PATRIARCHAL STRUCTURES AND FORMS IN THE NOVEL ANNE OF GREEN GABLES BY L.M MONTGOMERY

THESIS

Submitted to the School of Foreign Language- JIA as partial fulfillment of requirements for the English Seminar Subject in English Literature Programme

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CHAPTER 1

Patriarchal Society According to Feminism

Feminist Theories of Patriarchy

By Linda Napikoski
Updated on January 24, 2020

Patriarchal (adj.) describes a general structure in which men have power over women. Society (n.) is the entirety of relations of a community. A **patriarchal society** consists of a male-dominated power structure throughout organized society and in individual relationships.

Power is related to privilege. In a system in which men have more power than women, men have some level of privilege to which women are not entitled.

Feminist Analysis

Feminist theorists have expanded the definition of patriarchal society to describe a systemic bias against women. As second-wave feminists examined society during the 1960s, they did observe households headed by women and female leaders. They were, of course, concerned with whether this was uncommon. More significant, however, was the way society *perceived* women in power as an exception to a collectively held view of women's "role" in society. Rather than saying that individual men oppressed women, most feminists saw that oppression of women came from the underlying bias of a patriarchal society.

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Such a comparison reveals how much the concept of "literature" has changed in the past fifty years. Some theorists have challenged even the concept of literature. John Ellis argues that literature is not definable by properties, such as rhyme, meter, plot, setting, and characterization. "Nonliterary" works often have such properties—advertisements, the lyrics to popular songs, jokes, graffiti. Rather, the definition of literature is like that of weeds. Just as weeds are "plants we do not wish to cultivate" (38), so literature is identifiable by how people use it. People use works of literature not for utilitarian purposes—to get something done—but as objects of enjoyment in themselves. Ellis says that a work becomes literature when it is no longer "specifically relevant to the immediate context of its origin" (44). If a physics textbook is no longer read for information about physics but instead is read for some other reason—say, the elegance of its prose style—then it transcends the "immediate context of its origin" and becomes literature.

Terry Eagleton, another contemporary critic, claims that literature is a social construct; that is, that the concept of "literature" is created by society: "Literature, in the sense of a set of works of assured and unalterable value, distinguished by certain shared

Denotation and connotation. Some theorists claim that authors of literature use language in special ways. One of those ways, according to René Wellek, is an emphasis on connotative rather than denotative meanings of words. Scientists, for example, use language for its *denotative* value, its ability to provide signs (words) that mean one thing only. For scientists, the thing the sign represents—the *referent*—is more important than the sign itself. Any sign will do, as long as it represents the referent clearly and exactly (11). Because emotions render meanings imprecise, scientists strive to use signs that eliminate the emotional, the irrational, the subjective. Writers of

literature, in contrast, use language *connotatively*—to bring into play all the emotional associations words may have.

An Introduction to Literary Studies

Second edition

Mario Klarer

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MAJOR GENRES IN TEXTUAL STUDIES

As early as Greco-Roman antiquity, the classification of literary works into different genres has been a major concern of literary theory, which has since then produced a number of divergent and sometimes even contradictory categories. Among the various attempts to classify literature into genres, the triad *epic*, *drama*, and *poetry* has proved to be the most common in modern literary criticism. Because the epic was widely replaced by the new prose form of the novel in the eighteenth century, recent classifications prefer the *terms fiction*, *drama*, and *poetry* as designations of the three major literary genres. The following section will explain the basic characteristics of these literary genres as well as those of film, a fourth textual manifestation in the wider sense of the term. We will examine these types of texts with reference to concrete examples and introduce crucial textual terminology and methods of analysis helpful for understanding the respective genres.

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FICTION

Although the novel emerged as the most important form of prose fiction in the eighteenth century, its precursors go back to the oldest texts of literary history. Homer's **epics**, the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (*c.* seventh century BC), and Virgil's (70–19 BC) *Aeneid* (*c.* 31–19 BC) influenced the major medieval epics such as Dante Alighieri's (1265–1321) Italian *Divina Commedia* (*Divine Comedy, c.* 1307–21) and the early modern English epics such as Edmund Spenser's (*c.* 1552–99) *Faerie Queene* (1590; 1596) and John Milton's (1608–74) baroque long poem *Paradise Lost* (1667). The majority of traditional epics revolve

remain deeply rooted in the older genre of the epic. Miguel de Cervantes' (1547–1616) *Don Quixote* (1605; 1615), for instance, puts an end to the epic and to the *chivalric romance* by parodying their traditional elements (a lady who is not so deserving of adoration is courted by a not-so-noble knight who is involved in quite unheroic adventures). At the same time, however, Cervantes initiates a new and modified epic tradition. Similarly, the Englishman Henry Fielding (1707–54) characterizes his *novel Joseph Andrews* (1742) as a "comic romance" and "comic epic poem in prose," i.e., a parody and synthesis of existing genres. Also, in the plot structure of the early novel, which often tends to be episodic, elements of the epic survive in a new attire. In England, Daniel Defoe's (1660–1731) *Robinson Crusoe* (1719), Samuel Richardson's (1689–1761) *Pamela* (1740–41) and *Clarissa* (1748–49), Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), and Laurence Sterne's (1713–68) *Tristram Shandy* (1759–67) mark the beginning of this new literary genre, which replaces the epic, thus becoming one of the most productive genres of modern literature.

The newly established novel is often characterized by the terms "realism" and "individualism," thereby summarizing some of the basic innovations of this new medium. While the traditional epic exhibited a cosmic and allegorical dimension, the modern novel distinguishes itself by grounding the plot in a distinct historical and geographical reality. The allegorical and typified epic hero metamorphoses into the protagonist of the novel, with individual and realistic character traits.

These features of the novel which, in their attention to individualism and realism, reflect basic sociohistorical tendencies of the eighteenth century, soon made the novel a dominant literary genre. The novel thus mirrors the modern disregard for the collective spirit of the Middle Ages that heavily relied on allegory and symbolism. The rise of an educated middle class, the spread of the printing press, and a modified economic basis which allowed authors to pursue writing as an independent profession underlie these major shifts in eighteenth-century literary production. To this day, the novel still maintains its leading position as the genre which produces the most innovations in literature.

The term "novel," however, subsumes a number of subgenres such as the **picaresque novel**, which relates the experiences of a vagrant rogue (from the Spanish "picaro") in his conflict with the norms of

society. Structured as an episodic narrative, the picaresque novel tries to lay bare social injustice in a satirical way, as for example Hans Jacob Christoph von Grimmelshausen's (c. 1621–76) German *Simplicissimus* (1669), Daniel Defoe's *Moll Flanders* (1722), or Henry Fielding's *Tom Jones* (1749), which all display specific traits of this form of prose fiction. The **Bildungsroman** (novel of education), generally referred to by its German name, describes the development of a protagonist from childhood to maturity, including such examples as George Eliot's (1819–80) *Mill on the Floss* (1860), or more recently Doris Lessing's (1919–) cycle *Children of Violence* (1952–69). Another important form is the **epistolary novel**, which uses letters as a means of first-person narration, as for example Samuel Richardson's *Pamela* (1740–41) and *Clarissa* (1748–49). A further form is the **historical novel**, such as Sir Walter Scott's (1771–1832) *Waverley* (1814), whose actions take place within a realistic historical context. Related to the historical novel is a more recent trend often labeled new journalism, which uses the genre of the novel to rework incidents based on real events, as exemplified by Truman Capote's (1924–84) *In Cold Blood* (1966) or Norman Mailer's (1923–) *Armies of the Night* (1968). The **satirical novel**, such as Jonathan Swift's (1667–1745) *Gulliver's Travels* (1726) or Mark Twain's (1835–1910) *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1884), highlights weaknesses of society through the exaggeration of social conventions, whereas **utopian novels** or science fiction novels create alternative worlds as a means of criticizing real sociopolitical conditions, as in the classic *Nineteen Eighty-four* (1949) by George Orwell (1903–50) or more recently Margaret Atwood's (1939–) *The Handmaid's Tale* (1985). Very popular forms are the **gothic novel**, which includes such works as Bram Stoker's (1847–1912) *Dracula* (1897), and the **detective novel**, one of the best known of which is Agatha Christie's (1890–1976) *Murder on the Orient Express* (1934).

The **short story**, a concise form of prose fiction, has received less attention from literary scholars than the novel. As with the novel, the roots of the short story lie in antiquity and the Middle Ages. Story, myth, and fairy tale relate to the oldest types of textual manifestations, "texts" which were primarily orally transmitted. The term "tale" (from "to tell"), like the German "Sage" (from "sagen"—"to speak"), reflects this oral dimension inherent in short

THEORIZING PATRIARCHY

SYLVIA WALBY

definition of patriarchy has been continued by some of the major contemporary writers on this question, most importantly by Hartmann (1979, 1981b). I think that the incorporation of a generational element into the definition is a mistake. It implies a theory of gender inequality in which this aspect of men's domination over each other is central to men's domination over women. Yet in practice few contemporary theories of gender inequality establish that this is the case. For instance, while Hartmann uses a definition which incorporates generational hierarchy among men, this is not central to her theory of patriarchy, which focuses upon men's organizational ability to expropriate women's labour in paid work, and hence in the household. Thus inclusion of generation in the definition is confusing. It is a contingent element and best omitted.

Before developing the details of its forms, I shall define patriarchy as a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.

The use of the term social structure is important here, since it clearly implies rejection both of biological determinism, and the notion that every individual man is in a dominant position and every woman in a subordinate one.

Patriarchy needs to be conceptualized at different levels of abstraction. At the most abstract level it exists as a system of social relations. In contemporary Britain this is present in articulation with capitalism, and with racism. However, I do not wish to imply that it is homologous in internal structure with capitalism. At a less abstract level patriarchy is composed of six structures: the patriarchal mode of production, patriarchal relations in paid work, patriarchal relations in the state, male violence, patriarchal relations in sexuality, and patriarchal relations in cultural institutions. More concretely, in relation to each of the structures, it is possible to identify sets of patriarchal practices which are less deeply sedimented. Structures are emergent properties of practices. Any specific empirical instance will embody the effects, not only of patriarchal structures, but also of capitalism and racism.

The six structures have causal effects upon each other, both reinforcing and blocking, but are relatively autonomous. The specification of several rather than simply one base is necessary in order to avoid reductionism and essentialism. The presence of only one base, for instance, reproduction for Firestone (1974) and rape for Brownmiller (1976), is the reason for their difficulty with historical change and cultural variation. It is not necessary to go to the other extreme of denying significant social structures to overcome the charge of essentialism, as some of the postmodernist post-structuralists have done. The six identified are real, deep structures and necessary to capture the variation in gender relations in Westernized societies.

of the household as a unit for one of its adult members to concentrate on domestic work and one on paid work. Household labour is seen as 'real work', and people decide which sort of work it is most effective to engage in. It is suggested that it must be more efficient to have this specialized division of labour than for both spouses to do some of each. Once the decision has been taken that a person is going to be a homemaker or a full-time waged worker it is difficult to reverse, because of the investments that are being made.

The theory predicts certain outcomes for differential wages for men and women, and for the extent of women's and men's comparative participation in paid work. Since women take the homemaker role, they acquire, on average, less human capital and hence less pay than men; further, they will spend less time in paid employment. The times at which women engage in paid employment is seen to be related to the level of wages; the higher the level of wages, the greater likelihood of women substituting paid work for household work. This means that in times of recession, when wage rates fall, women are likely to leave the labour force and revert to useful activity in the household, while in times of economic boom they would enter it.

Although human capital theory is drawn from modern neo-classical economics, it has striking parallels with the functionalist school of thought in sociology. While these arguments cross traditional disciplinary boundaries, the essential elements and structure of the argument are the same.

Parsonian functionalism (Parsons and Bales, 1956) also explains women's lesser involvement in paid work as a result of their primary position in the family. Parsons conceptualized women's position in the family as that of the 'expressive' role, while men took on the externally oriented 'instrumental' role. This division is likewise seen as differentiation in the interests of the family, and indeed society, as a whole, not one of power and inequality. Human capital theory and Parsonian functionalism have the same structure of argument in that they explain the position of women in paid work as a result of their position in the family, which is considered to be functional both for its members and for society as a whole. Further, the notion of a household rather than an individual work strategy is not confined to human capital and Parsonian theory; it is a common feature of many sociological analyses of gender and work (see, for instance, Pahl, R. E., 1984). There are two main levels of critique of human capital theory: firstly, whether it is consistent with data on women's employment; secondly, whether the assumptions are reasonable.

CONCLUSION

While the review of theories of gender and employment has so far been conducted in terms of four main perspectives, there are some central issues which cross-cut these perspectives. These are important for my argument as to the interrelationship of the different patriarchal structures. Thus in the first part of the conclusion to this chapter I would draw out the following three points:

1 The labour market is more important and the family less important as the determinant of women's labour force participation than is conventionally assumed.
2 Women's lesser participation in paid work is a result of material constraints rather than a matter of 'choice' or of cultural values, as is frequently argued.
3 Politics and the state are much more important in the structuring of the sexual division of labour than is often recognized; we need an analysis in terms not merely of economy, but of *political* economy.

Labour market versus family

The conventional view has been to argue that women's position in employment (and indeed in most aspects of society) is determined by their position in the family. This is very clear in the analyses of neo-classical economists such as Mincer (1962, 1966), in functionalist sociologists such as Parsons and Bales (1956), and in Marxist writers such as (early) Beechey (1977, 1978). I think that this is wrong, except in the weak sense in which individual women faced with decisions will take their immediate domestic circumstances into account. It is doubtless true that a woman today considering employment decisions will be constrained by her domestic circumstances. A married woman is likely to be faced with expectations for domestic services from her husband and other 'dependents', combined with the likelihood that her husband's greater earning power will give him considerable influence over her decisions and, most importantly, her expectation of psychic and financial gains if she embraces the role of wife and mother enthusiastically. If our analysis is restricted to the current moment then it will look, superficially, as if the family significantly structures a woman's employment decisions. However, while this may be critical for an understanding of immediate decision making, it does not provide an explanation of the structures which constrain a woman's 'choice'. It does not explain why women do

not have the same access as men to the better jobs. It is an explanation of these circumstances that I seek, not a description of how women negotiate them.

It has been shown that women's lower pay cannot be explained in terms of their lower skill and qualifications, that is, as a result of their position in the family. It has been further demonstrated that women's labour force participation is not explicable in terms of their being used as a reserve army of labour, that is, in terms of their position in the family.

Rather, the structuring of the labour market, in particular, occupational segregation by sex, emerges as critical to the explanation at every turn. It is because women are concentrated in low-paying industries and occupations that they get paid less than men, not primarily due to human capital deficiencies. It is because women are to be found in the growing sectors of the economy, the service sector, rather than in the declining manufacturing sector, that they have not lost employment as much as men in times of recession such as the 1980s. The explanation of occupational segregation is critical to the explanation of gender inequality in paid work.

The causal link between labour market and family goes largely (but not exclusively) in the reverse direction from that conventionally assumed; it goes from the labour market to family, not vice versa, when we ask questions about causation at a structural level.

Materialist versus culturalist

A further conventional view is that women's patterns of employment are determined by cultural and ideological factors rather than material ones; this is related to the notion that the gender division of labour is consensual rather than conflictual. For instance, it is assumed that women voluntarily left paid work at the end of the world wars, that women voluntarily gave up paid work on marriage, that women choose light rather than heavy work, and that they choose not to gain training. These assumptions are not borne out by the evidence. Women left paid employment at the end of the First World War because they were forced to by agreements between employers and male unions, backed by state legislation. Women used to give up paid work on marriage because they were forced to by the marriage bar, which forbade married women from remaining in most forms of formal employment; their preferences were irrelevant to employers. After the removal of the marriage bar during the Second World War, the growth in married women's paid employment was enormous. Many women have been engaged in work as heavy and dirty as that of men, although this is often not recognized. Women's

access to training, such as the universities, has had to be fought for; initial entry was won by first-wave feminism, but struggles continue. In short I am arguing that women's access to forms of paid employment is an issue of conflict as much as consensus; about issues of material power as well as normative values.

The level of the analysis is again important as it was for the discussion of the relative importance of the labour market as against the family in shaping women's patterns of employment. If we look at women's own expressed beliefs of the reasons they do certain things, not others, it appears as if cultural values are of riding significance; however, the deeper question is what creates the structures that lead to these beliefs.

Politics   These issues relate to a further conventional view: that women's employment is not significantly affected by political processes. I am arguing that politics both in the sense of state action and organized collective behaviour not at the level of the state have been important in shaping women's employment (and hence men's).

