimani' for exclusive first person plural and 'keda' for inclusive first person plural).

1

Definitions and background


Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader). It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. *Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning.*

This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speakers organize what they want to say in accordance with who they're talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances. *Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning.*

This approach also necessarily explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker's intended meaning. This type of study explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part of what is communicated. We might say that it is the investigation of invisible meaning. *Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said.*

This perspective then raises the question of what determines the choice between the said and the unsaid. The basic answer is tied to the notion of distance. Closeness, whether it is physical, social, or conceptual, implies shared experience. On the assumption of how close or distant the listener is, speakers determine how much needs to be said. *Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance.*

These are the four areas that pragmatics is concerned with. To understand how it got to be that way, we have to briefly review its relationship with other areas of linguistic analysis.



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Joan Cutting



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16 INTRODUCTION

A

A3.3 **Speech acts**

Austin (1962) defined speech acts as the actions performed in saying something. **Speech act theory** said that the action performed when an utterance is produced can be analysed on three different levels. Let us look at the action in the conversation below. Three students are sitting together at the 'bun lunch', the social occasion at which the university lays on filled rolls and fruit juice on the first day of the course, to welcome the students and help them to get to know each other.

MM I think I might go and have another bun.
AM I was going to get another one.
BM Could you get me a tuna and sweetcorn one please?
AM Me as well?

(Students at bun lunch 1996)

The first level of analysis is the words themselves: 'I think I might go and have another bun', 'I was going to get another one', and so on. This is the **locution**, 'what is said', the form of the words uttered; the act of saying something is known as the **locutionary act**. The second level is what the speakers are doing with their words: AM and MM are 'asserting' and 'expressing intentions about their own action', and BM and AM are 'requesting action on the part of the hearer'. This is the **illocutionary force**, 'what is done in uttering the words', the function of the words, the specific purpose that the speakers have in mind. Other examples are the speech acts 'inviting', 'advising', 'promising', 'ordering', 'excusing' and 'apologising'. The last level of analysis is the result of the words: MM gets up and brings AM and BM a tuna and sweetcorn bun each. This is known as the **perlocutionary effect**, 'what is done by uttering the words'; it is the effect on the hearer, the hearer's reaction.

Austin developed, but soon abandoned, the **performative hypothesis** that behind every utterance there is a **performative verb**, such as 'to order', 'to warn', 'to admit' and 'to promise' that make the illocutionary force explicit. The example above could be reformulated:

MM I express my intention to go and have another bun.
AM I inform you that I was going to get another one.
BM I request you to get me a tuna and sweetcorn one.
AM I request you to get me one as well.

Austin realised that often the implicit performatives, ones without the performative verbs, as in the original version of this dialogue, sound more natural. He also realised that implicit performatives do not always have an obvious explicit performative understood. Take the expression, 'I'll be back!' It can mean either 'I promise that I'll be back' or 'I warn you that I'll be back.' Searle's (1976) solution to classifying speech acts was to group them in the following macro-classes:

Declarations
These are words and expressions that change the world by their very utterance, such as 'I baptise you', 'I declare you bankrupt', 'I pronounce this man to be guilty.'

SPEECH ACTS

17 **A**

which changes a nameless baby into one with a name, 'I hereby pronounce you man and wife', which turns two singles into a married couple, and 'This court sentences you to ten years' imprisonment, which puts the person into prison.

Representatives
These are acts in which the words state what the speaker believes to be the case, such as 'describing', 'claiming', 'hypothesising', 'insisting' and 'predicting'.

The fact that girls have been outstripping boys academically has been acknowledged for the past 12 years or so (Glasgow Herald: 28 November 2000)

I came; I saw; I conquered (Julius Caesar)

Macbeth shall never vanquished be until / Great Birnam wood to high Dunsinane hill / Shall come against him (Shakespeare: Macbeth)

Commissives
This includes acts in which the words commit the speaker to future action, such as 'promising', 'offering', 'threatening', 'refusing', 'vowing' and 'volunteering'.

'Ready when you are.'
'I'll make him an offer he can't refuse' (Mario Puzo, The Godfather)

I'll love you, dear, I'll love you / Till China and Africa meet, / And the river jumps over the mountain / And the salmon sing in the street (Auden)

Directives
This category covers acts in which the words are aimed at making the hearer do something, such as 'commanding', 'requesting', 'inviting', 'forbidding', 'suggesting' and so on.

