


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I

The scope of pragmatics

The purpose of this Chapter is to provide some indication of the scope of linguistic pragmatics. First, the historical origin of the term **pragmatics** will be briefly summarized, in order to indicate some usages of the term that are divergent from the usage in this book. Secondly, we will review some definitions of the field, which, while being less than fully satisfactory, will at least serve to indicate the rough scope of linguistic pragmatics. Thirdly, some reasons for the current interest in the field will be explained, while a final section illustrates some basic kinds of pragmatic phenomena. In passing, some analytical notions that are useful background will be introduced.

1.1 The origin and historical vagaries of the term pragmatics

The modern usage of the term **pragmatics** is attributable to the philosopher Charles Morris (1938), who was concerned to outline (after Locke and Peirce)¹ the general shape of a science of signs, or **semiotics** (or **semiotic** as Morris preferred). Within semiotics, Morris distinguished three distinct branches of inquiry: **syntactics** (or **syntax**), being the study of "the formal relation of signs to one another", **semantics**, the study of "the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable" (their designata), and **pragmatics**, the study of "the relation of signs to interpreters" (1938: 6). Within each branch of semiotics, one could make the distinction between **pure** studies, concerned with the

¹ Apart from this connection, there is only the slightest historical relation between pragmatics and the philosophical doctrines of **pragmatism** (see Morris, 1938 (1971: 43); Lyons, 1977a: 119). There have been recent attempts, however, to recast Morris's trichotomy in a Peircean (or pragmatist) mould, which are not covered in this book: see Silverstein, 1976; Bean, 1978.

elaboration of the relevant metalanguage, and **descriptive** studies which applied the metalanguage to the description of specific signs and their usages (1938 (1971: 24)).

As instances of usage governed by **pragmatical rule**, Morris noted that "interjections such as *Oh!*, commands such as *Come here!*, ... expressions such as *Good morning!* and various rhetorical and poetical devices, occur only under certain definite conditions in the users of the language" (1938 (1971: 48)). Such matters would still today be given a treatment within linguistic pragmatics. But Morris went on to expand the scope of pragmatics in accord with his particular behaviouristic theory of semiotics (Black, 1947): "It is a sufficiently accurate characterization of pragmatics to say that it deals with the biotic aspects of semiosis, that is, with all the psychological, biological, and sociological phenomena which occur in the functioning of signs" (1938: 108). Such a scope is very much wider than the work that currently goes on under the rubric of linguistic pragmatics, for it would include what is now known as psycholinguistics, sociolinguistics, neurolinguistics and much besides.

Since Morris's introduction of the trichotomy syntax, semantics and pragmatics, the latter term has come to be used in two very distinct ways. On the one hand, the very broad use intended by Morris has been retained, and this explains the usage of the term *pragmatics* in the titles of books that deal, for example, with matters as diverse as the psychopathology of communication (in the manner of G. Bateson and R. D. Laing – see Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967) and the evolution of symbol systems (see Cherry, 1974). Even here though, there has been a tendency to use *pragmatics* exclusively as a division of *linguistic* semiotics, rather than as pertaining to sign systems in general. This broad usage of the term, covering sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics and more, is still the one generally used on the Continent (see e.g. the collection in Wunderlich, 1972, and issues of the *Journal of Pragmatics*).

On the other hand, and especially within analytical philosophy, the term *pragmatics* was subject to a successive narrowing of scope. Here the philosopher and logician Carnap was particularly influential. After an initial Morrisian usage (Carnap, 1938: 2), he adopted the following version of the trichotomy:

If in an investigation explicit reference is made to the speaker, or to put it in more general terms, to the user of the language,

then we assign it [the investigation] to the field of pragmatics ... If we abstract from the user of the language and analyze only the expressions and their designata, we are in the field of semantics. And, finally, if we abstract from the designata also and analyze only the relations between the expressions, we are in (logical) syntax.

Unfortunately Carnap's usage of the term *pragmatics* was confused by his adoption of Morris's further distinction between pure and descriptive studies, and he came to equate pragmatics with descriptive semiotics in general, and thus with the study of natural (as opposed to logical) languages (Carnap, 1959: 13; see the useful clarification in Lieb, 1971). But Carnap was not even consistent here: he also held (Carnap, 1956) that there was room for a **pure pragmatics** which would be concerned with concepts like *belief*, *utterance*, and *intension* and their logical inter-relation. This latter usage, now more or less defunct, explains the use of the term in, for example, the title of a book by Martin (1959). Thus at least four quite different senses of the term can be found in Carnap's works, but it was the definition quoted above that was finally influential.

Incidentally, already in Morris's and Carnap's usages there can be found a systematic three-way ambiguity: the term *pragmatics* was applied not only to branches of inquiry (as in the contrast between pragmatics and semantics), but also to features of the object language (or language under investigation), so that one could talk of, say, the pragmatic particle *Oh!* in English, and to features of the metalanguage (or technical description), so that one could talk of, say, a pragmatic, versus a semantic, description of the particle *Oh!*. Such an ambiguity merely seems to parallel the way in which the sister terms *semantics* and *syntax* are used, and to introduce little confusion (but cf. Sayward, 1974).

The idea that pragmatics was the study of aspects of language that *required* reference to the users of the language then led to a very natural, further restriction of the term in analytical philosophy. For there is one aspect of natural languages that indubitably requires such reference, namely the study of **deictic** or **indexical** words like the pronouns *I* and *you* (see Chapter 2). The philosophical, and especially logical, interest in these terms is simply that they account for the potential failure of generally valid schemes of reasoning. For example, "I am Greta Garbo, Greta Garbo is a woman, therefore I am a

woman", is only necessarily true if in addition to the first two premises being true, the speaker of the conclusion is the same speaker as the speaker of the first premise. Bar-Hillel (1954) therefore took the view that pragmatics is the study of languages, both natural and artificial, that contain indexical or deictic terms, and this usage was explicitly adopted by Kalish (1967), and most influentially by Montague (1968). Such a usage has little to offer linguists, since all natural languages have deictic terms, and it would follow, as Gazdar (1979a: 2) points out, that natural languages would have no semantics but only a syntax and a pragmatics. If the trichotomy is to do some work within linguistics, some less restricted scope for pragmatics must be found.

In fact, in the late 1960s, an implicit version of Carnap's definition – investigations requiring reference to the users of a language – was adopted within linguistics, and specifically within the movement known as **generative semantics**. The history of that movement awaits a historian of ideas (but see Newmeyer, 1980), but its association with pragmatics can be explained by the resurgence of the interest in meaning which the movement represented. Such an interest inevitably involves pragmatics, as we shall see. Moreover this interest in meaning in a wide sense proved to be one of the best directions from which generative semantics could assail Chomsky's (1965) **standard theory**. At the same time, there was a keen interest shown by linguists in philosophers' attempts to grapple with problems of meaning, sometimes from the point of view of the 'users of the language'. For a period, at least, linguists and philosophers seemed to be on a common path, and this commonality of interest crystallized many of the issues with which this book is concerned. During this period, the scope of pragmatics was implicitly restricted. Carnap's 'investigations making reference to users of the language' is at once too narrow and too broad for linguistic interests. It is too broad because it admits studies as non-linguistic as Freud's investigations of 'slips of the tongue' or Jung's studies of word associations. So studies in linguistic pragmatics need to be restricted to investigations that have at least potential linguistic implications. On the other hand, Carnap's definition is too narrow in that, on a simple interpretation, it excludes parallel phenomena.³ For example, just as the

³ On another interpretation, all pragmatic parameters refer to users of the language, if only because such parameters must, in order to be relevant, be known or believed by participants.

1.2 Defining pragmatics

- (1) ??Come there please!
- (2) ??Aristotle was Greek, but I don't believe it
- (3) ??Fred's children are hippies, and he has no children
- (4) ??Fred's children are hippies, and he has children
- (5) ??I order you not to obey this order
- (6) ??I hereby sing
- (7) ??As everyone knows, the earth please revolves around the sun

The explanation of the anomalies exhibited by these sentences might be provided by pointing out that there are no, or at least no ordinary, contexts in which they could be appropriately used.⁴ Although an approach of this sort may be quite a good way of illustrating the kind of principles that pragmatics is concerned with, it will hardly do as an explicit definition of the field – for the simple reason that the set of pragmatic (as opposed to semantic, syntactic or sociolinguistic) anomalies are presupposed, rather than explained.⁵

Another kind of definition that might be offered would be that pragmatics is the study of language from a **functional** perspective, that is, that it attempts to explain facets of linguistic structure by reference to non-linguistic pressures and causes. But such a definition, or scope, for pragmatics would fail to distinguish linguistic pragmatics from many other disciplines interested in functional approaches to language, including psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics. Moreover, it may be plausibly argued that to adopt a definition of this sort is to confuse the *motives* for studying pragmatics, with the *goals* or general shape of a theory (about which more later).

One quite restricted scope for pragmatics that has been proposed is that pragmatics should be concerned solely with principles of language usage, and have nothing to do with the description of linguistic structure. Or, to invoke Chomsky's distinction between **competence** and **performance**, pragmatics is concerned solely with performance principles of language use. Thus, Katz & Fodor (1963) suggested that a theory of pragmatics (or a theory of **setting**

⁴ This line of argument relies on the distinction between **use** and **mention**, or between 'ordinary' usage and metalinguistic usage, for which see Lyons, 1977a: 5ff and references therein. In the sense of this distinction, sentences like (1)–(7) can be mentioned, but they cannot easily be used.

⁵ Another problem is that it is often in fact possible to imagine contexts in which the alleged anomalies are after all quite usable – the reader can try with the examples above. This problem will recur when we consider the concept of appropriateness of an utterance, discussed below.

selection as they then called it) would essentially be concerned with the disambiguation of sentences by the contexts in which they were uttered. In fact it is clear that contexts do a lot more than merely select between available semantic readings of sentences – for example, irony, understatement and the like are kinds of use that actually create new interpretations in contexts. Still, one could claim that grammar (in the broad sense inclusive of phonology, syntax and semantics) is concerned with the context-free assignment of meaning to linguistic forms, while pragmatics is concerned with the further interpretation of those forms in a context:

[Grammars] are theories about the structure of sentence types ... Pragmatic theories, in contrast, do nothing to explicate the structure of linguistic constructions or grammatical properties and relations ... They explicate the reasoning of speakers and hearers in working out the correlation in a context of a sentence token with a proposition. In this respect, a pragmatic theory is part of performance. (Katz, 1977: 19)

This position has a number of adherents (Kempson, 1975, 1977; Smith & Wilson, 1979), but it has a serious difficulty. The problem is that aspects of linguistic structure sometimes directly encode (or otherwise interact with) features of the context. It then becomes impossible to draw a neat boundary between context-independent grammar (competence) and context-dependent interpretation (performance). This problem is unwittingly illustrated by Katz's explication of this boundary: he points out that the pairs *rabbit* and *bunny*, or *dog* and *doggie* differ in that the second member of each pair is appropriately used either by or to children. Since the distinction is one relating to the appropriate users of the terms in a context, the distinction would not be part of a linguistic description of English, which would merely note that the members of each pair are synonymous. However, it is clear that the distinction is built into the language, in just the same way that in many languages degrees of respect between participants are encoded in lexis and morphology. Katz suggests that in order to ascertain whether a linguistic feature is context-dependent or context-independent, we imagine the feature occurring on an anonymous postcard (as an approximation to the empty or **null context**).⁶ But if we apply this criterion we see that

⁶ Here contrast Searle (1979b: 117): "There is no such thing as the zero or null context for the interpretation of sentences ... we understand the meaning

the implication or inference that speaker or addressee is a child is available when *bunny* is written on an anonymous postcard as it is when said in some concrete appropriate context (Gazdar, 1979a: 3). And that of course is because the kind of appropriate speaker or addressee is encoded by the term *bunny*.

Here we come to the heart of the definitional problem: the term *pragmatics* covers both context-dependent aspects of language structure and principles of language usage and understanding that have nothing or little to do with linguistic structure. It is difficult to forge a definition that will happily cover both aspects. But this should not be taken to imply that pragmatics is a hodge-podge, concerned with quite disparate and unrelated aspects of language; rather, pragmaticists are specifically interested in the inter-relation of language structure and principles of language usage. Let us now consider some potential definitions that are more plausible candidates.

We may begin with a definition that is specifically aimed at capturing the concern of pragmatics with features of language structure. The definition might go as follows:

- (8) Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are **grammaticalized**, or encoded in the structure of a language⁷

Or, putting it another way, one could say that pragmatics is the study of just those aspects of the relationship between language and context that are relevant to the writing of grammars. Such a definition restricts pragmatics to the study of certain aspects of linguistic structure, and stands in strong contrast to Katz's proposal, outlined above, that would restrict pragmatics to the study of grammatically irrelevant aspects of language usage. Such a scope for pragmatics would include the study of **deixis**, including honorifics and the like, and probably the study of **presupposition** and **speech acts**, i.e. much of the present book. It would exclude the study of principles of language usage that could not be shown to have repercussions on the grammar of languages, and this could be an embarrassment,

of such sentences only against a set of background assumptions about the contexts in which the sentence could be appropriately uttered."

⁷ The term *grammaticalization* is used throughout this book in the broad sense covering the encoding of meaning distinctions - again in a wide sense - in the lexicon, morphology, syntax and phonology of languages.

in Wales, 1979 and Tanz, 1980, while a useful collection of cross-linguistic observations can be found in Anderson & Keenan, in press.

The traditional categories of deixis are **person**, **place** and **time**. Briefly, as we shall devote a section to each below, these categories are understood in the following way. Person deixis concerns the encoding of the **role** of participants in the speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered: the category **first person** is the grammaticalization of the speaker's reference to himself, **second person** the encoding of the speaker's reference to one or more addressees, and **third person** the encoding of reference to persons and entities which are neither speakers nor addressees of the utterance in question. Familiar ways in which such participant-roles are encoded in language are of course the pronouns and their associated predicate agreements. Place deixis concerns the encoding of spatial locations *relative* to the location of the participants in the speech event. Probably most languages grammaticalize at least a distinction between **proximal** (or close to speaker) and **distal** (or non-proximal, sometimes close to addressee), but many make much more elaborate distinctions as we shall see. Such distinctions are commonly encoded in demonstratives (as in English *this* vs. *that*) and in deictic adverbs of place (like English *here* vs. *there*). Time deixis concerns the encoding of temporal points and spans *relative* to the time at which an utterance was spoken (or a written message inscribed). This time, following Fillmore (1971b), we shall call **coding time** or CT, which may be distinct from **receiving time** or RT, as example (1) made clear. Thus, just as place deixis encodes spatial locations on co-ordinates anchored to the place of utterance, so time deixis encodes times on co-ordinates anchored to the time of utterance. Time deixis is commonly grammaticalized in deictic adverbs of time (like English *now* and *then*, *yesterday* and *this year*), but above all in tense.

To these traditional categories, we should now add (following Lyons, 1968, 1977a, and Fillmore, 1971b, 1975) **discourse** (or **text**) **deixis** and **social deixis**. Discourse deixis has to do with the encoding of reference to portions of the unfolding discourse in which the utterance (which includes the text referring expression) is located.³ Instances of discourse deixis are the use of *that* and *this* in the following:

³ Token-reflexivity is thus a special sub-case of discourse deixis, both *that* in (21) and *this* in (22) are discourse deictic, but only the latter is token-reflexive.