The state was called upon by organized male workers in the nineteenth century to support their demands to exclude women from the best jobs. Feminist struggle has made a major change in the conduct of the state towards women workers since women gained political citizenship. Overt attempts to bar women have occurred much less frequently, while today the state ostensibly supports women's equal rights in employment through the Equal Pay and Sex Discrimination Acts (although this is not a policy pursued with vigour).

Gender relations in employment are critically affected by political struggle; women have not acquiesced in their exclusion from the best jobs.

Contemporary changes

Women have increasingly been entering paid employment in the post-war period, especially married women (since single women have usually taken paid work (see table 2.1)). This entry into such an important aspect of the 'public' sphere has traditionally been seen as a sign of the emancipation of women. Women's labour is less available for exploitation by husbands within the household. Exclusionary practices against women in the labour market are less frequent than before, either by organized male workers or the state.

In the light of such evidence one might write of the lessening of gender

inequality. However, the degree of inequality between men and women in terms of pay, conditions, and access to well-rewarded occupations has declined only very slightly. That is, there has been only a slight qualitative change in the position of women within employment, despite the considerable quantitative increase in their participation rates. The wages gap has declined only slightly, from women earning 63 per cent of men's earnings in 1970 to 74 per cent in 1986, while the expanding sector of part-time workers earn only 76 per cent of full-time women's pay (New Earnings Survey, 1986). The extent of vertical segregation is still extensive, despite some decreases in the decade 1971 to 1981, as shown in tables 2.2 and 2.3 above. While horizontal segregation by industries has declined for men, it has increased for women between 1971 and 1981, as shown in table 2.4 above.

So while the absolute exclusion of women from paid work is diminishing, their segregation into low-paying industries and occupations and part-time work has declined only a little. Women are gaining access to the public sphere of paid employment, but are subordinated to men within it.

This process of change from private to public form of patriarchal exploitation of women is a product of two main forces for change. Firstly, there is the demand for cheaper labour by employers within a capitalist labour market. This produces a continuing pull towards the entry of women into paid employment because patriarchal production relations constitute women as a cheaper labour force than men on average. As we have seen, however, this process is complicated by the differing forms of capital restructuring and of racism. Secondly, feminist struggle has helped undermine patriarchal exclusionary strategies. This has occurred on a number of sites, but those of the state and the trade unions are of particular importance here. The winning of the suffrage has enabled women to block exclusionary strategies being supported by the state. Trade unions themselves have been changed by women's entry to membership, and by increasing organization within them, from vehicles for patriarchal exclusionary strategies to at worst vehicles for segregation strategies.

The combined result of capitalist forces and feminist struggle have been primarily responsible for the change from private towards public patriarchal exploitation of women's labour.

NOTES

1   These committees included: The Machinery of Government Committee, the Committee on the Organization and Staffing of Government Offices, the

4

Culture

INTRODUCTION

Ideas about masculinity and femininity are to be found in all areas of social relations; they are part of the actions which go to make up the patriarchal structures. This chapter is concerned primarily with the representation of gender, which is part of the process that makes up cultural notions of femininities and masculinities. It will also address the questions of how individuals come to adopt personal identities as masculine or feminine, and how the content of these are determined.

The most traditional approach to sexual difference is to see masculine and feminine identities as reflecting biological structure, of bodies, hormones, muscles and genes. Such biological theories have been widely criticized (c.f., Oakley, 1972). However, the social significance of biological attributes remains as one of the issues that social theories of gender identity must deal with.

The chapter will examine three main approaches to gendered subjectivity: firstly, socialization theory; secondly, neo-Freudian, psychoanalytic theory; thirdly, discourse analysis. The perspectives I have been using in earlier chapters do not neatly divide between these approaches to culture and subjectivity. Liberals have typically adopted socialization theory, though might also be considered to have a position in discourse analysis. Marxists have typically used either psychoanalysis or discourse analysis. Radical feminists are typically represented in either socialization or discourse analysis.

There are three main issues within the debates: firstly, whether there is a dominant ideology which is significant for gender inequality; secondly, whether there are essential differences between masculinity and femininity; and, thirdly, the tension between individual autonomy and unity of a person on the one hand, and structural determination on the other.

The first issue is whether there is a hegemonic, or dominant, ideology (cf., Abercrombie et al, 1980, on this issue for class relations) which is

important in the maintenance of gender relations. Are women brainwashed into passivity and acquiescence by their socialization into femininity (Comer, 1974), or by an overarching patriarchal world religion (Daly, 1978)? In short, do women suffer from false consciousness? Or, are women's direct experiences a true form of knowledge of the world, and their subordination due to real material circumstances?

The second issue picks up the problem of essentialism in feminist thought: whether, in efforts to explain gender difference, theorists treat this in an over-rigid, timeless way, which is contradicted by history and the variety of forms of femininity and masculinity between classes and ethnic groups.

The third issue is an argument between liberal humanism's conception of the individual as a unified self-motivating being, and the poststructuralist analysis of meaning within discourses which decentres this rational, self-present subject (Weedon, 1987).

Traditionally ideology and culture have been considered to be best understood as a set of beliefs which are related in some way to other social phenomena. More recently writers in this field have argued that it is inappropriate to theorize ideology outside the material relations in which it is embedded.

SOCIALIZATION THEORY

The conventional position, at least till recently, has been to see masculine and feminine identities as a result of a process of socialization (Belotti, 1975; Comer, 1974; Parsons and Bales, 1956; Sharpe, 1976). Socialization is considered to take place primarily during childhood, during which boys and girls learn the appropriate behaviour for their sex. Writers proposing this theory have clear notions of what distinguishes masculinity and femininity, usually conceived of as mirror opposites. Masculinity entails assertiveness, being active, lively, and quick to take the initiative. Femininity entails cooperativeness, passivity, gentleness and emotionality.

Training in one or the other set of gender attributes is considered to start from birth in every aspect of their lives, as when babies are dressed in different colours, pink and blue, and encouraged or discouraged from greedy feeding (Belotti, 1975). Socialization proceeds with a set of rewards and punishments, ranging from changes in tone of voice to physical chastisement. Thus little girls are more likely to be told to be quiet and not to make a noise in circumstances where little boys would be expected to be boisterous.

The toys and games of childhood are also gendered. For instance, little girls are likely to be given dolls while boys get train sets and lego. Little girls are expected to play at ironing daddy's hanky, while little boys play soldiers. These games differ both in terms of the level of activity – boys having more active games – but also in the orientation of the object of play to adult roles – dolls are a preparation for childcare, soldiers for warfare.

The books and magazines that children and adolescents read are considered to differentiate gender identities further. In these, girls will be portrayed helping mummy with domestic chores, while boys are engaged helping daddy in manly ones or engaging in adventures. They show stereotyped images of the activities of both children and adults, contributing to expectations of both present and future gender roles.

Television and other media carry this process further (Tuchman, 1978). Advertising usually shows women as either sexually glamorous or as wives and mothers, while men occupy positions of power. Women are even shown less often than men (Tuchman, 1978). Not only are the overt images problematic for women, but there are a series of techniques, such as the 'authoritative' voice-over being more often male (87 per cent), which further contributes to the subordinate conception of women on television (Tuchman, 1978). Finally there are the story-lines themselves, which suggest restrictive feminine conduct as more appropriate for women. For instance, single working women are more often portrayed as the victim of violence than are married women (Tuchman, 1978). Indeed the plot of many Hollywood movies is one in which the narrative starts when a woman steps out of line and ends when she is restored to proper feminine subjection (Kuhn, 1982).

Education is considered to continue the process, both in terms of the formal curriculum, since boys and girls usually study different subjects, and of the hidden curriculum, in what they pick up informally. Boys are more successful at the upper reaches of the educational system. Even the dynamics of classroom interaction is set against the girls, who tend to be more reticent (Stanworth, 1983). Boys are more likely to take science and craft subjects, while girls take arts and domestic subjects. In this way they are prepared for their adult roles in the sexual division of labour (Deem, 1978, 1980; Sharpe, 1976).

While many of the early studies on gender socialization centred on femininity, an increasing number of studies have taken masculinity as their focus (Brod, 1987; Kimmel, 1987; Hearn, 1987; Fasteau, 1975; Tolson, 1977). These tend to concentrate on the unproductive aspects of masculinity for men, such as the stunting of the ability to express emotions, rather than masculinity as a route to privilege and power.

In short, socialization is considered to cause the differentiation of the genders into masculine and feminine subjects. Institutions from the family to the media and education are implicated in carrying out this process.

Socialization theory is a powerful antidote to suggestions that gender difference are biologically inherent. It documents in detail a series of social and social-psychological processes through which girls and boys acquire a gendered subjectivity. However, there are a lot of issues which socialization theory does not deal with adequately.

Firstly, despite its obvious anti-essentialist thrust, socialization theory operates with a very static and unitary conception of gender differences. While differences of some kind universally exist between masculinity and femininity, these are significantly variable. Few socialization theorists take sufficient account of the variety of masculinities and femininities, especially within different social classes, ethnic groups, generations, societies or historical periods.

Secondly, there is an ambiguity as to whether femininity and masculinity are merely mirror opposites, in which each sex is restricted, but in equal and opposite ways, or whether masculinity is the mode of the oppressor and femininity that of the oppressed. This is a dilemma which surfaces especially clearly in work which focuses on masculinity (Brod, 1987; Connell, 1987; Fasteau, 1975; Hearn, 1987; Tolson, 1977). Insofar as these analyses slide into the role differentiation type, parallel to that of Parsons, they are problematic in failing to recognise the power which is part of the masculine position. But not all are subject to this error; in particular, Connell and Hearn note the relationship between masculinity and power.

A third problem is that people are assumed to be relatively passive in their acquisition of gender identity, in many, though not all, varieties of this theory. Indeed it tends to assume that women have false consciousness, and this is an account of how they acquire it. Yet people are not 'cultural dopes'. They are more actively involved than this type of theory usually gives space for. Even the meaning of a cultural artefact is not immediately given but is constructed only in a social context, in which the audience has an active role.

A fourth problem is that socialization theory, while providing an account of how individuals become masculine or feminine, does not explain where the content of these notions comes from. This is the most serious shortcoming of this perspective. Socialization theory is a theory of the acquisition of gender, not of its construction. It has little to say on why gender should be dichotomous and why masculinities and femininities have specific contents. Why should contemporary masculinity con-

tain more elements of aggression than femininity does?

Fifthly, this approach assumes that there are specialized times and places on which we can focus in order to understand gender ideology, rather than realising that all aspects of social life involve gendered cultural notions. This problem is related to most of the four difficulties just mentioned. Gendered culture is actively constructed in all areas of social life, not just families, media and school. Discourses of masculinities and femininities are struggled over in the paid workplace and the state, as well as learnt by individuals.

PSYCHOANALYTIC APPROACHES

While many people would agree that Freud's original position was hopelessly biologistic and mysogynist in relation to women, there have been various attempts to rescue certain aspects of his work. There are two main versions of this in relation to gender. One is the work of object relations theorists, such as Chodorow (1978), the other that of the post-Lacanians who reinterpreted Freud with a focus on the symbolic level, such as Mitchell (1975).

Chodorow

Chodorow (1978) draws upon object relations theory, developing a theory of gender relations which focuses heavily on early childhood experiences. She examines the reproduction of mothering, rather than gender identity *per se*, since she thinks this is the key to understanding both gender differentiation and the oppression of women. Women are brought up to mother as a result of early childhood experiences in a way that men are not. Mothering is a rich experience, but simultaneously traps women into a different adult role from that of men, one which is not as well rewarded in contemporary society. The cause of the difference between the genders is that while girl children continue their gender identification with their mother, boy children have to make a serious break with her and identify with their more distant father, in order to become masculine. This is a wrench for the boys, and gives rise to a different type of personality which is less nurturing. The process is embedded in the unconscious and not amenable to simple conscious resolution. As a consequence girls grow up into nurturing adults, who mother children, while boys do not.

Chodorow values mothering highly. Indeed Hester Eisenstein (1984) considers that she has a woman-centred analysis. The problem is that it is

order to build an effective opposition women need to create their separate cultural spaces from men, so that they might spin and weave alternatives. This is conceived as a process of journeying, of the creation and uncovering of female strengths and values hidden under patriarchy. Daly thus advocates a separatist strategy which, while including sexual autonomy from men, does not concentrate on lesbianism as a central feature of her analysis.

Daly has provided a powerful account of women's oppressions and a positive vision of women and their potential. Her coverage of world history is striking. Her analysis of the role of religion as an authoritative source of justification of the subordination of women links her into the discourse tradition, even though she makes no reference to it.

The weaknesses of the account stem from the same place as its strengths, its global character. It has been criticised for being too sweeping and overgeneral, without sufficient regard to specific circumstances. Lorde (1981) finds fault with her for not giving an account of the resistance of women of colour to their oppression, only that of contemporary white Western women. Segal (1987) and Grimshaw (1988) consider that she is an essentialist whose separatism is a dangerous political mistake for women. Hester Eisenstein (1984) likewise regards her as a woman-centred analyst whose separatism is a political dead-end. In short she is roundly condemned as essentialist and separatist.

These criticisms are often ferocious and, I think, overstated. In outline they have a point, but they fail to deal with the rich nuances of the work. Firstly, the accusation of essentialism exaggerates the stasis in the account. Daly does not like most women as they are, nor does she want them to stay that way. Rather, she wants to send them all voyaging, discovering and changing. This is hardly embracing essential womanhood. It is true that she thinks women have a potential. It is also true that she does not say that men share this potential, but neither does she say that they do not. The silence on men is a problem, and it is this that I think is the most serious problem in her work. Secondly, the accusation of separatism is overstated, since almost all feminists utilise and defend the use of separatist tactics on occasion, whether as a caucus within a trade union or a women's committee on a local council. The issue should be not whether this is wrong in principle, but whether Daly argues for more forms of separatism than are appropriate. For instance, Daly's criticism of feminists who try to engage with patriarchal professions can be considered to push the separatist case too strongly.

The main problems in the work are its insufficient differentiation of the contexts of women's lives, of the variety of ways in which men engage in gender relations, and its neglect of the material level of the economy.

Sexuality is the key to the definition of women in the work of several radical feminists, for instance, MacKinnon (1982, 1987), Dworkin (1981) and Rich (1980). MacKinnon (1982) considers that sexuality is the basis; women are defined as sexual objects by men in all aspects of life. This is not only in arenas such as the family but also paid work, as her analysis of sexual harassment of women in paid work suggests (MacKinnon, 1979). Like those following the psychoanalytic tradition, these writers see gender and sexuality as inseparably entwined. MacKinnon even goes as far as to interdefine them, though Rich draws back from this. These accounts are limited by their one-sidedness insofar as they purport to be complete analyses of gender relations, but provocative nonetheless. They will be considered in more detail in the following chapter on sexuality.

Review of theories

The socialization theorists made an effective argument against notions that femininity and masculinity were biologically given attributes. But they were limited to accounts of how people became feminine or masculine, and could not account for the content of these ideas. Further, they were typically unable to deal with the variation in the content of gender identity between classes, ethnic groups, or cultures, or with social change.

The psychoanalytic theories argued that unseen processes in the unconscious during early childhood were important in the construction of gender identity. However, these suffered from similar difficulties of essentialism and ahistoricism, ignoring the social mediation of the notions of femininity and masculinity.

Discourse analysis provides the theoretical means to overcome the problems of essentialism and ahistoricism. In shifting the conceptual tools away from the individual to the social level, it enables us to explore the shifting content and relations between femininities and masculinities. However, some versions of it, especially those attuned to Derrida's deconstructionism, lost sight both of the social context of the power relations between the sexes and, in their focus on breaking down essentialist notions of femininity, of any common experiences of womanhood. But this was not universal, especially when analyses of discourse were related to the circumstances of production of those discourses as well as to their content.

Some radical feminist theorists implicitly utilise some aspects of a discourse approach, albeit one which has a very strong sense of fixed power relations (which is not to be found in Foucault's work). These

(Davies, 1975). I think the different significance of paid work for femininity is a remarkable shift in the content of femininity and for the boundary of femininity and masculinity. While previously the presence or absence of waged work was a significant marker of masculinity and femininity, especially among the middle classes, today this is not so. There remains only a residual element in that the type of paid work has some pertinence as a gender differentiator.

Waged work has been important as a signifier of masculinity. Particular sorts of work are imbued with more ability to bestow masculinity upon its doer than others. For instance, Cockburn (1983) has shown how the shift from working with heavy metal to light keyboards for print workers created enormous problems for their masculine identities. The changes concerned were not smoothly accomplished but were accompanied by much resistance.