From ghoules and ghosties and long-leggity beasties / And things that go bump in the night, / Good Lord, deliver us. (Scottish prayer)

Better remain silent and be thought a fool, than open your mouth and remove all possible doubt. (Ancient Chinese proverb)

Do not do unto others as you would they should do unto you. Their tastes may not be the same (Shaw)

Expressives
This last group includes acts in which the words state what the speaker feels, such as 'apologising', 'praising', 'congratulating', 'deploring' and 'regretting'.

A woman without a man is like a fish without a bicycle. (Steinem)

I've been poor and I've been rich – rich is better. (Tucker)

If I'd known I was gonna live this long, I'd have taken better care of myself. (Blake)

Analyzing meaning

An introduction to semantics and
pragmatics

Paul R. Kroeger

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Humpty Dumpty's claim to be the "master" of his words — to be able to use words with whatever meaning he chooses to assign them — is funny because it is absurd. If people really talked that way, communication would be impossible. Perhaps the most important fact about word meanings is that they must be shared by the speech community: speakers of a given language must agree, at least most of the time, about what each word means.

Yet, while it is true that words must have agreed-upon meanings, Twain's remark illustrates how word meanings can be stretched or extended in various novel ways, without loss of comprehension on the part of the hearer. The contrast between Mark Twain's successful communication and Humpty Dumpty's failure to communicate suggests that the conventions for extending meanings must also be shared by the speech community. In other words, there seem to be rules even for bending the rules. In this book we will be interested both in the rules for "normal" communication, and in the rules for bending the rules.

The term SEMANTICS is often defined as the study of meaning. It might be more accurate to define it as the study of the relationship between linguistic form and meaning. This relationship is clearly rule-governed, just as other aspects of linguistic structure are. For example, no one believes that speakers memorize every possible sentence of a language; this cannot be the case, because new and unique sentences are produced every day, and are understood by people hearing them for the first time. Rather, language learners acquire a vocabulary (lexicon), together with a set of rules for combining vocabulary items into well-formed sentences (syntax). The same logic forces us to recognize that language learners must acquire not only the meanings of vocabulary items, but also a set of rules for interpreting the expressions that are formed when vocabulary items are combined. All of these components must be shared by the speech community in order for linguistic communication to be possible. When we study semantics, we are trying to understand this shared system of rules that allows hearers to correctly interpret what speakers intend to communicate.

The study of meaning in human language is often partitioned into two major divisions, and in this context the term SEMANTICS is used to refer to one of these divisions. In this narrower sense, semantics is concerned with the inherent meaning of words and sentences as linguistic expressions, in and of themselves, while PRAGMATICS is concerned with those aspects of meaning that depend on or derive from the way in which the words and sentences are used. In the above-mentioned quote attributed to Mark Twain, the basic or "default" meaning of *good* (the sense most likely to be listed in a dictionary) would be its semantic content. The negative meaning which Twain manages to convey is the result of pragmatic inferences triggered by the peculiar way in which he uses the word.



An Introduction to English Semantics and Pragmatics

Patrick Griffiths

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1 Studying meaning

Overview

This is a book about how English enables people who know the language to convey meanings. Semantics and pragmatics are the two main branches of the linguistic study of meaning. Both are named in the title of the book and they are going to be introduced here. **Semantics** is the study of the “toolkit” for meaning: knowledge encoded in the vocabulary of the language and in its patterns for building more elaborate meanings, up to the level of sentence meanings. **Pragmatics** is concerned with the use of these tools in meaningful communication. Pragmatics is about the interaction of semantic knowledge with our knowledge of the world, taking into account contexts of use.

Bold print for explanations of terms

In the index at the back of the book, bold printed page numbers indicate places where technical terms, such as **semantics** and **pragmatics** in the paragraph above, are explained. The point is to signal such explanations and to make it fairly easy to find them later, should you want to.

Example (1.1) is going to be used in an initial illustration of the difference between semantics and pragmatics, and to introduce some more terms needed for describing and discussing meanings.

(1.1) Hold out your arm. That’s it.