2.2.1 *Person deixis*

As speakers switch, so the deictic centre, on which the rest of the deictic system hangs, is itself abruptly moved from participant to participant. The difficulties that a Martian or child might have with such a system are neatly illustrated in the following Yiddish story:

A melamed [Hebrew teacher] discovering that he had left his comfortable slippers back in the house, sent a student after them with a note for his wife. The note read: "Send me your slippers with this boy". When the student asked why he had written "your" slippers, the melamed answered: "Yold! If I wrote 'my' slippers, she would read 'my' slippers and would send her slippers. What could I do with her slippers? So I wrote 'your' slippers, she'll read 'your' slippers and send me mine". (Rosten, 1968: 443-4)

Although person deixis is reflected directly in the grammatical categories of person, it may be argued that we need to develop an independent pragmatic framework of possible **participant-roles**, so that we can then see how, and to what extent, these roles are grammaticalized in different languages. Such a framework would note that the speaker or **spokesman** can be distinct from the **source** of an utterance, the **recipient** distinct from the **target**, and hearers or **bystanders** distinct from addressees or targets, and that sometimes such distinctions are grammaticalized in non-obvious ways (see

Levinson, in prep.).⁷ The Yiddish joke above depends, of course, on the distinction between source and speaker, which becomes immediately pertinent if one reads aloud.

However, the basic grammatical distinctions here are the categories of first, second and third person. If we were producing a componential analysis (for which see Lyons, 1968: 470-81) of pronominal systems, the features that we seem to need for the known systems would crucially include: for first person, speaker inclusion (+S); for second person, addressee inclusion (+A); and for third person, speaker and addressee exclusion (-S, -A) (see Burling, 1970: 14-17; Ingram, 1978). It is important to note that third person is quite unlike first or second person, in that it does not correspond to any specific participant-role in the speech event (Lyons, 1977a: 638).

Pronominal systems, which are the most obvious manifestations of person, generally exhibit this three-way distinction (Ingram, 1978). But some pronominal systems exhibit as many as fifteen basic pronouns (ignoring honorific alternates) by superimposing distinctions based on plurality (dual, trial and plural), gender and so on. Here it is important to see that the traditional category of plural is not symmetrically applied to first person in the way it is to third: *we* does not mean plural speakers in the same way that *they* means more than one third person entity (Lyons, 1968: 277). In addition, in many languages, there are two first person 'plural' pronouns, corresponding to 'we-inclusive-of-addressee' and 'we-exclusive-of-addressee'. This distinction is not manifested in English directly, but it is perhaps indirectly: for the contraction from *let us* to *let's* only seems felicitous if the *us* is understood inclusively, as illustrated below (Fillmore, 1971b):

- (43) I let's go to the cinema
(44) ?Let's go to see you tomorrow

Other languages have pronominal systems much richer than the English one: in Japanese, pronouns are distinguished also with respect to sex of speaker, social status of referent and degree of intimacy with referent, so, for example, the second person pronoun

⁷ Thus it can be argued that in English the sentence *Billie is to come in now* grammatically encodes (amongst other things) that the recipient is not the target (Billie is), in contrast to *Billy, come in now* where recipient and target are coincident. (The example comes from Gazdar, 1979a.) But see also example (50) below.

2.2.2 Time deixis

Both time and place deixis are greatly complicated by the interaction of deictic co-ordinates with the non-deictic conceptualization of time and space. To understand these aspects of deixis in depth it is first necessary to have a good understanding of the semantic organization of space and time in general, but these topics lie beyond the scope of this book (see though, Leech, 1969; Fillmore, 1975; Lyons, 1977a: Chapter 15). Briefly, though, the bases for systems of reckoning and measuring time in most languages seem to be the natural and prominent cycles of day and night, lunar months, seasons and years. Such units can either be used as **measures**, relative to some fixed point of interest (including, crucially, the deictic centre), or they can be used **calendrically** to locate events in 'absolute' time relative to some absolute *origo*, or at least to some part of each natural cycle designated as the beginning of that cycle (Fillmore, 1975). It is with these units, calendrical and non-calendrical, that time deixis interacts.

Like all aspects of deixis, time deixis makes ultimate reference to participant-role. Thus as a first approximation (but see below), *now* can be glossed as 'the time at which the speaker is producing the utterance containing *now*'. It is important to distinguish the moment of utterance (or inscription) or *coding time* (or CT) from the moment of reception or *receiving time* (or RT). As we noted, in the canonical situation of utterance, with the assumption of the unmarked deictic centre, RT can be assumed to be identical to CT (Lyons (1977a: 685) calls this assumption **deictic simultaneity**). Complexities arise in the usage of tense, time adverbs and other time-deictic morphemes wherever there is a departure from this assumption, e.g. in letter writing, or the pre-recording of media programmes. In that event, a decision has to be made about whether the deictic centre will remain on the speaker and CT, as in (51), or will be **projected** on the addressee and RT, as in (52) (Fillmore, 1975):

Linguistic conventions may often specify the proper usage in situations where RT is not coincident with CT. For example, the Latin 'epistolary tenses' used past tense for events including CT, pluperfect for events prior to CT – in other words the deictic centre was projected into the future, the recipients' RT (Lakoff, 1970: 847). But we shall have to skirt these issues here (see Fillmore, 1975).

There are a number of aspects of 'pure' time deixis, where there is no direct interaction with non-deictic methods of time reckoning. These include tense (to be discussed below), and the deictic time adverbs like English *now*, *then*, *soon*, *recently* and so on. We can improve on our previous gloss for *now*, by offering 'the pragmatically given span including CT', where that span may be the instant associated with the production of the morpheme itself, as in the gestural use in (53), or the perhaps interminable period indicated in (54):

- (53) Pull the trigger *now*!
(54) I'm *now* working on a PhD

Now contrasts with *then*, and indeed *then* can be glossed as 'not now' to allow for its use in both past and future. *Then* is sometimes claimed to be necessarily anaphoric in nature, and to have no gestural deictic usage, but rather complex usages show this is not so – consider, for example, the following said pointing at a 1962 model Chevrolet (Nunberg, 1978: 33):

- (55) I was just a kid *then*

As an initial step towards seeing how time deixis interacts with cultural measurements of time in an absolute or non-deictic way, consider words like *today*, *tomorrow*, *yesterday*. Such terms presuppose a division of time into diurnal spans. Roughly, *then*, *today* glosses as 'the diurnal span including CT', *yesterday* as 'the diurnal span preceding the diurnal span that includes CT', and so on. However, as Fillmore (1975) notes, these have two kinds of referent: they can

2.2.3 Place deixis

Place or space deixis concerns the specification of locations relative to anchorage points in the speech event. The importance of locational specifications in general can be gauged from the fact that there seem to be two basic ways of referring to objects – by describing or naming them on the one hand, and by locating them on the other (Lyons, 1977a: 648). Now, locations can be specified relative to other objects or fixed reference points, as in:

- (66) The station is two hundred yards from the cathedral
(67) Kabul lies at latitude 34 degrees, longitude 70 degrees

Alternatively, they can be deictically specified relative to the location of participants at the time of speaking (CT), as in

- (68) It's two hundred yards *away*
(69) Kabul is four hundred miles West of *here*

In either case it is likely that units of measurement, or descriptions of direction and location, will have to be used, and in that case place deixis comes to interact in complex ways with the non-deictic organization of space (see Leech, 1969; Fillmore, 1975: 16–28; Lyons, 1977a: 690ff; and references therein).

There are, though, some pure place-deictic words, notably in English the adverbs *here* and *there*, and the demonstrative pronouns *this* and *that*. The symbolic usage of *here*, as in (70), can be glossed as 'the pragmatically given unit of space that includes the location of the speaker at CT'.

- (70) I'm writing to say I'm having a marvellous time *here*

The gestural usage must be glossed a little differently, as 'the pragmatically given space, proximal to speaker's location at CT, that includes the point or location gesturally indicated'. Note that we cannot eradicate the modifier 'pragmatically given' in these definitions: an utterance of (71) may have quite different implications of precision if said to a crane operator in contrast to a fellow surgeon.

- (71) Place it *here*

Again, we have the interaction between 'encyclopaedic knowledge' and linguistic knowledge, which together determine the exact location in question. This is another point at which philosophical treatments of indexicals offer us no help. The proposition picked out by the utterance of (71), as with the referent of *next Thursday*, depends on complex interactions between deictic and non-deictic factors.

The adverbs *here* and *there* are often thought of as simple contrasts on a proximal/distal dimension, stretching away from the speaker's location, as in:

- (72) Bring *that here* and take *this there*

But this is only sometimes so, for although *there* basically means 'distal from speaker's location at CT', it can also be used to mean 'proximal to addressee at RT'. Thus, in non-anaphoric uses,

- (73) How are things *there*?

does not generally mean 'how are things at some place distant from the speaker', but rather 'how are things where the addressee is'. The gestural usage of *there* favours the first interpretation, the symbolic usage the second. There are also of course anaphoric usages of *there* (cf. (40) above), and this explains why there is no necessary pragmatic anomaly in:

- (74) We're *there*

where *there* refers to the place we previously mentioned as our goal (Fillmore, 1971b: 226).¹²

¹² We seem also, though, to be able to say (74) if the referent of *there* is not actually mentioned but pragmatically given. Lyons (1977a: 672) draws attention to the fact that anaphoric references do not really require prior mention: it is sufficient if, for participants, the referent is situationally salient, and so already in the domain of discourse, the set of referents being talked about. The relation between domain of discourse and anaphora is taken up in 2.2.4 below.

The demonstrative pronouns are perhaps more clearly organized in a straightforward proximal–distal dimension, whereby *this* can mean ‘the object in a pragmatically given area close to the speaker’s location at CT’, and *that* ‘the object beyond the pragmatically given area close to the speaker’s location at CT’ (Lyons (1977a: 647) suggests the derivative glosses ‘the one here’, ‘the one there’, respectively). But the facts are complicated here by the shift from *that* to *this* to show empathy, and from *this* to *that* to show emotional distance (Lyons (1977a: 677) calls this **empathetic deixis**; see Fillmore, 1971b: 227 and R. Lakoff, 1974 for the intricacies of English usage). There is also a systematic neutralization of the proximal–distal dimension when it is not especially relevant, so that I can say, searching through a tin of needles for a number 9, either:

- (75) *This* is it!
 (76) *That’s* it!

Some languages have demonstratives with three and four way distinctions on the proximal–distal dimension, so that the North West American language Tlingit, for example, has demonstratives glossable as ‘this one right here’, ‘this one nearby’, ‘that one over there’, and ‘that one way over there’, while Malagasy has a six-way contrast on the same dimension (Frei, 1944: 115; Anderson & Keenan, in press). However, care must be exercised in the analysis of unfamiliar languages, as demonstratives are often organized with respect to contrasts between participant-roles rather than simply to distance in concentric circles from a fixed deictic centre (the speaker’s location at CT). Thus in Latin, and correspondingly in Turkish, *hic* (Turkish *bu*) means ‘close to speaker’, *iste* (Turkish *şu*) means ‘close to addressee’, and *ille* (Turkish *o*) means ‘remote from both speaker and addressee’ (Lyons, 1968: 278–9; cf. Anderson & Keenan, in press). Similarly, in the Philippine language Samal, we have a four way distinction based on four kinds of participant role: (i) close to speaker, (ii) close to addressee, (iii) close to audience (other members of conversational group), (iv) close to persons present but outside the conversational group that consists of speaker, addressee(s) and audience. This system (specifically a switch from the demonstrative that encodes (ii) or (iii) to that encoding (iv)) provides nice ways of slighting people by cutting them, demonstratively, out of the conversation (Fillmore, 1975: 43). There are thus systems of

demonstratives that are not organized primarily, or only, around the speaker’s location. There are also systems (e.g. in Australian and New Guinea languages) that distinguish the three dimensions of space, having demonstratives that gloss as ‘the one above the speaker’, ‘the one below the speaker’, ‘the one level with the speaker’ as well as distinguishing relative distance from participants (see e.g. Dixon, 1972: 262ff re Dyirbal). Some systems combine additional ‘exotic’ deictic parameters like ‘upriver/downriver from speaker’ or ‘visible/non-visible to speaker’ to produce enormous arrays (up to thirty or more items) of demonstrative terms (see Anderson & Keenan, in press).

The demonstrative determiners combine with non-deictic terms for spatial organization to yield complex deictic descriptions of location. The non-deictic conceptual organization of space includes all those distinctions between surfaces, spaces, enclosures, containers and so on, and between fronts, backs, tops, sides, of objects, not to mention widths, lengths, heights, etc. Thus:

- (77) *This side* of the box

can mean ‘the surface of the box that can be called a side which is nearest to the location of the speaker at CT’, but:

- (78) *This side* of the tree

simply means ‘that area of the tree visible from the point where the speaker is at CT (or the space between that area and that point)’. The difference between the glosses for (77) and (78) depends clearly on boxes, but not trees, having intrinsic sides (the difference is perhaps even clearer with an object like a car, which has an intrinsic orientation, so that its bottom remains its bottom even when the vehicle is turned over, and its front remains its front even when going backwards). The difference between (77) and (78) is not the same difficulty we met earlier, in the ambiguity of:

- (79) The cat is *behind* the car

where *behind* can have either a deictic usage (i.e. the car intervenes between the cat and the speaker’s location), or a non-deictic usage (i.e. the cat is at the intrinsic rear-end of the car). But the ultimate source of the difficulty is the same: some objects have intrinsic orientations, with fronts, sides, etc., and these allow both the deictic

selection of some oriented plane and the non-deictic reference to some such oriented plane. As a result the deictic/non-deictic ambiguity is very general, and plagues the recipients of expressions like:

(80) Bob is the man to the left of Mark

where Bob may be to Mark's own left (non-deictic), or to the left from the speaker's point of view (deictic).

There are, as has been noted, fairly close connections between deictic determiners, third person pronouns, and the definite article (Lyons, 1968: 279, 1977a: 646ff; Hawkins, 1978). All three categories are **definite**, and **definiteness** may perhaps be an essentially deictic notion. Lyons suggests that *this x* retains a pronominal element, as well as containing an adverbial element similar to *here*. On this analysis, *the x* differs from *this x* and *that x* only in that *this x* is marked '+ proximal', *that x* is marked '- proximal', and *the x* is unmarked for proximity, i.e. it is a neutral deictic term (Lyons, 1977a: 653-4).