Rather than containment within the domestic circle being the key sign of femininity today, I would suggest that it is sexual attractiveness to men. While the latter was a virtue in the Victorian period (Hamilton, 1909), it was so in a relatively undercover way as compared with today. It is no longer merely the femininity of young single women which is defined in this way, but increasingly that of older women as well. It is precisely on this issue of sexuality that the writers disagree: whether it is a sign of resistance for women to display and exert their sexuality (e.g., Winship, 1985), whether it is merely incorporation into a patriarchal system (e.g., Leeds Revolutionary Feminist Group, 1981), or whether it is both simultaneously (Vance, 1984). This will be explored further in the chapter on sexuality.

While many aspects of popular culture appear to be increasing the range of possibilities for women and reducing the restricted area of femininity, there is one which does not: pornography. It has been argued by some liberals that the availability of sexually explicit materials is an increase in freedom, and this after all was a focus of the anti-censorship battles of the 1950s and 1960s. However, this increase in freedom is for the dominant group in the pornography complex – men. The male gaze, not that of women, is the viewpoint of pornography. The materials themselves often include not merely sexually explicit scenes, but ones of violence towards and humiliation of women (Dworkin, 1981; Kappeler, 1986).

One of the sites of gender training which has undergone some of the most changes towards reducing gender differences is that of formal education. In pre-industrial Britain women were barred from such formal educational provision as existed. Training in literacy was confined largely to boys, and elite institutions such as the universities of Oxford and

Cambridge were closed. This exclusionary closure against women changed during the nineteenth century, such that formal education was one of the first of the public spheres to be fully open to women. Girls were admitted to the secondary schools as soon as they were created, and women fought their way into the universities (Deem, 1978; Lewis, 1983; Strachey, 1928). During the twentieth century, education has been the least patriarchal institution, formally open to women at all levels. In very recent years girls have been gaining more qualifications at the age of 16 than boys, and the gap in the qualifications of 18 year olds is closing, as is the number of degrees. Yet despite this lack of exclusion, we still see high levels of segregation by subjects studied, with boys in the sciences and girls in the arts.

A further general change in the ideologies of femininity and masculinity has been from a justification of difference, through a naturalizing ideology, to a dissimulative approach which denies the extent of the inequality. Once patriarchs openly proclaimed that women were not welcome in certain spheres of life; now they are more likely to deny that any barriers to women exist. The patriarchal ideology shifts from open exclusion of women as 'naturally' different, to one of denying the extent of women's disadvantages and denying that women's slight 'under-achievement' is a result of discrimination.

In short I am arguing that, while variable across class, ethnicity, and age in particular, femininity is consistently differentiated from masculinity over the last century and a half. However, there have been some important changes. Abstinence from paid work is no longer such a central element of femininity. Overall there has been a shift in the discourse of femininity away from private domesticity towards more public aspects of sexual attractiveness to men, outside as well as inside the family.

These changes have followed rather than led the material changes in gender relations. As we have seen, the ideology of specific occupations as masculine or feminine follows on after the economic and political struggles over which gender shall occupy these job slots. After women gained entry to paid work, abstinence from such employment ceased to be part of the feminine discourse.

5

Sexuality

Why are women criticized for forms of sexual conduct for which men are considered positively? Why did the myth of the vaginal orgasm have such popularity? Why do some men sexually abuse their children? Why do some people prefer sexual contact with people of the same sex and some with the other sex?

This chapter will address the question of whether sexuality is a major source of pleasure that we seek throughout our lives (cf., Freud, 1977) or the foundation of men's control over women (cf., MacKinnon, 1982), or if it is peripheral to considerations of social inequality (cf., Marx). Sexuality is either irrelevant or central to most analyses of social relations. Class analysis does not even defend its omission, while in Freudian thought and some radical feminist analyses sexuality is the main determinant of social life.

There is a major divide between those who consider sexuality to be an instinct or drive which is biologically inherent in all human beings, and those who consider it to be socially constructed in all its aspects of interest to social science. The former typically adopt a Freudian perspective, the latter more usually either symbolic interactionism, discourse analysis or radical feminism. However, some of the more recent interpretations of Freud have reduced the significance of biology in his texts and increased that of the social and cultural aspects, while some, but certainly not all, of the radical feminist analyses have a conception of an essential female sexuality. Nevertheless, while there is a degree of convergence in specific texts between the Freudians and social constructionists, there is a fundamental discrepancy between the two positions which underlies many of the other differences in the debates on sexuality. A further and related question is that of the significance of sexuality and the degree to which sexual practices are determined or determining of other social relations, together with the related one of the connection to social control.

6

Violence

INTRODUCTION

Male violence against women includes rape, sexual assault, wife beating, workplace sexual harassment and child sexual abuse. It is often thought of as the acts of a few men upon a few women. Male violence is widely considered to be individually motivated and with few social consequences, though with trauma caused to a few women. It is the last place to which most people would look as a typical example of social patterning of the relations between men and women.

I shall argue, on the contrary, that male violence against women has all the characteristics one would expect of a social structure, and that it cannot be understood outside an analysis of patriarchal social structures. Durkheim (1952) used the analysis of suicide, ostensibly one of the most individualistic of actions, to argue for a sociological analysis of society. I shall suggest that rape and wife beating, analogously conventionally considered individual acts, are social facts best analysed in terms of patriarchal social structures.[1]

Male violence exists in a myriad of forms, which may be placed on a continuum, with rape and wife beating and child sexual abuse at one end and sexual harassment and wolf whistles at the other (Hanmer and Saunders, 1984; Kelly, L., 1988a; Russell, 1984; Stanko, 1985). I shall focus on the more extreme types, but they are all interrelated and have similar, if not the same, explanations.

The definitions of forms of violence are contentious. The narrowest are usually the legal ones, and these carry a certain authority because of their status. However, they typically omit acts which some women identify as acts of violence. For instance, in Britain there is no such legal entity as rape of a wife by her husband; the woman is deemed to have consented to sexual intercourse on marriage. The exclusion of husband-wife rape from criminalization has recently been reconfirmed by a legal review. However, in many US states and most of Scandinavia sexual intercourse

against the will of the wife is legally rape. A survey in the USA found that 14 per cent of married women reported being raped by their husbands at least once (Russell, 1982).

An alternative approach to the definition of violence is to adopt the definition of women themselves (Stanko, 1985). This captures more than any other method the extent of the impact of violence on women. It is also the most radical in that it takes the word and perception of the women who have suffered the violence as our standard, rather than other bodies which claim authority in this area, such as the police.

A mid-way position is carefully to define the acts which are deemed from a social scientist's point of view to constitute violence, whether recognized as such by the state or all women. This is the approach taken by such social scientists as Russell (1982, 1984), who has carried out detailed surveys of the extent of violence. For instance Russell defines an act of intercourse where the man used force as rape, whether or not the woman concerned is prepared to use the emotive word rape.

A further issue is whether the rate of male violence is increasing. According to the police records of rape, it has increased by 143 per cent during the ten years from 1977 to 1987 (*Criminal Statistics, England and Wales, 1987*). Is this a real increase, or is it due to more women reporting this crime?

There are two substantive focuses to the explanation of male violence: firstly, why and how men use violence; secondly, why and how there is so little state action to discourage the violence.

PERSPECTIVES

It is possible to identify three main theoretical approaches to an analysis of male violence to women: those of liberalism, class analysis and radical feminism. The first explains the violence in terms of the psychological derangement of a small number of men; the second in terms of the frustrations of men who are disadvantaged in a class society; the third in terms of male power in a patriarchal society.

Liberalism

The conventional analysis of male violence sees it as the acts of a few wayward, generally psychologically deranged, men. The latter are considered abnormal, distinct from other men, and to be few in number. The explanation focuses on psychological processes rather than social context.

A typical account within this approach is that of West, Roy and Nichols (1978), who argue that rape is an act of individual men who have not developed normally. They suggest that this is a product of bad childhood experiences and a disrupted family background. In evidence for their thesis, West, Roy and Nichols provide the case histories of 12 rapists. All these rapists reported to the interviewing psychiatrist that they had problematic childhoods. They did not have the love, stability and attention children normally have. One or both of their parents had either actively rejected them or shown marked lack of warmth. As a result of their problematic childhoods these men were not able to acquire the normal form of masculinity; family disturbances left them unprepared to deal with the stresses of life, oversensitive and diffident. Their masculinity was impaired. This psychological maldevelopment shows itself in their later adult lives. The men are unable to establish normal relations with women, lacking the confidence to deal with the difficulties of socio-sexual relationships. The 'final outburst' takes place as a result of the combination of defective personality and a specific period of stress. A time of mounting frustration is seen to precede the rape. The men are discontented with their 'sexual outlets' and sexual performance. Their frustration is considered to be a result of sensitization to stress as a result of difficulties in the man's early upbringing, problems in engaging in heterosexual relationships and the struggle to maintain his conception of masculinity. In frustration they rape women. Their 'insecure' or 'impaired' masculinity is seen to be central to the explanation of rape.

This argument has some very serious problems with empirical evidence. Firstly, the notion that all or most rapists have serious psychological problems is contradicted by other, more reliable, empirical evidence. The majority of convicted rapists are not considered to be in need of psychiatric assistance by the courts. In 1978 only 3.5 per cent of rapists were sentenced by the British courts to a hospital order under the Mental Health Act of 1959. That is, the empirical evidence does not support the contention that rapists are psychologically deranged; this is the exception, rather than the rule. Indeed there are serious methodological problems in the study by West, Roy and Nichols. All the men in the sample were incarcerated in a psychiatric unit and were pre-selected as having psychological problems, so the study does not test the question of how typical it is for rapists to have psychological impairment.

Secondly, rape is far more common than this theory would predict. It is not the rare and unusual occurrence that theories of rape as a result of psychological abnormality suggest. Russell (1982) found in a methodologically rigorous survey about the extent of rape that, in a sample of 930 women in the USA, 44 per cent of women had been the subject of rape or

attempted rape at least once in their lives. Many more women are raped than is consistent with a theory that the crime's perpetrators are psychologically disturbed.

A similar argument has been applied to wife beating. Pizzey (1974) argues that men who beat their wives do so as a result of disturbing childhood experiences in which they saw their fathers beat their mothers. Boy children who see this become upset and violent. Again we have the theme of psychological abnormality as a result of problems during childhood. In this instance the start of the problem is quite specific, and the result is considered to be a repetition by the male when an adult. This is referred to by Pizzey as the cycle of violence. As evidence for her thesis Pizzey cites examples from among the women who were resident in the refuge that she helped to set up in Chiswick. She provides case histories in which the man who battered a woman had indeed been reared in a violent household. Further support for Pizzey's thesis can be found in the work of Gayford (1975), who did a questionnaire survey of the residents of the Chiswick refuge and came to similar conclusions.

There are problems with this argument that are similar to those about its application to rape. Firstly, the empirical evidence to support it is shaky. Pizzey simply cited the instances which fitted her claims. Gayford's own evidence shows that only nine of the hundred women interviewed had violent fathers (Wilson, E., 1983b: 33). Secondly, the more rigorous study by Gelles (1972) shows that not all men who had battered had come from a violent home, and that not all men who came from a violent home went on to batter their wives. Gelles's work was based upon a comparison of 40 families with domestic violence and 40 without. The addition of this control group was a vital methodological improvement upon previous studies. Thirty per cent of his violent spouses had never witnessed violence between their parents, while 50 per cent had (Gelles, 1972: 173). Thirdly, the extent of the violence against women in their homes is higher than is consistent with such a theory. Between one-quarter and one-third of married women experience serious violence at some point in their lives (MacKinnon, 1987: 24).

While a higher proportion of batterers have the disturbing home backgrounds than is the case for rapists, it is still a correlate in only a proportion of the cases. The generation-to-generation transmission of male violence to women via psychological processes can explain, at best, a small portion of this violence. Male violence against women cannot be explained primarily as a result of the psychological derangement of a few men.

The liberal approach to the state and male violence is to suggest that the state is a little inefficient and faces technical difficulties due to the

nature of the offences in bringing violent men to court. These were criticized for instance, by Pizzey, who found fault with the restrictions on the ability of police and court bailiffs to arrest men molesting their wives.

Implicit in this persepctive is the assumption that violence against women is rather rare. Hence the issues relating to the state are considered to be relatively minor ones. This is problematic, since the majority of men who are violent to women escape criminal sanction. The extent of the 'inefficiency' is, rather, sufficient to warrant the tag of structural bias.

Class analysis

Male violence against women does not form a large part of class analysis. However, there are a couple of examples which draw more upon class analysis than on any other framework. The basis of this approach is that men at the bottom of the class hierarchy are violent towards women as a result of the frustration generated by their circumstances. The violence is then attributed to the workings of class society. There are two main variants; firstly, a general model; secondly, a subcultural model.

Elizabeth Wilson (1983b) takes the first position, suggesting that male violence against women is most common in situations of economic stress. For instance, in times of high unemployment or of housing shortage, men at the bottom of the class order undergo acute stress. As a consequence they lash out in frustration against those nearest to them, their wives. The ultimate cause of this violence is then a capitalist society.

This view is supported by Gelles (1972) and by Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz (1980), who state that the rate of violence between husbands and wives is twice as high in blue-collar families than it is in white-collar families. It is reinforced further by evidence on the social class of women who were subjected to extra-marital rape according to the (US) National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence, which found that women with a family income under $6,000 in 1967 reported being raped three to five times more frequently than those where the family income was over this amount (Eisenhower, 1969).

The sub-cultural version, as articulated by Amir (1971), follows the features of the general model in locating male violence among men in the lower social strata. However, he adds to this by suggesting that these men develop a different set of values from the main culture as a consequence of alienation from it. When it is impossible to achieve the values of the main culture, people reject them and develop alternative values which are attainable. In these circumstances men at the bottom of the social order attach value to machismo and physical superiority. A deviant sub-culture of violence then develops at the bottom of the social order as a means of

coming to terms with that hierarchy. It is this sub-culture which generates rape merely as one more form of violence. Amir supports his argument with evidence on the socio-economic and racial composition of rapists as reported to the police. He finds that they are disproportionately working class and black, that is, drawn from the social groups at the bottom of the US social order.

The work of these writers is important in drawing attention to social conditions which shape men's violence against women. However, there are a number of problems with their accounts.

The work of both Wilson and Amir is predicated upon a notion that men who are violent towards women are disproportionately drawn from the lower social groupings. However, the evidence adduced to support this is shaky. Amir's figures were based upon those rapists reported to the police. But the majority of rapes are not reported to the police, and those which are reported are more likely to be the ones a white police force in a racist society is most likely to believe. In Russell's study, 24 per cent of black (Afro-American) rapists were reported to the police as compared to 5 per cent of the white rapists (Russell, 1984: 93). Pizzey (1974) argues, on the basis of her experience at the Chiswick refuge, that men who batter their wives are drawn from all social strata, not merely the bottom. Russell, in probably the largest and most rigorous survey of women enquiring into the extent of male violence (described more fully below), found that, in the case of marital rape, husbands were drawn evenly from all social classes: 32 per cent were lower class, 32 per cent middle class and 36 per cent upper middle class (Russell, 1982: 129). She also found that the race distribution of husband-rapists was very similar to that of the proportion of ethnic groups in the wider population: 73 per cent were white, slightly higher than the 68 per cent of the sample women who were white; 10 per cent of husband-rapists were Latino, as compared to 7 per cent of the sample; 10 per cent were black, the same as their presence in the sample; while 4 per cent were Asian, significantly lower than the 12 per cent of the sample which was Asian (Russell, 1982: 130). Thus Russell's findings about rape in marriage is that it is evenly distributed through the class and ethnic structure. It is a general experience that the crimes of the lower classes and races are more closely policed than those of the higher groups. I think the evidence on the socio-economic composition of rapists and batterers is then inconclusive.

A further problem is that neither writer explains why men who are frustrated at their class, and possibly race, position avenge themselves on women. They make no attempt to explain why such men do not attack their more obvious class or race enemies instead. It is not even that they attack women of the superordinate class or race, since the data suggest

public debate about the issue. The government has ordered more money to be spent on training social workers to deal with it. Yet the doctors at the centre of the crisis have been scapegoated.

Thus we see increasing challenges to the low level of state intervention against male violence. These have recently become major political issues, though rarely along party lines. The net outcome has been a very slight shift towards greater state intervention against male violence.

CONCLUSION

As the accounts above have indicated, there have been many important changes in state policy towards gender relations over the last 150 years, but these also include some very significant limitations. The state is still patriarchal as well as capitalist and racist. Some areas have seen greater changes than others. State policies directed towards confining women to the private sphere of the marital home have been very significantly reduced, enabling women's movement towards the public sphere. Here we see the cessation of legal backing to exclusionary practices in employment; the increased ease of divorce, and financial provision for non-wage earners; the ending of state backing to exclusionary practices in education and the removal of most forms of censorship of pronography; the decriminalization of contraception and abortion under most circumstances; and minor changes in the law making it marginally easier for a woman to leave a violent man.