Language is for communicating about the world outside of language. English language expressions like *arm* and *your arm* and *bold out* are linked to things, activities and so on. A general-purpose technical term that will appear fairly often in the book is **denote**. It labels the connections between meaningful items of language and aspects of the world – real or imagined – that language users talk and write about. *Hold out your arm*

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UNIT 2 SENTENCES, UTTERANCES AND PROPOSITIONS

Introduction	This unit introduces some basic notions in semantics. It is important that you master these notions from the outset as they will keep recurring throughout the course.
Instruction	Read the following out loud: <i>Virtue is its own reward</i> Now read it out loud again.
Comment	The same sentence was involved in the two readings, but you made two different utterances, i.e. two unique physical events took place.
Definition	An UTTERANCE is any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after which there is silence on the part of that person. An utterance is the USE by a particular speaker, on a particular occasion, of a piece of language, such as a sequence of sentences, or a single phrase, or even a single word.
Practice	Now decide whether the following could represent utterances. Indicate your answer by circling <i>Yes</i> or <i>No</i> . (1) "Hello" Yes / No (2) "Not much" Yes / No (3) "Utterances may consist of a single word, a single phrase or a single sentence. They may also consist of a sequence of sentences. It is not unusual to find utterances that consist of one or more grammatically incomplete sentence-fragments. In short, there is no simple relation of correspondence between utterances and sentences" Yes / No (4) "Pxgotmg!" Yes / No (5) "Schplotzenpflaasaaraagh!" Yes / No
Feedback	(1) Yes (2) Yes (3) Yes, even though it would be a bit of a mouthful to say in one utterance (i.e. without pauses). (4) No, this string of sounds is not from any language. (5) No, for the same reason.
Comment	Utterances are physical events. Events are ephemeral. Utterances die on the wind. Linguistics deals with spoken language and we will have a lot

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the term *Ex post facto research* for descriptive research studies. The main characteristic of this method is that the researcher has no control over the variables; he can only report what has happened or what is happening. Most *ex post facto research* projects are used for descriptive studies in which the researcher seeks to measure such items as, for example, frequency of shopping, preferences of people, or similar data. *Ex post facto studies* also include attempts by researchers to discover causes even when they cannot control the variables. The methods of research utilized in descriptive research are survey methods of all kinds, including comparative and correlational methods. In *analytical research*, on the other hand, the researcher has to use facts or information already available, and analyze these to make a critical evaluation of the material.

- (ii) *Applied vs. Fundamental*: Research can either be applied (or action) research or fundamental (to basic or pure) research. *Applied research* aims at finding a solution for an immediate problem facing a society or an industrial/business organisation, whereas *fundamental research* is mainly concerned with generalisations and with the formulation of a theory. "Gathering knowledge for knowledge's sake is termed 'pure' or 'basic' research."⁴ Research concerning some natural phenomenon or relating to pure mathematics are examples of fundamental research. Similarly, research studies, concerning human behaviour carried on with a view to make generalisations about human behaviour, are also examples of fundamental research, but research aimed at certain conclusions (say, a solution) facing a concrete social or business problem is an example of applied research. Research to identify social, economic or political trends that may affect a particular institution or the copy research (research to find out whether certain communications will be read and understood) or the marketing research or evaluation research are examples of applied research. Thus, the central aim of applied research is to discover a solution for some pressing practical problem, whereas basic research is directed towards finding information that has a broad base of applications and thus, adds to the already existing organized body of scientific knowledge.
- (iii) *Quantitative vs. Qualitative*: Quantitative research is based on the measurement of quantity or amount. It is applicable to phenomena that can be expressed in terms of quantity. Qualitative research, on the other hand, is concerned with qualitative phenomenon, i.e., phenomena relating to or involving quality or kind. For instance, when we are interested in investigating the reasons for human behaviour (i.e., why people think or do certain things), we quite often talk of 'Motivation Research', an important type of qualitative research. This type of research aims at discovering the underlying motives and desires, using in depth interviews for the purpose. Other techniques of such research are word association tests, sentence completion tests, story completion tests and similar other projective techniques. Attitude or opinion research i.e., research designed to find out how people feel or what they think about a particular subject or institution is also qualitative research. Qualitative research is specially important in the behavioural sciences where the aim is to discover the underlying motives of human behaviour. Through such research we can analyse the various factors which motivate people to behave in a particular manner or which make people like or dislike a particular thing. It may be stated, however, that to apply qualitative research in

⁴Pauline V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*, p. 30.


