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

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presentation in the context of narratological structures. Generally speaking, **characters** in a text can be rendered either as types or as individuals. A typified character in literature is dominated by one specific trait and is referred to as a *flat character*. The term *round character* usually denotes a persona with more complex and differentiated features.

Typified characters often represent the general traits of a group of persons or abstract ideas. Medieval allegorical depictions of characters preferred **typification** in order to personify vices, virtues, or philosophical and religious positions. The Everyman-figure, a symbol of the sinful Christian, is a major example of this general pattern in the representation of man in medieval literature. In today's advertisements, typified character presentations re-emerge in magazines, posters, film and TV. The temporal and spatial limitations of advertising media revive allegorical and symbolic characterization for didactic and persuasive reasons comparable to those of the Middle Ages.

A good example of the purposeful use of typified character presentation occurs in the opening scene of Mark Twain's, "A True Story" (1874).

> It was summer-time, and twilight. We were sitting on the porch of the farmhouse, on the summit of the hill, and "Aunt Rachel" was sitting respectfully below our level, on the steps —for she was our servant, and colored. She was a mighty frame and stature; she was sixty years old, but her eye was undimmed and her strength unabated. She was a cheerful, hearty soul, and it was no more trouble for her to laugh than it is for a bird to sing… I said: 'Aunt Rachel, how is it that you've lived sixty years and never had any trouble?" She stopped quaking: She paused, and there was a moment of silence. She turned her face over her shoulder toward me, and

Modes of presentation

explanatory method	**dramatic method**
narration	dialogue—monologue

Similar to typification and individualization, explanatory and dramatic methods hardly ever appear in their pure forms, but rather as hybrids of various degrees, since the narrator often also acts as a character in the text. Questions concerning character presentation are always connected with problems of narrative perspective and are therefore hard to isolate or deal with individually. The following section on point of view thus inevitably touches upon aspects already mentioned.

c)
Point of view

The term **point of view,** or narrative perspective, characterizes the way in which a text presents persons, events, and settings. The subtleties of narrative perspectives developed parallel to the emergence of the novel and can be reduced to three basic positions: the action of a text is either mediated through an exterior, unspecified narrator *(omniscient point of view),* through a person involved in the action *(first person narration),* or presented without additional commentary *(figural narrative situation).* This tripartite structure can only summarize the most extreme manifestations, which hardly ever occur in their pure form; individual literary works are usually hybrids combining elements of various types of narrative situ-ations.[5]

The most common manifestations of narrative perspectives in prose fiction can, therefore, be structured according to the following pattern:

omniscient point of view	**first person narration**
through external narrator who refers to protagonist in the third person	by protagonist or by minor character
figural narrative situation	
through figures acting in the text	

Texts with an **omniscient point of view** refer to the acting figures in the third person and present the action from an all-knowing, Godlike perspective. Sometimes the misleading term *third person narration* is also applied for this narrative situation. Such disembodiment of the narrative agent, which does away with a narrating persona, easily allows for changes in setting, time, and action, while simultaneously providing various items of information beyond the range and know-ledge of the acting figures. Jane Austen (1775–1817), for example, introduces an omniscient narrator of this sort in her novel *Northanger Abbey* (1818):

> No one who had ever seen Catherine Moreland in her infancy, would have supposed her born to be a heroine. Her situation in life, the character of her father and mother, her own person and disposition, were equally against her. Her father was a clergyman, without being neglected, or poor, and a very respectable man, though his name was Richard—and he had never been handsome. He had a considerable independence, besides two good livings—and he was not in the least addicted to locking up his daughters. Her mother was a woman of useful plain sense, with a good temper, and, what is more remarkable, with a good constitution.[6]

As evident in this example, an omniscient narrator can go back in time ("Catherine Moreland in her infancy"), look into the future ("to be a heroine") and possess exact information about different figures of the novel ("Her situation in life... Her father... Her mother..."). This omniscient point of view was particularly popular in the traditional epic but also widely used in the early novel.

First person narration renders the action as seen through a participating figure, who refers to her-or himself in the first person. First person narrations can adopt the point of view either of the protagonist or of a minor figure. The majority of novels in first person narration use, of course, the **protagonist** (main character) as narrator, as for example, in Laurence Sterne's (1713–68) *Tristram Shandy* (1759–67) or Charles Dickens' (1812–70) *David Copperfield* (1849–50). The opening lines of J.D.Salinger's (*1919) *The Catcher in the Rye* (1951) also refer to this tradition of first person narration by the protagonist. "If you really want to

hear about it, the first thing you'll probably want to know is where I was born, and what my lousy childhood was like, and how my parents were occupied and all before they had me, and all that David Copperfield kind of crap, but I don't feel like going into it."[7] These first person narrations by protagonists aim at a supposedly authentic representation of the subjective experiences and feelings of the narrator.

This proximity to the protagonist can be avoided by introducing a **minor character** as first person narrator. By depicting events as seen through the eyes of another person, the character of the protagonist remains less transparent. A number of novels which center around a main figure, such as Herman Melville's (1819–91) *Moby Dick* (1851) or F.Scott Fitzgerald's (1896–1940) *The Great Gatsby* (1925), mystify the protagonist by using this particular technique. The opening words of *Moby Dick*, "Call me Ishmael," are uttered by the minor character Ishmael, who subsequently describes the mysterious protagonist Captain Ahab. In *The Great Gatsby*, Nick relates the events around the enigmatic Gatsby from the periphery of the action. Through this deliberately chosen narrative perspective, the author anticipates thematic aspects of the evolving plot.

In the **figural narrartive situation,** the narrator moves into the background, suggesting that the plot is revealed solely through the actions of the characters in the text. This literary technique is a rela-tively recent phenomenon, one which has been developed with the rise of the modern novel, mostly in order to encourage the reader to judge the action without an intervening commentator. The following example from James Joyce's (1882–1941) *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* (1916) renders the action through the figural perspective of the protagonist.

> The fellows had seen him running. They closed round him in a ring, pushing one against another to hear.
>
> —Tell us! Tell us!
>
> —What did he say?…
>
> He told them what he had said and what the rector had said and, when he had told them, all the fellows flung their caps spinning up into the air and cried:

and unified form. It is a striking example of how the use of narrative perspective, character presentation, setting, and plot-structure can create an interdependent network of elements which work toward a common goal.

Modernist and postmodernist novels introduce these techniques in very overt ways, often even **changing narrative perspectives** within one text in order to highlight decisive shifts in the course of action or narrative. The Canadian novelist Margaret Atwood (*1939), for example, begins the first section of her novel *The Edible Woman* (1969) in first person narration by the protagonist. The second part is then rendered in a figural narrative situation in order to emphasize the general alienation of the main character. "Marian was sitting list-lessly at her desk. She was doodling on the pad for telephone messages. She drew an arrow with many intricate feathers, then a cross-hatch of intersecting lines. She was supposed to be working..."[9] When Marian regains her identity at the end of the novel, Atwood also switches back to the original first person narration. "I was cleaning up the apartment. It had taken me two days to gather the strength to face it, but I had finally started. I had to go about it layer by layer" (ibid.: 289). Later on, Atwood even lets the protagonist reflect about these narratological changes when Marian says: "Now that I was thinking of myself in the first person singular again I found my own situation much more interesting" (ibid.: 290). Atwood's novel is an obvious example of how thematic aspects of a text, such as the protagonist's loss of identity, can be emphasized on a structural level by means of narratological techniques such as point of view.

d) Setting

Setting is another aspect traditionally included in analyses of prose fiction, and it is relevant to discussions of other genres, too. The term "setting" denotes the location, historical period, and social surroundings in which the action of a text develops. In James Joyce's (1882–1941) *Ulysses* (1922), for example, the setting is clearly defined as Dublin 16 June 1904. In other cases, for example William Shakespeare's (1564–1616) *Hamlet* (*c.* 1601), all we know is that the action takes place in medieval Denmark. Authors hardly ever choose a setting for its own sake, but rather embed a story in

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



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7.1 Character and characterisation

There is an important distinction to be made between *character* and *characterisation*.

- *A character* is a person in a literary work.
- *Characterisation* is the way in which a character is created.

Since most readers are at home with the idea of character, comment on it can be brief. A character is someone in a literary work who has some sort of identity (it needn't be a strong one), an identity which is made up by appearance, conversation, action, name and (possibly) thoughts going on in the head. There's no reason why we should call these literary creations 'characters', but since it's become customary, it's wise to continue the practice.

Calling figures in literature 'characters' rather than, say, 'persons', is a way of reminding ourselves that a character is a literary creation. Characters in books may have all sorts of links with the people we meet everyday (in some cases we feel more strongly about them than real people) but we only meet them in books. A way of putting this is to say that characters are all the product of characterisation; that's to say, they've been made in a particular way. Much of what follows in this chapter is about how characters are created. The words an author uses are the means that make each character who he or she is. Characters are what they are like because of the way they've been made. The kind of conversations they have, the things they do, their appearances and so on are the particular ways in which the author has chosen to characterise his or her characters. We might remember the difference by saying that:

Characterisation is a method and character the product.

7.2 The creation of character

Characters in books are not real people but figures who have been specially created by the author. We may imagine an author looking at those aspects of people that make up their personalities and selecting some which are then put together. In this putting together, the author might play up some features and subdue others. The character so produced might be interesting, and we might

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

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2. Fakta Cerita (*Facts*)

a. Alur (*Plot*)

Alur merupakan rangkaian peristiwa yang sambung-sinambung yang terjalin dalam hubungan kausalitas (sebab-akibat) guna membangun jalannya cerita secara terpadu dan utuh. Peristiwa yang dialami tokoh dalam cerita dapat tersusun menurut urutan waktu terjadinya. Akan tetapi tidak semua kejadian dalam hidup tokoh ditampilkan secara berurutan, lengkap sejak kelahiran tokohnya. Peristiwa yang ditampilkan dipilih dengan memper-hatikan kepentingan dalam membangun cerita.

Alur merupakan unsur cerita yang berperan penting dalam memperlancar jalannya cerita. Alur adalah rangkaian peristiwa yang terpilih yang menggiring pembaca untuk melihat peristiwa yang terjadi berikutnya. Oleh karena itu, jalinan peristiwa harus memperlihatkan sebab akibat. Plot mengandung penyebab/ motivasi, dan akibat serta saling berhubungan antara keduanya.