However, while there are many changes which facilitate women's entry to the public sphere there are not so many which improve the position of women in it. While the equal opportunity legislation might have been thought to improve women's position in this respect, it is widely considered to have had only a marginal impact. Further, women's position as heads of one-parent families is economically perilous, with low levels of state benefits. The relaxation of censorship has permitted increased circulation of pornography. So while there have been un-doubted benefits to women from these transformations, what has occurred is as much a change in the kind of patriarchal control as of degree.

Has the Thatcher era changed the state significantly in relation to women? I do not think that there is a clear break in the gender policies of the state in the way that there has been in the handling of class relations. While some aspects of women's position have become worse, especially those which involve welfare services and payments, in others there have been some small gains, such as marginal improvements in the equal

opportunity legislation, numbers of women in public office, and ease of divorce, while in many other areas, such as abortion and contraception, there has been little change.

Thatcherism presents itself as rolling back the frontiers of the state in keeping with a neo-liberal strategy. In practice this applies only to certain sectors of the state, since others, especially those to do with its military and policing functions, are being strengthened. The question here is which strategy is being applied to gender relations. Interestingly, right-wing morality has not been given the backing of the state – for instance, access to abortion and contraception has not been reduced; they have been considered arenas for the neo-liberal strategy. However, women have suffered disproportionately from the rolling back of welfare provision.

NOTES

1 The legislation in Britain took a different form from that in the USA, where women were more actively involved in the campaigns and the focus was on the worst, not best, forms of employment for women.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PATRIARCHY

I am distinguishing between two forms of patriarchy: private and public. They differ on a variety of levels: firstly, in terms of the relations between the structures and, secondly, in the institutional form of each structure. Further, they are differentiated by the main form of patriarchal strategy: exclusionary in private patriarchy and segregationist in public patriarchy. Private patriarchy is based upon household production, with a patriarch controlling women individually and directly in the relatively private sphere of the home. Public patriarchy is based on structures other than the household, although this may still be a significant patriarchal site. Rather, institutions conventionally regarded as part of the public domain are central in the maintenance of patriarchy.

In private patriarchy it is a man in his position as husband or father who is the direct oppressor and beneficiary, individually and directly, of the subordination of women. This does not mean that household production is the sole patriarchal structure. Indeed it is importantly maintained by the active exclusion of women from public arenas by other structures. The exclusion of women from these other spheres could not be perpetuated without patriarchal activity at these levels.

Public patriarchy is a form in which women have access to both public and private arenas. They are not barred from the public arenas, but are nonetheless subordinated within them. The expropriation of women is performed more collectively than by individual patriarchs. The household may remain a site of patriarchal oppression, but it is no longer the main place where women are present.

In each type of patriarchy the six structures are present, but the relationship between them, and their relative significance, is different. For instance, I am not arguing that in private patriarchy the only significant site is that of the household. In the different forms there are different relations between the structures to maintain the system of patriarchy.

In the private system of patriarchy the exploitation of women in the household is maintained by their non-admission to the public sphere. In a sense the term 'private' for this form of patriarchy might be misleading, in that it is the exclusion from the public which is the central causal mechanism. Patriarchal relations outside the household are crucial in shaping patriarchal relations within it. However, the effect is to make women's experience of patriarchy privatized, and the immediate beneficiaries are also located there.

In the public form of patriarchy the exploitation of women takes place at all levels, but women are not formally excluded from any. In each

institution women are disadvantaged.

The second aspect of the difference between private and public patriarchy is in the institutional form of each of the structures. This is a movement from an individual to a more collective form of appropriation of women. There has also been a shift in patriarchal strategy from exclusionary to segregationist and subordinating.

I have traced the movement from private to public patriarchy within each of the six patriarchal structures during the course of this book. Within paid work there was a shift from an exclusionary strategy to a segregationist one, which was a movement from attempting to exclude women from paid work to accepting their presence but confining them to jobs which were segregated from and graded lower than those of men. In the household there was a reduction in the confinement of women to this sphere over a lifetime and a shift in the main locus of control over reproduction. The major cultural institutions ceased to exclude women, while subordinating women within them. Sexual controls over women significantly shifted from the specific control of a husband to that of a broader public arena; women were no longer excluded from sexual relations to the same extent, but subordinated within them. Women's exclusion from the state was replaced by their subordination within it.

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PATRIARCHY IN BRITISH HISTORY

Recent British history has seen a movement towards the private model, and then a movement away to the public form. The height of the private form was to be found in the mid-nineteenth century in the middle classes. Many scholars have argued that there was an intensification in the domestic ideology and the extent to which middle-class women were confined to the private sphere of the home (Davidoff and Hall, 1987; Gilman, 1966; Pinchbeck, 1930; Schreiner, 1918; Tilly and Scott, 1978). There were extremely strong sanctions against non-marital sexuality for such women. They did not work in public, only in their own households, and were excluded from the public sphere of the state, lacking citizenship rights such as suffrage and, if married, ability to own property. Violence against wives by husbands was condoned as legitimate chastisement 'so long as the rod was no thicker than a man's thumb'. Cultural institutions, such as the church, supported the notion that a woman's place was in the home.

There were some limits and contradictions to this private model of patriarchy, but they do not destroy the general case. For instance, it was applied to middle-class women to a much greater extent than working-

been changes not only in the degree of patriarchy but also in its form. Britain has seen a movement from a private to a public form of patriarchy over the last century.

I am distinguishing two main forms of patriarchy, private and public. Private patriarchy is based upon household production as the main site of women's oppression. Public patriarchy is based principally in public sites such as employment and the state. The household does not cease to be a patriarchal structure in the public form, but it is no longer the chief site. In private patriarchy the expropriation of women's labour takes place primarily by individual patriarchs within the household, while in the public form it is a more collective appropriation. In private patriarchy the principle patriarchal strategy is exclusionary; in the public it is segregationist and subordinating.

The change from private to public patriarchy involves a change both in the relations between the structures and within the structures. In the private form household production is the dominant structure; in the public form it is replaced by employment and the state. In each form all the remaining patriarchal structures are present – there is simply a change in which are dominant. There is also a change in the institutional forms of patriarchy, with the replacement of a primarily individual form of appropriation of women by a collective one. This takes place within each of the six patriarchal structures. (See Table 1.1.)

Table 1.1   Private and public patriarchy

Form of patriarchy	Private	Public
Dominant structure	Household production	Employment/State
Wider patriarchal structures	Employment State Sexuality Violence Culture	Household production Sexuality Violence Culture
Period	C19th	C20th
Mode of expropriation	Individual	Collective
Patriarchal strategy	Exclusionary	Segregationist

LOIS TYSON

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SECOND EDITION

derives from the Greek word for womb (*hystera*) and refers to psychological disorders deemed peculiar to women and characterized by overemotional, extremely irrational behavior. Feminists don't deny the biological differences between men and women; in fact, many feminists celebrate those differences. But they don't agree that such differences as physical size, shape, and body chemistry make men naturally superior to women: for example, more intelligent, more logical, more courageous, or better leaders. Feminism therefore distinguishes between the word *sex*, which refers to our biological constitution as female or male, and the word *gender*, which refers to our cultural programming as feminine or masculine. In other words, women are not born feminine, and men are not born masculine. Rather, these gender categories are constructed by society, which is why this view of gender is an example of what has come to be called *social constructionism*.

The belief that men are superior to women has been used, feminists have observed, to justify and maintain the male monopoly of positions of economic, political, and social power, in other words, to keep women powerless by denying them the educational and occupational means of acquiring economic, political, and social power. That is, the inferior position long occupied by women in patriarchal society has been culturally, not biologically, produced. For example, it is a patriarchal assumption, rather than a fact, that more women than men suffer from hysteria. But because it has been defined as a female problem, hysterical behavior in men won't be diagnosed as such. Instead, it will be ignored or given another, less damaging name, for example, shortness of temper. Of course, not all men accept patriarchal ideology, and those who don't—those who don't believe, for example, that because men generally have been endowed by nature with stronger muscles, they have been endowed with any other natural superiority—are often derided, by both patriarchal men and women, as weak and unmanly, as if the only way to be a man were to be a patriarchal man.

I call myself a patriarchal woman because I was socially programmed, as are most women and men, *not* to see the ways in which women are oppressed by traditional gender roles. I say that I'm recovering because I learned to recognize and resist that programming. For me, such recognition and resistance will always require effort—I'm recovering rather than recovered—not just because I internalized patriarchal programming years ago but because that program continues to assert itself in my world: in movies, television shows, books, magazines, and advertisements as well as in the attitudes of salespeople who think I can't learn to operate a simple machine, repair technicians who assume I won't know if they've done a shoddy job, and male drivers who believe I'm flattered by sexual offers shouted from passing cars (or, worse, who don't give a moment's thought to how I might feel or, worse yet, who hope I feel intimidated so that they can feel

The Future of Feminism

Sylvia Walby

treating 'reducing gender inequality' as equivalent to feminist; and treating 'promoting the interests of women' as equivalent to feminist.

Self-definition is perhaps the most common approach. A person or project is feminist if they say they are feminist. This approach is consistent with the traditions of the early second wave women's movement in that it is based on a person's own experience. However, there are some difficulties here. The term 'feminist' is contentious – indeed even stigmatised. 'Feminism' is a signifier of something very particular and comes with additional meanings attached, which many seek to avoid. It has acquired connotations of separatism, extremism, men-avoiding lesbianism. This narrowing of the term is partly a product of a hostile opposition, in which feminism is caricatured and ridiculed in segments of the media. The phenomenon is hardly new ('bra-burning' has long been used as an adjective linked to feminism in this way).

This stigmatising of the term 'feminism' had its effects. It has led to the development of the phenomenon of the person who states 'I'm not a feminist but . . .', where the 'but' is followed by an endorsement of goals that are usually thought of as feminist, such as equal pay for equal work and the elimination of male violence against women. As a consequence, other terminology has developed that can be used to signify 'feminist' without resorting to the 'f word' (Redfern and Aune 2010), such as 'gender equality', 'equality', 'equal opportunities' and 'diversity'. There is a further issue concerning the positioning of anti-sexist men in relation to feminism. Even if such men support, and contribute to, feminist goals and projects, there is a question as to whether or not they can be described as 'feminist' on the conventional approach, since men do not usually experience inequality as a result of their gender.

An alternative approach to the definition of feminism is to consider people and projects that pursue the goal of reducing gender inequality to be feminist. This does away with the need for self-definition and for direct experience of gender inequality. There are many people and projects which declare that they seek to reduce gender inequality but do not normally use the label 'feminist'. There are feminists who do not like the connotations that have been attached to the term, but actively support the goals. For example, women who state 'I am not a feminist but . . .' do support feminist goals that would be included by using this alternative approach to definition. Then there are men who actively support the goal of reducing

FEMINIST THOUGHT

A More Comprehensive Introduction

ROSEMARIE TONG

Disagreeing with radical-libertarian feminists that a turn to androgyny is a liberation strategy for women, radical-cultural feminists argue against this move in one of three ways. Some anti-androgynists maintain the problem is not femininity in and of itself, but rather the low value that patriarchy assigns to feminine qualities such as "gentleness, modesty, humility, supportiveness, empathy, compassionateness, tenderness, nurturance, intuitiveness, sensitivity, unselfishness," and the high value it assigns to masculine qualities such as "assertiveness, aggressiveness, hardiness, rationality or the ability to think logically, abstractly and analytically, ability to control emotion."[5] They claim that if society can learn to value "feminine" traits as much as "masculine" traits, women's oppression will be a bad memory. Other anti-androgynists object, insisting femininity *is* the problem because it has been constructed by men for patriarchal purposes. In order to be liberated, women must reject femininity as it has been constructed for them and give it an entirely new meaning. Femininity should no longer be understood as those traits that deviate from masculinity. On the contrary, femininity should be understood as a way of being that needs no reference point external to it. Still other anti-androgynists, reverting to a "nature theory," argue that despite patriarchy's imposition of a false, or inauthentic, *feminine* nature upon women, many women have nonetheless rebelled against it, unearthing their true, or authentic, *female* nature instead. Full personal freedom for a woman consists, then, in her ability to renounce her false feminine self in favor of her true female self.

As difficult as it is to fully reflect the range of radical feminist thought on gender, it is even more difficult to do so with respect to sexuality. Radical-libertarian feminists argue that no specific kind of sexual experience should be prescribed as *the* best kind for women.[6] Every woman should be encouraged to experiment sexually with herself, with other women, and with men. Although heterosexuality can be dangerous for women within a patriarchal society, women must nonetheless feel free to follow the lead of their own desires, embracing men if that is their choice.

Radical-cultural feminists disagree. They stress that through pornography, prostitution, sexual harassment, rape, and woman battering,[7] through foot binding, suttee, purdah, clitoridectomy, witch burning, and gynecology,[8] men have controlled women's sexuality for male pleasure. Thus, in order to be liberated, women must escape the confines of heterosexuality and create an exclusively female sexuality through celibacy, autoeroticism, or lesbianism.[9] Only alone, or with other women, can women discover the true pleasure of sex.

Radical feminist thought is as diverse on issues related to reproduction as it is on matters related to sexuality. Radical-libertarian feminists claim biological motherhood drains women physically and psychologically.[10] Women

1

Liberal Feminism

Liberalism, the school of political thought from which liberal feminism has evolved, is in the process of reconceptualizing, reconsidering, and restructuring itself.[1] Because this transformation is well under way, it is difficult to determine the precise status of liberal feminist thought. Therefore, if we wish to gauge the accuracy of Susan Wendell's provocative claim that liberal feminism has largely outgrown its original base,[2] we must first understand the assumptions of both classical and welfare liberalism. It may turn out that liberal feminists are "liberal" only in some ways.

Conceptual Roots of Liberal Feminist Thought and Action

In *Feminist Politics and Human Nature*,[3] Alison Jaggar observed that liberal political thought generally locates our uniqueness as human persons in our capacity for rationality. The belief that reason distinguishes us from other animals is, however, relatively uninformative, so liberals have attempted to define reason in various ways, stressing either its *moral* aspects or its *prudential* aspects. When reason is defined as the ability to comprehend the rational principles of morality, then the value of individual autonomy is stressed. In contrast, when reason is defined as the ability to determine the best means to achieve some desired end, then the value of self-fulfillment is stressed.[4]

Whether liberals define reason largely in moral or prudential terms, they nevertheless concur that a just society allows individuals to exercise their autonomy and to fulfill themselves. Liberals claim that the "right" must be given priority over the "good."[5] In other words, our entire system of individual rights is justified because these rights constitute a framework within which we can all choose our own separate goods, provided we do not deprive others

of theirs. Such a priority defends religious freedom, for example, neither on the grounds that it will increase the general welfare nor on the grounds that a godly life is inherently worthier than a godless one, but simply on the grounds that people have a right to practice their own brand of spirituality. The same holds for all those rights we generally identify as fundamental.

The proviso that the right takes priority over the good complicates the construction of a just society. For if it is true, as most liberals claim, that resources are limited and each individual, even when restrained by altruism,[6] has an interest in securing as many available resources as possible, then it will be a challenge to create political, economic, and social institutions that maximize the individual's freedom without jeopardizing the community's welfare.

When it comes to state interventions in the private sphere (family or domestic society),[7] liberals agree that the less we see of Big Brother in our bedrooms, bathrooms, kitchens, recreation rooms, and nurseries, the better. We all need places where we can, among family and friends, shed our public personae and be our "real" selves. When it comes to state intervention in the public sphere (civil or political society),[8] however, a difference of opinion emerges between so-called classical, or libertarian, liberals on the one hand, and so-called welfare, or egalitarian, liberals on the other.[9]

Classical liberals think the state should confine itself to protecting civil liberties (e.g., property rights, voting rights, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association). They also think that, instead of interfering with the free market, the state should simply provide everyone with an equal opportunity to determine his or her own accumulations within that market. In contrast, welfare liberals believe the state should focus on economic disparities as well as civil liberties. As they see it, individuals enter the market with differences based on initial advantage, inherent talent, and sheer luck. At times, these differences are so great that some individuals cannot take their fair share of what the market has to offer unless some adjustments are made to offset their liabilities. Because of this perceived state of affairs, welfare liberals call for government interventions in the economy such as legal services, school loans, food stamps, low-cost housing, Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, and Aid to Families with Dependent Children so that the market does not perpetuate or otherwise solidify huge inequalities.