Methods of Data Collection

The task of data collection begins after a research problem has been defined and research design/plan chalked out. While deciding about the method of data collection to be used for the study, the researcher should keep in mind two types of data viz., primary and secondary. The *primary data* are those which are collected afresh and for the first time, and thus happen to be original in character. The *secondary data*, on the other hand, are those which have already been collected by someone else and which have already been passed through the statistical process. The researcher would have to decide which sort of data he would be using (thus collecting) for his study and accordingly he will have to select one or the other method of data collection. The methods of collecting primary and secondary data differ since primary data are to be originally collected, while in case of secondary data the nature of data collection work is merely that of compilation. We describe the different methods of data collection, with the pros and cons of each method.

COLLECTION OF PRIMARY DATA

We collect primary data during the course of doing experiments in an experimental research but in case we do research of the descriptive type and perform surveys, whether sample surveys or census surveys, then we can obtain primary data either through observation or through direct communication with respondents in one form or another or through personal interviews.⁵ This, in other words, means

⁵An experiment refers to an investigation in which a factor or variable under test is isolated and its effect(s) measured. In an experiment the investigator measures the effects of an experiment which he conducts intentionally. Survey refers to the method of securing information concerning a phenomena under study from all or a selected number of respondents of the concerned universe. In a survey, the investigator examines those phenomena which exist in the universe independent of his action. The difference between an experiment and a survey can be depicted as under:



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As [Table 4.1](#), we turn to the components of designing the research proposal. [Appendix 4](#) through [Appendix 10](#) address steps in this process.

Chapter 5. The Introduction

It is important to properly introduce a research study. We provide a model for writing a good scholarly introduction to your proposal. The chapter begins with designing an abstract for a study. This is followed by developing an introduction to include identifying the research problem or issue, framing this problem within the existing literature, pointing out deficiencies in the literature, and targeting the study for an audience. This chapter provides a systematic method for designing a scholarly introduction to a proposal or study.

Chapter 6. The Purpose Statement

At the beginning of research proposals or projects, authors mention the central purpose or intent of the study. This passage is the most important statement in the entire research process, and an entire chapter is devoted to this topic. In this chapter, you learn how to write this statement for quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods studies, and you will be provided with scripts that help you design and write these statements.

Chapter 7. Research Questions and Hypotheses


The questions and hypotheses addressed by the researcher serve to narrow and focus the purpose of the study. As a major signpost in a project, the set of research questions and hypotheses needs to be written carefully. In this chapter, you will learn how to write both qualitative and quantitative research questions and hypotheses, as well as how to employ both forms in writing mixed methods questions and hypotheses. Numerous examples serve as scripts to illustrate these processes.

Chapter 8. Quantitative Methods

Quantitative methods involve the processes of collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and writing the results of a study. Specific methods exist in both survey and experimental research that relate to identifying a sample and population, specifying the type of design, collecting and analyzing data, presenting the results, making an interpretation, and writing the research in a manner consistent with a survey or experimental study. In this chapter, the reader learns the specific procedures for designing survey or experimental methods that need to go into a research proposal. Checklists provided in the chapter help to ensure that all steps are included.

Chapter 9. Qualitative Methods

Qualitative approaches to data collection, analysis, interpretation, and report writing differ from the traditional, quantitative approaches. Purposeful sampling, collection of open-ended data, analysis of text or images (e.g., pictures), representation of information in figures and tables, and personal interpretation of the findings all inform qualitative methods. This chapter advances steps in designing qualitative procedures into a research proposal, and it also includes a checklist for making sure that you cover important procedures. Ample



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- How will the results be reported?
- What will the gatekeeper gain from the study?

• Comment about sensitive ethical issues that may arise [see Chapter 3, and Berg, 2001]. For each issue raised, discuss how the research study will address it. For example, when studying a sensitive topic, it is necessary to mask names of people, places, and activities. In this situation, the process for masking information requires discussion in the proposal.

DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES

Comments about the role of the researcher set the stage for discussion of issues involved in collecting data. The data collection steps include setting the boundaries for the study, collecting information through unstructured or semistructured observations and interviews, documents, and visual materials, as well as establishing the protocol for recording information.