Secara garis besar struktur alur sebuah novel bibagi menjadi tiga tahap, yaitu tahap awal, tengah, dan akhir (Nurgiyantoro, 1998:142). Pada tahap awal lazim disebut tahap perkenalan. Tahap perkenalan biasanya berisi informasi penting mkengenai hal-hal yang akan dikisahkan ada tahap-tahap berikutnya. Tahap ini

menyampaikan informasi yang diperlukan untuk memahami cerita selanjutnya. Fungsi tahap awal sebuah cerita adalah untuk memberikan informasi dan penjelasan seperlunya khususnya yang berkaitan dengan pelataran dan penokohan.

Tahap tengah merupakan tahap pertikaian atau konflik (*conflict*), menampilkan pertentangan atau konflik yang sudah mulai dimunculkan pada tahap sebelumnya menjadi semakin meningkat, semakin menegangkan. Pada tahap ini terjadi komplikasi, penggawatan (*complication)* dan klimaks (*climax)*. Konflik erat kaitannya dengan unsur penggawatan yang terdapat pada kejadian awal. Tahap tengah merupakan bagian terpanjang dan terpenting dalam fiksi.

Pada tahap akhir atau tahap peleraian, menampilkan adegan tertentu sebagai akibat klimaks. Tahap ini menyampaikan bagaimana akhir cerita atau pecahan masalah (*denouement)*.

Menurut Saleh Saad (dalam Rahmanto, 1988:30), alur dibagi menjadi dua bagian yakni (1) alur maju (progresi) yaitu suatu cerita yang dimulai dari awal tengah kemudian baru berakhir dan (2) alur mundur (regresi) yaitu suatu cerita yang dimulai dari akhir menuju tahap tengah dan berakhir pada tahap awal. Alur ini juga disebut alur sorot balik atau *flashback*. Pada realitasnya, terkadang terdapat alur fiksi campuran yakni alur progresi dan regresi dipakai bersama-sama dalam sebuah fiksi.

S. Tasrif (dalam Lubis, 1978:10) membagi alur menjadi lima tahap.

(1) Tahap Penyituasian (*Situation*) yakni tahap pengenalan situasi latar dan tokoh-tokoh cerita. Tahap ini disebut tahap pembukaan cerita yang berisi penyampaian informasi awal.

(2) Tahap Pemunculan Konflik (*Generating Sircumstances*) yakni peristiwa-peristiwa yang menyulut konflik mulai dimunculkan. Jadi tahap ini merupakan awal mumculnya konflik.

(3) Tahap Peningkatan Konflik (*Rising Action*), yakni konflik yang telah dimunculkan pada tahap sebelumnya semakin berkembang dan dikembangkan kladar intesitasnya. Peristiwa-peristiwa dramatic yang menjadi inti cerita semakin mencekam dan menegangkan.

(4) Tahap Klimaks (*Climax*), konflik atau pertentangan-pertentangan yang terjadi yang terjadi pada para tokoh cerita mencapai intensitas puncak. Pada tahap inilah puncak pertikaian dan ketegangan berlangsung.

(5) Tahap Penyelesaian (*Denouement*), konflik yang telah mencapai puncak atau klimaks diberi penyelesaian, ketegangan dikendorkan. Semua konflik dan subkonflik juga diberi jalan keluar dan cerita diakhiri.

Secara lebih rinci, alur fiksi dapat pula dikaji melalui struktur naratifnya. Sebagai sebuah karya sastra, novel merupakan satu sistem yang berstruktur. Sebagai sistem yang bersruktur, novel memiliki unsur struktur naratif. Struktur naratif menurut Chama-mah-Soeratno merupakan perwujudan bentuk penyajian suatu atau beberapa peristiwa (1991:1), sedangkan naratif dapat diarti-kan sebagai rangkaian peristiwa yang menjadi pokok pembicaraan dalam wacana dengan berbagai relasi yang mengaitkan peristiwa (1991:3).

Di dalam struktur naratif terdapat dua hal yakni cerita (*story atau content*) dan wacana (*discourse atau expression*). Struktur naratif merupakan penanda (*signifie*) dari peristiwa, penokohan dan latar yang terdapat di dalam cerita dan petanda (*signifiant*) dari unsur-unsur di dalam ekspresi naratif yang terdapat di dalam wacana. Dengan demikian objek estetik naratif ialah cerita dari artikulasi wacana (Chatman, 1978: 15-42). Tujuan analisis struktur naratif dengan demikian adalah untuk memperoleh susunan teks baik susunan wacana (*discourse)* maupun susunan cerita (*story*). Untuk itu analisis sekuen (*sequence*) perlu dilakukan guna mengungkapkan struktur naratif.

b. Penokohan/Perwatakan (*Characters*)

Kehadiran tokoh dalam suatu cerita dapat dilihat dari berbagai cara, yang secara garis besar dapat dibagi dalam tiga cara antara lain: (1) Cara analitis, yakni pengarang secara langsung menjelaskan dan melukiskan tokoh-tokohnya, (2) Cara dramatik, yakni pengarang melukiskan tokoh-tokohnya melalui gambaran tempat dan lingkungan tokoh, dialog antartokoh, perbuatan dan jalan pikiran tokoh, dan (3) Kombinasi keduanya (Saad dalam Ali, 1986:123-124).

Rimmon-Kenan (1986:59-66) menyebut cara pertama sebagai pendefinisian langsung (*direct definition*), dan cara kedua disebut sebagai penghadiran tidak langsung (*indirect presentation*). Penghadiran tidak langsung ini dapat juga dilakukan dengan mengacu pada relasi spasial atas penampilan eksternal dan lingkungan tokoh. Setiap tokoh yang hadir dalam cerita memiliki unsur fisiologis yang berkaitan dengan fisik; unsur psikologis yang menyangkut psikis tokoh; dan unsur sosiologis yang berhubungan dengan lingkungan sosial tokoh (Oemarjati, 1971:66-67).

Analisis tokoh dapat dilakukan dari nama tokoh. Penamaan tokoh (*naming*) menurut Wellek dan Warren (1989:287) merupakan cara paling sederhana untuk menampilkan tokoh. Penamaan tokoh disesuaikan dengan kepribadiannya yang berkaitan dengan psikososial dan sikapnya yang mengacu pada perbuatan atau tingkah lakunya dalam cerita. Penamaan tokoh dapat juga berupa simbol, profesi dan pekerjaannya. Nama tokoh dapat membayangkan tentang wajah dan perangainya. Dengan demikian dalam penafsiran tokoh, nama mempunyai fungsi penting. Karena itu nama tokoh akan dibicarakan bersama-sama dalam analisis penokohan.

Tokoh dalam cerita tidak sepenuhnya bebas. Tokoh merupakan bagian atau unsur dari suatu keutuhan artistik yakni karya sastra, yang seharusnya selalu menunjang keutuhan artistik itu (Kenney, 1986:25). Dalam suatu cerita umumnya tokoh hadir

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

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19 Racism in the 21st Century

Michael A. Zárate
University of Texas at El Paso

Many of the world's problems are human made, including racism. Suffice it to say that racism is a long-standing problem—despite the tremendous scholarly investigation for at least the last 60 years. With so much attention, why then have researchers been unable to cure this problem? Simply put, racism is multiply determined. Some causes of racism predict an unwillingness to desire a cure or change. Other models of racism predict a lack of awareness of that racism—thereby avoiding change. Still other models and associated data suggest that racist beliefs are simply well engrained, making it difficult to change those beliefs even if one wants to. Because of these disparate reasons, once one attempts to produce some understanding of a complex behavior like racism, one is also left with the realization that we as a science are far from any real answer.

This chapter explores racism as it is occurring today. In the first section, racism is defined and the focus of this chapter is detailed. The second section presents current manifestations of racism. The third section describes the various models describing racism. Finally, potential solutions are described. When possible, each section highlights areas where research appears to lag behind the theories. The focus of this book precludes extensive discussion of many of the associated theories. For instance, this volume includes chapters on stereotype threat and the common ingroup identity model. Both of those chapters are covered by their original authors (Aronson and Gaertner, respectively). It seems prudent to avoid extensive review of those topics given their treatment by those authors in this volume.

The third section describes the various models describing racism. Finally, potential solutions are described. When possible, each section highlights areas where research appears to lag behind the theories. The focus of this book precludes extensive discussion of many of the associated theories. For instance, this volume includes chapters on stereotype threat and the common ingroup identity model. Both of those chapters are covered by their original authors (Aronson and Gaertner, respectively). It seems prudent to avoid extensive review of those topics given their treatment by those authors in this volume.

DEFINING RACISM

Jones (1997) defined racism as a special form of prejudice. According to Jones, prejudice is the "positive or negative attitude, judgment, or feeling about a person that is generalized from attitudes or beliefs held about the group to which the person belong" (p. 10). Racism, however, adds to prejudice the following constructs.

> First, the basis of group characteristics is assumed to rest on biology—race is a biological construct. Second, racism has, as a necessary premise, the *superiority* of one's own race. Third, racism rationalizes institutional and culture practices that formalize the hierarchical domination of one racial group over another. (p. 11, italics in original)

Jones's definition brings together the concepts of perceived biological differences and apparent forms of competition and system justification, as well as feelings of self-superiority. Thus, the definition is broad enough that it encompasses most of the modern theories regarding racism.

RACISM AND ETHNICITY

The inclusion of a biological construct in the definition of racism provides room for expansion. Most geneticists and anthropologists agree that race is not a true biological construct (Smedley & Smedley, 2005). At the same time, social psychologists have long distinguished reality from the perceptions of reality. Race is a clear social and political construct, predictive of behavior and therefore

Swim, J. K., & Hyers, L. L. (2009). *Sexism.* In *Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination.* (*pp.* 407-424). Psychology Press.



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20 Sexism

Janet K. Swim
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Lauri L. Hyers
West Chester University

Social psychological research on sexism has come a long way in the second half of the 20th century, from a mere page on sexism (termed antifeminism) in Allport's (1954) classic text *The Nature of Prejudice* to the current rate of thousands of pages of scholarly work published every year devoted exclusively to the topic. The accumulating knowledge of the significance of sexism is both a reflection of and reflected by dramatic changes in women's status. Women in Western countries have rejected second-class citizenship, obtaining rights to vote, hold property, seek divorce, run for public office, make choices about their personal health care and reproduction, wear pants, pursue higher education, develop careers of their choosing, and take legal action against abuse, sexual harassment, and rape. Although women's status is highly varied across cultures, efforts to resist sexist oppression can be found worldwide.