Finally, let us consider some motion verbs that have built-in deictic components. English *come* vs. *go* makes some sort of distinction between the direction of motion relative to participants in the speech event (the exposition here follows Fillmore, 1966, 1975: 50ff). As a first approximation, we may note that

(81) He's *coming*

seems to gloss as 'he is moving towards the speaker's location at CT', while

(82) He's *going*

glosses as 'he is moving away from the speaker's location at CT'. The suggested gloss for *come* would in fact be roughly correct for Spanish *venir* or Japanese *kuru*, but it will not handle English usages like:

(83) I'm *coming*

since this cannot mean 'the speaker is moving towards the location of the speaker', but rather means 'the speaker is moving towards the location of the *addressee* at CT'. (Such a usage may have diachronically arisen from a polite deictic shift to the addressee's point of view.) In Japanese one must here say the equivalent of *I go*. Taking this into account, we may suggest that English *come* glosses as 'movement towards either the location of the speaker, or towards the location of

the addressee, at CT'. However this won't quite do either – one can say:

(84) When I'm in the office, you can *come* to see me

where *come* glosses as 'movement towards the location of the speaker at the time of some other specified event' (let us call this time **reference time**). Such a usage is still ultimately deictic, in that it makes reference to participant-role, but it is not directly place-deictic (in that there is no anchorage to the location of the present speech event). In narrative, we sometimes dispense with even this last vestige of deictic content, using *come* relative to the locations of protagonists rather than participants, but this non-deictic usage we shall ignore. Our third approximation to a gloss for *come* is therefore: 'motion towards speaker's location, or addressee's location, at either CT, or reference time'.

Our analysis is still incomplete, however, as there is a deictic usage of *come* that is based not on participants' actual location, but on their normative location or **home-base**. Hence the possibility of saying, when neither speaker nor addressee is at home:

(85) I *came* over several times to visit you, but you were never *there*

So we must append another clause to our gloss, namely: 'or motion towards the home-base maintained at CT by either speaker or addressee'. Very similar remarks throughout can be made for *go*, and also for verbs like *bring* and *take* (see Fillmore, 1975: 50ff).

A number of Amerindian languages encode reference to home-base in a more systematic way. Thus in Chinantec, there are four expressions to choose from if one wants to say 'Pedro moved to X', depending on the following criteria: (i) one verb form is used if the speaker S is at X at CT, and X is S's home-base; (ii) another is used if S is at X, but X is not S's home-base; (iii) a third is used if S is not at X, but X is S's home-base; (iv) a fourth is used if S is not at X, and X is not S's home-base (Fillmore, 1971b: 16).

Further complexities in place deixis arise if the speaker is in motion – it then becomes quite possible to use temporal terms in order to refer to deictic locations, as in:

(86) I first heard that ominous rattle *ten miles ago*

(87) There's a good fast food joint just *ten minutes from here*

This raises the issue about whether time deixis or place deixis is more

basic. Lyons (1977a: 669) inclines to a view that, since place-deictic terms like *this* and *that* can be used in a temporal sense (especially to refer to proximal and distal parts of an unfolding discourse), place deixis is more fundamental than time deixis. Such a view is favourable to **localism**, the theory that attempts to reduce non-spatial to spatial expressions (Lyons, 1977a: 718ff). But the usage in (86) and (87) can be used to reverse the argument, and in general each domain (space and time) provides fertile ground for metaphors about the other (see Chapter 3 below). In addition, deictic locations always have to be specified with respect to the location of a participant *at coding time*, i.e. place deixis always incorporates a covert time deixis element, while the converse is not true.

2.2.4 Discourse deixis

Discourse, or text, deixis concerns the use of expressions within some utterance to refer to some portion of the discourse that contains that utterance (including the utterance itself). We may also include in discourse deixis a number of other ways in which an utterance signals its relation to surrounding text, e.g. utterance-initial *anyway* seems to indicate that the utterance that contains it is not addressed to the immediately preceding discourse, but to one or more steps back. (Such signals are deictic because they have the distinctive relativity of reference, being anchored to the discourse location of the current utterance.) The only detailed accounts of this area of deixis are, again, to be found in Fillmore, 1975 and Lyons, 1977a: 667ff. Since discourse unfolds in time, it seems natural that time-deictic words can be used to refer to portions of the discourse; thus analogously to *last week* and *next Thursday*, we have *in the last paragraph* and *in the next Chapter*. But we also have place-deictic terms re-used here, and especially the demonstratives *this* and *that*. Thus *this* can be used to refer to a forthcoming portion of the discourse, as in (88), and *that* to a preceding portion, as in (89):

- (88) I bet you haven't heard *this* story
 (89) *That* was the funniest story I've ever heard

Considerable confusion is likely to be caused here if we do not immediately make the distinction between *discourse deixis* and *anaphora*. As we noted, anaphora concerns the use of (usually) a pronoun to refer to the same referent as some prior term, as in:

- (90) *Harry's* a sweetheart; *he's* so considerate

where *Harry* and *he* can be said to be **co-referential**, i.e. pick out the same referent. Anaphora can, of course, hold within sentences, across sentences, and across turns at speaking in a dialogue. Deictic or other definite referring expressions are often used to introduce a referent, and anaphoric pronouns used to refer to the same entity thereafter. It is important to remember, however, that deictic and anaphoric usages are not mutually exclusive, as was remarked in connection with example (40) above. Nevertheless, in principle the distinction is clear: where a pronoun refers to a linguistic expression (or chunk of discourse) itself, it is discourse-deictic; where a pronoun refers to the same entity as a prior linguistic expression refers to, it is anaphoric. It follows that there is a close, but quite unexplored, relation between discourse deixis and **mention** or quotation; thus in the following example (from Lyons, 1977a: 667):

- (91) A: That's a rhinoceros
 B: Spell *it* for me

it refers not to the referent, the beast itself, but to the word *rhinoceros*. Here, *it* is not doing duty for a use of *rhinoceros* but rather for a mention of it. Further, the property of **token reflexivity**, as in the following usage of *this*, is just a special case of intra-sentential discourse deixis:

- (92) *This* sentence is not true

Fillmore (1971b: 240) hopes that a theory of discourse deixis will resolve the well-known paradoxes associated with sentences like (92) (if it's false, it's true; and if it's true, it's false), and indeed with token reflexivity in general.

A number of significant problems for the distinction between anaphora and discourse deixis have been thrown up by the very considerable body of work on **pronominalization** (see Lyons, 1977b; Lyons, 1977a: 662ff for a review; and for recent work, see e.g. Heny & Schnelle, 1979). Firstly, there are the so-called **pronouns of laziness** (Geach, 1962: 125ff), as in Karttunen's well-known sentence (see Lyons, 1977a: 673ff):

- (93) The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man who gave *it* to his mistress

2.2.5 Social deixis

Social deixis concerns "that aspect of sentences which reflect or establish or are determined by certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs" (Fillmore, 1975: 76). Fillmore, unfortunately, then proceeds to water down the concept of social deixis by including, for example, much of the theory of speech acts (see Chapter 5). Here we shall restrict the term to those aspects of language structure that encode the social identities of participants (properly, incumbents of participant-roles), or the social relationship between them, or between one of them and persons and entities referred to. There are of course many aspects of language usage that depend on these relations (see e.g. Brown & Levinson, 1978, 1979), but these usages are only relevant to the topic of social deixis in so far as they are grammaticalized. Obvious examples of such grammaticalizations are 'polite' pronouns and titles of address, but there are many other manifestations of social deixis (see Brown & Levinson, 1978: 183-92, 281-5; Levinson, 1977, 1979b).

¹¹ Ross proposed left-dislocation as a transformation, but there are in fact serious problems with such an analysis, and it seems better to treat such topic phrases as appositional NPs, not unlike vocatives, even though there is little theory about how to handle the syntax and semantics of these (see Gundel, 1977: 46ff).

There are two basic kinds of socially deictic information that seem to be encoded in languages around the world: **relational** and **absolute**. The relational variety is the most important, and the relations that typically get expressed are those between:

- (i) speaker and referent (e.g. referent honorifics)
- (ii) speaker and addressee (e.g. addressee honorifics)
- (iii) speaker and bystander (e.g. bystander or audience honorifics)
- (iv) speaker and setting (e.g. formality levels)

We can talk of **honorifics** just where the relation in (i)-(iii) concerns relative rank or respect; but there are many other qualities of relationship that may be grammaticalized, e.g. kinship relations, totemic relations, clan membership, etc., as made available by the relevant social system. The first three kinds of honorific were clearly distinguished by Comrie (1976b), who pointed out that traditional descriptions have often confused (i) and (ii): the distinction is that in (i) respect can only be conveyed by referring to the 'target' of the respect, whereas in (ii) it can be conveyed without necessarily referring to the target. Thus the familiar *tu/vous* type of distinction in singular pronouns of address (which, following Brown & Gilman (1960), we shall call T/V pronouns) is really a **referent honorific** system, where the referent happens to be the addressee. In contrast, in many languages (notably the S. E. Asian languages, including Korean, Japanese and Javanese) it is possible to say some sentence glossing as 'The soup is hot' and by the choice of a linguistic alternate (e.g. for 'soup') encode respect to the addressee without referring to him, in which case we have an **addressee honorific** system. In general, in such languages, it is almost impossible to say anything at all which is not sociolinguistically marked as appropriate for certain kinds of addressees only. In practice, though, the elaborate 'speech levels' of the S. E. Asian languages are complex amalgams of referent and addressee honorifics (see Geertz, 1960 and Comrie, 1976b re Javanese; Kuno, 1973 and Harada, 1976 re Japanese).

The third kind of relational information, that between speaker and bystander, is more rarely encoded in **bystander honorifics**. (The term *bystander* here does duty as a cover term for participants in audience role and for non-participating overhearers.) Examples include the Dyirbal alternative vocabulary, referred to above, used in the presence of taboo relatives (see also Haviland, 1979 re Guugu

Yimidhrr), and certain features of Pacific languages, like aspects of the 'royal honorifics' in Ponapean (Garvin & Reisenberg, 1952: 203).

To these three kinds of relational information we may add a fourth, namely the relation between speaker (and perhaps other participants) and setting (or social activity). Although most languages are used differently in formal settings, in some the distinction formal/informal is firmly grammaticalized, for example in Japanese by so-called *mas*-style, and in Tamil by a high *diglossic variant* (see below). Note that while the first three kinds of information are relative strictly to the deictic centre, here specifically the social standing of the speaker, formality is perhaps best seen as involving a relation between all participant roles and situation (but see Irvine, 1979; J. M. Atkinson, 1982).¹⁴

The other main kind of socially deictic information that is often encoded is *absolute* rather than relational. There are, for example, forms reserved for certain speakers, in which case we may talk (after Fillmore, 1975) of **authorized speakers**. For example, in Thai the morpheme *khǎb* is a polite particle that can only be used by male speakers, the corresponding form reserved for female speakers being *khá* (Haas, 1964). Similarly, there is a form of the first person pronoun specifically reserved for the use of the Japanese Emperor (Fillmore, 1971b: 6). There are also in many languages forms reserved for **authorized recipients**, including restrictions on most titles of address (*Your Honour, Mr President*, etc.); in Tunica there were pronouns that differed not only with sex of referent, but also with the sex of the addressee, so that there were, for example, two words for 'they', depending on whether one was speaking to a man or a woman (Haas, *ibid.*).

Having reviewed the main kinds of social-deictic information that are grammaticalized by different languages, we may now consider where in grammatical systems such distinctions are encoded. Note that only the first kind of relational information, i.e. that on the speaker-referent axis, imposes intrinsic limitations on the ways in which such information can be encoded – namely in referring expressions, and morphological agreements with them. For good sociological reasons, such referent honorifics are found for actors, their social

¹⁴ The difference may be more apparent than real; there may well be honorific systems encoding relations between addressee and referent, and there are the Australian 'triangular' kin terms mentioned in section 2.2.1, so the role of the speaker may not always be so central to the first three kinds of social deixis either.

5.6 The context-change theory of speech acts

One candidate for such a pragmatic theory of speech acts is a view that treats speech acts as operations (in the set-theoretic sense) on context, i.e. as functions from contexts into contexts. A context must be understood here to be a set of propositions, describing the beliefs, knowledge, commitments and so on of the participants in a discourse. The basic intuition is very simple: when a sentence is uttered more has taken place than merely the expression of its meaning; in addition, the set of background assumptions has been altered. The contribution that an utterance makes to this change in

the context is its speech act force or potential. Thus if I assert that p , I add to the context that I am committed to p .

On this view, most speech acts add some propositions to the context, e.g. assertions, promises and orders work in this way. We may express each of these as functions from contexts into contexts very roughly along the following lines:

- (i) An *assertion* that p is a function from a context where the speaker S is not committed to p (and perhaps, on a strong theory of assertion, where H the addressee does not know that p), into a context in which S is committed to the justified true belief that p (and, on the strong version, into one in which H does know that p)
- (ii) A *promise* that p is a function from a context where S is not committed to bringing about the state of affairs described in p , into one in which S is so committed
- (iii) An *order* that p is a function from a context in which H is not required by S to bring about the state of affairs described by p , into one in which H is so required

Such analyses are capable of considerable refinement, and the reader is directed to work by Hamblin (1971), Ballmer (1978), Stalnaker (1978) and Gazdar (1981) for sophisticated treatments.

One should note that not all speech acts add propositions to the context; some remove them – e.g. permissions, recantations, abolitions, disavowals. Thus, for example, we could characterize the giving of permission as follows:


- (iv) A *permission* that (or for) p is a function from a context in which the state of affairs described by p is prohibited, into one in which that state of affairs is not prohibited

thus capturing the intuition that it makes no sense (at least in some systems of deontic logic – see Hilpinen, 1971) to permit what is not prohibited.

One of the main attractions of the context-change theory is that it can be rigorously expressed using set-theoretic concepts. There is no appeal, as there is in most versions of Thesis, to matters of intention and other concepts that resist formalization. The theory is only now becoming generally considered, and it is too early to assess its prospects with any confidence.²² Important questions that arise, though, are the following:

²² One may, though, have initial reservations – there are doubts about defining contexts wholly as sets of propositions, and there is also a real possibility that

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15.3 Deixis

Deixis means different things to different people. For Bühler (1934), any expression which located a referent in space or time was a deictic expression. Thus, for him, *The cat sat on the mat* contained a deictic locative expression, namely, *on the mat* (the sentence also contains a tense marker, which is usually considered to be deictic). Later scholars have mostly restricted the term deixis to cases where the referent is located using the current speech event or one or more of its participants as reference points. In the sentence *The cat sat on the mat*, the cat is located with respect to the mat: the mat is thus the reference point, and the speech event plays no role. In the sentence *That cat sat on the mat*, however, the cat is located not only with respect to the mat, but also with respect to the speaker, *that* indicating (probably) that the cat was relatively distant from the speaker. A point of disagreement concerns the deictic status of the definite article. Some scholars consider it to be deictic, because the current context of situation is involved in referent identification. Others exclude the definite article, because it does not locate the referent on any specific parameter. We shall, at least at first, include only expressions which truly locate a referent with respect to (some aspect of) the current speech situation. We therefore include personal pronouns, but exclude the definite article. Our key diagnostic criterion for deictic expressions will be the sensitivity of their use in designating a given referent to certain speech-situational parameters, particularly location in space and time relative to the speaker, and participatory status. Thus, someone referring to a book held by another person would say *that book*, but the holder of the book, referring to the same book, would say *this book*; referring to 8 July on 7 July, one would say *tomorrow*, but referring to the same day on 9 July, one would say *yesterday*; a speaker refers to himself as *I*, but his hearer, referring to the same person, would say *you*. We shall initially recognize five main types of deixis: **person deixis**, **spatial deixis**, **temporal deixis**, **social deixis**, and **discourse deixis**.