• Identify the purposefully selected sites or individuals for the proposed study. The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants or sites (or documents or visual material) that will best help the researcher understand the problem and the research question. This does not necessarily suggest random sampling or selection of a large number of participants and sites, as typically found in quantitative research. A discussion about participants and site might include four aspects identified by Miles and Huberman (1994): the setting (where the research will take place), the actors (who will be observed or interviewed), the events (what the actors will be observed or interviewed doing), and the process (the evolving nature of events undertaken by the actors within the setting).

• Indicate the type or types of data to be collected. In many qualitative studies, inquirers collect multiple forms of data and spend a considerable time in the natural setting gathering information. The collection procedures in qualitative research involve four basic types, as shown in Table 9.2.

Table 9.2 Qualitative Data Collection Types, Options, Advantages, and Limitations

Data Collection Types	Options Within the Type	Advantages of the Type	Limitations of the Type
Observations	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Complete participant—researcher conceals role• Observer as participant—role of researcher is known• Participant as observer—observation role secondary to participant role• Complete observer—researcher observes without participating	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Researcher has a firsthand experience with participant.• Researcher can record information as it occurs.• Unusual aspects can be noticed during observation.• Useful in exploring topics that may be uncomfortable for participants to discuss.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Researcher may be seen as intrusive.• Private information may be observed that researcher cannot report• Researcher may not have good attending and observing skills.• Certain participants (e.g., children) may present special problems in getting rapport.

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Qualitative Data Analysis

Second Edition

Matthew B. Miles
A. Michael Huberman


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The influence of the researcher's *values* is not minor (e.g., what one thinks about the fairness of arrests).

To put it another way, qualitative data are not so much about "behavior" as they are about *actions* (which carry with them intentions and meanings and lead to consequences). Some actions are relatively straightforward; others involve "impression management"—how people want others, including the researcher, to see them.

Furthermore, those actions always occur in specific situations within a social and historical context, which deeply influences how they are interpreted by both insiders and the researcher as outsider.

Thus the apparent simplicity of qualitative "data" masks a good deal of complexity, requiring plenty of care and self-awareness on the part of the researcher.

Strengths of Qualitative Data

What is important about well-collected qualitative data? One major feature is that they focus on *naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings*, so that we have a strong handle on what "real life" is like.

That confidence is buttressed by *local groundedness*, the fact that the data were collected in close proximity to a specific situation, rather than through the mail or over the phone. The emphasis is on a specific *case*, a focused and bounded phenomenon embedded in its context. The influences of the local context are not stripped away, but are taken into account. The possibility for understanding latent, underlying, or nonobvious issues is strong.

Another feature of qualitative data is their *richness and holism*, with strong potential for revealing complexity; such data provide "thick descriptions" that are vivid, nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth that has strong impact on the reader.

Furthermore, the fact that such data are typically collected over a *sustained period* makes them powerful for studying any process (including history); we can go far beyond "snapshots" of "what?" or "how many?" to just how and why things happen as they do—and even *assess causality* as it actually plays out in a particular setting. And the inherent *flexibility* of qualitative studies (data collection times and methods can be varied as a study proceeds) gives further confidence that we've really understood what has been going on.

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Qualitative data, with their emphasis on people's "lived experience," are fundamentally well suited for locating the *meanings* people place on the events, processes, and structures of their lives: their "perceptions, assumptions, pre-judgments, presuppositions" (van Manen, 1977) and for connecting these meanings to the *social world* around them.

We make three other claims for the power of qualitative data, to which we return during later chapters. They often

Figure 1.3
Components of Data Analysis: Flow Model



have been advocated as the best strategy for discovery, exploring a new area, *developing hypotheses*. In addition we underline their strong potential for *testing hypotheses*, seeing whether specific predictions hold up. Finally, qualitative data are useful when one needs to supplement, validate, explain, illuminate, or reinterpret *quantitative* data gathered from the same setting.

The strengths of qualitative data rest very centrally on the competence with which their analysis is carried out. What do we mean by analysis?

F. Our View of Qualitative Analysis

Our general view of qualitative analysis is outlined in Figure 1.3. We define *analysis* as consisting of three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification. We explore each of these themes in more depth as we proceed through the book. For now, we make only some overall comments.