Still, at present, a pressing issue in the social sciences has been how to make the case that sexism exists in many different forms and that it produces measurable consequences. Documenting sexism and its consequences is important due to several myths about sexism. We use the term myth here, not as sacred stories, but as widely held cultural misnomers. One myth is that sexism is not that harmful (e.g., sexual harassment is just flirting; traditional gender-role divisions are good for women and men; "mild" domestic violence or emotional abuse is normal; using masculine pronouns or male-identified occupation titles are simply traditions; gendered career choices are functional; hostile sexism is balanced by benevolent caretakers; claims of antifemale sexism are blown out of proportion because both women and men experience sexism; women should not expect life to be easy; and women do not appreciate what has been done for them already). A second myth is that women enjoy their lesser status roles in society, freely choosing to comply with gender-role restrictions (e.g., wearing makeup, doing more domestic work than men, pursuing low-paying occupations, engaging in prostitution, living with abusers). Early psychological theory justified women's desire for their own oppression by characterizing them as masochistic or martyrs by nature (e.g., Deutsch, 1930). Although this early view is not likely to be currently widely accepted, the myth still exists when cultural context, social norms, and lesser social power are not fully acknowledged. Many religious and traditional beliefs continue to promote norms that reward women for embracing subservient roles. These two myths contribute to a third myth that sexism is rare. The prevalence of sexism is masked by restrictive definitions of what constitutes sexist beliefs and behavior; targets' lack of recognition, acknowledgment, or reporting of their experiences; and perpetrators' lack of awareness or willingness to admit their own sexist beliefs and behaviors.

In this chapter we examine evidence about the prevalence of sexism by examining different ways in which sexist beliefs can be manifested, evidence documenting sexist behaviors, and some of the consequences of sexism. We define sexism as individuals' attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors, and organizational, institutional, and cultural practices that either reflect negative evaluations of individuals based on their gender or support unequal status of women and men. Most of the chapter focuses on an individual level of analysis and antifemale sexism, as these represent most of the

women and men; "mild" domestic violence or emotional abuse is normal; using masculine pronouns or male-identified occupation titles are simply traditions; gendered career choices are functional; hostile sexism is balanced by benevolent caretakers; claims of antifemale sexism are blown out of proportion because both women and men experience sexism; women should not expect life to be easy; and women do not appreciate what has been done for them already). A second myth is that women enjoy their lesser status roles in society, freely choosing to comply with gender-role restrictions (e.g., wearing makeup, doing more domestic work than men, pursuing low-paying occupations, engaging in prostitution, living with abusers). Early psychological theory justified women's desire for their own oppression by characterizing them as masochistic or martyrs by nature (e.g., Deutsch, 1930). Although this early view is not likely to be currently widely accepted, the myth still exists when cultural context, social norms, and lesser social power are not fully acknowledged. Many religious and traditional beliefs continue to promote norms that reward women for embracing subservient roles. These two myths contribute to a third myth that sexism is rare. The prevalence of sexism is masked by restrictive definitions of what constitutes sexist beliefs and behavior; targets' lack of recognition, acknowledgment, or reporting of their experiences; and perpetrators' lack of awareness or willingness to admit their own sexist beliefs and behaviors.

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

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1 The Study of Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination Within Social Psychology

A Quick History of Theory and Research

Charles Stangor
University of Maryland

The history of the empirical study of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination is a young one, but nevertheless one that is rich, exciting, and potentially useful in informing public policy. It is a history that has happened incredibly fast—indeed it is a great pleasure for me to personally know pretty much everyone who has helped to create the excellent research that I try to summarize in this chapter. This literature has been developed and presented in the myriad journal articles that we have published on these topics, and summarized in a substantial number of comprehensive reviews (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Fiske, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Mackie & Smith, 1998; Major & O'Brien, 2005; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2003; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Nelson, 2002; Stangor & Lange, 1994; Wilder, 1986), as well as innumerable edited books. This work has also been improved and refined through the many enjoyable conferences that we have shared together.

We should be extremely proud of the accomplishments that we have made in this field. When we began our enterprise, less than 100 years ago, it was not clear how stereotypes and prejudice should be conceptually considered, or that they could be effectively operationalized. In less than a century we have created a generally accepted conceptualization of these important ideas, which we routinely assess using sophisticated implicit reaction time measures and brain imaging techniques, in addition to our standard repertoire of behavior and self-report. We understand, at least to some extent, the sources of these beliefs and attitudes, and we have made some progress in understanding how to effectively change them. Most important, we have developed a substantial understanding of the influence of stereotypes and prejudice—as social expectations—on behavior. This represents a major conceptual advance in only a short period of time.

Our research has also been widely incorporated into other fields, including clinical, developmental, educational, legal, and organizational psychology. This suggests that the results of our endeavors are important and useful. On the other hand, we have had a tendency to focus on the easy problems and ignore the more difficult ones. Despite some important exceptions, we have tended to work in our labs rather than hitting the field, we study college students who by and large are not prejudiced, and we refrain from making many public statements about the implications of our research. These limitations have probably prevented us from advancing as quickly or effecting as much social change as we might like. I think we should try to do more in this regard.

I hope you will enjoy my review, and will not be offended where I have included my own unique, and potentially debatable, interpretations of some of these topics. Let me be the first to acknowledge,

however, that in many ways there is little point in either reading or writing it. The chapter represents, in essence, an abridged version of what to me is the *real* history of the social psychology of stereotyping and prejudice, which is David Schneider's (2004) amazing book, *The Psychology of Stereotyping*. In all honesty, you don't have time to read my chapter—you should take the time instead to read the real story—from Professor Schneider.

DEFINING STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE

The definitions that we find most consensual regarding stereotyping and prejudice have changed over time as the field itself has changed. Most important, our definitions have generally simplified with the years. We now define prejudice as a negative attitude toward a group or toward members of the group. Defining stereotyping has been more problematic—there are tens, if not hundreds of definitions in the literature, although they are mostly based on the general idea of stereotypes as knowledge structures that serve as mental "pictures" of the groups in question (Lippmann, 1922). With some exceptions, I'd say that we generally agree that stereotypes represent the traits that we view as characteristic of social groups, or of individual members of those groups, and particularly those that differentiate groups from each other. In short, they are the traits that come to mind quickly when we think about the groups.

The tendency to simplify things has led us to discard some of the presumed characteristics of stereotypes and prejudice that were integral to early conceptualizations, such as those of Allport (1954), including *inaccuracy, negativity,* and *overgeneralization*. It is unfortunate that we have let those original requirements go—after all, they really are the heart of why we care about the topic at all. Our concepts should be simple, but also not so simple that they lose their essence. Stereotypes are problematic because they are negative, inaccurate, and unfair—they would simply be part of the study of person perception more broadly if they weren't.

In terms of negativity, the data are clear, and we probably should acknowledge it more fully, as we generally do regarding prejudice. Although they can be positive, stereotypes are primarily negative. We generate many more negative than positive stereotypes when asked to do so, and even expressing positive stereotypes is not seen positively. Consider how we might react to people who have claimed that African Americans have the positive traits of being athletic and musical. The problem, in part, is that if we express positive stereotypes, it is assumed that we hold the negative ones, too.

It is more difficult to get a good handle on the accuracy question. Although some have tried (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Lee, Jussim, & McCauley, 1995; McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980; Ryan, Park, & Judd, 1996), the conclusions they have drawn have not been consistent. Suffice it to say that there is a good kernel of truth to most group beliefs—there is a correlation between perception and reality (Swim, 1994). Whether stereotypes are in general over- or underestimated is not so clear. In any case, it is the process of using stereotypes (overgeneralization), more than holding them, that is problematic, because it is so unfair (Fiske, 1989; Stangor, 1995). No matter how accurate our belief is, it does not describe every member of the group—therefore, basing judgments of individuals on category level knowledge is just plain wrong. The idea that categorization is less fair than individuation is a major contribution of this literature, and one that I think has also made some difference outside of the field.

Nelson, T. D. (2009). *Ageism*. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 431–440). Psychology Press..



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largely buy into the stereotypes as reflecting a true state of the world, and therefore there is nothing wrong with being characterized along age stereotypes (Caporael, Lukaszewski, & Culbertson, 1983; Giles, Fox, Harwood, & Williams, 1994; Nelson, 2003; Neugarten, 1974). If there is "no outraged victim" protesting how they are stereotyped, does ageism simply not exist?

Unfortunately, ageism does indeed exist, and the purpose of this chapter is to discuss the nature of ageism, how it is perpetuated, and how to reduce it.

THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF AGEISM

Go into any greeting card store in the United States and in the birthday card section, peruse some of the cards. Almost immediately, you'll notice a common message: Sorry to hear you're another year older. Birthdays are seen as a decline, a step toward being in a group that is not respected and not valued in our society. Birthdays are a reminder of one's increasing physical and mental health issues as the years go by. Getting older is bad. Why would card makers put such a message on a card that ostensibly is meant for a celebration? That they do, and frequently print such overt and covert jokes about getting older, is one indicator of the degree to which aging is institutionalized in our culture. Try that same message with another stigmatized group, and you are likely to arouse not laughter in the card recipient, but anger: Sorry to hear you're overweight! Sorry to hear you're handicapped! Sorry to hear you're gay! I think you get the point. People spend billions of dollars every year to hide the physical signs that their body is aging: skin creams, face-lifts, tuck this, pull back that, hair dye (hide that gray), wigs, and makeup, all to conceal external signs of their age (National Consumer's League, 2004). Why? Because we are told, in innumerable ways throughout our life, that aging is bad. Young is good, and old is not good. This chapter explores some of the reasons why ageism is so institutionalized in America, and what that means for the lives of older adults.

EARLY AGEISM RESEARCH

Technically, *ageism* is defined as prejudice against anyone based on his or her age. Indeed, we do seem to have stereotypes for nearly every age group (teens, children, infants, those who are "middle-aged," and "old people"). Although some ageism research has focused on negative attitudes and stereotypes toward teens and children (termed "juvenile ageism"; e.g., Westman, 1991), most research on ageism has tended to focus on prejudice against older adults (Nelson, 2002, 2005). There are two major types of ageism: *malignant ageism* and *benign ageism* (Butler, 1980). In the former, the perceiver feels an extreme dislike toward the older person, and believes the older person is worthless. In the latter, the perceiver views the older person through prejudice and stereotypes due to their own fear of aging. We discuss this further when we talk about theories of ageism.