15.3.1 Person deixis

Person deixis involves basically the speaker, known as the **first person**, the addressee, known as the **second person**, and other significant participants in the speech situation, neither speaker nor hearer; these are known as **third person**. All of these, at least in English, come in singular and plural form and several are marked for case. (See table p. 320.)

In many languages, pronoun usage encodes social deixis (see below). Notice that the third person singular forms also encode gender. It is important to realize that the occurrence of gender in these forms is not deictic, that is to say, it is not sensitive to aspects of the speech situation. In other words, not all the meaning of a **deictic expression** is deictic in nature.

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	Singular	Plural
1st person	I/me	we/us
2nd person	you	you
3rd person	he/him, she/her, it	they/them

A couple of remarks are worth making on the subject of plural forms of personal pronouns. First of all, there is a kind of dominance relation holding among the terms: first person dominates second and third, and second person dominates third. This manifests itself in the following way. If the group designated includes the first person, then a first person plural pronoun must be used, even if there is only one first person and thousands of second and/or third persons. Similarly, if there is no first person in the group designated, but at least one second person, then a second person pronoun is needed. Only if neither first person nor second person is present can third person pronouns be used.

The second point concerns the **representative** vs. **true** use of the plural pronouns. The word *we* is rarely spoken by a plurality of persons: there is normally a single speaker. This speaker represents the group to which he or she refers. On the other hand, *they* usually designates a plurality of present referents. Representative use is possible, but is more uncommon (e.g. in pointing to a single person and saying *They are going to Greece for their holidays*). In the second person, the two possibilities, of representative and true use, are more or less equally likely.

15.3.2 Spatial deixis

Spatial deixis manifests itself principally in the form of locative adverbs such as *here* and *there*, and demonstratives/determiners such as *this* and *that*. English has a relatively impoverished spatial deictic system, with only two terms, usually labelled **proximal** and **distal**. Many languages have three or more terms. The most common types of three-term system subdivide the **distal** category. There are two main ways of doing this. The first involves a **distal/remote** distinction. (English at one time had such a system, with three terms *here*, *there*, and *yonder*.) Spanish has such a system. The other type of three-term system does not strictly depend on distance, but is closely related to the person system, that is to say, the terms can be glossed "near to me" (= *here*), "near to you", and "not near to either you or me" (= third person). Older analyses of Turkish proposed this analysis. It is nowadays not considered correct, however. One suggestion as to the true nature of the Turkish spatial deictics is that within the distal category there is a **gestural/symbolic** distinction (see below). Deictic systems with more than three terms incorporate such notions as 'visible/'invisible', 'below the line of sight'/'above the line of sight', and so on.

Let us return now to English (although many of the observations will be more generally valid). The proximal term *here* means something like “region relatively close to the speaker”, and *there* means “relatively distant from the speaker”. It is important to realize, however, that ‘relative closeness’ is contextually determined. *Here* may represent an area less than the square metre on which the speaker is standing, or it could be something much vaster, such as *Here in our local galaxy cluster*. This is another species of definiteness: *here* is meaningless unless the hearer can locate the dividing line (in terms of distance) between *here* and *there*. (Paradoxically, there is no limit to how far away *here* can extend.)

The spatial deictics show a similar sort of dominance relation to the personal pronouns. We can illustrate this with *this* and *that*. The point is that the combination of *this book* and *that book* must be collectively referred to as *these books*, not *those books*. This encourages us to think of *this* as a **first person deictic**. (There is a small amount of evidence that *that* is ambiguous between second person and third person, in that *those* prefers to be either one or the other. I can refer to (i) *those books that you have* and (ii) *those books that John has*. If I subsequently say *Those books are very valuable*, there is a strong preference for interpreting this as either (i) or (ii), but not both together, unless you and John can be united in a joint second-person reference.)

15-3-3 Temporal deixis

Temporal deictics function to locate points or intervals on the time axis, using (ultimately) the moment of utterance as a reference point. There are thus three major divisions of the time axis: (i) before the moment of utterance, (ii) at the time of utterance, (iii) after the time of utterance. The most basic temporal deictics in English are *now* and *then*. *Now* is in some ways a kind of temporal *here*, and displays the same capacity for indefinite extension. That is, it can refer to a precise instant: *Press the button—now!*; or it can accommodate a wide swathe of time: *The solar system is now in a relatively stable phase* (notice, however, that the phenomenon of dominance is absent from temporal deictics, as is the association with first person). *Then* points away from the present, but is indifferent as to direction, which is normally indicated contextually (*We were happy then; OK, I'll see you then*).

Temporal deictics depend heavily on calendric notions, if we understand that term to subsume both clock and calendar. For instance, *today*, *yesterday*, and *tomorrow*, designate, respectively, “the period of 24 hours beginning at 12 o'clock midnight which includes the time of utterance”, “the period of 24 hours which precedes the one including the time of utterance” and “the period of 24 hours which follows the one including the time of utterance”. Notice that these terms’ meanings include both deictic information (past, present, or future) and non-deictic information (“period of 24 hours beginning . . .”, etc.). Only the 24-hour period has lexicalized deictics. For parallel references to

other periods, we must use the terms *this*, *last*, and *next*. With these, there are complications (and uncertainties) according to whether the time period is referred to by means of a proper name or not. Consider, first, cases where a proper name is not used. Expressions such as *this week*, *last week*, and *next week*, *this month*, *last month*, and *next month*, *this year*, *last year*, and *next year* are all interpreted calendrically, that is to say, to take the example of *week*, *last week* means “the period of seven days beginning on Sunday (or Monday) preceding the corresponding period which includes the time of utterance” (a non-calendric interpretation would be “the period of seven days preceding the time of utterance”). Notice that *Mary is here for a week/month/year* is not normally interpreted calendrically; *Mary is here for the next week/month/year*, according to my intuitions, can be either calendric or not.

If the proper name of a period of time is used, additional restrictions come into play. Take the names of days, first. The lexical items *today*, *yesterday*, and *tomorrow* have priority, so that, for instance *this Wednesday* cannot be uttered on Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday. *Last Wednesday* cannot be uttered on Thursday to refer to the previous day, but may be used to refer to the Wednesday of the preceding week. Speakers disagree as to whether a reference to, say, Monday, said on the Wednesday of the same week, should be *this Monday* or *last Monday*; a parallel disagreement applies to a reference, said on the same day, to the following Saturday—some would say *this Saturday*, others *next Saturday*. In referring to months, *this July* means “the July falling within the calendric year which includes the time of utterance”, with the exception that one does not normally say (with exceptions to be noted in a moment) *this July* if one is speaking in July. With months, there is a similar uncertainty concerning the meanings of *last* and *next* as with named days.

It is of course possible, and quite normal, to say, for instance, *This July is the hottest I have ever known*, when one is still within the period designated by *this July*. However, it is important to realize that the *this* in this usage is not a temporal *this*, that is to say, it does not belong to the contrast set which includes *last* and *next*. In fact, it is an extended use of the spatial *this*, and contrasts with *That July was the hottest I have ever known*. It is therefore not a specifically temporal deictic.

It has already been mentioned that verb tense represents a type of deixis. This will not be dealt with here; it is discussed in Chapter 14.

15-3-4 Social deixis

Social deixis is exemplified by certain uses of the so-called TV (*tu/vous*) pronouns in many languages. It will be illustrated here using examples from French. Arguments will be presented that not all the usages of TV pronouns fall properly under the heading of deixis. One which incontrovertibly does is where relative social status of speaker and hearer is signalled. There are three basic possibilities involving two communicants A and B: (i) A addresses B

with *tu*, B addresses A with *vous*; (ii) A addresses B with *vous*, B addresses A with *tu*; (iii) A and B both use the same form (either *tu* or *vous*). The basic parameter here is social status: *tu* points downwards along the scale of social status with the speaker's position as reference point, *vous* points upwards, while symmetrical use signals social equality.

Turning now to instances of symmetrical usage of TV pronouns, let us enquire briefly into the factors which determine whether *tu* or *vous* is used, and whether such usage can properly be regarded as deixis. One factor is usually described by some such term as 'social distance': *tu* indicates intimacy, *vous* indicates lack of intimacy, or distance. It is tempting to draw a parallel here with the proximal and distal terms in spatial deixis, and say that *tu* is proximal and *vous* distal. I shall suggest two reasons why such a parallel should not be drawn. The first is that there is no validity in an argument from reverse metaphor. That is, just because the [+intimate/-intimate] distinction would make a satisfying metaphorical extension from the [proximal/distal] distinction of spatial deixis, it does not follow that that is what it is, especially if the forms used give no support to the derivation. In the present case, there is no spatial content in literal uses of *tu* and *vous* to support such a derivation. The second reason is that the dominance relations between [+intimate] and [-intimate] are the wrong way round. Recall that *here* dominates *there*: in the case of TV pronouns used to signal intimacy (or lack of it), V dominates T. It is hard to demonstrate this in French, because there is no distinct intimate plural form, as there is in, for instance, German. But it can be shown. Imagine a group of people appointing one of their number as a spokesperson to address some individual. Suppose that the person chosen would naturally say *tu* to the person being addressed. Suppose further that the group contains individuals who would naturally say *vous* to the person being addressed. What form does the spokesperson choose? French native intuitions unhesitatingly opt for *vous*.

As a clue to another factor affecting the choice between T and V consider the following situation. A husband and wife jointly front a news programme on TV. When they are on the air, they address one another as *vous*; off-camera, of course, they use *tu*. Clearly neither relative social status nor intimacy can explain this. The deciding factor seems to be the formality or informality of the situation. It is at least arguable that this cannot be laid at the door of deixis at all.

15.3.5 Discourse deixis

Discourse deixis refers to such matters as the use of *this* to point to future discourse elements, that is, things which are about to be said, as in *Listen to this, it will kill you!*, and *that* to point to past discourse elements, as in *That was not a very nice thing to say*. In a similar spirit, the *hereby* of an explicit performative sentence could be said to point to current discourse: *Notice is hereby served that if payment is further delayed, appropriate legal action will be taken*.

Meaning in language

It is sometimes claimed that certain sentence adverbs, such as *therefore* and *furthermore*, include an element of discourse deixis in their meaning, as they require the recovery of a piece of previous discourse to be understood. *Therefore* and *furthermore* could be glossed: "It follows from that" and "In addition to that", respectively, (where *that* is a discourse deictic). A distinction can be made between discourse deixis and anaphora, although the two are obviously related. Anaphora picks up a previous reference to an extralinguistic entity and repeats it. In *John entered the room. He looked tired, he* refers to the same person that *John* refers to, but it does not strictly refer to the word *John* itself. It must be admitted that in reference to a case like *therefore* the distinction between discourse deixis and anaphora becomes somewhat blurred.

1.1 Definite reference

There are various types and modes of reference. We shall concentrate on three: **definite reference**, **indefinite reference**, and **generic reference**. There is no doubt that it is definite reference which is the most crucial for the functioning of language. (In the philosophical literature it is usually called *singular definite reference*; for our purposes, however, there are no particular problems in moving from *singular* to *plural*.)

To open the discussion of definite reference, consider the two sentences below:

- (1) The man gave it to her.
- (2) A man gave it to her.

How does the meaning of sentence (1) differ from the meaning of sentence (2)? Obviously both indicate an act of giving by some adult male person (we shall ignore the rest of the sentence). The features which distinguish (1) from (2) can be set out as follows:

- (a) The intended referential target is necessarily a particular entity (believed by the speaker to fall into the category MAN, but notice that the speaker can be mistaken about this and still, on some particular occasion, successfully refer), who can in principle be uniquely identified by the speaker.

This means that the speaker should be able, on demand, to give information that for them distinguishes the (man) in question from all other men. The speaker may not be able to name the man, or even give any descriptive information: for instance, what makes the man unique may be only that he occasioned an auditory experience on the part of the speaker at a particular time and place.

- (b) The speaker intends that the referential target should come to be uniquely identified for the hearer, too.

This is, in fact, the main point of the act of reference. Once again, the information which enables the hearer to uniquely identify the intended referent may be minimal.

- (c) The act of reference brings with it to the hearer an implicit assurance that they have enough information to uniquely identify the referent, taking into account the semantic content of the referring expression (or other properties of the expression which limit the search space), and information available from context, whether situational (i.e. currently perceivable), linguistic, or mental (i.e. memory and knowledge).

Searle makes a quaint distinction between a 'successful' act of reference, which requires only (a) to hold, and a 'fully consummated' act of reference, which requires also (b). (The act of reference is thus like having an orgasm: one can do it on one's own, but to be fully consummated we need a partner.) We can follow Searle, and add the following features/conditions for a fully successful act of referring (not necessarily distinctive for referring):

- (d) Normal input and output conditions hold.


This just means that, for instance, speaker and hearer speak the same language, the utterance is both audible and comprehensible to the hearer, and so on.

- (e) The act of reference is embedded in a more inclusive speech act.

An act of reference cannot stand on its own as a communication: *the man* communicates nothing, except when embedded in a sentence like *I saw the man*, or as an answer to a question such as *What can you see?*

- (f) The speaker intends that the hearer should recognize his intention to refer by virtue of his having produced the utterance in question.

3. Alan Cruse, 2011



9.2.5 Indirect reference

Indirect reference is reference to something by means of a linguistic expression whose default use is to refer to something else. We have already encountered two species of indirect reference, namely, metaphor and metonymy (Chapter 12). But the phenomenon goes beyond these, and includes cases which would not normally be considered to fall under either. A typical sort of case involves characters in plays and films and the actors who play them. Imagine a situation where John and his wife Mary both act in a play. John plays a character called Ralph, and Mary a character called Elizabeth. In the play, Ralph and Elizabeth are lovers; the character Ralph is poisoned in the third act by Elizabeth's mother Joan (played by Mary's sister Alice), who hates him and doesn't want him to marry her daughter. In this situation, all the following sentences (and many more like them) have interpretations under which they make true statements:

- (71) John is married to Mary.
- (72) John and Mary are lovers.
- (73) Ralph and Elizabeth are lovers.
- (74) Ralph is married to Elizabeth.
- (75) John is poisoned in the third act.
- (76) Elizabeth and Joan are sisters.
- (77) Joan is Elizabeth's mother.

To account for this and similar cases, the cognitive linguist Gilles Fauconnier (1994) proposes an **identification principle**:

If two objects (in the most general sense), *a* and *b*, are linked by a pragmatic function $F(b/a)$, a description *d*_a of *a*, may be used to identify its counterpart *b*.

In the above case, there is a pragmatic function, which we can label 'dramatic portrayal', which links John to Ralph, Mary to Elizabeth, and Alice to Joan. By virtue of this we can refer to actors by the names of the characters they portray, and vice versa. Notice that each of the sentences (71)–(77) has two distinct readings, one true and one false, without being, in the normal sense of the term, ambiguous (there is neither grammatical nor lexical ambiguity). Another pragmatic function that licenses indirect reference is 'pictorial representation':


- (78) (looking at an old picture) You can't see Jane clearly because of the stain.

A pragmatic function of 'constancy of identity over time' allows us to refer to persons at an earlier stage of their life by their present functions, even though those functions did not apply at the time:

- (79) My mother was only two years old when war broke out.