Although both classical-liberal and welfare-liberal streams of thought appear in liberal feminist thought, most contemporary liberal feminists seem to favor welfare liberalism. In fact, when Susan Wendell (not herself a liberal feminist) described contemporary liberal feminist thought, she stressed it is "committed to major economic re-organization and considerable redistribution of wealth, since one of the modern political goals most closely associated with liberal feminism is

equality of opportunity, which would undoubtedly require and lead to both."[10] Very few, if any, contemporary liberal feminists favor the elimination of government-funded safety nets for society's most vulnerable members.

Since it is nearly impossible to discuss all liberal feminist thinkers, movements, and organizations in a single book, I have decided to focus only on Mary Wollstonecraft, John Stuart Mill, Harriet Taylor (Mill), the woman's suffrage movement in the United States, Betty Friedan, and the National Organization for Women. My aim is to construct a convincing argument that, for all its shortcomings, the overall goal of liberal feminism is the worthy one of creating "a just and compassionate society in which freedom flourishes."[11] Only in such a society can women and men thrive equally.

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ANALYSIS OF LIBERAL FEMINISM IN THE NOVEL MULAN'S SECRET PLAN BY TESSA ROEHL

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Abstract — The aims of this study are to identify the liberal feminism that found in the novel *Mulan's Secret Plan by Tessa Roehl*. In liberal feminism women should have a same right and same opportunity as a man. The liberal feminism could be seen in the character of Mulan in the novel *Mulan's Secret Plan*. Mulan struggled for her right to get educational opportunities same as man and struggle for her right to freely choose what she wants to do. In order to understand how the aspect of liberal feminism were found in the novel, the theory of liberal feminism proposed by (Tong, 2008) were utilized in this study. This study used observation method to collect the data and qualitative method to analyze data. The result of this study indicates the aspect of liberal feminism in Mulan character were equal education and equal liberty.

Keywords — Liberal feminism; Novel *Mulan's Secret Plan*; Equal Liberty; Equal Education.

### 3.	Materials and Method

3.1 Materials

Liberal Feminism

According to Rosemarie Tong's in her book *Feminist Thought* (Tong, 2008), there are some aspects that become the focus for the women struggle such as equal education, equal liberty, equal right as explained further below.

Equal Education

Women as well as men have this capacity. Thus, society owes girls the same education that it owes to boys, simply because all human beings deserve an equal chance to develop their rational and moral capacities so that they can achieve full personhood. For example, woman do not only help their parents at home to take care of the farm or to handle their household works. They should be educated so they are able to have a good rational and moral abilities such as patience, obedience and flexibility by which then they are able to develop their confidence and take care and educate their children better. Because of that women should have opportunities in education in the same way as men written by (Tong, 2008).

Equal Liberty

The ordinary way to maximize happiness is to permit individuals to pursue their desires, provided the individuals do not hinder or obstruct each other in the process. If sexual equality, or gender justice want to be achieved, then the political right and economic opportunity of the women must be provided by the society through the same education that men enjoy. For example, women are liberty to determine what careers they want to do, they are free to choose whether to handle households or go outside to work. They can lead a company or do another job in the same way as man do without care about the gender (Tong, 2008).

Equal Right

As human beings, woman is the same as men. Therefore, women have a right to equal treatment. Women need economic opportunities and sexual freedom as well as civil liberties to be fully liberated. All citizens have the same right to take part in the government of his or her country. One of them is the right for suffrage in order to become men's equals. They claim that the vote gives people the power not only to express their own political views but also to change those systems, structures, and attitudes that contribute to

energy on idle entertainments, she will manage her household—especially her children—"properly."[20] But it would be a mistake to think that most of Wollstonecraft's arguments for educational parity were utilitarian. On the contrary, her overall line of reasoning in *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman* was remarkably similar to Immanuel Kant's overall line of reasoning in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*—namely, that unless a person acts autonomously, he or she acts as less than a fully human person.[21] Wollstonecraft insisted if rationality is the capacity distinguishing human beings from animals, then unless females are mere animals (a description most men refuse to apply to their own mothers, wives, and daughters), women as well as men have this capacity. Thus, society owes girls the same education that it owes boys, simply because all human beings deserve an equal chance to develop their rational and moral capacities so they can achieve full personhood.

Repeatedly, Wollstonecraft celebrated reason, usually at the expense of emotion. As Jane Roland Martin said, "In making her case for the rights of women . . . [Wollstonecraft] presents us with an ideal of female education that gives pride of place to traits traditionally associated with males at the expense of others traditionally associated with females."[22] It did not occur to Wollstonecraft to question the value of these traditional male traits. Nor did it occur to her to blame children's lack of virtue on their absentee fathers, who should be summoned, in her view, only when "chastisement" is necessary.[23] On the contrary, she simply assumed traditional male traits were "good," and women—not men—were the ones who were rationally and morally deficient.

Overall, Mill went further than Wollstonecraft did in challenging men's alleged intellectual superiority. Stressing that men's and women's intellectual abilities are of the same *kind*, Wollstonecraft nonetheless entertained the thought that women might not be able to attain the same *degree* of knowledge that men could attain.[46] Mill expressed no such reservation. He insisted intellectual achievement gaps between men and women were simply the result of men's more thorough education and privileged position. In fact, Mill was so eager to establish that men are not intellectually superior to women that he tended to err in the opposite direction, by valorizing women's attention to details, use of concrete examples, and intuitiveness as a superior form of knowledge not often found in men.[47]

Unlike Taylor, and despite his high regard for women's intellectual abilities, Mill assumed most women would continue to choose family over career even under ideal circumstances—with marriage a free contract between real equals, legal separation and divorce easily available to wives, and jobs open to women living outside the husband-wife relationship. He also assumed that women's choice of family over career was entirely voluntary and that such a choice involved women consenting to put their other interests in life on the back burner until their children were adults: "Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman marries, it may in general be understood that she makes choice of the management of a household, and the bringing up of a family, as the first call upon her exertions, during as many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; and that she renounces not all other objects and occupations, but all which are not consistent with the requirements of this."[48] Mill's words attested to his apparent belief that ultimately, women, more than men, are responsible for maintaining family life. However enlightened his general views about women were, Mill could not overcome the belief that she who bears the children is the person best suited to rear them.

As noted, Taylor disagreed with Mill that truly liberated women would be willing to stay at home to rear their children to adulthood. Yet, like Mill, Taylor was fundamentally a reformist, not a revolutionary. To be sure, by inviting married women with children as well as single women to work outside the home, Taylor did challenge the traditional division of labor within the family, where the man earns the money and the woman manages its use. But Taylor's challenge to this aspect of the status quo did not go far enough. For example, it did not occur to her that if husbands were to parent alongside their wives and if domestic duties were equally divided, then both husbands and wives could work outside the home on a full-time basis, and working wives with children would not have to work a "double day" or hire a "panoply" of female servants to do *their* housework and childcare.

Nineteenth-Century Action: The Suffrage

Both John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill believed women needed suffrage in order to become men's equals. They claimed the vote gives people the power not only to express their own political views but also to change those systems, structures, and attitudes that contribute to their own and/or others' oppression. Thus, it is not surprising that the nineteenth-century U.S. women's rights movement, including the woman suffrage movement, was tied to the abolitionist movement, though not always in ways that successfully married gender and race concerns.[49]

When white men and women began to work in earnest for the abolition of slavery, it soon became clear to female abolitionists that male abolitionists were reluctant to link the women's rights movement with the slaves' rights movement. Noting it was difficult for whites (or was it simply white *men?*) to view women (or was it simply *white* women?) as an oppressed group, male abolitionists persuaded female abolitionists to disassociate women's liberty struggles from blacks' liberty struggles. Indeed, male abolitionists even convinced famed feminist orator Lucy Stone to lecture on abolition instead of women's rights whenever her audience size was noticeably large.[50]

Convinced their male colleagues would reward them for being team players, the U.S. women who attended the 1840 World Anti-Slavery Convention in London thought that women would play a major role at the meeting. Nothing could have proved less true. Not even Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, two of the most prominent leaders of the U.S. women's rights movement, were allowed to speak at the meeting. Angered by the way in which the men at the convention had silenced women, Mott and Stanton vowed to hold a women's rights convention upon their return to the United States. Eight years later, in 1848, three hundred women and men met in Seneca Falls, New York, and produced a Declaration of Sentiments and twelve resolutions. Modeled on the Declaration of Independence, the Declaration of Sentiments stressed the issues Mill and Taylor had emphasized in England, particularly the need for reforms in marriage, divorce, property, and child custody laws. The twelve resolutions emphasized women's rights to express themselves in public—to speak out on the burning issues of the day, especially "in regard to the great subjects of morals and religion," which women were supposedly more qualified to address than men.[51] The only one of these resolutions the Seneca Falls Convention did not unanimously endorse was Resolution 9, Susan B. Anthony's Woman's Suffrage Resolution: "Resolved, that it is the duty of the women of this country to secure to themselves their

sacred right to the franchise."[52] Many convention delegates were reluctant to press such an "extreme" demand for fear that all of their demands would be rejected. Still, with the help of abolitionist Frederick Douglass, Resolution 9 did manage to pass.

Assessing the Seneca Falls Convention from the vantage point of the twentieth century, critics observe that, with the exception of Lucretia Mott's hastily added resolution to secure for women "an equal participation with men in the various trades, professions, and commerce,"[53] the nineteenth-century meeting failed to address class concerns such as those that troubled underpaid white female mill and factory workers. Moreover, the convention rendered black women nearly invisible. In the same way that the abolitionist movement had focused on the rights of black *men*, the nineteenth-century women's rights movement focused on the rights of mostly privileged *white* women. Neither white women nor white men seemed to notice much about black women.

Yet, many working-class white women and black women did contribute to the nineteenth-century women's rights movement. In fact, some black women were exceptionally gifted feminist orators. For example, Sojourner Truth delivered her often quoted speech on behalf of women at an 1851 women's rights convention in Akron, Ohio. Responding to a group of male hecklers, who taunted that it was ludicrous for (white) women to desire the vote since they could not even step over a puddle or get into a horse carriage without male assistance, Sojourner Truth pointed out that no man had ever extended such help to her. Demanding the audience look at her black body, Sojourner Truth proclaimed that her "womanhood," her "female nature," had never prevented her from working, acting, and yes, speaking like a man: "I have ploughed, and planted, and gathered into barns and no man could head me! And ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man—when I could get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen children and seen them most all sold off to slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain't I a woman?"[54]

As the fates would have it, the Civil War began just as the women's rights movement was gaining momentum. Seeing in this tragic war their best opportunity to free the slaves, male abolitionists again asked feminists to put women's causes on the back burner, which they reluctantly did. But the end of the Civil War did not bring women's liberation with it, and feminists increasingly found themselves at odds with recently emancipated black men. Concerned that women's rights would again be lost in the struggle to secure black (men's) rights, the male as well as female delegates to an 1866 national women's rights convention decided to establish an Equal Rights Association.

Co-chaired by Frederick Douglass and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, the association had as its announced purpose the unification of the black (men's) and woman suffrage struggles. There is considerable evidence, however, that Stanton and some of her co-workers actually "perceived the organization as a means to ensure that Black men would not receive the franchise unless and until white women were also its recipients."[55] Unmoved by Douglass's and Truth's observation that on account of their extreme vulnerability, black men needed the vote even more than women did, Anthony and Stanton were among those who successfully argued for the dissolution of the Equal Rights Association for fear that the association might indeed endorse the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, which enfranchised black men but not women.

Upon the dissolution of the Equal Rights Association, Anthony and Stanton established the National Woman Suffrage Association. At approximately the same time, Lucy Stone, who had some serious philosophical disagreements with Stanton and especially Anthony about the role of organized religion in women's oppression, founded the American Woman Suffrage Association. Henceforward, the U.S. women's rights movement would be split in two.

In the main, the National Woman Suffrage Association forwarded a revolutionary feminist agenda for women, whereas the American Woman Suffrage Association pushed a reformist feminist agenda. Most American women gravitated toward the more moderate American Woman Suffrage Association. By the time these two associations merged in 1890 to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association, the wide-ranging, vociferous women's rights movement of the early nineteenth century had been transformed into the single-issue, relatively tame woman's suffrage movement of the late nineteenth century. From 1890 until 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was passed, the National American Woman Suffrage Association confined almost all of its activities to gaining the vote for women. Victorious after fifty-two years of concerted struggle, many of the exhausted suffragists chose to believe that simply by gaining the vote, women had indeed become men's equals.[56]

in her 1975 article "The Conservatism of *Ms.*," which faulted *Ms.* magazine, the most widely recognized publication of liberal feminism, for imposing a pseudofeminist "party line." After describing this line at length, Willis noted its overall message was a denial of women's pressing need to overthrow patriarchy and capitalism and an affirmation of women's supposed ability to make it in the "system." Whatever *Ms.* has to offer women, insisted Ellis, it is not feminism:

> At best, Ms.'s self-improvement, individual-liberation philosophy is relevant only to an elite; basically it is an updated women's magazine fantasy. Instead of the sexy chick or the perfect homemaker, we now have a new image to live up to: the liberated woman. This fantasy, misrepresented as feminism, misleads some women, convinces others that "women's lib" has nothing to do with them, and plays into the hands of those who oppose any real change in women's condition.[126]

Willis's criticism may have been on target at the time, but *Ms.* has changed since the mid-1970s. Its editors have featured articles that show, for example, how classism, racism, and heterosexism intersect with sexism, thereby doubling, tripling, and even quadrupling the oppression of some women. Moreover, liberal feminists have, with few exceptions,[127] moved away from their traditional belief that any woman who wants to can liberate herself "individually" by "throwing off" her conditioning and "unilaterally" rejecting "femininity."[128] They now believe that achieving even a modest goal such as "creating equal employment opportunity for women" calls for much more than the effort of individual women; it will require the effort of a whole society committed to "giving girls and boys the same early education and ending sex prejudice, which in turn will require major redistribution of resources and vast changes in consciousness."[129] Sexual equality cannot be achieved through individual women's willpower alone. Also necessary are major alterations in people's deepest social and psychological structures.

In a 2002 article entitled "Essentialist Challenges to Liberal Feminism," Ruth E. Groenhout argued that feminists who are not liberal feminists should reconsider their wholesale rejection of liberalism. Specifically, she suggested that, properly interpreted, the liberal view of human nature is not quite as bad as Jaggar and Elshtain portrayed it. As Groenhout understands it, the liberal picture of human nature contains "a crucial aspect of the feminist analysis of the wrongness of sexist oppression."[130]

Sexual oppression, and social systems that perpetuate sexual oppression, are morally evil because they limit or deny women's capacity to reflect on and

for women's way of acting is rooted deep in women's psyche, specifically, in women's way of thinking about themselves as women. Relying on Freudian constructs such as the pre-Oedipal stage and the Oedipal stage (explained below) and/or on Lacanian constructs such as the Symbolic order (also explained below), they claim that gender identity and hence gender inequity is rooted in a series of infantile and early childhood experiences. These experiences, most of which are accessible to us only through psychoanalysis, are, in the estimation of psychoanalytic feminists, the cause of individuals' viewing themselves in masculine or feminine terms, of thinking of themselves as boys or girls. Moreover, these same experiences are the cause of society's privileging things "masculine" over things "feminine." Hypothesizing that in a nonpatriarchal society, masculinity and femininity would be both differently constructed and valued, psychoanalytic feminists recommend that we work toward such a society by altering our early infantile childhood experiences or, more radically, transforming the linguistic structures that cause us to think of ourselves as men or women.

Sigmund Freud

By no means was Sigmund Freud a feminist, yet psychoanalytic feminists have found in his writings clues about how to better understand the causes and consequences of women's oppression. Freud's theories about psychosexual development disturbed his late-nineteenth-century Viennese contemporaries not so much because he addressed traditionally taboo topics (e.g., homosexuality, sadism, masochism, and oral and anal sex), but because he theorized that all sexual "aberrations," "variations," and "perversions" are simply stages in the development of *normal* human sexuality.[1] According to Freud, children go through distinct psychosexual developmental stages, and their gender identity as adults is the result of how well or badly they have weathered this process. Masculinity and femininity are, in other words, the product of sexual maturation. If boys develop "normally" (i.e., typically), they will end up as men who display expected masculine traits; if women develop "normally," they will end up as women who display expected feminine traits.