Research on ageism is still in its infancy, with only a couple of studies conducted on it prior to 1969, when the term was first coined by Butler (1969). One of the first studies on attitudes toward older people was conducted by Tuckman and Lorge (1953). Their research found that people in the United States tended to have a fairly negative attitude toward older adults. Indeed, later studies affirmed that Americans have negative attitudes toward older people and aging (Barrow & Smith, 1979; Falk & Falk, 1997; Nuessel, 1982). However, many other studies showed that people had very positive attitudes toward older adults (Bell, 1992; Crockett & Hummert, 1987; Green, 1981). What seems to account for these mixed findings on whether ageism even exists? A closer examination of the methods used in the studies reveals a significant difference in the way the questions are worded when asking questions about the respondent's attitude toward older adults. When one is asked "What is your attitude toward your grandparent (or older boss, or neighbor)?" one tends to answer with quite positive attitudes toward these specific older adults. However, when a respondent is asked about his or her attitudes toward "older people" in general, the response is typically fairly negative. Why might this occur? This is fairly typical in social perception. Many studies have shown that to the degree that one can individuate a member of a stereotyped outgroup, the less that the

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Feminist Politics: Where We Stand

Simply put, feminism is a movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression. This was a definition of feminism I offered in *Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center* more than 10 years ago. It was my hope at the time that it would become a common definition everyone would use. I liked this definition because it did not imply that men were the enemy. By naming sexism as the problem it went directly to the heart of the matter. Practically, it is a definition which implies that all sexist thinking and action is the problem, whether those who perpetuate it are female or male, child or adult. It is also broad enough to include an understanding of systemic institutionalized sexism. As a definition it is open-ended. To understand feminism it implies one has to necessarily understand sexism.

As all advocates of feminist politics know, most people do not understand sexism, or if they do, they think it is not a problem. Masses of people think that feminism is always and only about women seeking to be equal to men. And a huge majority of these folks think feminism is anti-male. Their misunderstanding of feminist politics reflects the reality that most folks learn about feminism from patriarchal mass media. The feminism they hear about the most is portrayed by women who are primarily committed to gender equality — equal pay for equal work, and sometimes women and

movement created the context for female bonding. We did not bond against men, we bonded to protect our interests as women. When we challenged professors who taught no books by women, it was not because we did not like those professors (we often did); rightly, we wanted an end to gender biases in the classroom and in the curriculum.

The feminist transformations that were taking place in our coed college in the early '70s were taking place as well in the world of home and work. First and foremost feminist movement urged females to no longer see ourselves and our bodies as the property of men. To demand control of our sexuality, effective birth control and reproductive rights, an end to rape and sexual harassment, we needed to stand in solidarity. In order for women to change job discrimination we needed to lobby as a group to change public policy. Challenging and changing female sexist thinking was the first step towards creating the powerful sisterhood that would ultimately rock our nation.

Following in the wake of civil rights revolution feminist movement in the '70s and '80s changed the face of our nation. The feminist activists who made these changes possible cared for the well-being of all females. We understood that political solidarity between females expressed in sisterhood goes beyond positive recognition of the experiences of women and even shared sympathy for common suffering. Feminist sisterhood is rooted in shared commitment to struggle against patriarchal injustice, no matter the form that injustice takes. Political solidarity between women always undermines sexism and sets the stage for the overthrow of patriarchy. Significantly, sisterhood could never have been possible across the boundaries of race and class if individual women had not been willing to divest of their power to dominate and exploit subordinated groups

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

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Domestic labor Unpaid work carried out in the home, mainly by women. The performance of this essential work is often considered key to women's inequality.

Dress reform A movement in the middle to late Victorian era that promoted practical and comfortable clothing. This was in contrast to the uncomfortable and over-elaborate women's clothing such as corsets that were worn at that time. Dress reformers were often treated with disbelief and ridicule.

Dyke Previously a derogatory term, this word was "reclaimed" by lesbian feminists in the 1970s and is an important identity to some lesbians. However, many people still believe it to be a slur and it is often used to insult masculine women.

Emotional labor A requirement of some jobs, especially those often done by women, where workers must manage their own feelings and show enthusiasm or caring. It is also used in relation to women's unacknowledged role of organizing and maintaining emotional and social connections.

Empowerment Measures to improve the lives of oppressed people, particularly legal and social changes, such as improving girls' education in the developing world. It also describes a feeling of strength experienced by individual women when they make changes in their work or relationships with themselves and others.

Equality feminism A strand of feminism, sometimes deployed by conservatives in the US, that focuses on legal equality between women and men.

Essentialism The belief that there are profound differences between men and women that are essential to their identity and that cannot be changed.

Eve teasing A euphemism, used in South Asia, meaning the sexual harassment and abuse of women in public places.

Fat positivity An acceptance of people of all sizes, recognizing that it is not necessary to be thin in order to be healthy or happy; a movement to combat anti-fat bias.

Feminism A wide range of social movements and ideologies based on asserting women's rights; collective activism for legal, economic, and social equality between the sexes; and the belief that women should have rights and opportunities equal to those of men.

Feminist theology Examining the history, practices, beliefs, and scriptures of religions from a feminist perspective.

First-wave feminism A period of feminism from 1848 until around 1918–1920. It focused on women's right to vote, rights within marriage, and the ending of legal barriers to education and work.

Gender The state of being male or female; socially constructed behaviors, roles, and activities that are connected to masculinity or femininity; someone's deeply held internal perception that they are male or female.

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Margaret Walters

FEMINISM

A Very Short Introduction

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Chapter 3
The 18th century: Amazons of the pen

Mary Astell was one of the earliest true feminists, perhaps the first English writer to explore and assert ideas about women which we can still recognize and respond to. Throughout her life she identified with and spoke directly to other women, acknowledging their shared problems. Though she was deeply religious, she had little in common with her outspoken predecessors in the 17th-century sects. She was profoundly conservative; a life-long Royalist and a High Church Anglican, radical only in her perception of the way women's lives were restricted by convention, and their minds left undeveloped and untrained.

Astell was born in 1666. Her father, a Newcastle coal merchant, died when she was 12 years old. In her late teens, Astell fell into a deep depression, writing poems about her lonely misery, and the fact that, for all her intellectual self-confidence, she could not envisage any tolerable future for herself. At the age of 21, she wrote a poem complaining about her frustration (which must have been shared by many other girls) and gloomily admitting that she could imagine no life that would allow her to use her talents or satisfy her ambition.

> Nature permits not me the common way,
> By serving Court or State, to gain
> That so much valu'd trifle fame

Madsen, D. L. (2000). *Feminist theory and literary practice*. Pluto Press.



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Ynestra King and Carol Adams, whose work is discussed in chapter four.

Perhaps the most prominent feminist activist against institutionalised male sexual violence and pornography in particular is Andrea Dworkin who, with the feminist legal scholar Catherine MacKinnon, created a landmark when they sought legal means to have pornography designated a civil offence, in the Minneapolis Anti-Pornography Ordinance. Dworkin argues, in works like *Pornography: Men Possessing Women* (1981), that pornography victimises all women, who are objectified and their meaning fixed within a network of violent sexual imagery. In this way, pornography serves to legitimate and to perpetuate the structures of male power. 'The major theme of pornography as a genre is male power, its nature, its magnitude, its use, its meaning. Male power as expressed in and through pornography, is discernible in discrete but interwoven, reinforcing strains: the power of self, physical power over and against others, the power of terror, the power of naming, the power of owning, the power of money, and the power of sex. ... The valuation of women in pornography is a secondary theme in that the degradation of women exists in order to postulate, exercise, and celebrate male power. Male power, in degrading women, is concerned first with itself, its perpetuation, expansion, intensification, and elevation' (in Humm, 1992, pp. 83–84).

The Rise of American Feminist Literary Theory

At this time, feminist activism saw the rise of feminist theory in the areas of literary study, political theory, philosophy and history. This development culminated in the emergence of Women's Studies programmes in the United States and globally. The first full Women's Studies programme was set up at San Diego State College in 1970 (Leitch, 1989, p. 325). The preferred method of organisation has been interdepartmental and the preferred methodology interdisciplinary with a strong emphasis upon the historical. Feminist literary theory had three main aims: to expose the workings of the ubiquitous patriarchal power structure; to promote the rediscovery of women's historical achievements (including literary history); and to establish a feminine perspective on critical, literary, political, scientific, philosophical (and other) theories of the cultural forces that shape our lives. The intended aim was to change the sexist bias of traditional educational and social practices.

In literary critical circles, pre-feminist or 'traditional' criticism came under attack for its blindness to gender. Traditional approaches to the text assume that texts are not gendered, 'great' works of literature express timeless and immutable truths that are not affected by such worldly issues as sex. Feminists charge that this kind of approach institutionalises male prejudice by refusing to acknowledge that 'great' works of literature often endorse masculine values and interests. Early feminist theory, which developed from the Women's Liberation and Civil Rights movements, focused upon points of continuity between the reading experience and personal experience (including family, society, networks of relationships, power structures, systems of value learned and lived and perpetuated in 'private' life).

One of the pioneering literary studies was Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* (1971) which offered an analysis of authoritative male writers and revealed a pattern of masculine dominance and feminine submission that Millett identified as misogyny. *Sexual Politics* exposed the patriarchal prejudice and sexual violence celebrated in classic modern texts such as D.H. Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers* and *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, or Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead*. Millett's basic insight was that all writing is marked by gender; this fact is suppressed by traditional non-feminist theory which claims for literature immunity from such worldly experiences as the experience of one's sexuality. The aim of feminist literary critics such as Millett was to promote a positive image of women in art and therefore in life, and also to raise the consciousness of women to their own oppression. The method pursued by Millett is to look at how female characters are portrayed and in what positions/situations they are placed in 'great' literary works. From this, she builds up a picture of the attitudes towards women that characterise the work of a

Crandall, C. S., & Eshleman, A. (2003). A justification-suppression model of the expression and experience of prejudice. *Psychological Bulletin*, *129*(3), 414.

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A Justification–Suppression Model of the Expression and Experience of Prejudice

Christian S. Crandall and Amy Eshleman
University of Kansas

The authors propose a justification–suppression model (JSM), which characterizes the processes that lead to prejudice expression and the experience of one's own prejudice. They suggest that "genuine" prejudices are not directly expressed but are restrained by beliefs, values, and norms that suppress them. Prejudices are expressed when justifications (e.g., attributions, ideologies, stereotypes) release suppressed prejudices. The same process accounts for which prejudices are accepted into the self-concept. The JSM is used to organize the prejudice literature, and many empirical findings are recharacterized as factors affecting suppression or justification, rather than directly affecting genuine prejudice. The authors discuss the implications of the JSM for several topics, including prejudice measurement, ambivalence, and the distinction between prejudice and its expression.