Data Reduction

Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions. As we see it, data reduction occurs continuously throughout the life of any qualitatively oriented project. Even before the data are actually collected (see Figure 1.1), anticipatory data reduction is occurring as the researcher decides (often without full awareness) which conceptual framework,

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Data reduction refers to the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions. As we see it, data reduction occurs continuously throughout the life of any qualitatively oriented project. Even before the data are actually collected (see Figure 1.1), anticipatory data reduction is occurring as the researcher decides (often without full awareness) which conceptual framework, which cases, which research questions, and which data collection approaches to choose. As data collection proceeds, further episodes of data reduction occur (writing summaries, coding, teasing out themes, making clusters, making partitions, writing memos). The data reduction/transforming process continues after fieldwork, until a final report is completed.

Data reduction is not something separate from analysis. It is *part* of analysis. The researcher's decisions—which data chunks to code and which to pull out, which patterns best summarize a number of chunks, which evolving story to tell—are *all analytic choices*. Data reduction is a form of analysis that sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that "final" conclusions can be

analysis. The displays discussed in this book include many types of matrices, graphs, charts, and networks. All are designed to assemble organized information into an immediately accessible, compact form so that the analyst can see what is happening and either draw justified conclusions or move on to the next step of analysis the display suggests may be useful.

of analysis that sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and organizes data in such a way that "final" conclusions can be drawn and verified. As Tesch (1990), points out, it also can be seen as "data condensation."

By "data reduction" we do not necessarily mean quantification. Qualitative data can be reduced and transformed in many ways: through selection, through summary or paraphrase, through being subsumed in a larger pattern, and so on. Occasionally it may be helpful to convert the data into primitive quantities (e.g., the analyst decides that the case being looked at has a "high" or "moderate" degree of administrative centralization), but this is not always wise. Even when it does look like a good analytical strategy, our advice is to keep the numbers, and the words you used to derive the numbers, together in your ensuing analysis. It is important not to strip the data at hand from the context in which they occur.

Data Display

The second major flow of analysis activity is data display. Generically, a *display* is an organized, compressed assembly of information that permits conclusion drawing and action. In daily life, displays vary from gasoline gauges to newspapers to computer screens to factor analysis printouts. Looking at displays helps us to understand what is happening and to do something—either analyze further or take action—based on that understanding.

The most frequent form of display for qualitative data in the past has been *extended text*. As we note later, text (in the form, say, of 3,600 pages of field notes) is terribly cumbersome. It is dispersed, sequential rather than simultaneous, poorly structured, and extremely bulky. Using only extended text, a researcher may find it easy to jump to hasty, partial, unfounded conclusions. Humans are not very powerful as processors of large amounts of information; our cognitive tendency is to reduce complex information into selective and simplified gestalts or easily understood configurations. Or we drastically overweight vivid information, such as the exciting event that jumps out of page 124 of the field notes after a long, "boring" passage. Pages 109 through 123 may suddenly have been collapsed, and the criteria for weighing and selecting may never be questioned. Extended text can overload humans' information-processing capabilities (Faust, 1982) and preys on their tendencies to find simplifying patterns.

In the course of our work, we have become convinced that better displays are a major avenue to valid qualitative

conclusion drawing. The next step of analysis the display suggests may be useful.

As with data reduction, the creation and use of displays is not separate from analysis, it is a *part* of analysis. Designing a display—deciding on the rows and columns of a matrix for qualitative data and deciding which data, in which form, should be entered in the cells—*is* analytic activities. (Note that designing displays also has clear *data reduction* implications.)

The dictum "You are what you eat" might be transposed to "You know what you display." In this book we advocate more systematic, powerful displays and urge a more inventive, self-conscious, iterative stance toward their generation and use.

Conclusion Drawing and Verification

The third stream of analysis activity is conclusion drawing and verification. From the start of data collection, the qualitative analyst is beginning to decide what things mean—is noting regularities, patterns, explanations, possible configurations, causal flows, and propositions. The competent researcher holds these conclusions lightly, maintaining openness and skepticism, but the conclusions are still there, inchoate and vague at first, then increasingly explicit and grounded, to use the classic term of Glaser and Strauss (1967). "Final" conclusions may not appear until data collection is over, depending on the size of the corpus of field notes; the coding, storage, and retrieval methods used; the sophistication of the researcher; and the demands of the funding agency, but they often have been prefigured from the beginning, even when a researcher claims to have been proceeding "inductively."