The theoretical bases for Freud's views on the relationship between sex and gender are found in *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sexuality.* In this work, Freud laid out his theory of psychosexual development in detail. Because adults in Freud's time equated sexual activity with reproductive genital sexuality (heterosexual intercourse), adults thought children were sexless. Dismissing this view of children's sexualities as naive, Freud argued that far from being without sexual interests, children engage in all sorts of sexual behavior. He claimed that children's sexuality is "polymorphous perverse"—that insofar as the infant is

concerned, her or his entire body, especially its orifices and appendages, is sexual terrain. The infant moves from this type of "perverse" sexuality to "normal" heterosexual genital sexuality by passing through several stages. During the *oral* stage, the infant receives pleasure from sucking her or his mother's breast or her or his own thumb. During the *anal* stage, the two- or three-year-old child enjoys the sensations associated with controlling the expulsion of her or his feces. During the *phallic* stage, the three- or four-year-old child discovers that the genitals are a source of pleasure, and either resolves or fails to resolve the so-called Oedipus complex. Around age six, the child ceases to display overt sexuality and begins a period of latency that ends around puberty, when the young person enters the *genital* stage characterized by a resurgence of sexual impulses. If all goes normally during this stage, the young person's libido (defined by Freud as undifferentiated sexual energy) will be directed outward, away from autoerotic and homoerotic stimulation and toward a member of the opposite sex.

Freud stressed that the critical moment in the psychosexual drama described above occurs when the child tries to successfully resolve the Oedipus complex. He claimed that the fact that only boys have penises fundamentally affects the way in which boys and girls undergo psychosexual development. The boy's Oedipus complex stems from his natural attachment to his mother, for it is she who nurtures him. Because of the boy's feelings toward his mother, he wants to possess her—to have sexual intercourse with her—and to kill his father, the rival for his mother's attentions. Freud added, however, that the boy's hatred of his father is modulated by his coexisting love for his father. Because the boy wants his father to love him, he competes with his mother for his father's affections, experiencing increased antagonism toward her. Nevertheless, despite his increased antagonism toward his mother, the boy still wishes to possess her and would attempt to take her from his father were it not for his fear of being punished by his father. Supposedly, having seen either his mother or some other female naked, the boy speculates that these creatures without penises must have been castrated, by his father, no less. Shaken by this thought, the boy fears his father will castrate him, too, should he dare to act on his desire for his mother. Therefore, the boy distances himself from his mother, a painful process that propels him into a period of sexual latency that will not surface again until the time of puberty.[2]

During the period of sexual latency, the boy begins to develop what Freud called a superego. To the degree the superego is the son's internalization of his father's values, it is a patriarchal, social conscience. The boy who successfully resolves the Oedipus complex develops a particularly strong superego. In the course of giving up mother love (albeit out of fear of castration), he learns how to defer to the authority of his father. The boy waits his turn for his own

8

Postmodern and Third-Wave Feminism

Feminist thought has increased in diversity during the last quarter century. It is no longer in its adolescence; indeed it is adult in its intellectual maturity. But like flesh-and-blood human adults, feminist thought is in the throes of a midlife crisis. Among the many identity challenges it faces are the emergence and growing popularity of postmodern feminism and third-wave feminism.

Because the relationship between postmodernism and feminism is an uneasy one, feminists who classify themselves as postmodern feminists often have difficulty explaining how they can be both postmodern and feminist. Like all postmodernists, postmodern feminists reject phallogocentric thought, that is, ideas ordered around an absolute word (logos) that is "male" in style (hence the reference to the phallus). In addition, postmodern feminists reject any mode of feminist thought that aims to provide a single explanation for why women are oppressed or *the* ten or so steps *all* women must take to achieve liberation. Indeed, some postmodern feminists are so mistrustful of traditional feminist thought that they eschew it altogether. For example, Hélène Cixous wanted nothing to do with terms such as *feminist* and *lesbian*. She claimed these words are parasitic on phallogocentric thought because they connote "deviation from a norm instead of a free sexual option or a place of solidarity with women."[1] It is better, she said, for women seeking liberation to avoid such terms, because they signal a unity that blocks difference. Although postmodern feminists' refusal to develop one overarching explanation and solution for women's oppression poses major problems for feminist theory, this refusal also adds needed fuel to the feminist fires of plurality, multiplicity, and difference. Postmodern feminists invite each woman who reflects on their writings to become the kind of feminist she wants to be. There is, in their estimation, no single formula for being a "good feminist."

7

Ecofeminism

Like multicultural, postcolonial, and global feminists, ecofeminists high-light the multiple ways in which human beings oppress each other, but these theorists also focus on human beings' domination of the nonhuman world, or nature. Because women are culturally tied to nature, ecofeminists argue there are conceptual, symbolic, and linguistic connections between feminist and ecological issues. According to Karen J. Warren, the Western world's basic beliefs, values, attitudes, and assumptions about itself and its inhabitants have been shaped by an oppressive patriarchal conceptual framework, the purpose of which is to explain, justify, and maintain relationships of domination and subordination in general and men's domination of women in particular. The most significant features of this framework are:

1. value-hierarchical thinking, namely, "up-down" thinking, which places higher value, status, or prestige on what is "up" rather than on what is "down"
2. value dualisms, that is, disjunctive pairs in which the disjuncts are seen as oppositional (rather than as complementary) and exclusive (rather than as inclusive) and that place higher value (status, prestige) on one disjunct rather than the other (e.g., dualisms that give higher value or status to that which has historically been identified as "mind," "reason," and "male" than to that which has historically been identified as "body," "emotion," and "female")
3. logic of domination, that is, a structure of argumentation that leads to a justification of subordination.[1]

believers in the "megamachine" myth. This myth espouses the view that human beings can use their minds and tools not only to extend control over nature and everything identified with nature—woman, the body, life, death, and so on—but also to make huge monetary profits in doing so. According to Dinnerstein, this myth will continue to rule our thoughts and actions unless we end the present division of the world into male and female (culture and nature) and the assignments of women to nature (child-rearing as well as childbearing) and men to culture (world building). Women must bring nature into culture (by entering the public world), and men must bring culture into nature (by entering the private world). Then and only then will we see that men and women (culture and nature) are *one* and that it is counterproductive for half of reality to try to dominate the other half. A reality, divided and at war with itself, cannot and will not survive. Thus, Dinnerstein proclaimed, "The core meaning of feminism . . . lies, at this point, in its relations to earthly life's survival."[58] Unless men and women get their act together and start behaving like adults instead of infants, the human species can expect a rapid demise.

Karen J. Warren

Like Dinnerstein, Karen J. Warren emphasized that the dualisms threatening to destroy us are social constructions. In a capitalist, patriarchal society, women and nature, men and culture, have certain meanings, but these meanings are far from necessary. They would be very different in a socialist, nonpatriarchal society. For example, they would be very different in the kind of society Marge Piercy posited in *Woman on the Edge of Time*, a work of fiction in which people rejected all dualisms, beginning with the male-female dichotomy (see Chapter 2). In Mattapoisett, Piercy's utopia that we described earlier, babies are born from brooders and raised by three co-mothers (of both sexes). Since both men and women mother—the men even lactate and nurse—both men and women also work. Piercy's society is also one in which the line between nature and culture is largely nonexistent. Although Mattapoisett is agriculturally oriented, it is also technologically advanced. Almost totally mechanized factories do the society's drudge work and heavy labor, producing the tools and commodities necessary to sustain a system of military *defense* (not offense), agricultural production, a limited (nonpolluting) transportation system, and a comfortable lifestyle for everyone. People's work is both socially useful and personally rewarding, and there is nothing that resembles a sexual division of labor. Work is based entirely on people's abilities and proclivities, with a modicum of unpleasant work (e.g., waste disposal) equally distributed to all people. As the result of serious efforts to control the

earth when you die, to become nourishment for the earth, and for the sister flowers, and for the brother deer. It is appropriate that you should offer this blessing for the four-legged and, in due time, reciprocate in turn with your body in this way, as the four-legged gives life to you for your survival.[68]

The lesson the Sioux grandfather taught his grandson about hunting is clearly far more ecofeminist (antinaturist and antisexist) than the lesson the typical "great white hunter" would teach his grandson about hunting for the fun or sport of it, for the pleasure of the kill. The Sioux hunting lesson is one that informs us how people whose conceptual schemes are not oppositional see themselves in *relationship* to nonhuman nature. Nevertheless, the Sioux hunting lesson is not fully ecofeminist, for it does not proceed from a gender analysis. Moreover, it arose in a culture that treats women as less than men's equals. This last observation suggests, contrary to what Warren asserts, that even in a culture where women are no more identified with nature than men are, sexism might still exist.

According to Warren, of the four major schools of traditional feminist thought (liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist), the socialist comes closest to providing the theoretical basis from which to launch transformative ecofeminist practices.[69] Liberal feminism is deficient, in Warren's estimation, because it maintains dualisms such as culture-nature, mind-body, and rational-emotional. Like liberalism, liberal feminism emphasizes the value of individualism and independence as opposed to the importance of weblike relationships and the connectedness of all forms of life and natural resources.[70] Thus, liberal feminism is not particularly compatible with ecology; indeed, its theoretical basis seems to be at odds with ecology.

Marxist feminism is inadequate for very different reasons, thought Warren. Marxist feminists, like Marxists, believe physical labor is the essential human activity that transforms natural, material resources into products for human exchange and consumption. This theoretical approach allows little if any room for concerns about nature, since Marxists and Marxist feminists place liberated "men and women, as one class, over and against nature."[71] Moreover, in setting the human world over and against the nonhuman world, Marxist feminism fails to appreciate just how closely women's oppression is linked with nature's oppression. To set women in opposition to nature is to set women in opposition to themselves in a profound way.[72]

Finally, claimed Warren, radical feminism is inadequate because it unwittingly "assumes the very nature-culture split that ecofeminism denies" by requiring women either to embrace (radical-cultural feminists) or to reject

size of the population, Mattapoisett's communities are small, self-sufficient, and very democratic. People have time for play as well as work. Indeed, inhabitants of Mattapoisett are anything but workaholics. They enjoy both the serenity of the natural world and the excitement of the "holies," a highly developed cinematic/multisensory experience. Persons are both masculine and feminine; society is both natural and cultural.[59]

Wanting very much to reconceptualize nature and culture as well as man and woman, Warren claimed feminists must be ecofeminists—without insisting, as Piercy did, that women must forsake their special role in biological reproduction.[60] Warren argued that, *logically*, feminism is just as much a movement to end naturism as it is a movement to end sexism:

(C1) Feminism is a movement to end sexism.
(C2) But sexism is conceptually linked with naturism (through an oppressive conceptual framework characterized by a logic of domination).
(C3) Thus, feminism is (also) a movement to end naturism.[61]

All forms of oppression are interlocked and intertwined. Oppression is a many-headed beast that will continue to exist and regenerate itself until human beings manage *completely* to behead it.

Focusing on the kind of ethics currently informing environmentalism, Warren noted there are within it many sexist elements, or male biases, that undermine its ability to "save the earth." Only an ecofeminist ethics—an ethics free of androcentric as well as anthropocentric distortions—can overcome naturism once and for all. Such an ethics, said Warren, must be a "care-sensitive ethics."[62]

In elaborating her preferred ecofeminist ethics, Warren claimed it had eight "necessary" or "boundary" conditions. First, an ecofeminist ethics is a theory-in-process that evolves together with people. Second, an ecofeminist ethics is entirely "opposed to any 'ism' that presupposes or advances a logic of domination."[63] No thread of sexism, racism, classism, naturism, or other ism may be woven into the ecofeminist quilt. Third, and very importantly, an ecofeminist ethics is a contextualist ethics that invites people to narrate their relationships: to specify *how* they relate to humans, nonhuman animals, and nature. Fourth, if it is anything, said Warren, an ecofeminist ethics is an inclusivist ethics that acknowledges, respects, and welcomes difference. Unlike an exclusivist ethics, an inclusivist ethics is empirically unbiased; that is, it passes the "R-4 test" for *good* generalizations about different sorts of human beings, nonhuman animals, and nature.[64] By making sure that its empirical claims are based on data that is (1) representative, (2) random, (3) the right

(ed. Maynard Solomon, 1979) and *Marxist Literary Theory: A Reader* (eds. Terry Eagleton and Drew Milne, 1996). Overviews are Terry Eagleton's *Marxism and Literary Criticism* (1976) and Philip Goldstein's *The Politics of Literary Theory: An Introduction to Marxist Criticism* (1990). A focus on an individual author is Jean Howard and Scott Shershow's *Marxist Shakespeares* (2000).

Feminist and Gender Criticism

Influence of feminist criticism.   Feminist and gender criticism have much in common with reader-response and new historicist criticism, especially with critics who, like Stanley Fish, believe that interpretations of literature are influenced by communities of readers. We include it here under "All of Reality" because it bases its interpretations on ideas about the nature of females and female experience. With the rise of feminism in the 1950s and 1960s, feminist critics claimed that, over the years, men had controlled the most influential interpretive communities. Men decided which conventions made up "literature" and judged the quality of works. Men wrote the literary histories and drew up the lists of "great" works— the literary canon. Because works by and about women were largely omitted from the canon, female authors were ignored, and female characters misconstrued.

Since the 1960s, feminist literary critics have successfully challenged these circumstances. Far more women now teach, interpret, evaluate, and theorize about literature than ever before. Previously neglected works such as Zora Neale Hurston's *Their Eyes Were Watching God* (1937), Kate Chopin's *The Awakening* (1899), Charlotte Perkins Gilman's "The Yellow Wallpaper" (1892), and Rebecca Harding Davis's *Life in the Iron-Mills* (1861) are now widely read. Certain literary genres practiced by women, such as diaries, journals, and letters, have gained more respect. Numerous anthologies, literary histories, and interpretive studies explore women's contributions to literature. Recently, however, a new movement, "gender studies," has evolved out of feminist studies in order to address broader issues; notably, the nature of both femininity and masculinity, the differences within each sex, and the literary treatment of men and homosexuals. Gender studies "complicate" feminist studies because, although they share many interests, they are not exactly the same. Both, however, are political in that they argue for the fair representation and treatment of persons of all "genders."

Foucault. Gender criticism, perhaps because it is so new, remains a nebulous, difficult-to-define approach to the study of literature. It covers almost anything having to do with "gender," including feminist criticism, theories of cultural influence, and crimes such as sexual abuse. One of the most important aspects of gender criticism is its exploration of the literary treatment of homosexuality. As with new historicism, the theorist who most influences gender studies is Michel Foucault. The first volume of his three-volume study *The History of Sexuality* (1976) states his basic ideas about sexuality. The Western concept of "sexuality," Foucault maintains, is not a universal category but was invented in the late nineteenth century. Sexuality in the modern West is not innate or biological but is instead a matrix of concepts created by society. Society, in other words, "constructs" sexuality. These concepts constitute an "ideology" that benefits people in power, most notably bourgeois capitalists. Like all ideologies, this one is manifested in discourses such as religion, science, politics, medicine, and literature.

Some gender critics disagree with Foucault's heavy emphasis on cultural determinism. They believe that sexual identity, including homosexuality, results from biological rather than cultural causes. Gay criticism (which deals with men) and lesbian criticism (which focuses on females) at first espoused homosexuality as no less "natural" and "normal" than heterosexuality. Gay and lesbian "pride" meant coming out of the closet, accepting a common identity, and joining the struggle against homophobia. Gay and lesbian critics studied the works and lives of authors who were admitted homosexuals and bisexuals or who seemed to have suppressed homosexual tendencies. They sought to expose the politics of gender in society and literature—how certain groups manipulate concepts of gender for their own benefit.

Queer theory. But *queer theory*, a new and still evolving branch of gay and lesbian criticism, calls into question the "essentialist" concepts of gender held by earlier gay and lesbian critics. As Annamarie Jagose (in *Queer Theory: An Introduction*) says, instead of holding that homosexuality, or any sexuality, is the same for everyone, queer theory embraces the post-structuralist notion that all meanings, including sexual identity, are unstable: "within poststructuralism, the very notion of identity as a coherent and abiding sense of self is perceived as a cultural fantasy rather than a demonstrable fact" (82). Foucault's belief that sexuality is "not an essentially personal attribute but an available cultural category" (79) has greatly influenced queer

4
Feminist criticism

"I'm not a feminist—I like men!"

"I'm not a feminist—I think women should be able to stay at home and raise children if they want to!"

"I'm not a feminist—I wear a bra!"

Contrary to the opinions of many students new to the study of feminist literary criticism, many feminists like men, think that women should be able to stay at home and raise children if they want to do so, and wear bras. Broadly defined, feminist criticism examines the ways in which literature (and other cultural productions) reinforces or undermines the economic, political, social, and psychological oppression of women. However, just as the practitioners of all critical theories do, feminist critics hold many different opinions on all of the issues their discipline examines. In fact, some feminists call their field feminisms in order to underscore the multiplicity of points of view of its adherents and offer ways of thinking that oppose the traditional tendency to believe there is a single best point of view. Yet many of us who are new to the study of feminist theory, both male and female, have decided ahead of time that we are not feminists because we don't share whatever feminist point of view we have found the most objectionable. In other words, before we even come to the theory classroom, many of us have reduced feminism to whatever we consider its most objectionable element and, on that basis, have rejected it. This attitude reveals, I think, the oversimplified, negative view of feminism that still persists in American culture today. For it is from the culture at large—the home, the workplace, the media, and so on—that we have gathered the antifeminist bias we sometimes bring into the classroom.