I do not ask for final honesty,
Since none can say,
"This is my motive, this is me."
—Donald Hall, "A Friend Revisited"

The expression of prejudice is marked by a deep conflict between a desire to express an emotion and, at the same time, to maintain values and self-concepts that conflict with prejudice. In this article, we examine the nature of this conflict and develop a general framework for understanding how this conflict can lead to the expression of prejudice. The scientific literature on the psychology of prejudice is long and large, but the theories and studies tend to be about specific problems and prejudices, not the phenomenon of prejudice. We develop the justification–suppression model (JSM) to encompass the best known and empirically supported theories, incorporating many of their common elements. The goal of the JSM is to provide an integrative framework that helps to organize a range of previous studies and theories into a coherent review and analysis. We provide a simple structure for conceptualizing the process of prejudice expression and the experience of prejudice; this structure leads to several hypotheses about the expression and suppression of prejudice.

Definition of Prejudice

We define prejudice as a negative evaluation of a social group or a negative evaluation of an individual that is significantly based on the individual's group membership. This simple and broad definition differs from other definitions in a number of ways.

Allport (1954) argued that a prejudice must be "unfounded"; it must "lack basis in fact" (p. 7). After 43 pages of discussion on determining whether a prejudice has a basis in fact, he concluded that it is a nearly hopeless task to establish when prejudice is rational or justified: "The study of groups, so far as it has gone, does not permit us to say that hostility toward a group is to any appreciable extent based on 'well-deserved reputation' " (Allport, 1954, p. 125).

With regard to our theoretical assumptions, we do not define prejudice as "irrational," because it is virtually impossible to ascertain rationality (see Brown, 1995). A more important reason to avoid the issue of rationality is, we argue, that the psychological processes that lead to prejudice and its expression are identical for "rational" and "irrational" prejudices. Regardless of their foundation in fact—whether they are complete fantasies, based on a kernel of truth, the whole cob, or an entire silo of truth—the psychological processes of prejudice do not depend on a hypothetical "objective" observer's evaluation of accuracy.

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The basic unit in a psychological theory should be a psychological process, and it is the phenomenological reality of the perceiver that is the explanandum of psychological theory, not the meta-analytic results of carefully conceived social researches. As such, we eschew the psychologically false dichotomy of rational–irrational in our definition of prejudice.

Although "positive prejudice" may exist, we emphasize negative prejudice for three reasons. First, negative prejudice is more harmful, damaging, and disruptive to social interaction and social justice (Brown, 1995; J. M. Jones, 1997). Second, the empirical literature on positive prejudice toward out-groups is scanty. Third and most important, our model describes the process by which an underlying prejudice becomes experienced and expressed. A positive prejudice is likely to be expressed and experienced in its

Hughes, M., & Tuch, S. A. (2003). Gender differences in whites' racial attitudes: Are women's attitudes really more favorable? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 384–401.

Social Psychology Quarterly
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Gender Differences in Whites' Racial Attitudes: Are Women's Attitudes Really More Favorable?*

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Studies of gender differences in orientation toward others have found that women are more strongly concerned than men with affective processes and are more likely to be other-focused, while men tend to be more instrumental and more self-oriented. Recent research has extended this finding to include gender differences in racial attitudes, and reports that women also are more favorable than men in their racial outlooks. In this study we examine differences between white men and white women across a broader spectrum of racial attitudes with more diverse national samples than were employed previously, including the 1988–2000 General Social Surveys and the 1988–1994 American National Election Studies. We find that gender differences in racial attitudes are small, inconsistent, and limited mostly to attitudes on racial policy. Our findings are consistent with the views that white women's and white men's racial attitudes are rooted in their shared sense of group position, and that gender-differentiated value socialization plays only a small role in racial attitude formation.

Does women's prosocial orientation lead them to hold more positive racial attitudes than men? A gender socialization argument, based on the assumption that gender-differentiated value socialization exerts an important influence on attitudes in general (Beutel and Marini 1995; Cross and Madson 1997) and on racial attitudes specifically (Johnson and Marini 1998), strongly suggests that it does so. This argument implies that an effective mechanism for reducing the racial animosity and conflict that still deeply divide American society in the early twenty-first century would be to socialize people, especially males, to have the kinds of prosocial value orientations typical of females.

An alternative argument, based in the work of Blumer (1958), is that racial attitudes emerge from the structural relations between groups, and that prejudice is linked inseparably to what Blumer called a "sense of group position." Because women and men in the same racial category occupy the same position in the racial hierarchy, this argument predicts that women's and men's racial attitudes should show little difference, regardless of any gender difference in prosocial orientation. In the present study we evaluate these arguments using data from two large, nationally representative surveys, the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American National Election Study (ANES).

* A previous version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, held in Chicago in August 1999. The data sets used in this study were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data for the General Social Survey, National Data Program for the Social Sciences, originally were collected by James A. Davis and Tom W. Smith of the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, and distributed by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, University of Connecticut. The data for the American National Election Study originally were collected by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, under the direction of Warren E. Miller, Donald R. Kinder, and Steven J. Rosenstone. Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here. We thank Carol A. Bailey, Sandra L. Hanson, K. Jill Kiecolt, Carolyn J. Kroehler, James W. Michaels, Rachel Parker-Gwin, Lee Sigelman, and Marylee Taylor for helpful comments. The authors share equal responsibility for the conception, design, and execution of this paper. Direct correspondence to Michael Hughes, Department of Sociology, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0137, mdh@vt.edu, or Steven A. Tuch, Department of Sociology, George Washington University, Washington, DC 20052, steve@gwu.edu.

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BACKGROUND

Gender and Normative Orientations

Substantial evidence indicates that women are more strongly concerned about others and about social relationships than are men. For example, Cross and Madson's (1997) review of research on gender and self-construal shows that social relationships and connections to others are more likely to be a part of women's than of men's self-concepts; as a consequence, women's moral decisions are more likely to reflect others' needs as well as obligations to others. These differences are consistent with findings in the literature on gender differences in behavioral and normative orientations (Beutel and Marini 1995) showing that women have closer relationships with others than do men, are more deeply involved in caregiving, are more prosocial and altruistic, and are more compassionate and empathetic.

These conclusions are consistent with a wide array of findings on gender differences in orientations toward violence showing that men are far more likely than women to support violent or forceful options across an array of social control, foreign affairs, and law enforcement situations (Smith 1984). Research on policy preferences reported in many national studies follows a similar pattern: women are more likely than men to prefer policies that oppose violence and support compassion, regulation, and protection (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).

Overall these gender differences in normative orientations strongly suggest that women would be more likely than men to support interracial interaction and policies promoting racial equality, and to reject dehumanizing racial stereotypes—in short, that women's racial attitudes would be more favorable than men's.

Not every study, however, reports that women's typical value pattern is expressive and communal and that men's is typically instrumental and autonomous. The review in Prince-Gibson and Schwartz (1998), for example, shows that studies of attachment values and traditional work values reveal no gender differences. Prince-Gibson and Schwartz's own (1998) study uncovered no gender differences in either value priorities or the meanings of values across 10 value types: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security. These findings suggest that if gender differences are present in racial attitudes, they would not be due to values. If racial attitudes are linked strongly to values, however, these findings would suggest little or no gender difference in racial attitudes.

Gender and Theories of Whites' Racial Attitudes

Theories of racial attitudes (for a review, see Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000) have not explicitly considered gender as an important variable. Yet theories of racial attitudes that implicate personality dimensions as determinants of such attitudes are consistent with the idea that gender differences in personality could lead to gender differences in these attitudes. Symbolic racism theory, for example, which emphasizes individualism and antiblack affect (Kinder and Sears 1981), authoritarian personality theory, which emphasizes authoritarianism and aggressiveness (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1994), and social dominance theory, which emphasizes social dominance orientation (Sidanius 1993), all focus on personality dimensions that the literature on gender differences in self-construal (Cross and Madson 1997) and value orientations (Beutel and Marini 1995) suggests would be more prominent in men than in women.

Social structural theories, on the other hand, do not imply that men and women should have different racial attitudes. These include realistic group conflict theory (Bobo 1983; D. Campbell 1965), group position theory (Blumer 1958; Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997), and various approaches that combine race and class (Bonacich 1980). Although these approaches differ widely in their specifics, they are generally consistent with Blumer's (1958) idea that racial prejudice and antagonism are reflections not of individual personality traits, but of competition and conflict between groups for material rewards, power, and status in a racialized society. A social structural approach would suggest that because white men and white

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

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then uses to talk about itself. Prejudice is "first of all a cultural atmosphere; one breathes it in with the air of the family and the society" (Memmi, 2000, p. 133).

Although their analyses contained the seeds of universally generalisable lessons, they were also very much situated in a specific set of socio-structural and socio-historical arrangements. The issues that both Allport and Myrdal wrote about were concerning dilemmas deeply anchored in the socio-structural organisation of a particular society, the United States. Whereas Allport was trying to derive universalist conclusions from his analyses of American social structure, Myrdal, in contrast, was very much trying to particularize by writing about the tensions at the core of American moral creed. Whereas, for Allport, prejudice was as much a problem of "psychological causation" as one of "social causation" (Allport, 1950), in his seminal study of racism in America, Myrdal provided perhaps the most cogent example of the significance of moral dilemmas: the perceived tension between "the Creed of progress, liberty, equality, and humanitarianism" (vol. I, p. 80) and the reality of segregation. It is this very tension that turned (at least in Myrdal's eyes) a national problem (the "Negro problem") into a *moral* problem. Allport has had a "hegemonic impact on the main trajectory of research" (Jackman, 2005, p. 89). The universalist Allport is the hero of our field, whereas Myrdal seems to be the forgotten voice.

It is argued that "Allport missed important aspects of the nature of prejudice" and that "his blindspots became the field's blindspots for many years" (Dovidio et al., 2005, pp. 9–10). Contemporary social psychology of prejudice has aimed to redress the balance, to remedy some of the effects of those blindspots. As a consequence, we are more knowledgeable about the cognitive, emotional, and behavioural aspects of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination that we have ever been. Yet we still seem to be missing what is essential about prejudice – the puzzles and tensions that ordered and civilized societies bring to the prejudice problematic (Wetherell & Potter, 1992) and that are "ordinarily invisible" (Opotow, 2011). It is because of the "extreme complexity" of prejudice that "many theoretical problems are unsolved - and seem almost unsolvable" (Kramer, 1949, p. 389). This extreme complexity comes from seeing prejudice primarily as phenomenon deeply embedded in the social organisation of societies and connected to structural factors and larger societal systems such as education, poverty, employment, criminal justice (Tileagă, 2015). As Bar-Tal (2000) argues "social psychology cannot escape from dealing with larger societal systems if it desires to be *social* in the broad meaning of the term and to be relevant to real problems that preoccupy people in their social life" (p. 156, emphasis in original).