Fauconnier accounts for these sorts of case in terms of **mental spaces**. These are mental constructs in which alternative representations of states of affairs are held. The pragmatic functions underlie correspondences that are rather like Lakoff's metaphorical correspondences between domains, in that they connect entities across spaces. For instance, in the theatrical example mentioned above, there is a 'reality space' and a 'play space', each depicting a state of affairs, and there are correspondences which link individuals in one space with individuals in the other space. Example (79) requires a 'present-time' space and a 'past-time' space, the correspondence being based on the persistence of personal identity through time. The description *my mother* is obviously valid only in the present-time space, but can be used to refer to the same individual in the past-time space. Mental spaces have been put to a variety of uses which it is not possible to explore here.

4. Virginia LoCastro, 2003



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for the listener unless both the speaker and listener are looking at the same place on the same map.

The most basic distinction made by deixis seems to be “near the speaker” and “away from the speaker.” Thus, there are proximal terms—*this, here*—and distal terms—*that, those, there*. As with following directions on a map, both speakers and addressees have to know where the deictic center is located, for example, the You Are Here marker on the map. Typically, the deictic center in face-to-face conversation is the speaker’s location. If a friend flies from London to Chicago on a business trip and leaves on your answering machine the message, “Just wanted you to know I’m here . . . Talk with you later,” you can only assume that “here” means Chicago and “later” means after the day’s business, or that evening, Chicago time.

Some languages have a three-part deictic system: in Japanese, it is possible to distinguish near the speaker (“here,” *here*), near the addressee (“there,” *over*), and away from both (“over there,” *over there*). The Spanish of Spain also has three: *aquí* (here), *ahí* (there) and *allí* (over there). Outside Spain it is also possible to hear *aca* (here) and *alla* (there). Of course, it is possible to say “over there” in English; however, it is not with a single word as in Spanish and Japanese. The main point about deixis is that it is not possible to interpret the speaker’s use of deictic forms without knowledge of the context of occurrence. There are several kinds of deictic expressions: person, spatial, temporal, social, and discourse deixis.

Person Deixis

Many languages have a three-part set of linguistic forms: in English, first person (*I*), second person (*you*), and third person (*he, she, it, and they*). The speaker uses “I” to refer to him- or herself, refers to the addressee as “you,” both when the hearer is one or more persons, and employs “he,” “she,” “it,” “they” to signal other persons in the context of the utterance. In face-to-face conversation, the persons to whom “I” and “you” refer are constantly changing, as the speaker and hearer exchange roles in the course of the talk. If the speaker wants to include the addressee with the speaker explicitly in the talk, “we” can serve that function; as “we” can be inclusive or exclusive, depending on the speaker’s

intention in a specific context of use. Here is a part from a speech given by President Reagan in 1984 (Lakoff 1990, 189).

By beginning to rebuild our defenses, **we** have restored credible deterrence and can confidently seek a secure and lasting peace, as well as a reduction of arms. As I said Wednesday night, America is back and standing tall. **We**’ve begun to restore great American values: the dignity of work, the warmth of family, the strength of neighborhood and the nourishment of human freedom. But **our** work is not finished.

It is not clear about whom Reagan is talking when he uses “we” and “our”: the government of the United States, the people, or both. The strategy is a subtle means to bring the people into believing they are the U.S. government, reinforcing nationalistic beliefs and values through use (or his speech writers’ use!) of language.

Note that not all uses of *you* in English or *vous* in French are deictic. When *you* is deictic, it should be possible to point out the referent, commonly the addressee. However, in other cases, such as “You never know what’s going to happen,” the pronoun has no specific referent and may include the speaker and any copresent participants. Here is an example from an essay written by a Mexican learner of English.

I think that if **you** are really comonced about **your** goals **you** don’t need to be socially accepted, but if it occurs that **you** can’t reach that desire, **you** could get frustrated. **You** only have to look for the biggest goal, not for other factors that **you** can attain on the way to reaching the biggest one. (LoCastro 2000b)

In this case, “you” does not directly refer to the addressee or reader of the essay. An interesting example where “you” is arguably nondeictic—that is, not being used to address someone in particular—can be observed when a speaker refers to members of the audience, in effect, overhearers of television interview programs. A politician may be perceived to be answering the interviewer’s questions, while, in fact, he or she is employing “you” to refer as well to the listening audience, the mass of voters. The speaker may be well aware of the ambiguity, using it

to create a kind of slippage from appearing to address the interviewer's question while at the same time talking to the voters in the audience.

Spatial Deixis

The second category of deixis concerns space and movement. The most obvious deictic expressions in this category of spatial deixis in English are *here* and *there*. However, these adverbs are only two of many possible linguistic forms. Rather than take a static view of spatial deixis, it is preferable to consider movement toward or away from the speaker with the deictic center located with the current speaker. The verbs *come* and *go* illustrate this distinction well.

Come home! (movement toward the speaker)
Go home! (movement away from the speaker)

Note that the English distinction may not hold for all languages. A pair of verbs that can be confusing for second language learners of English is *borrow* and *loan*: A loans a book to B and B borrows the book from A. However, in Latin American Spanish, the verb *prestar* can mean both "to borrow" and "to loan." The direction of the verbal action, from A to B or B to A, is kept separate in English, but not always in other languages.

Another important point about spatial deixis is that distance from the speaker or addressee may be psychological and not simply physical; it is dependent on the speaker's affective stance. For example, psychological distance can be communicated by the speaker uttering, "I don't like that," referring to behavior of a child standing right in front of the speaker. The speaker uses "that" to convey an attitude of displeasure, even anger, toward the child's behavior.

Temporal Deixis

This category of deictic markers includes forms used to refer to such meanings as the time of a speaker's utterance, "now," in comparison to "before," which can signal an event that happened prior to the present moment of speaking.

Now, I have a wonderful new car. Before, I was always driving a junky, secondhand car.

In other words, the point here is that deixis is concerned with the time of an event relative to the actual time of speaking about it. It can be complicated, as in the following example.

I can give you a lift home *then*. (A few minutes from now)
I was able to swim five hundred meters *then*. (When I was a child)
I will meet you at noon. See you *then*. (Tomorrow, over the weekend)

Interpretation of these utterances depends on knowing the utterance time, that is, when the speaker is doing the talking, as with expressions such as "the day before yesterday" (see the accompanying table). If a teacher leaves a note on his or her office door that reads, "I'll be back in an hour. Gone to the library," students coming to visit the teacher for help cannot know when the hour is up unless they know the time the message was put on the board. Confusion may also result in deciding the meaning of "last" versus "this" or "next week." If today is Sunday, and the speaker is talking about activities of "this week," for example, is the speaker including Sunday in the entity of the six days before the Sunday or in the entity of the six days following the Sunday? Both can be possible interpretations of "this week." This can be a difficult point for speakers of other languages if the system of their first language, in a sense, cuts the pie in a different way than that of the second language.

There is another type of temporal deixis that can help the listener understand a speaker's meaning. In English, the present and past verb tenses can signal proximal and distal deictic meanings. The distal form, in particular, can communicate distance from the current moment as well as distance from current reality.

the day before yesterday	yesterday	today	tomorrow	the day after tomorrow
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Current moment: I teach in Mexico (now).
 Distance from current moment: I lived in Paris (in the late 1960s).
 Distance from reality: If I could live anywhere in the world . . .
 [but I don't have such choice]

The tense system signals the event time, which may be simultaneous with the utterance time or with the time reported in the utterance (see the next table).

To these categories can be added social deixis and discourse deixis. The study of naturally occurring talk has demonstrated that traditional approaches to deixis cannot account for the full range of this phenomenon.

Social Deixis

Some languages encode social status differences as constraints on the speaker's choice of person deictic expressions. This is called social deixis; it can be observed in the *tu/vous* distinction in French. *Tu* is used with friends and intimates; it also expresses solidarity in Québécois French. *Vous*, however, is employed with all nonfamiliar in continental French. The same distinctions can be found in many European languages, such as German (*du/Sie*). Spanish and Italian have more complex systems. Two forms are used with familiars, *tu* (taking Italian as our example) for second-person singular, and *voi* for second-person plural. However, to signal social distance, *lei* is polite second-person singular and *loro* second-person plural. Peninsular Spanish has four forms as well: *tú/vosotros, usted*

Congruent	It's raining now.	Utterance time same as event time
Incongruent	By the time you read this, I will have arrived in Paris.	Time of intended receipt of the message and event time later than utterance time
Incongruent	Zakia will be back on Wednesday.	Event time later than utterance time

Subject pronoun	Singular/Plural	Informal/Formal
<i>Tu</i>	Singular	Informal
<i>Usted</i>	Singular	Formal
<i>Ustedes</i>	Singular and Plural	Informal and Formal

and *ustedes*. There are also regional variations; in Mexican Spanish, only *tú, usted, and ustedes* are used (see the next table).

Still other languages, such as Japanese, avoid use of personal pronouns despite their existence ("I," *-watashi*, "you," *-anata*, "he" *-kare*, "she" *-kanojo* with the plurals formed by adding a suffix, *-tachi*, to the base forms). When they are used, in addition to the literal meanings, social and attitudinal meanings are present that are not related to the pointing function. The following example signals that the speaker has a negative attitude toward the person *kanojo* or her habit of being late.

Kanojo wa, itsumo osoi n desu. [Her, she's always late.]

To avoid expressing an attitudinal stance, titles, address forms and/or family names are used with an honorific marker: Yamamoto + *san* (standard form)/*sama* (more formal) *gakucho, sensei* (dr/madam, dean, teacher). The choice of the situationally appropriate deictic form made by the speaker is therefore dependent on social and other contextual considerations.

Social deixis allows the speaker to express degrees of closeness or involvement and of distance or independence from the addressee. Levinson (1983, 63) defines social deixis as "the encoding of social distinctions that are relative to participant-roles." Javanese in Indonesia has six levels that encode the social status of the speakers and listeners. The question "Did you take that much rice?" can be said in six different ways (see the accompanying table, in which the levels are listed in order of decreasing status). The speaker shifts from one level to another, depending on contextual variables.

In a language such as Japanese, the honorific system is the codification or grammaticalization of social deixis, as a speaker of Japanese

Question Marker	You	Take	Rice	That much	
<i>Menapa</i>	<i>nandalem</i>	<i>mundhut</i>	<i>sekul</i>	<i>semanten?</i>	3a High
<i>Manapa</i>	<i>panjenengan</i>	<i>mendhet</i>	<i>sekul</i>	<i>semanten?</i>	3
<i>Napa</i>	<i>sampeyan</i>	<i>mendhet</i>	<i>sekul</i>	<i>semanten?</i>	2
<i>Napa</i>	<i>sampeyan</i>	<i>njupuk</i>	<i>sega</i>	<i>semanten?</i>	1a
<i>Apa</i>	<i>sliramu</i>	<i>mundhut</i>	<i>sega</i>	<i>semono?</i>	1b
<i>Apa</i>	<i>kowor</i>	<i>njupuk</i>	<i>sega</i>	<i>semono?</i>	1 Low

Source: Holmes 1992, 273.

must encode relative social distance in each utterance. Indeed, one way of looking at deixis is to view it as an example of the grammaticalization of contextual features. Person deictic expressions (*tu/vous*, for example), which are used to show differences in social status, encode sociocultural features of the context in language. Of the two sentences below, the first one expresses the greatest degree of deference; the speaker signals more humbleness toward the professor than in the second one.

Sensei wa moo okaeri ni narimashita-ga. [The professor has already gone home.]

Sensei wa moo kaeraremashita-ga. [The professor has already left.]
(Maynard 1990, 278–79)

It is important to note that the encoding of social deixis even in Japanese does not necessarily reflect any permanent relationship between the speaker and addressee. The social status of conversational partners is relative in a particular instance of talk. In one context, a listener may be addressed with forms signaling higher status than the listener, such as in a teacher-student relationship at school or at the university. Shopping in a department store with family members, the same person will not necessarily be addressed as *sensei*. Further, speakers can use the forms of social deixis in different situations to signal, proactively, lesser or greater social distance or involvement with the addressee. In other words, speakers can indicate that they wish to shorten the social distance

Discourse Deixis

According to Levinson, discourse deixis has to do with “the encoding of reference to portions of the unfolding discourse in which the utterance (which includes the text-referring expression) is located” (1983, 62). Here is an example.

For two years, I will have to interact with a new system, being part of it. *This* is a dilemma: on one side, I have to be prepared for a different life; on the other, I am not inclined to forget all values and tastes that I had before. The trade-off between *those* two opposite tendencies showed me that, at least, my home should reflect my personality. (Hatch 1992, 219)

A more typical example is the following:

This chapter will *first* define speech acts and provide a brief overview of how *this* field of discourse has been applied to second language acquisition

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(SLA). *Next*, research methodologies used in studying speech acts will be examined, and selected empirical studies that have appeared in recent years will be considered. *Finally*, the available studies on the teaching of speech act behavior to nonnative speakers will be reviewed, and the pedagogical implications of the findings to date will be described. (Cohen 1996, 383)

In both examples, the italicized words enable the writer to refer to other parts of the text. Discourse deixis provides signposts for the reader to follow the speaker or writer’s train of thought and intended meaning.

exophoric reference often requires knowledge of the sociocultural context in which the text is found.

The second main category of reference, *endophoric* (*ends* "inside"), refers to linguistic elements that are present in the linguistic text itself. The most common form of endophoric reference in English is *anaphora*, where the analyst has to go "backward" in the text.

A: so now (0.2) it won't be that long (0.3) she hired
this attorney today, so (+)
 B: is **he** expensive?

(LoCastro 1990b)

Most of us are familiar with anaphora; textbooks are full of exercises that ask students to find the antecedent for a pronoun.

The second type of endophoric reference is *cataphora*, which comprises reference requiring that one go "forward" to find the referent.

It's going down quickly, the sun. (Brown and Yule 1983a, 193)


The "it" at the start of the utterance is used to refer to "the sun," which follows it in the linear text. Cataphoric reference is typically found in newspaper articles or other narratives where the writer wants to engage the readers' curiosity.

The trip would hardly have been noteworthy, except for the man who made it. In mid-July a powerful American financier flew to Mexico City for a series of talks with high-level government officials, including President Miguel de la Madrid and his finance minister, Gustavo Petricoli. (Newsweek, September 21, 1987, 44, quoted in McCarthy 1991, 42)

The passage describes "the" trip in the second sentence; however, the referent for "the man" is not made clear until later. The purpose of cataphoric reference is to entice the readers into continuing to read the article in *Newsweek*.

The third type of endophoric reference is *zero anaphora*, which denotes instances where the referent is ellipted. In "I was waiting for the

5. Patrick Griffiths, 2007



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1 Studying meaning

Overview

This is a book about how English enables people who know the language to convey meanings. Semantics and pragmatics are the two main branches of the linguistic study of meaning. Both are named in the title of the book and they are going to be introduced here. **Semantics** is the study of the “toolkit” for meaning: knowledge encoded in the vocabulary of the language and in its patterns for building more elaborate meanings, up to the level of sentence meanings. **Pragmatics** is concerned with the use of these tools in meaningful communication. Pragmatics is about the interaction of semantic knowledge with our knowledge of the world, taking into account contexts of use.