To see how this negative oversimplification works to blind us to the seriousness of the issues feminism raises, let's briefly examine one of the most maligned feminist claims: that we should not use the masculine pronoun *he* to represent both men and women. For many people, this claim suggests what they see as

the trivial, even infantile, nature of feminist demands. What possible difference could it make if we continue to use the "inclusive *he*" to refer to members of both sexes? We know what we mean when we do it: it's simply a convention of language that includes both males and females. Such people believe that feminists should just concentrate on getting women an equal crack at the dough and forget all this nonsense about pronouns! For many feminists, however, the use of the pronoun *he* to refer to members of both sexes reflects and perpetuates a "habit of seeing," a way of looking at life, that uses male experience as the standard by which the experience of both sexes is evaluated. In other words, although the "inclusive *he*" claims to represent both men and women, in reality it is part of a deeply rooted cultural attitude that ignores women's experiences and blinds us to women's points of view. The damaging effects of this attitude can be seen in a number of areas.

For example, before the centuries-old struggle for women's equality finally emerged in literary studies in the late 1960s, the literary works of (white) male authors describing experience from a (white) male point of view was considered the standard of universality—that is, representative of the experience of all readers—and universality was considered a major criterion of greatness. Because the works of (white) female authors (and of all authors of color) do not describe experience from a (white) male point of view, they were not considered universal and hence did not become part of the literary canon. It is interesting to note that popularity was not necessarily considered evidence of universality, for many women writers who enjoyed widespread fame during their lives were not "canonized" in literary histories, which focused primarily on male writers. Of course, those holding up this standard of greatness did not believe they were being unfairly discriminatory; they simply believed that they were rejecting literary texts that were not universal, that were not great. Even when (white) women authors began to appear more frequently in the canon and on college syllabi in the mid-1970s, they were not represented on an equal basis with (white) male authors.

Even today, unless the critical or historical point of view is feminist, there is a tendency to underrepresent the contribution of women writers. For example, in Matthew J. Bruccoli's preface to recent editions of *The Great Gatsby*, he notes that the 1920s was "an age of achievement . . . in American literature" (x) and lists the names of twelve authors to support his claim. Only one of those authors—Willa Cather—is a woman. What about Ellen Glasgow, Susan Glaspell, Nella Larsen, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Rolla Lynn Riggs, Gertrude Stein, Djuna Barnes, Elizabeth Maddox Roberts, H. D. (Hilda Doolittle), or Marianne Moore? That many students probably recognize only a few of these names illustrates the marginalization of many women writers by literary history, though not necessarily by the reading public at the time these women wrote. Similarly, in most Hollywood films, even today, the camera eye (the point of

view from which the film is shot) is male: the female characters, not male, are the objects gazed on by the camera and often eroticized as if a male eye were viewing them, as if the point of view of the "universal" moviegoer were male.

Perhaps the most chilling example of the damaging effects of this "habit of seeing" is found in the world of modern medicine, where drugs prescribed for both sexes often have been tested on male subjects only. In other words, in laboratory tests to determine the safety of prescription drugs before marketing them, men's responses frequently have been used to gather statistical data on the medications' effectiveness and possible side effects. As a result, women may experience unexpected side effects while male users are unaffected. How could medical scientists not have anticipated this problem? Surely, the cultural habit of seeing male experience as universal played a role.

Traditional gender roles

I offer the above examples up front because I think they show some of the ways in which all of us have been programmed to see (or to be blind), myself included. I consider myself a recovering patriarchal woman. By *patriarchal woman* I mean, of course, a woman who has internalized the norms and values of *patriarchy*, which can be defined, in short, as any culture that privileges men by promoting traditional gender roles. *Traditional gender roles* cast men as rational, strong, protective, and decisive; they cast women as emotional (irrational), weak, nurturing, and submissive. These gender roles have been used very successfully to justify inequities, which still occur today, such as excluding women from equal access to leadership and decision-making positions (in the family as well as in politics, academia, and the corporate world), paying men higher wages than women for doing the same job (if women are even able to obtain the job), and convincing women that they are not fit for careers in such areas as mathematics and engineering. Many people today believe such inequities are a thing of the past because antidiscriminatory laws have been passed, such as the law that guarantees women equal pay for equal work. However, these laws are frequently side-stepped. For example, an employer can pay a woman less for performing the same work as a man (or for doing more work than a man) simply by giving her a different job title. So women still are paid roughly between fifty-five and eighty cents, depending on their ethnicity and age, for every dollar earned by men.

Patriarchy is thus, by definition, *sexist*, which means it promotes the belief that women are innately inferior to men. This belief in the inborn inferiority of women is a form of what is called *biological essentialism* because it is based on biological differences between the sexes that are considered part of our unchanging essence as men and women. A striking illustration is the word *hysteria*, which

First stage. A survey of the history of feminist and gender criticism helps spotlight their concerns. The first stage of feminist criticism began with two influential books: Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1949) and Kate Millet's *Sexual Politics* (1970). Both authors criticized the distorted representation of women by well-known male authors. Their work laid the foundation for the most prevalent approach of this stage, the "images of women" approach. Following de Beauvoir and Millet, feminist critics called attention to the unjust, distorted, and limited representation ("images") of females in works of literature, especially works authored by males. They celebrated realistic representations of women and brought to light neglected works by and about women. They sought to expose the "politics" of self-interest that led people to create stereotypical and false images of women.

Second stage. In the second stage of feminist criticism, beginning in the early 1970s, critics shifted away from works by males to concentrate on works by females. Elaine Showalter, a prominent critic from this period, called this approach "gynocriticism." Especially influential was the work of French critics such as Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, and Hélène Cixous. Their criticism, called *écriture féminine* (female writing), argued for an "essential" (biological, genetic, psychological) difference between men and women that causes women to think and write differently from men. Gynocritics urged women to become familiar with female authors and to discover their own female "language," a language that supposedly enters the subconscious before the "patriarchal" language of the dominant culture. They tried to delineate a female poetics, a use of literary conventions and genres that seems typically "female." Some critics based feminist poetics on the possible connection between writing and the female body. Because women's bodies have more fluids than men's, they argued, women's writing is more "fluid." It is less structured, less unified, more inclusive of many points of view, less given to neat endings, and more open to fantasy than writing by men. It rejects or undermines the "marriage plot" and the "happy ending," in which a strong female protagonist "capitulates" to a male by marrying him. Female poetics seeks to understand why female authors tend to favor certain genres (lyric poetry, novel, short story, tale, letters, diaries, memoirs) over others (epic, martial romance, drama, satire), favored by males.

Third stage. The third stage of feminist criticism rebelled against the "essentialist" assumptions of gynocriticism and is closely allied

with new historicism in its focus on the cultural creation of identity. Gayle Rubin, in two influential essays—"The Traffic in Women" (1975) and "Thinking Sex" (1984)—distinguishes between "sex" and "gender." Whereas *sex* is the biological difference between males and females, *gender* is the cultural difference. Culture determines the traits and behavior that set masculinity apart from femininity and rules on "normal" and "natural" gender distinctions. Western culture, for example, has seen women as passive rather than active, irrational rather than rational, subjective rather than objective, at home rather than at "work," spiritual rather than material, and impractical rather than practical. It has ruled that certain kinds of behavior are "abnormal" and "unnatural" for females to practice, such as pursuing careers, doing construction work, being pastors or priests, wearing "male" clothes, or being assertive. Such gender distinctions, feminist critics claim, are arbitrary and almost always give women less power, status, and respect than men. In one sense, the feminist focus on gender is deterministic: Many women are "trapped" by the gender traits assigned to them by culture. In another sense, however, it offers hope. Culture, unlike biology, can be changed—through education, social action, and politics.

Gender criticism. All three of these "stages" of feminist criticism have overlapped and coexisted. They continue to be practiced. But the focus on gender in the third stage led not only to a new stage of feminist criticism, it also helped to establish the broader movement of gender criticism. Until the mid-1980s, many feminist critics assumed that all women were the same in their biological nature, their gender traits, their shared history of oppression, and their aspirations. Most feminist critics, furthermore, wrote from the perspective of an elite group of people: women who were Western, politically liberal, middle class, and highly educated. Beginning around 1985, some feminist critics challenged these assumptions and this perspective. Feminist critics, they said, should look at the many ways in which women differ from one another. Factors other than gender, they said, give females identity. These factors include such things as race, ethnic background, and socioeconomic circumstances. Critics began studying the literary representation of women in minority cultures, in non-Western cultures, at various economic levels, and in different work situations. They began examining ways females themselves marginalize or "erase" other females. Perhaps most important, they began to pay attention to sex and gender differences among women, especially between heterosexuals and homosexuals.

THE MAIN CHARACTER'S STRUGGLE AGAINST
PATRIARCHAL STRUCTURES IN ABI DARE'S *THE GIRL*
WITH THE LOUDING VOICE

THESIS

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THE MAIN CHARACTER'S RESISTANCE TOWARDS PATRIARCHY SYSTEM IN "THE NOTEBOOK" NOVEL BY NICHOLAS SPARK: FEMINIST APPROACH

THESIS

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2021

PATRIARCHAL OPPRESSION TO THE MAIN
CHARACTERS IN ETAF RUM'S *A WOMAN IS NO MAN*

THESIS

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
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Paralleling the growing interest in qualitative research in sociology has been an increased acceptance of these methods in other disciplines and applied fields. Such diverse disciplines as geography (DeLyser, Herbert, Aitken, Crang, & McDowell, 2010; Hay, 2010), political science (McNabb, 2004), and psychology (Camic, Rhodes, & Yardley, 2003; Fischer, 2005; *Qualitative Research in Psychology*) have seen the publication of edited books, texts, and journals on qualitative research methods over the past decade and a half. The American Psychological Association started publishing the journal *Qualitative Psychology* in 2014. Qualitative methods have been used for program evaluation and policy research (Bogdan & Taylor, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; M. Q. Patton 1987, 2008, 2010, 2014; Rist 1994). Journals and texts on qualitative research can be found in such diverse applied areas of inquiry as health care and nursing (Latimer, 2003; Munhall, 2012; Streubert & Carpenter, 2010; *Qualitative Health Research*), mental health, counseling, and psychotherapy (Harper & Thompson, 2011; McLeod, 2011), education (Bogdan & Biklen, 2006; *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*; Lichtman, 2010; *Qualitative Research in Education*), music education (Conway, 2014), public health (Ulin, Robinson, & Tolley, 2005), business (Meyers, 2013), theology (Swinton & Mowat, 2006), disability studies (Ferguson et al., 1992), human development (Daly, 2007; Jessor, Colby, & Shweder, 1996), social work (Sherman & and Reid, 1994; *Qualitative Social Work*), and special education (Stainback & Stainback, 1988).

One does not have to be a sociologist or to think sociologically to practice qualitative research. Although we identify with a sociological tradition, qualitative approaches can be used in a broad range of disciplines and fields.

Just as significant as the increasing interest in qualitative research methods has been the proliferation of theoretical perspectives rooted in the phenomenological tradition underlying this form of inquiry. We consider the relationship between theory and methodology more fully later in this chapter.

QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY

The phrase *qualitative methodology* refers in the broadest sense to research that produces descriptive data—people's own written or spoken words and observable behavior. As Ray Rist (1977) pointed out, qualitative methodology, like quantitative methodology, is more than a set of data-gathering techniques. It is a way of approaching the empirical world. In this section we present our notion of qualitative research.

1. *Qualitative researchers are concerned with the meaning people attach to things in their lives.* Central to the phenomenological perspective and hence qualitative research is understanding people from their own frames of reference and

experiencing reality as they experience it (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). Qualitative researchers empathize and identify with the people they study in order to understand how those people see things. Herbert Blumer (1969) explained it this way:

> To try to catch the interpretative process by remaining aloof as a so-called "objective" observer and refusing to take the role of the acting unit is to risk the worst kind of subjectivism—the objective observer is likely to fill in the process of interpretation with his[2] own surmises in place of catching the process as it occurs in the experience of the acting unit which uses it. (p. 86)

As suggested by Blumer's quote, qualitative researchers must attempt to suspend, or set aside, their own perspectives and taken-for-granted views of the world. Bruyn (1966) advised the qualitative researcher to view things as though they were happening for the first time. Nothing is taken for granted. Psathas (1973) wrote:

> For the sociologist, a phenomenological approach to observing the social world requires that he break out of the natural attitude and examine the very assumptions that structure the experience of actors in the world of everyday life. A method that provides assistance in this is "bracketing" the assumptions of everyday life. This does not involve denying the existence of the world or even doubting it (it is not the same as Cartesian doubt). Bracketing changes my attitude toward the world, allowing me to see with clearer vision. I set aside preconceptions and presuppositions, what I already "know" about the social world, in order to discover it with clarity of vision. (pp. 14–15)

2. *Qualitative research is inductive.* Qualitative researchers develop concepts, insights, and understandings from patterns in the data rather than collecting data to assess preconceived models, hypotheses, or theories. Glaser and Strauss (1967) coined the phrase "grounded theory" to refer to the inductive theorizing process involved in qualitative research that has the goal of building theory. A theory may be said to be grounded to the extent that it is derived from and based on the data themselves. Lofland (1995) described this type of theorizing as "emergent analysis" and pointed out that the process is creative and intuitive as opposed to mechanical.

In qualitative studies, researchers follow a flexible research design (Marshall & Rossman, 2011). We begin our studies with only vaguely formulated research questions. However we begin, we do not know for sure what to look for or what specific questions to ask until we have spent some time in a setting. As we learn about a setting and how participants view their experiences, we can make decisions regarding additional data to collect on the basis of what we have already learned.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Qualitative,
Quantitative,
and
Mixed Methods
Approaches

DESIGN

JOHN W. CRESWELL

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The Characteristics of Qualitative Research

For many years, proposal writers had to discuss the characteristics of qualitative research and convince faculty and audiences as to their legitimacy. Now these discussions are less frequently found in the literature and there is some consensus as to what constitutes qualitative inquiry. Thus, my suggestions about this section of a proposal are as follows:

• Review the needs of potential audiences for the proposal. Decide whether audience members are knowledgeable enough about the characteristics of qualitative research that this section is not necessary.

• If there is some question about their knowledge, present the basic characteristics of qualitative research in the proposal and possibly discuss a recent qualitative research journal article (or study) to use as an example to illustrate the characteristics.

• If you present the basic characteristics, what ones should you mention? Fortunately, there is some common agreement today about the core characteristics that define qualitative research. A number of authors of introductory texts convey these characteristics, such as Creswell (2013), Hatch (2002), and Marshall and Rossman (2011).

- *Natural setting:* Qualitative researchers tend to collect data in the field at the site where participants experience the issue or problem under study. They do not bring individuals into a lab (a contrived situation), nor do they typically send out instruments for individuals to complete. This up-close information gathered by actually talking directly to people and seeing them behave and act within their context is a major characteristic of qualitative research. In the natural setting, the researchers have face-to-face interaction, often over time.

- *Researcher as key instrument:* Qualitative researchers collect data themselves through examining documents, observing behavior, or interviewing participants. They may use a protocol—an instrument for collecting data—but the researchers are the ones who actually gather the information. They do not tend to use or rely on questionnaires or instruments developed by other researchers.

- *Multiple sources of data:* Qualitative researchers typically gather multiple forms of data, such as interviews, observations, documents, and audiovisual information rather than rely on a single data source. Then the researchers review all of the data, make sense of it, and organize it into categories or themes that cut across all of the data sources.

- *Inductive and deductive data analysis:* Qualitative researchers build their patterns, categories, and themes from the bottom up by organizing the data into increasingly more abstract units of information. This inductive process illustrates working back and forth between the themes and the database until the researchers have established a comprehensive set of themes. Then deductively, the researchers look back at their data from the themes to determine if more evidence can support each theme or whether they need to gather additional information. Thus, while the process begins inductively, deductive thinking also plays an important role as the analysis moves forward.

- *Participants' meanings:* In the entire qualitative research process, the researcher keeps a focus

on learning the meaning that the participants hold about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the research or that writers express in the literature.

- *Emergent design:* The research process for qualitative researchers is emergent. This means that the initial plan for research cannot be tightly prescribed, and some or all phases of the process may change or shift after the researcher enters the field and begins to collect data. For example, the questions may change, the forms of data collection may shift, and the individuals studied and the sites visited may be modified. The key idea behind qualitative research is to learn about the problem or issue from participants and to address the research to obtain that information.