There has also been growing realisation that the American experience was but one facet of a larger organisation of prejudice that extends back to imperialism and colonialism and that reaches across the globe. Each context has its own legacy of racism, sexism, and many other -isms but all arise in a context in which negative attitudes, hostilities, and unimaginable hurt and fear have been born of exploitation and the profit motive (Fanon, 1963). This connection was nowhere more evident than in the way in which the Black Lives Matter movement quickly spread from the USA to other countries where citizens also recognized the ongoing legacy of dehumanisation, injustice, and violence in their lives.

If you address issues of prejudice structurally you are not interested in prejudice *per se*, but in collective ideological practices that reinforce racial and other kinds of ideological orders that keep people in their place. The advocates of a societal social psychology of prejudice (see for example, Howarth, Wagner, Magnusson, & Sammut, 2014) have made this point repeatedly. Racism itself "forms a structure, and accordingly, the struggle against racism must be fundamentally geared towards the removal of the practices, mechanisms, and institutions that maintain systemic white privilege" (Bonilla-Silva, 2013, p. 266). We sometimes mistakenly believe that it is human psychology that makes us prisoners of social structure. However, as Turner (2006) has argued, society is not a "psychological prison." Instead, it makes us "capable of collective action" and helps us expand "human possibilities."

Allport, G. W., Clark, K., & Pettigrew, T. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*.

THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE

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many antagonistic attitudes as favorable attitudes. In this volume, accordingly, we shall be concerned chiefly with prejudice *against*, not with prejudice *in favor of*, ethnic groups

The phrase "thinking ill of others" is obviously an elliptical expression that must be understood to include feelings of scorn or dislike, of fear and aversion, as well as various forms of antipathetic conduct: such as talking against people, discriminating against them, or attacking them with violence.

Similarly, we need to expand the phrase "without sufficient warrant." A judgment is unwarranted whenever it lacks basis in fact. A wit defined prejudice as "being down on something you're not up on."

It is not easy to say how much fact is required in order to justify a judgment. A prejudiced person will almost certainly claim that he has sufficient warrant for his views. He will tell of bitter experiences he has had with refugees, Catholics, or Orientals. But, in most cases, it is evident that his facts are scanty and strained. He resorts to a selective sorting of his own few memories, mixes them up with hearsay, and overgeneralizes. No one can possibly know *all* refugees, Catholics, or Orientals. Hence any negative judgment of these groups *as a whole* is, strictly speaking, an instance of thinking ill without sufficient warrant.

Sometimes, the ill-thinker has no first-hand experience on which to base his judgment. A few years ago most Americans thought exceedingly ill of Turks—but very few had ever seen a Turk nor did they know any person who had seen one Their warrant lay exclusively in what they had heard of the Armenian massacres and of the legendary crusades. On such evidence they presumed to condemn all members of a nation.

Ordinarily, prejudice manifests itself in dealing with individual members of rejected groups. But in avoiding a Negro neighbor, or in answering "Mr. Greenberg's" application for a room, we frame our action to accord with our categorical generalization of the group as a whole. We pay little or no attention to individual differences, and overlook the important fact that Negro X, our neighbor, is not Negro Y, whom we dislike for good and sufficient reason, that Mr Greenberg, who may be a fine gentleman, is not Mr. Bloom, whom we have good reason to dislike.

So common is this process that we might define prejudice as:

> an avertive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to the group.

McCauley, C. R., Jussim, L. J., & Lee, Y.-T. (1995). *Stereotype accuracy: Toward appreciating group differences.* American Psychological Association.



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Del Boca, 1981, for a review). Regardless of differences in definition, however, all authors in this book agree that stereotypes constitute people's beliefs about groups—beliefs that may be positive or negative, accurate or inaccurate. Nonetheless, many laypeople and social scientists still seem to assume that stereotypes are inaccurate, rigid, and pernicious. In the next sections, therefore, we identify the typical accusations leveled against stereotypes and evaluate their scientific status. Are stereotypes factually incorrect? Are they rigid? Are they illogical? Do they lead people to exaggerate differences among groups?

What Is Wrong With Stereotypes?

The Classic Charges

From Katz and Braly (1933) to the present, stereotypes have been condemned as factually incorrect, illogical in origin, and irrationally resistant to new information about the stereotyped group. Each of these charges is well-founded if a stereotype is understood as an exceptionless generalization about the target group (e.g., "All Asians are smart"). However, each is baseless if a stereotype is understood as a probabilistic prediction about how the target group differs from others (McCauley et al., 1980). Below we show how few, if any, of the classic charges against stereotypes would apply to a belief that Asians are likely to do better academically than individuals from most other groups. This distinction between all-or-none beliefs and probabilistic beliefs is crucial for evaluating the validity of some of the most common charges against stereotypes.

Stereotypes are factually incorrect. This must be true if a stereotype is an all-or-none generalization about members of the stereotyped group. It cannot be the case that every German is efficient. If there is even one inefficient German, the stereotype is incorrect. Allport (1954) took this approach in distinguishing stereotypes from valid beliefs about group characteristics. For Allport, "all lawyers are crooked" is a stereotype; "lawyers are more crooked than most people" is not (p. 192).

Do people hold such all-or-none stereotypes? The research evidence

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

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performance, and production-design stylings that subvert audience expectations as only an experimental film can.

We've already discussed the importance of narrative to many documentary films. A growing number of narrative feature films that incorporate documentary techniques demonstrate that the borrowing works in both directions. Contemporary directors such as Jean-Pierre and Luc Dardenne (*Two Days, One Night*, 2014), Lance Hammer (*Ballast*, 2008), Benh Zeitlen (*Beasts of the Southern Wild*, 2012), Ryan Coogler (*Fruitvale Station*, 2013), and Kelly Reichardt (*Night Moves*, 2014) use small crews, natural lighting, handheld cameras, and nonactors (alongside deglamorized professionals) to lend their gritty narrative films the sense of authentic realism associated with documentary aesthetics and techniques.[2]

Genre

Our brief survey of documentary and experimental cinema demonstrates that both of these primary types of movies can be further divided into defined subcategories. These distinctions are both useful and inevitable. Any art form practiced by ambitious innovators and consumed by a diverse and evolving culture can't help developing in multiple directions. When filmmakers and their audiences recognize and value particular approaches to both form and content, these documentary or experimental subcategories are further differentiated and defined. And the moment such a distinction is accepted, filmmakers and viewers will begin again to refine, revise, and recombine the elements that defined the new categorization in the first place.

Genre refers to the categorization of narrative films by the stories they tell and the ways they tell them. Commonly recognized movie genres include the Western, horror, science fiction, musical, and gangster film. But this is far from a complete list. The film industry continues to make action movies, biographies (biopics), melodramas, thrillers, romances, romantic comedies, fantasy films, and many others that fall within some genre or subgenre category.

Cinema of ideas
All cinema is about ideas—many about the idea of cinema itself—and there are many ways to make a film. Some filmmakers find nothing more challenging than making a movie about an idea for its own sake. With *The Tree of Life* (2011), writer/director Terrence Malick gently deals with such abstract ideas as life and death, love, family, joy and sorrow, the flow of time, and whether eternity exists. Its visual impact, produced by vivid images of our natural world, creates an overlaying structure. Under that he gently tucks a beautifully realized account of one family's life in the 1950s American Southwest, thus letting us experience the universe and the individual. But its principal purpose, like that of all cinema, is to make us see and help us understand its ideas.

A long list like that may lead you to believe that all films are genre movies. Not so. A quick scan of the movies in theaters during a single week in 2014 reveals many narrative films that tell stories and employ styles that don't fit neatly into any existing genre template. The nongenre titles filling out the top fifteen box office leaders during the last weekend in 2014, for example, included *Night at the Museum: Secret of the Tomb* (Shawn Levy), *The Gambler* (Rupert Wyatt), *Wild* (Jean-Marc Vallée), and *Top Five* (Chris Rock), as well as *The Hunger Games: Mockingjay—Part 1* (Francis Lawrence), which borrows from a number of genres but doesn't land directly in any.

Genre is certainly not the only way that narrative movies are classified. The film industry breaks down films according to studio of origin, budget, target audience, and distribution patterns. Moviegoers often make viewing decisions according to the directors and/or stars of the films available. Film scholars may categorize and analyze a movie based on a wide range of criteria, including its specific aesthetic style, the artists who created it,

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

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22 Sexual Prejudice

Gregory M. Herek
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Social psychologists have been conducting research on racial, ethnic, and religious prejudices for nearly a century. By contrast, prejudice related to sexual orientation has only recently received systematic scientific scrutiny. Sexual prejudice manifests many of the same social psychological characteristics as other forms of prejudice with more extensive research pedigrees, as this chapter makes clear. Nevertheless, its relatively recent recognition by scientists and society is indicative of some of its distinctive features, notably that it is based on a concealable status and that it is not universally condemned. Indeed, it remains widespread in contemporary society.

This chapter considers these commonalities and differences in providing an overview of current theory and research on sexual prejudice, especially as it is manifested in the United States. The chapter is guided by a conceptual framework that integrates the constructs of stigma and prejudice, and provides a unified account of how they are experienced by sexual minorities and heterosexuals. After describing that framework, the chapter considers issues relevant to the definition of sexual prejudice as an attitude; its cognitive, affective, and behavioral sources; some of its key correlates; and its underlying motivations. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how cultural and psychological factors have combined to foster a reduction in sexual prejudice in recent years.

SEXUAL STIGMA AND PREJUDICE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Although this chapter is about sexual prejudice, it is grounded in a conceptual framework that begins with the construct of stigma (earlier versions of this framework can be found in Herek, 2004, 2007; Herek, Chopp, & Strohl, 2007). As used here, *stigma* refers to the negative regard, inferior status, and relative powerlessness that society collectively accords to people who possess a particular characteristic or belong to a particular group or category. Inherent in this definition is the fact that stigma constitutes shared knowledge about which attributes and categories are valued by society, which ones are denigrated, and how these valuations vary across situations. Whereas lay definitions of stigma tend to focus on the condition or attribute that discredits the individuals who manifest it—marking them as diverging in an undesirable way from society's understanding of normalcy—social psychological accounts have emphasized the social processes through which a stigmatized condition acquires its meaning in different situations (Goffman, 1963; see also Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Jones et al., 1984). These culturally constructed meanings are grounded in society's power relations so that individuals who inhabit a stigmatized role enjoy less access to valued resources, less influence over others, and less control over their own fate than the nonstigmatized (Link & Phelan, 2001).