Bold print for explanations of terms

In the index at the back of the book, bold printed page numbers indicate places where technical terms, such as **semantics** and **pragmatics** in the paragraph above, are explained. The point is to signal such explanations and to make it fairly easy to find them later, should you want to.

Example (1.1) is going to be used in an initial illustration of the difference between semantics and pragmatics, and to introduce some more terms needed for describing and discussing meanings.

(1.1) Hold out your arm. That’s it.

Language is for communicating about the world outside of language. English language expressions like *arm* and *your arm* and *hold out* are linked to things, activities and so on. A general-purpose technical term that will appear fairly often in the book is **denote**. It labels the connections between meaningful items of language and aspects of the world – real or imagined – that language users talk and write about. *Hold out your arm*


denotes a situation that the speaker wants; *hold out* denotes an action; *arm* denotes a part of a person; *your arm* denotes ‘the arm of the person being spoken to’; and so on. An **expression** is any meaningful language unit or sequence of meaningful units, from a sentence down: a clause, a phrase, a word, or meaningful part of a word (such as the parts *hope*, *-ful* and *-ly* that go together to make the word *hopefully*, but not the *ly* at the end of *boldy*, because it is not a separately meaningful part of that word.)

That’s it at the end of Example (1.1) is an expression which can mean ‘OK (that is correct)’, or ‘There is no more to say’, but for the moment I want to discuss the expressions *That* and *it* separately: what do they denote? *That* denotes something which is obvious to whomever is being addressed – perhaps the act of holding out an arm – yes, acts and events can be spoken of as if they were “things”. (There is a question over which arm, since most people have two.) Other possibilities for what *that* could denote are the arm itself, or some other thing seen or heard in the surroundings. The word *it* usually denotes something that has recently been spoken about: the arm or the act of holding it out are the two candidates in (1.1). Without knowing the context in which (1.1) occurred, its meaning cannot confidently be explained much more than this.

In fact, (1.1) is a quotation from the first of J. K. Rowling’s Harry Potter books.¹ It is spoken to Harry by Mr Ollivander, a supplier of fine wands. In the book it comes just after Mr Ollivander, taking out a tape measure, has asked Harry ‘Which is your wand arm?’ The contextual information makes it pretty certain that *your arm* denotes Harry’s wand arm (his right arm, Harry guesses, as he is right-handed). Immediately after Mr Ollivander has said what was quoted in (1.1), he begins to measure Harry for a wand. This makes it easy in reading the story to understand that Harry complied with the request to hold out his arm, and “That’s it” was said to acknowledge that Harry had done what Mr O. had wanted. This acknowledgement can be unpacked as follows: *That* denotes Harry’s act done in response to the request – an obvious, visible movement of his arm, enabling Mr O. to use the measuring tape on Harry’s arm; *it* denotes the previous specification of what Harry was asked to do, the act of holding out his arm; and the *’s* (a form of *is*) indicates a match: what he had just done was what he had been asked to do. Table 1.1 summarises this, showing how pragmatics is concerned with choices among semantic possibilities, and how language users, taking account of context and using their general knowledge, build interpretations on the semantic foundation.

The reasoning in the right-hand column of Table 1.1 fits a way of thinking about communication that was introduced by the philosopher H. P. Grice (1989 and in earlier work) and is now very widely accepted

6. Jacob L. Mey, 1993



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references depend on, and sometimes change with, the presence of the referred terms. Moreover, this presence has to obey certain rules of proximity (cf. the discussions in the literature about how far away a pronoun can occur from its referent and still be perceived as anaphorical).

What is most interesting for us, however, is the pragmatic aspect of anaphorical (or pronominal) reference. The so-called 'antecedent' (i.e., that which precedes the pronoun and to which the pronoun refers) can be of different kinds, depending on the kind of text we're dealing with. The technicalities do not interest us here; suffice it to say that a pragmatic approach to anaphora tries to take into account not only what the anaphorical pronoun is referring to, strictly speaking (this can be a noun, a piece of text, even a situation) but, beyond that, what 'hidden dimensions' there are in anaphorical reference; that is: what kind of (mostly implicit) value-judgements accompany a sentence- or text-anaphoric expression?

An interesting case in this respect is the reference that holds between gender-marked articles and pronouns and their corresponding nouns. The old controversy about the 'generic masculine' has been actualized in the past decades under the influence of the feminist movement: it should no longer be acceptable to refer to female persons by the masculine gender, nor to 'mixed' sets of humans by the so-called 'generic masculine' alone. While there are quick-and-easy solutions to this problem in English (the 'generic plural', or using 'combined pronouns' such as 's/he', or the perhaps a little more awkward 'he or she'), languages such as Spanish have no options here.

In Spanish (as in the other Romance languages), every noun has its specific grammatical gender, and referential expressions must agree in gender with the anaphorized ones. If I say *los profesores* 'the teachers', then I have already made a choice (since I also could have said *las profesoras* 'the female teachers'); if I choose to spell out the gender distinctions (*los/las profesores/las*, or use the heavier technique of repetition: *los profesores y las profesoras*), then I still encounter the problem of reference in the corresponding pronouns: do I say *ellos* or *ellas*, or, again, both? The problem is a pragmatic one, and not just a matter of grammar: what is at stake is not simply correctness in observing the grammatical rules, but the ways these rules reflect the patterns of domination that are at work in society. Whereas the grammarians only tell us to avoid 'syntactic clashes' (Casares 1947), pragmatics informs us about the

clashes of interest between different groups in society, and specifically about the ways in which these clashes are expressed in the language (including the syntax), and in the way the language (including the syntax) is used by its speakers.

Anaphora may not always obey the strict referential rules of grammatical theory, as in the case of the so-called 'lazy pronouns' (the expression is due to Barbara Partee (1972)) and other elements with ambiguous 'local reference', that everybody accepts and understands correctly because in a given context, they are unambiguous. Thus, in the classic examples (originally due to Lauri Karttunen (1969) and others), such as

He's been to Italy many times but he still doesn't speak *the* language

or

The man who gave *his paycheck* to his wife was wiser than the man who gave *it* to his mistress (Partee 1972: 434)

we understand the anaphora to cover references that aren't 'really' there. 'The' language does not refer to any language that has been mentioned previously; however, we understand it immediately as 'the language of Italy', since Italy has been mentioned. Similarly, in the other example we understand that 'it' refers to the paycheck the man did *not* give to his mistress, but to his wife.

As to the 'syntactic clashes' that were mentioned earlier, consider the following Spanish example:

la catedrático ['the female (University) professor'].

Here, the real-world reference is to a woman (manifested by the feminine article *la*); as such, it conflicts with the masculine gender of the head noun *catedrático*. Rather than condemning this violation of the rules of syntax, as does the Spanish academician Julio Casares, who remarked that such a 'syntactic clash [would be] insupportable' (1947: 303; quoted Kjær Nissen 1990: 14), the pragmatically oriented linguist turns his or her attention to the real-world reasons for such a 'clash'. The true concern of pragmatics is not whether the rules of grammar have

text in ways that are difficult to analyse, or even see, with the naked eye.

Basically, what these questions and problems amount to is the eternal query of 'whose language' we're speaking, and why (Mey 1985). Raising this question amounts to starting an investigation into the societal parameters of language use. Furthermore, the problems envisaged here will have to be framed against a background of a deeper understanding of familiar concepts such as rules, utterances, speech acts, contexts and so on. Such questions will properly be treated under the heading of *metapragmatics*, broadly understood as: 'reflections on the language users' use'.

From this point of view, the present part of my book naturally falls into, first, a number of chapters dealing with so-called 'conversation analysis'. (Questions of 'text linguistics' proper will be dealt with only briefly in the present book: see section 9.2.) After that, a chapter will deal with metapragmatic questions of various kinds. Finally, in a concluding chapter we will look more closely into the social conditions of language use; unfortunately, we will only be able to skim the surface of the problem.⁷⁶

The present chapter will present an overview of the entire macro-pragmatic problematic, starting from the single utterance (or sentence) up to and including the notion of 'discourse'.

9.2 FROM SENTENCE (PAIR) TO TEXT

Most people will agree that single sentences, or pairs of sentences (as exemplified in the standard conversational interchange: greeting-greeting, question-answer, and so on), are not sufficient as a framework for a pragmatic theory, and that we have to extend our vision to what is loosely called the 'text'. However, not all are agreed on what a text is, and how to deal with it.

'Text theory', as such, is not an invention of the last decades. Although most linguists of the traditional observances have concentrated their attention on describing units of 'sub-text' size, even structuralists such as the Dane Louis Hjelmslev held that the proper object of linguistic analysis was the text (cf. Hjelmslev 1943: 18).

In more recent times, we have witnessed the rise of so-called 'text grammar'. In its more primitive version, a text grammar is no more than a grammar of anything that extends beyond the sentence. For some text

Pursuing any extensional conception of text grammar, we find ourselves in a kind of double bind: on the one hand, we think of a text as an (infinitely expandable) sentence or sentence-like object; on the other, such an abstract, theoretical construct will never match the concrete, finite reality of spoken or written texts. If we ask how we can escape this impasse, the answer is simply that the text, as discussed in the above framework, is not a particularly helpful or interesting concept in understanding human speech behaviour. What we need to do is to transcend the limited approach that sees texts as collections of language productions and ascribes these productions to a single individual uttering sentences, or even to pairs of individuals exchanging standardized text units such as questions and answers, orders and acknowledgements, promises and acceptances, and other simple conversational repartees.

By widening our perspective to what (in the widest possible sense) surrounds spoken or written utterances, we also obtain a better understanding of what the utterances are really about; as we know, utterances only make sense when they are quoted in their proper context.

Usually, one defines the co-text of a (single or multiple) sentence as that portion of text which (more or less immediately) surrounds it. (Unfortunately, there are no agreed limits as to what 'immediately' is supposed to mean here.)

However, such a co-text of utterance is insufficient for our understanding of the words that are spoken, unless it includes an understanding of the actions that take place as part of, and as a result of, those words. In order to understand people's linguistic behaviour, we need to know what their language use is about; that is, we must look further than the co-text of utterance and take the whole of the linguistic scene into our view. This means that we must extend our vision from co-text to *co-text*: the entirety of circumstances (not only linguistic) that surround the production of language.⁷⁸ What does this mean? A first approach could go as follows.

9.3 FROM SPEECH ACT TO CONVERSATION

In Part II, I spent a lot of time talking about speech acts and about the ways they are used to express our aims and intentions: what we want to 'do with our words', as Austin put it. In the present chapter, I want to situate those speech acts in the context in which most of them


normally and naturally occur: in interchanges between two or several 'conversationalists'.

Such a context should not be restricted to what, technically speaking, is a co-text. It will not only have to go beyond the individual speech act and its expression, but even beyond what many linguists, especially speech act theorists, have traditionally assumed to be the ideal (and correct) frame for their theory: the two-person, two-utterance 'interchange' (A says something to which B replies). In the framework of so-called 'conversation analysis' (CA), the various mechanisms determining people's use of language in an extended, open conversational setting are explored: Who holds the right to speak (often called the 'floor', because that's where 'common' people traditionally stand when they speak in public); what kind of rules are there for either yielding or holding on to the 'floor'; what makes a particular point in the conversation particularly appropriate for a 'turn' (one speaker leaving the floor, another taking it); and so on?

Conversation analysts have deployed a wealth of insights into these matters, and have elaborated an impressive arsenal of techniques for the description and explanation of the mechanisms of conversation, as we will see in the following chapters. However, with all due respect for their findings and results, the framework in which they operate is strictly that of a co-text, in the sense defined above; put in another way, CA is a minimalist approach, which allows only so much hypothesizing as is strictly required to explain the phenomena at hand.

While such a parsimonious attitude to theory building undoubtedly has its merits, it also causes certain deficiencies inasmuch as it leaves out all 'contextual' considerations (in the sense of 'context' I talked about a moment ago). In particular, the social aspects of this extended context have no place to go in such a framework; which is what explains some of the weaknesses of the CA approach.⁷⁹ The following section will deal with these aspects; for a more in-depth treatment of the social aspects of text production and consumption, see chapter 14, below.

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propensity by actively directing others' attention. Of special importance to our account is so-called lip-pointing in which a meta-communicative facial expression (conveyed by a configuration of lip and/or head; Sherzer 1972, Enfield 2009: ch. 3) indicates that a participant's gaze direction is, at that moment, to be understood as an intentional, communicative signal.

With shared intentionality as a foundation, all languages have developed systems of deictic markers: for example, demonstratives such as English *that* and *this*. These systems display a defining semiotic property of human communication, namely the use of signs that not only have meanings in themselves, but whose meanings are enriched through relations of opposition and contrast with other elements of the system, such that each element has a composite meaning, a combination of what it *is* and what it *is not*. Simple systems in the domain of deixis feature a semantically marked form in opposition to an unmarked one. More complex systems involve multiple dimensions of contrast. A further way in which the meanings of elements of a deictic system may be enriched is through their mapping onto the local socioculturally constituted worlds of their users. Speakers use deictic forms to refer to locally relevant features of the environment and deictic systems are interwoven with the sociocultural world in complex and sometimes counter-intuitive ways.

An overarching question to be addressed is, 'What's special about deixis as a form of reference? How does it differ if at all from reference accomplished by non-deictic means, and what consequence does this difference have for its function or use in actual situations of social interaction?' In order to address this question, we begin by developing an account of deixis that is rooted in basic, instinctive human propensities for (a) intentional, goal-directed behaviour and (b) the capacity for two or more individuals to share attention. Together, these human capacities provide a basis for the collective or shared intentionality that underwrites all forms of reference, including reference accomplished via the use of deixis. We then turn to briefly sketch the semantic domain describing the essential elements of deictic reference and some of the documented typological variation. Much of the literature in this area focuses on just these issues and so here we do little more than provide a thumbnail sketch and point to relevant landmarks. We then consider demonstrative reference in which the recipient's attention is directed either by talk, gesture, or gaze to some enumerable thing. Here we show that deixis is a low-cost, high-efficiency, minimally characterizing way to accomplish reference. These features surely account for many of its uses in interaction. But we suggest that referrers select deixis for reference for reasons other than efficiency. First, the semantically general character of deictic forms makes them well-suited for reference to hard-to-describe and/or nameless objects. In such a situation a deictic form can exploit features of the artifactual environment including the presence of the thing being referred to. Second, the semantically non-specific, minimally characterizing features of deixis allow speakers to avoid description where such description may be counterproductive to some interactional goal. Third, because these forms require for their interpretation the application of knowledge in common ground (shared knowledge), successful reference via such a form can be

CHAPTER 12

REFERENCE

BARBARA ABBOTT

12.1 INTRODUCTION

EVEN taking a very constrained view, words like *refer* and *reference* have two distinct but related uses. As used in, e.g., a common translation of Gottlob Frege's famous 1892 paper 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung' as 'On sense and reference', they are associated with the relation between linguistic expressions and the entities that they apply to. In this sense they tag a semantic relation. Using the words this way we might say that the noun phrase (NP) *the star of Evija* refers to the singer Madonna.^{1,2} However, 58 years later P. F. Strawson argued strenuously that it is wrong to speak of expressions as referring. Rather, referring is something speakers of a language use expressions to do. Under this construal (which, it must be admitted, is closer to everyday usage), 'refer' and 'reference' tag elements within the realm of pragmatics. As this is a pragmatics handbook, the latter construal will be the focus of the current chapter.