Conclusion drawing, in our view, is only half of a Gemini configuration. Conclusions are also *verified* as the analyst proceeds. Verification may be as brief as a fleeting second thought crossing the analyst's mind during writing, with a short excursion back to the field notes, or it may be thorough and elaborate, with lengthy argumentation and review among colleagues to develop "intersubjective consensus," or with extensive efforts to replicate a finding in another data set. The meanings emerging from the data have to be *tested* for their plausibility, their sturdiness, their "confirmability"—that is, their *validity*. Otherwise we are left with interesting stories about what happened, of unknown truth and utility.

We have presented these three streams—data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification—as intertwined before, during, and after data collection in paral-

Figure 1.4
Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model



lel form, to make up the general domain called "analysis." The three streams can also be represented as shown in Figure 1.4. In this view the three types of analysis activity and the activity of data collection itself form an interactive, cyclical process. The researcher steadily moves among these four "nodes" during data collection and then shuttles among reduction, display, and conclusion drawing/verification for the remainder of the study.

The coding of data, for example (*data reduction*), leads to new ideas on what should go into a matrix (*data display*). Entering the data requires further data reduction. As the matrix fills up, preliminary *conclusions* are drawn, but they lead to the decision, for example, to add another column to the matrix to *test* the conclusion.

In this view, qualitative data analysis is a continuous, iterative enterprise. Issues of data reduction, of display, and of conclusion drawing/verification come into figure successively as analysis episodes follow each other. But the other two issues are always part of the ground.

Such a process is actually no more complex, conceptually speaking, than the analysis modes quantitative researchers use. Like their qualitative brethren, they must be preoccupied with data reduction (computing means, standard deviations, indexes), with display (correlation tables, regression printouts), and with conclusion drawing/verifi-

generally usable by others. See Chapter 10, section D for more.

G. Using This Book

Overview

This book is organized roughly according to the chronology of qualitative research projects, from initial design to final reports. For a quick overview of that sequence, see Chapter 13. A run through the Table of Contents will also help.


Format of Specific Methods

We've designed this sourcebook to be as practical as possible. Each method is described in this format:

- Name of method.*
- Analysis problem.* The problem, need, or difficulty faced by a qualitative data analyst, for which the method proposed is a useful solution.
- Brief description.* What the method is and how it works.
- Illustration.* In more detail, a "minicase" showing how the method is developed and used. Usually this section has a variety of subheadings, such as "Building the Display," "Entering the Data," and "Analyzing the Data."
- Variations.* Alternative approaches using the same general principle. Relevant work of other researchers is cited.
- Advice.* Summarizing comments about use of the method, and tips for using it well.
- Time required.* Approximate estimates (contingent on subject matter, researcher's skill, research questions being asked, number of cases, etc.).

The text also includes supplementary methods, described in a briefer format, that can be used with or instead of the principal method being discussed.

Suggestions for Users



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- Order** The condition that things are constituted in an organized fashion that can be revealed through observation.
- Ordinal level** (of quantification) Ordering data by rank without reference to specific measurement, i.e. more or less than, bigger or smaller than.
- Paradigm** The overall effect of the acceptance of a particular general theoretical approach, and the influence it has on the scientists' view of the world. According to Kuhn, normal scientific activity is carried out within the terms of the paradigm.
- Parameter** A measurable characteristic or feature that is shared in different populations.
- Parsimony** Economy of explanation of phenomena, especially in formulating theories.
- Participant** Someone who takes part in a research project as a subject of study. This term implies that the person takes an active role in the research by performing actions or providing information.
- Pilot study** A pre-test of a questionnaire or other type of survey on a small number of cases in order to test the procedures and quality of responses.
- Plagiarism** The taking and use of other people's thoughts or writing as your own. This is sometimes done by students who copy out chunks of text from publications or the Internet and include it in their writing without any acknowledgement to its source.
- Population** A collective term used to describe the total quantity of cases of the type which are the subject of the study. It can consist of objects, people and even events.
- Positivism** An epistemological stance that maintains that all phenomena, including social, can be analysed using scientific method. Everything can be measured and, if only one knew enough, the causes and effects of all phenomena could be uncovered.
- Postmodernism** A movement that reacts against the all embracing theories of the Modern Movement and insists on the inseparable links between knowledge and power.
- Prediction** One of the common objectives of research.
- Primary data** Sources from which researchers can gain data by direct, detached observation or measurement of phenomena in the real world, undisturbed by any intermediary interpreter. It is a matter of philosophical debate as to what extent the detachment and undisturbed state are possible or even desirable.