Sexual stigma is the stigma attached to any nonheterosexual behavior, identity, relationship, or community. It constitutes socially shared knowledge about homosexuality's devalued status in society—that is, its denigration and discrediting relative to heterosexuality (for other discussions of sexual stigma, see Herek, 2004, 2007; Herek et al., 2007). Like other stigmas, sexual stigma creates roles and expectations for conduct that are shared and understood by the members of society. Regardless of their own sexual orientation or personal attitudes, people in the United States (and many other countries) know that homosexual desires and behaviors are widely regarded in negative terms relative to heterosexuality. They are also aware of the malevolent stereotypes that

are routinely attached to individuals whose personal identities are based on same-sex attractions, behaviors, relationships, or membership in a sexual minority community.

Although same-sex and different-sex behaviors are ubiquitous in human societies and other species, notions of "the homosexual" and "the heterosexual"—and the idea that individuals can be defined in terms of their sexual attractions and behaviors—emerged in medical discourse relatively recently (e.g., Chauncey, 1982–1983). The stigmatization process was apparent in the very construction of these categories during the 19th century. The modern term *homosexuality* (*Homosexualität*), appears to have been first used in 1869 by Karl Maria Benkert in a German-language pamphlet (Feray & Herzer, 1990; Herzer, 1985).[1] It was not the only term in use at that time to refer to the phenomenon of same-sex attraction and love, but it represented an attempt to cast them in more positive terms. Nevertheless, homosexuality's inferior status is evident in the fact that Benkert contrasted it with "normal sexuality" (*Normalsexualität*). *Heterosexuality* (*Heterosexualität*) came into usage as the counterpart to homosexuality only later (see also J. N. Katz, 1995). Thus, the stigmatization of homosexuality has historically been inherent in the differentiation of sexual behaviors and desires in Western thought.

As with other social groupings that create majority and minority statuses, sexual orientation is a socially constructed category. Our contemporary understanding of it as a binary heterosexual–homosexual system (with the status of bisexuality often ambiguous) is historically recent. Thus, sexual stigma is a product of cultural forces, although the various social categories linked to homosexuality over the past century (including categories related to disease, predation, and immorality) may resonate with cultural universals of stigma (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). As sexual stigma becomes increasingly delegitimized, homosexuality may cease to be associated with these categories.

Stigma-derived differentials in status and power are legitimated and perpetuated by society's institutions and ideological systems in the form of *institutional* or *structural stigma* (e.g., Link & Phelan, 2001). As a product of sociopolitical forces, structural stigma "represents the policies of private and governmental institutions that restrict the opportunities of stigmatized groups" (Corrigan et al., 2005, p. 557). Structural sexual stigma is referred to here as *heterosexism*. Adapting Link and Phelan's (2001) definition of institutional racism, heterosexism can be understood as a cultural ideology that is embodied in institutional practices that work to the disadvantage of sexual minority groups even in the absence of individual prejudice or discrimination. It comprises the organizing rules that enforce and perpetuate sexual stigma in society's institutions. As with institutional and individual racism, distinguishing between heterosexism and individual sexual prejudice facilitates the analysis of structural policies and individual attitudes as separate albeit interrelated phenomena.

By embedding sexual stigma in society's institutions, including religion, the law, and medicine, heterosexism has historically justified the differential status of sexual minorities relative to heterosexuals. It is noteworthy, however, that as lesbian, gay, and bisexual people have increasingly come to be recognized as a minority group whose members deserve recognition not simply as human beings but also as well-functioning members of society who are entitled to full citizenship and equal rights, discriminatory practices and policies against them have begun to lose their claims to moral righteousness. In other words, heterosexism's legitimacy in the United States and elsewhere is increasingly contested (e.g., Kelman, 2001). In some arenas, such as the mental health professions and behavioral sciences, heterosexism is now completely delegitimized, as signaled by the American Psychiatric Association's removal of homosexuality from its *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* in 1973, and the American Psychological Association's subsequent commitment to "take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness that has long been associated with homosexual orientations" (Conger, 1975, p. 633).

[1] It has been argued that *Homosexualität* should be translated as "homosexual" rather than "homosexuality" (Bech, 1998).

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

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

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Conventions also include aspects of style associated with particular genres. For example, melodrama is characterised by an excessively stylised *mise-en-scène*, while film noir commonly employs low-key lighting and narrative flashbacks. Horror films often rely on tight framing, preparing for the inevitable hand that suddenly reaches into the frame for someone's shoulder. Even the graphic style of opening credits may be conventional, as in the case of the 'Wild West font' often found at the beginnings of westerns, evocative of the rough-hewn wood of pioneer homesteads, or the scrawled and edgily kinetic credit style of serial-killer films like *Se7en* (1995) that suggest a psychological disturbance haunting the killer.

Mainstream cinema also features numerous aural conventions on the soundtrack involving dialogue, music and sound effects. Film scoring in all genres often featuring Wagnerian leitmotifs associated with particular characters or places is commonly used to enhance a desired emotional effect in support of the story. This convention is parodied in Mel Brooks' *Blazing Saddles* (1974) when the black sheriff (Cleavon Little) rides through the desert accompanied by the incongruous tune 'April in Paris', and then passes by Count Basie and his Orchestra inexplicably present, playing one of their signature tunes in the wilderness. Different types of musical accompaniment are conventional in particular genres. Sweeping strings are common in romantic melodramas, while electronic music or the theremin is used in science fiction for its futuristic connotations.

The familiarity of conventions allows for parody, which becomes possible only when conventions are known to audiences. As discussed in Chapter 2, much of the humour of Mel Brooks' film parodies depends upon viewers being familiar with specific genre films. Conventions can also be used by filmmakers for disturbing purposes precisely because viewers expect them. George A. Romero's undermining of numerous conventions of the classic horror film in *Night of the Living Dead* (1968), also discussed later, is one of the main reasons the film had such a powerful effect on audiences when first released.

iconography

The term 'iconography' derives from art historian Erwin Panofsky's discussion of Renaissance art, wherein he suggested that themes or concepts were expressed by symbolically-charged objects and events. Genre critics such as Lawrence Alloway adapted the idea of iconography – that familiar

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

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ACTIVITY

Representation

The representation of gender is only one of a range of representations which can be studied in *Beautiful Thing* and should be developed to include an analysis of Sandra. Other important areas to look at include the representation of the *family*, of *place* and of *class*.

- What key sequences would you choose to illustrate these three areas from the film?
- In *My Summer of Love* the central protagonists are female – how do they conform to or subvert (go against) gender expectations?
- Can you see any similarities between Mona and Jamie?

The conversation between Jamie and Ste about their responses to the world around them is typical of a type of narrative which has been defined as the 'coming of age' film and it is interesting to place *Beautiful Thing* in this context (one which has been more often associated with Hollywood cinema). The 'coming of age' film is often a sub-genre of the teen movie, although there are examples across a range of genres. It isn't a discrete genre but there are some recognizable codes and conventions:

Conventions of the 'coming of age' film

- The coming of age is a period of transition from 'childhood' to 'adulthood' which is characterized by the need to make decisions about the future – to do with family, friends, education, work, sexuality, etc.
- The time scale for taking these important decisions is often a short period – such as a summer.
- 'Coming of age' films tend to rely on dialogue and emotion rather than physical action.
- The actual age of the central character can vary, but tends to be around mid-teen.
- The story is often told in flashback by the central character who is now older and wiser.
- The central character is usually male.

NOTEBOX

Discussion points

- What 'coming of age' films have you seen? Include British and US films.
- Who do you think is the audience for these films? Why do you think they have remained so popular?
- Would you define *Beautiful Thing* and *My Summer of Love* as 'coming of age' films? Do the conventions apply to both films?

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

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4 Feminist criticism

"I'm not a feminist – I like men!"
"I'm not a feminist – I think women should be able to stay at home and raise children if they want to!"
"I'm not a feminist – I wear a bra!"

Contrary to the opinions of many students new to the study of feminist literary criticism, many feminists like men, think that women should be able to stay at home and raise children if they want to do so, and wear bras. Broadly defined, feminist criticism examines the ways in which literature (and other cultural productions) reinforces or undermines the economic, political, social, and psychological oppression of women. However, just as the practitioners of all critical theories do, feminist critics hold many different opinions on all of the issues their discipline examines. In fact, some feminists call their field *feminisms* in order to underscore the multiplicity of points of view of its adherents and offer ways of thinking that oppose the traditional tendency to believe there is a single best point of view. Yet many of us who are new to the study of feminist theory, both male and female, have decided ahead of time that we are not feminists because we don't share whatever feminist point of view we have found the most objectionable. In other words, before we even come to the theory classroom, many of us have reduced feminism to whatever we consider its most objectionable element and, on that basis, have rejected it. This attitude reveals, I think, the oversimplified, negative view of feminism that persists in American culture today. For it is from the culture at large – the home, the workplace, the media, and so on – that we have gathered the antifeminist bias we sometimes bring into the classroom.

To see how this negative oversimplification works to blind us to the seriousness of the issues feminism raises, let's briefly examine one of the most maligned feminist claims: that we should not use the masculine pronoun *he* to represent both men and women. For many people, this claim suggests what they see as the trivial, even infantile, nature of feminist demands. What possible difference could it make if we continue to use the "inclusive *he*" to refer to members of both sexes? We

know what we mean when we do it: it's simply a convention of language that includes both males and females. Such people believe that feminists should just concentrate on getting women an equal crack at the dough and forget all this nonsense about pronouns! For many feminists, however, the use of the pronoun *he* to refer to members of both sexes reflects and perpetuates a "habit of seeing," a way of looking at life, that uses male experience as the standard by which the experience of both sexes is evaluated. In other words, although the "inclusive he" claims to represent both men and women, in reality it is part of a deeply rooted cultural attitude that ignores women's experiences and women's points of view. The damaging effects of this attitude can be seen in a number of areas.