The next question is which kinds of expressions can be used by speakers to refer to things? Keeping within our relatively constrained view, overwhelmingly the assumption has been that NPs are the primary tools of reference. Although it would not be outrageous to say something like *Mary was using the words deceive and underhanded to refer to your activities*, suggesting that verbs and adjectives might be said to be used in referring, nevertheless it is almost entirely the case that scholars have focused on NPs in this area. A related fact is the tendency of philosophers to focus on what they call *singular reference*, or reference to individuals, in their discussions of reference of either the semantic or the pragmatic type, where the *singular terms* which may participate in singular referring relations are all NPs.

CHAPTER 13

CONTEXT

ANITA FETZER

13.1 INTRODUCTION

CONTEXT has not only become a major field of research in the arts and humanities, and in the social sciences, but also in information technology and engineering. While the impact of context and contextual features has been acknowledged explicitly in the latter, context itself has become an object of investigation in the arts and humanities and social sciences, where diverse, but not mutually exclusive conceptualizations of context have been implemented and applied to research designs in natural- and non-natural language communication, computer-mediated communication, information technology and robotics, and social-action-based analyses. The multifaceted nature of context and the context dependence of the concept itself have made it almost impossible for the scientific community to agree upon one commonly shared definition of context or one commonly accepted theoretical perspective, and frequently, only a minute aspect of context is described, analysed, or formalized (cf. the interdisciplinary conferences on context: Akman et al. 2001; Blackburn et al. 2003; Bouquet et al. 1999).

Context is seen as an interactional achievement in ethnomethodological conversation analysis and interactional linguistics (Heritage 1984; Goodwin and Duranti 1992; Schegloff 1992a); it is considered a relational construct in sociopragmatics (Fetzer 2004, 2010); it is described as a psychological construct in relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson 1986); and it is referred to as 'other minds' in functional grammar (Givón 2005). Within these research paradigms, context is further refined as a dynamic construct, which relates interlocutors and the language that they use in a dialectical manner. To capture the dialectics of the dynamic processes, communication has been described as both context-creating and context-dependent (Bateson 1972). In a similar vein, context is seen as imported into communication and as invoked in communication (Levinson 2003a), and in interactional-sociolinguistic terms, context is brought into the communicative exchange and it is brought out in the communicative exchange (Gumperz 1992a).

24.2 PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS
IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE

24.2.1 Pragmatics, semantics, and cognitive architecture

From the perspective of human cognitive architecture, the pragmatics–semantics interface is the point where the meaning or content provided by our linguistic knowledge interacts with the inferential capacities that we bring to bear on the interpretation of ostensive communicative acts. There are a range of possibilities about how the two systems at this interface interact: they might be rigidly separated and sequential in their operation; they might be distinct systems in so far as they deploy their own specific procedures but nevertheless operate in parallel; they might not be distinguishable in any interesting sense and instead constitute a single general interpretive system that uses information from any source (perception, language, memory) as it becomes available.

The idea that our cognitive capacities are significantly modular in their architecture was brought to prominence by Jerry Fodor (1983). On his construal, a modular system is one which applies to a limited specific stimulus domain and is encapsulated from top-down expectations and utilities of the overall cognitive system, thus being both rigid in its operations and also having a kind of objectivity in representing the input stimulus (uncontaminated by beliefs, desires, hopes). In his view, only the peripheral systems, that is, those systems that present aspects of the outside world to our central thought processes, are modular. So, while our various perceptual systems and the linguistic parser are modules, the central conceptual systems, whose job it is to reach well-founded decisions about what to believe and what to do, have to be highly context-sensitive (responsive to relevant top-down information) and so cannot be modular. Interpreting utterances and other communicative acts is clearly one such context-sensitive process and so, on this Fodorian view, our pragmatic capacities cannot but be non-modular.

However, pragmatic processes seem to have at least some of the characteristics of an autonomous mental system. Ever since Grice, it has been widely assumed that overtly communicative behaviour is interpreted in accordance with maxims or principles that do not apply more generally (to the interpretation of other kinds of purposive behaviour). For instance, Gricean maxims of quantity and quality, and their neo-Gricean modifications (e.g. Horn 1984; Levinson 2000), apply only to the domain of rational communicative behaviour, specifically linguistic utterances; no one would expect the information we might gain from watching someone's intentional but non-communicative behaviour (e.g. cooking a meal, packing a suitcase) to meet the standards of informativeness, relevance, and truthfulness we expect when someone overtly requires us to direct our attention to the stimulus he has produced as is the case in overt

communication.⁶ Furthermore, the processes of utterance understanding are spontaneous, automatic, and fast—we can't help but infer a speaker's meaning when an utterance is directed at us (and often even when it is not). Sperber and Wilson (2002) have taken these observations seriously and proposed that pragmatics is indeed a modular mental system, albeit not quite in the Fodorian sense in which input systems (perception and language) are modular.

The claim that pragmatics is modular has to be situated within a broader view of the whole mind as massively modular (Sperber 1994a, 2005; Carruthers 2006). A driving consideration here comes from ideas in evolutionary psychology (see, for instance, Cosmides and Tooby 1994): just as natural selection favours the development of specific organs (eyes, ears, hearts, livers) to carry out specific survival-enhancing biological processes, so it favours specialized solutions to the specific cognitive problems the organism encounters in its environment—that is, mechanisms that are dedicated to processing a circumscribed input domain whose regular properties can be exploited by specific cognitive procedures. On this basis, it is far more reasonable to suppose that our central cognitive system consists of multiple specialized subsystems rather than a single general-purpose system for interpreting and responding to the myriad issues the world presents us with. Of course, once we move beyond the peripheral 'input' systems that Fodor focused on to the central conceptual systems, the concept of a 'module' has to be modified somewhat, in particular with regard to the issue of the information available to the system. Sperber (1994a, 2000) develops an account in which conceptual modules are multiply interconnected, so that the procedures of each of the individual modules can be informationally encapsulated, while 'chains of inference can take a conceptual premise from one module to the next, and therefore integrate the contribution of each in some final conclusion' (Sperber 1994a: 133).

It is a defining property of pragmatic processes that they are context-sensitive, so, whatever the principles and procedures of the pragmatics module, they must have access to contextual assumptions from a wide range of sources (current perception, earlier discourse, general and cultural knowledge stored in memory). The account of pragmatics given in relevance theory provides a solution to this tension between responsiveness to broad context and the informational encapsulation of a modular system, in that the general comprehension procedure which is the engine of the system

applies not only to the derivation of hypotheses about the communicated content (explicitures and implicatures) but also to the accessing of contextual assumptions. Here is the relevance-based comprehension procedure:


- (3) a. Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation (of the ostensive stimulus)—that is, in resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies, enriching encoded meaning, *supplying contextual assumptions*, computing implicatures, etc.
- b. Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied.

It is not my concern here to motivate this procedure or explain the general cognitive underpinnings of our context-specific 'expectations of relevance' which play the crucial role in terminating the process and settling on an interpretation (for detailed accounts, see Wilson and Sperber 2004, 2012b; Wilson this volume). The key point here is that, in effect, the pragmatics module itself regulates its accessing of information stored in other conceptual modules and imposes a degree of encapsulation which ensures that the interpretive process can be both swift and accurate.

A further important feature of Sperber and Wilson's view of the pragmatics module is that it is like the more general 'theory of mind' module in being inherently *meta-representational*—that is, it explains specific kinds of human behaviour in terms of mental representations in the mind of the person who produced the behaviour. So, while the outputs of our perceptual systems consist of base-level descriptive representations like 'X is red' or 'X is screaming', the outputs of the theory of mind module are higher-order representations in that they are attributions of lower-order mental representations to others, e.g. 'X believes *there are chocolates in the box*' and/or 'X desires *to eat some chocolates*', and so too those of the pragmatics module, e.g. 'X intends me to recognize that she is informing me that *she is hungry and wants to eat lunch now*'. Thus the pragmatics module can be viewed as a special submodule of the more general theory of mind module: that is, it has its own dedicated procedures (such as (3) above and perhaps other more specific heuristics and inferential shortcuts based on it) which would not work if applied to other kinds of theory of mind tasks (for detailed argument along these lines, see Sperber and Wilson 2002; Wilson 2005).⁷

How are we to construe the pragmatics-semantics interface within this modular picture of the mind? Assuming with Fodor (and Sperber and Wilson) that language is a modular system,⁸ then the output of that system is a representation of the

8. Stefinee Pinnegar, 2009



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and reflection) moments allows us access to multiple layers of our experience as we identify the pasts that are resident in the present and the future orientations that rewrite the experience of the present as we capture an account of it. Construction and interpretation of present moments provide a venue for S-STTEP researchers to uncover and utilize our tacit or personal practical knowledge and use it to understand and alter our practice to improve it.

In the present moment, when we are uncertain of the coming future, we take all that we know from our past to confront what is happening now and then take action. Principles from Gestalt psychology, such as proximity, good continuation, and similarity, help us in this task. Yet there is a constant and ongoing in-conclusiveness in the moment-to-moment living of a life.

Stern uses the concept of a musical phrase to articulate the ways in which these moments adhere and move forward. As we listen to a note, we are still aware of the note that went before and we predict the note that will follow. In this way the form "of the musical phrase is revealed and captured by the listener as the crest of the immediate present instant passes from the still resonating horizon of the past . . . toward the anticipated horizon of the future" (Stern, 2004, p. 29). In these moments we are very aware of "self" because we experience ourselves as existing in the moment and of that moment happening to us.

Stern (2004) reminds us that "we are aware of our status as experienter" (p. 59). While present moments have duration, they also carry vitality effects such that we experience some moments of awareness with greater or lesser intensity, interest, and emotion. Thus, some of these moments seem thicker than others. Examining practice from a present moment perspective allows S-STTEP researchers to attend to, explore, and develop understandings of vitality effects in practice.

Stern (2004) argues that in therapy, attention to the present moment is critical, since the longer the therapist stays with the present moment, the more pathways for therapy will open up. Therefore, from the perspective of exploring the present moment, there is value in lingering within the present moment. This insight supports the need for and value of S-STTEP research, for such studies can support practitioners in staying in a "present moment of practice" long enough to more fully understand practices and to deepen the understanding and potential for action that emerges. Just as staying in the present moment opens up more pathways for therapy, staying in the present moment opens up more pathways for considering and changing practice for improvement.

Practices are built up in present moments, and careful attention to them and exploration of them hold potential for coming to understand practice and relationships in practice with others better and more deeply. Since awareness in present moments can lead to reconsiderations of the past and transformation of the future, opening them to understanding becomes an important tool for exploring and improving practice. As a strategy, the exploration of present moments can help those who study their own practice uncover more completely the tacit knowing they hold in practice.


Stern's (2004) description of implicit knowing also holds great promise for explorations of practice, since his theory of knowing in present moments highlights

management, analyze ways students think through problem-solving, investigate misconceptions in students' work, and many other meaningful, timely activities. One of the activities I value most is an activity where each of my students design, develop, present, and reflect upon a 20-minute lesson. Many times, students desiring to teach secondary mathematics have not developed the ability to determine when a lesson can be presented using a discovery, inquiry, or cooperative learning approach, nor has the teacher candidate been exposed to such teaching strategies in the learning experience in mathematics during his/her higher education experience. Too often the teaching strategy in the university content classroom is lecture based or direct instruction. Lecture-based and direct instruction strategies do not generally provide opportunities for interactive engagement. These strategies may be efficient for the higher education content classroom, but they are not what is desired by the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) for students at the K-12 level nor for this teacher educator.

As a way to advocate alternative instructional choices, I modeled lessons, some of which are purely discovery and inquiry based, and some that work well in cooperative learning environments. During class sessions, I purposefully modeled lessons for my students that would engage them in hands-on activities and force them to learn by discovery. Reactions varied. One student was very reluctant to abandon his pencil and calculator. But most of my students were profoundly impressed as they expressed, "This is so much fun," or "I never thought of this like that." It was obvious to me that they were experiencing something foreign and exciting. One student even pressed another to try to discover her way of visualizing patterns rather than calculating with symbols. I was fairly confident that they understood what was expected, and what the aspects of a discovery lesson involved now that they had experienced it themselves. We also discussed issues such as questioning techniques and responses to student inquiry. I would say, "Notice that I answered your question with another question to allow you time to figure this out yourself." Or I would draw attention to the process by which I was directing someone's activities on the board. For this assignment, the group developed a rubric to determine what aspects of this teaching activity were important for critical analysis. We agreed that accuracy in content, preparation of detailed lesson plan, student interaction, implementation of the plan, and reflection would be major components of the assessment. I believed the teacher candidates were ready to demonstrate their learning by teaching model discovery lessons themselves. All students developed discovery lessons on paper, but during the actual teaching activities, two of five teacher candidates reverted back to direct instruction using symbol manipulation rather than allowing participants time to engage in the activities planned. These two students actually taught after the two others who did engage everyone in learning by discovery. While these two wrote in their lesson reflections that they realized that most, if not all, of their activities used a direct instruction format, they were comfortable about that.

I had thought students would be excited about using a discovery approach to instruction because they were excited about learning by discovery in my simulations. Instead, they appeared to revert back to what seemed to be the easiest, most comfortable method of instruction for them – direct instruction. I was further discouraged

9. John W. Creswell, J. David Creswell (2016)



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
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Chapter 9 Qualitative Methods

Qualitative methods demonstrate a different approach to scholarly inquiry than methods of quantitative research. Although the processes are similar, qualitative methods rely on text and image data, have unique steps in data analysis, and draw on diverse designs. Writing a method section for a proposal or study for qualitative research partly requires educating readers as to the intent of qualitative research, mentioning specific designs, carefully reflecting on the role the researcher plays in the study, drawing from an ever-expanding list of types of data sources, using specific protocols for recording data, analyzing the information through multiple steps of analysis, and mentioning approaches for documenting the methodological integrity or accuracy—or validity—of the data collected. This chapter addresses these important components of writing a good qualitative method section into a proposal or study. [Table 9.1](#) presents a checklist for reviewing the qualitative methods section of your project to determine whether you have addressed important topics.

- Indicate the type or types of data to be collected. In many qualitative studies, inquirers collect multiple forms of data and spend a considerable time in the natural setting gathering information. The collection procedures in qualitative research involve four basic types and their strengths and limitations, as shown in [Table 9.2](#).
 - A **qualitative observation** is when the researcher takes field notes on the behavior and activities of individuals at the research site. In these field notes, the researcher records, in an unstructured or semi-structured way (using some prior questions that the inquirer wants to know), activities at the research site. Qualitative observers may also engage in roles varying from a nonparticipant to a complete participant. Typically these observations are open-ended in that the researchers ask general questions of the participants allowing the participants to freely provide their views.
 - In **qualitative interviews**, the researcher conducts face-to-face interviews with participants, telephone interviews, or engages in focus group interviews with six to eight interviewees in each group. These interviews involve unstructured and generally open-ended questions that are few in number and intended to elicit views and opinions from the participants.
 - During the process of research, the investigator may collect **qualitative documents**. These may be public documents (e.g., newspapers, minutes of meetings, official reports) or private documents (e.g., personal journals and diaries, letters, e-mails).
 - A final category of qualitative data consists of **qualitative audiovisual and digital materials** (including social media materials). This data may take the form of photographs, art objects, videotapes, website main pages, e-mails, text messages, social media text, or any forms of sound. Include creative data collection procedures that fall under the category of visual ethnography (Pink, 2001) and which might include living stories, metaphorical visual narratives, and digital archives (Clandinin, 2007).
 - In a discussion about data collection forms, be specific about the types and include arguments concerning the strengths and weaknesses of each type, as discussed in [Table 9.2](#). Typically, in good qualitative research the researchers draw on multiple sources of qualitative data to make interpretations about a research problem.
- Include data collection types that go beyond typical observations and interviews. These unusual forms create reader interest in a proposal and can capture useful information that observations and interviews may miss. For example, examine the compendium of types of data in [Table 9.3](#) that can be used, to stretch the imagination about possibilities, such as gathering sounds or tastes, or using cherished items to elicit comments during an interview. Such stretching will be viewed positively by graduate committee members and by editors of journals.