- *Reflexivity:* In qualitative research, the inquirer reflects about how their role in the study and their personal background, culture, and experiences hold potential for shaping their interpretations, such as the themes they advance and the meaning they ascribe to the data. This aspect of the methods is more than merely advancing biases and values in the study, but how the background of the researchers actually may shape the direction of the study.

- *Holistic account:* Qualitative researchers try to develop a complex picture of the problem or issue under study. This involves reporting multiple perspectives, identifying the many factors involved in a situation, and generally sketching the larger picture that emerges. A visual model of many facets of a process or a central phenomenon aids in establishing this holistic picture (see, for example, Creswell & Brown, 1992).

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│                    ┌──────────────────────────┐              │
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│                    │    Themes/Descriptions    │              │
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│                    │ Interrelating Themes/Description │       │
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│                    │ Organizing and Preparing  │             │
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
Step 1. Organize and prepare the data for analysis. This involves transcribing interviews, optically scanning material, typing up field notes, cataloguing all of the visual material, and sorting and arranging the data into different types depending on the sources of information.

Step 2. Read or look at all the data. This first step provides a general sense of the information and an opportunity to reflect on its overall meaning. What general ideas are participants saying? What is the tone of the ideas? What is the impression of the overall depth, credibility, and use of the information? Sometimes qualitative researchers write notes in margins of transcripts or observational field notes, or start recording general thoughts about the data at this stage. For visual data, a sketchbook of ideas can begin to take shape.

Step 3. Start coding all of the data. Coding is the process of organizing the data by bracketing chunks (or text or image segments) and writing a word representing a category in the margins (Rossman & Rallis, 2012). It involves taking text data or pictures gathered during data collection segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) or images into categories, and labeling those categories with a term, often a term based in the actual language of the participant (called an *in vivo* term). As shown in Table 9.4, Tesch (1990) provided the eight steps typically used in forming codes.

Table 9.4 Tesch's Eight Steps in the Coding Process

1. Get a sense of the whole. Read all the transcriptions carefully. Perhaps jot down some ideas as they come to mind as you read.

2. Pick one document (i.e., one interview)—the most interesting one, the shortest, the one on the top of the pile. Go through it asking yourself, "What is this about?" Do not think about the substance of the information but its underlying meaning. Write thoughts in the margin.

3. When you have completed this task for several participants, make a list of all topics. Cluster together similar topics. Form these topics into columns, perhaps arrayed as major, unique, and leftover topics.

4. Now take this list and go back to your data. Abbreviate the topics as codes and write the codes next to the appropriate segments of the text. Try this preliminary organizing scheme to see if new categories and codes emerge.

5. Find the most descriptive wording for your topics and turn them into categories. Look for ways of reducing your total list of categories by grouping topics that relate to each other. Perhaps draw lines between your categories to show interrelationships.

6. Make a final decision on the abbreviation for each category and alphabetize these codes.

7. Assemble the data material belonging to each category in one place and perform a preliminary analysis.

8. If necessary, recode your existing data. (pp. 142–149)

In addition, give some attention to the types of codes to develop when analyzing a text transcript or a picture (or other type of visual object). I tend to think about codes as falling into three categories:

- Codes on topics that readers would expect to find, based on the past literature and common sense. When studying bullying in the schools, I might code some segments as "attitudes toward oneself." This code would be expected in a study about bullying in the schools.

- Codes that are surprising and that were not anticipated at the beginning of the study. In a study of leadership in nonprofit organizations, I might learn about the impact of geo-warming on the building of the organization and how this shapes the location and proximity of individuals to one another. Without going out to the building before the study begins and looking at it, I would not necessarily think about the codes of geo-warming and location of offices in my study of leadership.

- Codes that are unusual, and that are, in and of themselves, of conceptual interest to readers. I will use one of the codes that we discovered in our qualitative study of a campus' response to a gunman (Asmussen & Creswell, 1995). We did not anticipate the code "retriggering" to emerge in our study, and it surfaced from the perspective of a psychologist called into the campus to assess the response. The fact that individuals were reminded of past traumatic incidents—retriggering—prompted us to use the term as an important code and ultimately a theme in our analysis.

One further issue about coding is whether the researcher should (a) develop codes *only* on the basis of the emerging information collected from participants, (b) use predetermined codes and then fit the data to them, or (c) use some combination of emerging and predetermined codes. The traditional approach in the social sciences is to allow the codes to emerge during the data analysis. In the health sciences, a popular approach is to use predetermined codes based on the theory being examined. In this case, the researchers might develop a **qualitative codebook**, a table that contains a list of predetermined codes that researchers use for coding the data. Guest and colleagues (2012) discussed and illustrated the use of codebooks in qualitative research. The intent of a codebook is to provide definitions for codes and to maximize coherence among codes—especially when multiple coders are involved. This codebook would provide a list of codes, a code label for each code, a

brief definition of it, a full definition of it, information about when to use the code and when not to use it, and an example of a quote illustrating the code. This codebook can evolve and change during a study based on close analysis of the data when the researcher is not starting from an emerging code perspective. For researchers who have a distinct theory they want to test in their projects, I would recommend that a preliminary codebook be developed for coding the data and permit the codebook to develop and change based on the information learned during the data analysis.

Step 4. Use the coding process to generate a description of the setting or people as well as categories or themes for analysis. *Description* involves a detailed rendering of information about people, places, or events in a setting. Researchers can generate codes for this description. This analysis is useful in designing detailed descriptions for case studies, ethnographies, and narrative research projects. Use the coding as well for generating a small number of *themes* or categories— perhaps five to seven themes for a research study. These themes are the ones that appear as major findings in qualitative studies and are often used as headings in the findings sections (or in the findings section of a dissertation or thesis) of studies. They should display multiple perspectives from individuals and be supported by diverse quotations and specific evidence.

Beyond identifying the themes during the coding process, qualitative researchers can do much with themes to build additional layers of complex analysis. For example, researchers interconnect themes into a story line (as in narratives) or develop them into a theoretical model (as in grounded theory). Themes are analyzed for each individual case and across different cases (as in case studies) or shaped into a general description (as in phenomenology). Sophisticated qualitative studies go beyond description and theme identification and form complex theme connections.

Step 5. Advance how the description and themes will be *represented* in the qualitative narrative. The most popular approach is to use a narrative passage to convey the findings of the analysis. This might be a discussion that mentions a chronology of events, the detailed discussion of several themes (complete with subthemes, specific illustrations, multiple perspectives from individuals, and quotations) or a discussion with interconnecting themes. Many qualitative researchers also use visuals, figures, or tables as adjuncts to the discussions. They present a process model (as in grounded theory), advance a drawing of the specific research site (as in ethnography), or convey descriptive information about each participant in a table (as in case studies and ethnographies).

Step 6. A final step in data analysis involves making an **interpretation in qualitative research** of the findings or results. Asking, "What were the lessons learned?" captures the essence of this idea (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). These lessons could be the researcher's personal interpretation, couched in the understanding that the inquirer brings to the study from a personal culture, history, and experiences. It could also be a meaning derived from a comparison of the findings with information gleaned from the literature or theories. In this way, authors suggest that the findings confirm past information or diverge from it. It can also suggest new questions that need to be asked—questions raised by the data and analysis that the inquirer had not foreseen earlier in the study. Ethnographers can end a study, Wolcott (1994) said, by stating further questions. The questioning approach is also used in transformative approaches to qualitative research. Moreover, when qualitative researchers use a theoretical lens, they can form interpretations that call for action agendas for reform and change. Researchers might describe how the narrative outcome will be compared with theories and the general literature on the topic. In many qualitative articles, researchers also discuss the literature at

the end of the study (see the discussion in Chapter 2). Thus, interpretation in qualitative research can take many forms; be adapted for different types of designs; and be flexible to convey personal, research-based, and action meanings.

Although validation of findings occurs throughout the steps in the process of research (as shown in Figure 9.1), this discussion focuses on it to enable a researcher to write a passage into a proposal on the procedures for validating the findings that will be undertaken in a study. Proposal developers need to convey the steps they will take in their studies to check for the accuracy and credibility of their findings. Validity does not carry the same connotations in qualitative research as it does in quantitative research; nor is it a companion of reliability (examining stability) or generalizability (the external validity of applying results to new settings, people, or samples; both are discussed in Chapter 8). Qualitative validity means that the researcher checks for the accuracy of the findings by employing certain procedures, while qualitative reliability indicates that the researcher's approach is consistent across different researchers and different projects (Gibbs, 2007).

Validity is one of the strengths of qualitative research and is based on determining whether the findings are accurate from the standpoint of the researcher, the participant, or the readers of an account (Creswell & Miller, 2000). Terms abound in the qualitative literature that address validity, such as *trustworthiness, authenticity,* and *credibility* (Creswell & Miller, 2000), and it is a much-discussed topic (Lincoln, Lynham, & Guba, 2011).

A procedural perspective that I recommend for research proposals is to identify and discuss one or more strategies available to check the accuracy of the findings. The researcher actively incorporates validity strategies into their proposal. I recommend the use of multiple approaches, and these should enhance the researcher's ability to assess the accuracy of findings as well as convince readers of that accuracy. There are eight primary strategies, organized from those most frequently used and easy to implement to those occasionally used and more difficult to implement:

- *Triangulate* different data sources of information by examining evidence from the sources and using it to build a coherent justification for themes. If themes are established based on converging several sources of data or perspectives from participants, then this process can be claimed as adding to the validity of the study.

- Use *member checking* to determine the accuracy of the qualitative findings through taking the final report or specific descriptions or themes back to participants and determining whether these participants feel that they are accurate. This does not mean taking back the raw transcripts to check for accuracy; instead, the researcher takes back parts of the polished or semi-polished product, such as the major findings, the themes, the case analysis, the grounded theory, the cultural description, and so forth. This procedure can involve conducting a follow-up interview with participants in the study and providing an opportunity for them to comment on the findings.

- Use a *rich, thick description* to convey the findings. This description may transport readers to the setting and give the discussion an element of shared experiences. When qualitative researchers provide detailed descriptions of the setting, for example, or offer many perspectives about a theme, the results become more realistic and richer. This procedure can add to the validity of the findings.

- Clarify the *bias* the researcher brings to the study. This self-reflection creates an open and honest narrative that will resonate well with readers. Reflectivity has already been mentioned as a core characteristic of qualitative research. Good qualitative research contains comments by the researchers about how their interpretation of the findings is shaped by their background, such as

Qualitative Methods

Qualitative methods demonstrate a different approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of quantitative research. Although the processes are similar, qualitative methods rely on text and image data, have unique steps in data analysis, and draw on diverse designs. Writing a methods section for a proposal for qualitative research partly requires educating readers as to the intent of qualitative research, mentioning specific designs, carefully reflecting on the role the researcher plays in the study, drawing from an ever-expanding list of types of data sources, using specific protocols for recording data, analyzing the information through multiple steps of analysis, and mentioning approaches for documenting the accuracy—or validity—of the data collected. This chapter addresses these important components of writing a good qualitative methods section into a proposal. Table 9.1 presents a checklist for reviewing the qualitative methods section of your proposal to determine whether you have addressed important topics.

Table 9.1 A Checklist of Questions for Designing a Qualitative Procedure

	Are the basic characteristics of qualitative studies mentioned?
	Is the specific type of qualitative design to be used in the study mentioned? Is the history of, a definition of, and applications for the design mentioned?
	Does the reader gain an understanding of the researcher's role in the study (past historical, social, cultural experiences, personal connections to sites and people, steps in gaining entry, and sensitive ethical issues) and how they may shape interpretations made in the study?
	Is the purposeful sampling strategy for sites and individuals identified?
	Are the specific forms of data collection mentioned and a rationale given for their use?
	Are the procedures for recording information during the data collection detailed (such as protocols)?
	Are the data analysis steps identified?
	Is there evidence that the researcher has organized the data for analysis?
	Has the researcher reviewed the data generally to obtain a sense of the information?
	Has the researcher coded the data?
	Have the codes been developed to form a description and/or to identify themes?
	Are the themes interrelated to show a higher level of analysis and abstraction?
	Are the ways that the data will be represented mentioned—such as in tables, graphs, and figures?
	Have the bases for interpreting the analysis been specified (personal experiences, the literature, questions, action agenda)?
	Has the researcher mentioned the outcome of the study (developed a theory, provided a complex picture of themes)?
	Have multiple strategies been cited for validating the findings?

CHAPTER 4

ordination

ordination

religion

🖨 Print   ✔ Cite   ⤴ Share   🗒 Feedback   ⋮

*Also known as: holy orders*

Written and fact-checked by The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica
Last Updated: Article History

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ordination, in Christian churches, a rite for
the dedication and commissioning of
ministers. The essential ceremony consists of
the laying of hands of the ordaining minister
upon the head of the one being ordained, with
prayer for the gifts of the Holy Spirit and of

Women's Ministry in the Church

Summary: Protestant women across many denominations fought for, and slowly gained, a share of ministerial authority over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. In Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches, proponents of women's ordination still fight opposition from church authorities.

In 1893 at the World's Parliament of Religions in Chicago, the Reverend Antoinette Brown Blackwell declared that "[w]omen are needed in the pulpit as imperatively and for the same reason that they are needed in the world—because they are women." The Rev. Blackwell was the first woman to be ordained by an established denomination in the United States, having been called to be pastor of a Congregational church in South Butler, New York, in 1853. Like many women of her day, she was active in speaking out as a Christian against slavery and for numerous other social and economic reforms. In the late 19th century, the Quaker preacher Lucretia Mott and the Universalist preacher Olympia Brown were also recognized in the ministry of their churches, as was the irrepressible Jarena Lee in the African Methodist Episcopal Church. These women were preceded by generations of female preachers who had few credentials beyond their own clear sense of divine calling. But the question of women's ordination did not become a widespread and burning issue for America's churches until the mid-20th century.

In recent decades, one of the most controversial and visible differences between the various streams of Christianity in America has been whether women are present in the ordained ministry. Some Holiness and Pentecostal denominations were among the first to begin ordaining women in the first half of the 20th century, believing that the Holy Spirit could empower whoever God chose. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Presbyterians and Methodists also began ordaining women to full status in the ministry, followed by most of the Lutheran churches in the 1970s. After decades of discussion in the Episcopal Church, the ordination issue was brought to a crisis in 1974 when three bishops took matters into their own hands and conducted an "irregular" ordination of eleven women to the priesthood. Two years later, the Episcopal Church voted officially to open the priesthood to women. Today, in local churches from Long Beach, California, to Long Island, New York, women serve as priests and ministers, fully ordained by a wide spectrum of Protestant denominations. With the 2010 ordination of Margaret Lee in the Diocese of Quincy, Illinois, women have been ordained as priests in all 110 dioceses of the Episcopal Church in the United States.

In many of America's churches, however, there are no women in the ordained ministry. This includes America's two largest denominations, the Roman Catholic Church and the Southern Baptist Convention (although there have been women ordained by individual Southern Baptist churches).

In the Eastern Orthodox churches, the issue of women's ordination remains closed and without much controversy. The same could be said of many independent Protestant churches, even though women had often been ordained in the early years of these movements—in the midst of 19th-century revivalism, reform, and egalitarianism. In all of these churches, however, women are visible in other forms of ministry, including in teaching, counseling, chaplaincy, administration, worship, youth ministry, community outreach, and pastoral care positions. In both the Roman Catholic Church and in a number of Orthodox churches, women also have important leadership roles as members of religious orders. But women in these churches are excluded from the ordained, sacramental ministry, which prevents them from officiating Holy Communion services, performing the major sacraments of the life cycle, heading churches and dioceses, deciding doctrine, and holding higher positions of power in the church. Those who oppose women's ordination articulate their opposition on the basis of their theology of gender and on what they understand to be an unchanging tradition of male ministry and priesthood, beginning with Christ and the twelve disciples.

As with many issues, the interpretation of the Bible is at stake in the discussion of women's ordination. Opponents of women's ordination call upon passages in St. Paul's letters in the New Testament, such as I Timothy 2:11, "Let the women learn in silence with full submission. I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over a man; she is to keep silent." Those who affirm women's ordination, however, also quote the references of St. Paul to women serving as deacons, apostles, and co-workers, as well as his Letter to the Galatians 3:27-28: "There is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus." Further, they also cite how the resurrected Jesus appeared first to Mary Magdalene, meaning that a woman was the first to witness the resurrection and be entrusted with proclaiming the message of Good News.

In the Roman Catholic Church today, many people see women's ordination to the priesthood as an urgent issue. Already women have assumed de facto leadership of many parishes because of the acute shortage of male priests. Some Roman Catholic sisters who have felt called to priesthood continue to press for ordination, a move said to be supported by 60 percent of American Catholics. Other women