For example, before the centuries-old struggle for women's equality finally emerged in literary studies in the late 1960s, the literary works of (white) male authors describing experience from a (white) male point of view were considered the standard of universality – that is, representative of the experience of all readers – and universality was considered a major criterion of greatness. Because the works of (white) female authors (and of all authors of color) do not describe experience from a (white) male point of view, they were not considered universal and hence did not become part of the literary canon. It is interesting to note that popularity was not necessarily considered evidence of universality, for many women writers who enjoyed widespread fame during their lives were not "canonized" in literary histories, which focused primarily on male writers. Of course, those holding up this standard of greatness did not believe they were being unfairly discriminatory; they simply believed that they were rejecting literary texts that were not universal, that were not great. Even when (white) women authors began to appear more frequently in the canon and on college syllabi in the mid-1970s, they were not represented on an equal basis with (white) male authors.

Even today, unless the critical or historical point of view is feminist, there is a tendency to underrepresent the contribution of women writers. For example, in Matthew J. Bruccoli's preface to recent editions of *The Great Gatsby*, he notes that the 1920s was "an age of achievement … in American literature" (x) and lists the names of 12 authors to support his claim. Only one of those authors – Willa Cather – is a woman. What about Ellen Glasgow, Susan Glaspell, Nella Larsen, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Rolla Lynn Riggs, Gertrude Stein, Djuna Barnes, Elizabeth Maddox Roberts, H. D. (Hilda Doolittle), or Marianne Moore? That many students probably recognize only a few of these names illustrates the marginalization of many women writers by literary history, though not necessarily by the reading public at the time these women wrote. Similarly, in most Hollywood films, even today, the camera eye (the point of view from which the film is shot) is male: the female characters, not male, are the objects gazed on by the camera and often eroticized as if a male eye were viewing them, as if the point of view of the "universal" moviegoer were male.

Carefree life definition and meaning | Collins English Dictionary. (n.d.).

from https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/carefree-life



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

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AMENDMENT XV

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Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude—

political, and social options. By the end of the 1890s, Jim Crow laws in the South discriminated against blacks in public schools, public transportation, and public accommodations, and designated a subordinate place for African Americans. The retrenchment only continued when in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in *Plessy v. Ferguson* upheld the constitutionality of what it called, "separate but equal" treatment for African Americans. From the end of the Civil War to the 1950s, more than 6 million black southerners moved north and west to escape what was, in reality, dramatically unequal treatment and oppression in southern states. Northern and western states were no panacea either, as they often had policies and practices that discriminated against African Americans, but they offered some relief from the relentless racism of the South.

It was not until the modern civil rights movement of the 1940s, '50s and '60s, a period that some have called the Second Emancipation or the Second Reconstruction, that these discriminatory laws and practices finally began to give way. Still, throughout the society white privilege survived, and in some quarters white supremacy remains a thriving ideology. For many African Americans, struggles for equality, justice, and fairness continue into the twenty-first century.

Wolinsky, Richard., Davidson, L. G., Lupoff, R.A. (2003). A Literary Journal: *A rediscovered interview with Walter Tevis*. Brick Magazine issue 72. https://brickmag.com/an-interview-with-walter-tevis/

The Probabilities Archive: Walter Tevis (1928-1984) | *KPFA*. (n.d.) from https://kpfa.org/area941/episode/the-probabilities-archive-walter-tevis-1928-1984/



FROM *BRICK* 72

Walter Tevis straddled the science fiction and mainstream worlds. His acclaimed first novel, The Hustler, *which delved into the world of pool sharks and was published in 1959, was turned into an even more acclaimed film two years later starring Paul Newman and Jackie Gleason. His second novel, 1963's science fiction gem* The Man Who Fell to Earth, *became a cult classic and a 1976 film by British auteur Nicolas Roeg* (Don't Look *Now) featuring rock star David Bowie. In 1980, Tevis returned with his third novel,* Mockingbird, *another science fiction work, this one set in a dystopian future. But those who knew Tevis's work had special regard for his small pool of short stories, published from the late 1950s through to the 1970s in such magazines as* Galaxy *and* The Magazine of Fantasy and Science Fiction. In *1981, these stories were collected, along with newer material, in* Far From Home.

By 1981, the radio show that Dick Lupoff, Lawrence Davidson, and I co-hosted, Probabilities, *had been on the airwaves of Berkeley, California's KPFA for four years. Originally a program dedicated to science fiction interviews, the show had expanded to include other genre and general fiction authors as our tastes, as co-hosts, began to change, but mostly it still focused on its original theme. When we learned that Tevis was coming to Cody's Books to read and sign copies of* Far From Home, *it was cause for some jubilation. Lupoff had loved Tevis's work for years, having read pretty much everything he'd published. Davidson and I admired his three novels and enjoyed the new collection.*

Because of time constraints and studio availability, we'd decided to hold the interview at Cody's itself, just prior to Tevis's public reading, in owner Andy Ross's office, using a small professional tape recorder. Immediately things went wrong. Ross's office was locked, Ross was on vacation, and nobody with a key was available.

Radio Wolinsky

11.01.20

The Probabilities Archive: Walter Tevis (1928-1984)

LISTEN DOWNLOAD

Walter Tevis, in conversation with Richard Wolinsky, Richard A. Lupoff and Lawrence Davidson, recorded for the *Probabilities* KPFA radio program.

Walter Tevis, who died in 1984 at the age of 56, only wrote six novels. The first was *The Hustler*, which was adapted into a classic film with Paul Newman and Jackie Gleason. The second, *The Man Who Fell to Earth*, was adapted into another classic movie starring David Bowie. Later came two science fiction novels, *Mockingbird* in 1980 and *Steps of the Sun* in 1983. Also in 1983 was *The Queens Gambit*, which is now a Netflix miniseries, and his final novel, *The Color of Money*, a sequel to the Hustler with a different plot than the Scorcese film, came out the year of his death 1984. This interview was recorded in the stairwell of Codys Bookstore in Berkeley in October 1981 on the publication of his only short story collection, *Far From Home*.

Transcript of the interview, from *Brick* magazine.

Liu, W. M. (2010). Social class and classism in the helping professions: Research, theory, and practice. Sage Publications.

Social Class and Classism in the Helping Professions

Research, Theory, and Practice

William Ming Liu
The University of Iowa

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To that end, we fit into the expectations of upscale parents at this mall. A lone woman walked out of a store carrying some shopping bags and stopped to ask how we liked our Bugaboo stroller. After a very quick conversation about the stroller, the woman added, "Yes, I have a Bugaboo as well and it is at home," smiled and walked away.

These two experiences remind me that social class and classism are all around us and are constantly part of our conversations. We only need to be sensitive to how social class is communicated and the subtle—and at times not-so-subtle—ways in which people jockey for position along the social class hierarchy. In these two experiences, "Montessori" and "Bugaboo" become indicators of social class and status and are used to demonstrate familiarity but also to suggest that "we are all of a kind, we are peers, and we are part of the same cohort." Dropping these hints, like an eye-wink or a nod, is a subtle gesture of communality—of knowing something others do not. It is a way of establishing social class and status without having to talk about how much one makes, educational level, or one's occupation. It is akin to the ways we get to know people and the light social conversations that occur over wine or cocktails and how people probe, mostly through seemingly innocuous questions, about where one went to school (private, public, ivy league), where one works (white-collar, salaried), and where one lives (rent, own, high-rise, single-home, good neighborhood). The questions, in this case, are used to investigate and to establish potential likeness of social class.

I believe for most of us, there is likely to be an incident or experience that vividly exemplified social class and classism in our lives. When I teach social class, most students recall some incident or series of events that consolidated for them the meaning of social class in their lives at the time. Remarkably, for many of these students as they think about that particular incident or event, they recognize the reverberations that it caused across their lives. For instance, some students recall traumatic incidents that made them feel shameful about being poor and in turn initiated a drive toward status and upward mobility that they believed could shield them from feeling that way again. This commonality in experiences reveals to me that social class and classism are pervasive throughout our lives, and how imperative it is that helping professionals understand its impact and use social class and classism to inform their work.

At the risk of sounding clichéd, I think it is fair to say that social class and classism are all around us. Before we are even born, the social classes of our parents, families, and neighborhoods are already making an impact

> A "class" is an economic group within which an individual belongs, and the individual perceives material (i.e., types of belongings, neighborhood) and nonmaterial (i.e., educational level) boundaries. The individual may observe other "classes" which are perceived to be, in subjective hierarchy, higher, lower, and at the same place (i.e., lateral) as the individual's own class. Class mobility is possible, but only through the comprehension of the other class's norms, values, and culture; that is, each class is perceived to have its own culture, and the further away the social class group is from the current position, the more dissonant or unfamiliar the culture is to the individual. Consequently, classism is an employed behavior and attitude, and an expected consequence as the individual attempts to navigate within and between classes. (p. 14)

With *socioeconomic status (SES)*, Liu, Ali, et al. (2004) argue that the term often implies that an individual's place in an economic hierarchy is temporary and in flux. The term *SES* may also imply that there is not necessarily any group consciousness, but instead the individual is an autonomous agent within a constantly dynamic economic environment (Liu, in press). Finally, in *SES*, because the individual is assumed by the researcher to be focused on social mobility, one issue may be the unequal distribution of resources as a factor in SES transitions. This inequality of resources is a result of classism exerted by other people and social forces, but because SES is focused on mobility rather than consciousness, investigating, understanding, and exploring the causes and consequences of classism may not be fully addressed. But even as I make these distinctions, I am aware that I am attempting to draw differences among terms that have been confusingly used in the past. So even here, some may argue that *SES* has different meanings and definitions. And I would agree. My focus here is not so much on operationalizing *SES* as on operationalizing *social class* and *classism*.

Because the focus of social class here is on the individual's worldview, I do not imply that social class becomes *idio class* (specific to individuals with no connection to context or history; Liu, in press). That is, a social class worldview does not negate the sociopolitical (e.g., unequal distribution of power), sociohistorical (e.g., biased and inaccurate histories of peoples), and sociostructural (e.g., legal, education, and economic systems) forces that marginalize, exploit, and oppress individuals (Liu & Ali, 2005). Social class, SES, or any of the other ways an individual understands and interacts with his or her economic context needs to be understood within various interdependent systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1986; Liu & Ali, 2008). Thus, while helping professionals, psychologists, and counselors are interested in the idiosyncratic ways in which individuals perceive their social class contexts, social class is always dependent on multiple and simultaneous macro-level operations (some of which favor and some of which disadvantage the individual). These operations are typically not within the agency of the individual to impact or change *in toto*.

Records - 2700chess.com. (n.d.). *The highest official FIDE ratings of all 2700+ players, with links to profiles, dates of records and games.*

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