10. Matt Smith, 2007



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(p. 84, Chapter 5) also reveals are the tensions and inequalities inherent in qualitative research. This is perhaps best exemplified in the negative response to her findings from her partners in Peru. The analysis of this situation draws out the intersection of the personal and political with the process of doing qualitative research on development, and highlights the significant moral and ethical dilemmas that need to be negotiated not only in terms of the methodology but also in terms of development itself.

ETHICS AND MORALITY


Whilst the interpersonal dimensions of doing qualitative research on development generate important ethical dilemmas, sometimes accentuated by issues of cultural and linguistic difference, these can intersect with the ethical dilemmas inherent in development theory and practice. Donnelly tackles this head on in his chapter, drawing on the experience of research in Sudan to reflect on the wider ethical problematics within development as a concept. He reveals and reflects on the multiple levels at which the researcher is confronted with decisions and questions over the maintenance, compromise and negotiation of their values in relation to development. For Donnelly this particularly becomes a question of power, not simply in terms of researcher and researched, but in terms of the wider contexts of exploitation, domination and sometimes authoritarianism in which the researcher may be positioned. So not only is ethical sensitivity and reflexivity essential but Donnelly also makes the case for a moral engagement at the core of doing qualitative research on development. The position of the researcher is also a concern for Staples, whose discussion of researching the complex narratives behind the operation of a small South Indian NGO has the added element of a long-term personal association with the organisation. Staples' discussion of the "ethical precariousness" (p. 132, Chapter 7) engendered by his roles "as a volunteer, as a donor representative, a researcher and, in some cases, as a friend" (p. 143, Chapter 7) highlight once again the complex commitment and engagement many development researchers have to those they research. The contradictions this can generate are highlighted by Simpson in her discussion of research on the 'gap year' in Peru. The author offers a candid discussion of the dilemma of matching her commitment to the poor and to understanding the perspectives of the poor, with the belief that one set of findings was unrepresentative and, in effect, an "'official' local perspective" (p. 159, Chapter 8). The difficulty of deciding on an appropriate and ethical response in this situation is made harder by the

wider context of the research – the rise of a 'gap year' industry looking to the authors' work to prove the value of their activities. This demonstrates that the border between research and context, and between research and processes and practices of change and development, are less than clear-cut. Not only is this an issue of how the researcher positions themselves in relation to particular conceptions and values, but the ways the methodology relates to processes of development and change.

RESEARCH, PRACTICE AND CHANGE

The strong normative aspect of conceptions of development alongside the often personal commitments of the researcher to achieving equitable development engender strong, if contested, connections between qualitative research and development practice and processes of change. At one level this may be mediated by the degree to which qualitative methods are embraced by the development industry and development organisations are able to draw on such approaches to support and enrich their work (see the chapters by Bakewell and Hovland). However, it is important to think critically about the connections between research, practice and change; a beneficial outcome through improved development practices cannot be assumed. This theme is taken up at a theoretical level by Mellor in her discussion of participatory methodologies, their relationship to qualitative approaches, and the ways in which both relate to processes of change. Despite the underlying commitments of many of the contributors in this volume, Mellor points out that "there is no direct relationship between the adoption of a subject-oriented qualitative methodology and a change-oriented approach" (p. 184, Chapter 9). The author notes that this requires attention to the role of the researcher and the degree to which they seek to play an active if not interventionist role. It also demands reflection on what is being asked of those being researched, how they are engaged, and the potential damage or unintended changes that engagement could produce; as Simpson also notes, one cannot assume the interest or enthusiasm of research subjects in the research, its agenda or its outcomes. Even where there seems to be a positive response to a research process orientated towards change at a micro level, one also cannot assume this will translate into those particular processes of change. Hovland explores this issue through her discussion of some research done in a unit of a relatively large development organisation, focusing particularly on the boundaries around the research and wider organisational practices which were being researched. The chapter highlights the difficult

11. Jaszcolt, 2002



2.1 Theoretical Background: Pragmatics

2.1.1 Defining pragmatics

Pragmatics is a relatively young linguistic discipline – compared to, for example, phonetics and syntax – which began to establish itself as an independent area of linguistic research only about 40 years ago. Linguistic pragmatics has its foundation in language philosophy and developed as a result of ideas concerning the functions and use of language by philosophers such as Wittgenstein (1953; in Bach, 2004), Austin (1962), Searle (1969, 1975, 1976) and Grice (1968, 1975). The term *pragmatics* itself goes back to another philosopher, Peirce (1905), and his work on pragmatism.¹ The first definition of pragmatics that is generally quoted was developed by Morris (1938), who defined pragmatics as 'the study of the relation of signs to interpreters' (p. 6). It has to be noted, however, that his definition was based on a semiotic² view

of pragmatics and that subsequent definitions of linguistic pragmatics tend to use different terms and are often more detailed. I have included below three definitions that are now commonly used to describe pragmatics from a perspective that is also relevant for the present investigation:

Pragmatics is the study of language from the point of view of users, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction and the effects their use of language has on other participants in the act of communication. (Crystal, 1985, p. 240)

Die linguistische Pragmatik (von griech. Pragma, Handlung), ist die Lehre von den Kommunikationsprinzipien, nach denen sich Menschen richten, wenn sie in sozialen Zusammenhängen rational und effizient miteinander interagieren. Diesen Prinzipien folgen Sprecher/Schreiber, um Bedeutungen zu implizieren, die über die Satzbedeutung hinausgehen, und Hörer/Leser, um die im Kontext plausiblen Äußerungsbedeutungen aus der Menge der möglichen zu erschliessen. Beschrieben werden die sprachlichen Formen, Handlungsmuster, Implikations- und Interpretationsstrategien, die ein einvernehmliches Aushandeln der nicht gesagten, wohl aber gemeinten und verstandenen Bedeutungen ermöglichen. (Bublitz, 2001, p. 27)


Linguistic pragmatics (from Greek pragma, activity/deed) is the study of communication principles to which people adhere when they interact rationally and efficiently in social contexts. Speakers/writers follow these principles to imply additional meaning to a sentence, and hearer/readers follow these principles to infer the possible meaning of an utterance out of all available options in a given context. Pragmatics describes the linguistic forms, action patterns and strategies that are used to imply and interpret, which enable interlocutors to comprehend the intended, but not uttered meaning. (Bublitz, 2001, p. 27)

Pragmatics studies the use of language in human communication as determined by the conditions of society. (Mey, 2001, p. 6)

I have selected these definitions because together they provide a sound initial starting point for the present study. Crystal (1985) emphasizes that actual language use is important in pragmatics research and that pragmaticians are interested in both the coding and decoding of utterances by speakers and hearers. Bublitz's (2001) definition is very similar, but also includes the underlying notion that there are principles speakers adhere to when communicating effectively and rationally. Finally, Mey's (2001) definition explicitly mentions the significant role society plays in pragmatics.

Many of the ideas behind these definitions are based on speech act theory (e.g. Austin 1962; Searle, 1969, 1975, 1976), the cooperative principle (e.g. Grice, 1975), conversational implicature (e.g. Grice, 1989) and politeness theory (e.g. Brown & Levinson 1978, 1987; Lakoff, 1973, 1977; Leech, 1983).

12. Prof. Dr. Sugiyono, 2013



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INSTRUMEN DAN TEKNIK PENGUMPULAN DATA

A. Instrumen Penelitian

Seperti telah dikemukakan pada bab sebelumnya bahwa, terdapat dua hal utama yang mempengaruhi kualitas hasil penelitian, yaitu, *kualitas instrumen penelitian, dan kualitas pengumpulan data*. Dalam penelitian kuantitatif, kualitas instrumen penelitian berkenaan dengan validitas dan reliabilitas instrumen dan kualitas pengumpulan data berkenaan ketepatan cara-cara yang digunakan untuk mengumpulkan data. Oleh karena itu instrumen yang telah teruji validitas dan reliabilitasnya, belum tentu dapat menghasilkan data yang valid dan reliabel, apabila instrumen tersebut tidak digunakan secara tepat dalam pengumpulan datanya. Instrumen dalam penelitian kuantitatif dapat berupa test, pedoman wawancara, pedoman observasi, dan kuesioner.

Dalam penelitian kualitatif, yang menjadi instrumen atau alat penelitian adalah peneliti itu sendiri. Oleh karena itu peneliti sebagai instrumen juga harus "divalidasi" seberapa jauh peneliti kualitatif siap melakukan penelitian yang selanjutnya terjun ke lapangan. Validasi terhadap peneliti sebagai instrumen meliputi validasi terhadap pemahaman metode penelitian kualitatif, penguasaan wawasan terhadap bidang yang diteliti, kesiapan peneliti untuk memasuki obyek penelitian, baik secara akademik maupun logistiknya. Yang melakukan validasi adalah peneliti sendiri, melalui evaluasi diri seberapa jauh pemahaman terhadap metode kualitatif, penguasaan teori dan wawasan terhadap bidang yang diteliti, serta kesiapan dan bekal memasuki lapangan.

Peneliti kualitatif sebagai *human instrument*, berfungsi menetapkan fokus penelitian, memilih informan sebagai sumber data, melakukan pengumpulan data, menilai kualitas data, analisis data, menafsirkan data dan membuat kesimpulan atas temuannya.

Dalam penelitian kualitatif segala sesuatu yang akan dicari dari obyek penelitian belum jelas dan pasti masalahnya, sumber datanya, hasil yang diharapkan semuanya belum jelas. Rancangan penelitian masih bersifat sementara dan akan berkembang setelah peneliti memasuki obyek penelitian. Selain itu dalam memandang realitas, penelitian kualitatif berasumsi bahwa realitas itu bersifat holistik (menyeluruh), dinamis, tidak dapat dipisahkan ke dalam variabel-variabel penelitian. Kalaupun dapat dipisahkan, variabelnya akan banyak sekali. Dengan demikian dalam penelitian kualitatif ini belum dapat dikembangkan instrumen penelitian sebelum masalah yang diteliti jelas sama sekali. Oleh karena itu dalam penelitian kualitatif "*the researcher is the key instrumen*". Jadi peneliti adalah merupakan instrumen kunci dalam penelitian kualitatif.

Dalam hal instrumen penelitian kualitatif, Lincoln and Guba (1986) menyatakan bahwa:

"The instrument of choice in naturalistic inquiry is the human. We shall see that other forms of instrumentation may be used in later phases of the inquiry, but the human is the initial and continuing mainstay. But if the human instrument has been used extensively in earlier stages of inquiry, so that an instrument can be constructed that is grounded in the data that the human instrument has produced"

Selanjutnya Nasution (1988) menyatakan:

"Dalam penelitian kualitatif, tidak ada pilihan lain daripada menjadikan manusia sebagai instrumen penelitian utama. Alasannya ialah bahwa, segala sesuatunya belum mempunyai bentuk yang pasti. Masalah, fokus penelitian, prosedur penelitian, hipotesis yang digunakan, bahkan hasil yang diharapkan, itu semuanya tidak dapat ditentukan secara pasti dan jelas sebelumnya. Segala sesuatu masih perlu dikembangkan sepanjang penelitian itu. Dalam keadaan yang serba tidak pasti dan tidak jelas itu, tidak ada pilihan lain dan hanya peneliti itu sendiri sebagai alat satu-satunya yang dapat mencapainya"

Berdasarkan dua pernyataan tersebut dapat difahami bahwa, dalam penelitian kualitatif pada awalnya dimana permasalahan belum jelas dan pasti, maka yang menjadi instrumen adalah peneliti sendiri. Tetapi setelah masalahnya yang akan dipelajari jelas, maka dapat dikembangkan suatu instrumen.

Dalam penelitian kualitatif instrumen utamanya adalah peneliti sendiri, namun selanjutnya setelah fokus penelitian menjadi jelas, maka kemungkinan akan dikembangkan instrumen penelitian sederhana, yang diharapkan dapat melengkapi data dan membandingkan dengan data yang

telah ditemukan melalui observasi dan wawancara. Peneliti akan terjun ke lapangan sendiri, baik pada *grand tour question*, tahap *focused and selection*, melakukan pengumpulan data, analisis dan membuat kesimpulan.

Menurut Nasution (1988) peneliti sebagai instrumen penelitian serasi untuk penelitian serupa karena memiliki ciri-ciri sebagai berikut:

1. Peneliti sebagai alat peka dan dapat bereaksi terhadap segala stimulus dari lingkungan yang harus diperkirakan bermakna atau tidak bagi penelitian
2. Peneliti sebagai alat dapat menyesuaikan diri terhadap semua aspek keadaan dan dapat mengumpulkan aneka ragam data sekaligus
3. Tiap situasi merupakan keseluruhan. Tidak ada suatu instrumen berupa test atau angket yang dapat menangkap keseluruhan situasi, kecuali manusia
4. Suatu situasi yang melibatkan interaksi manusia, tidak dapat difahami dengan pengetahuan semata. Untuk memahaminya kita perlu sering merasakannya, menyelaminya berdasarkan pengetahuan kita
5. Peneliti sebagai instrumen dapat segera menganalisis data yang diperoleh. Ia dapat menafsirkannya, melahirkan hipotesis dengan segera untuk menentukan arah pengamatan, untuk mentest hipotesis yang timbul seketika
6. Hanya manusia sebagai instrumen dapat mengambil kesimpulan berdasarkan data yang dikumpulkan pada suatu saat dan menggunakan segera sebagai balikan untuk memperoleh penegasan, perubahan, perbaikan atau pelakan.
7. Dalam penelitian dengan menggunakan test atau angket yang bersifat kuantitatif yang diutamakan adalah respon yang dapat dikuantifikasi agar dapat diolah secara statistik, sedangkan yang menyimpang dari itu tidak dihiraukan. Dengan manusia sebagai instrumen, respon yang aneh, yang menyimpang justru diberi perhatian. Respon yang lain daripada yang lain, bahkan yang bertentangan dipakai untuk mempertinggi tingkat kepercayaan dan tingkat pemahaman mengenai aspek yang diteliti.

B. Teknik Pengumpulan Data

Teknik pengumpulan data merupakan langkah yang paling strategis dalam penelitian, karena tujuan utama dari penelitian adalah mendapatkan data. Tanpa mengetahui teknik pengumpulan data, maka peneliti tidak akan mendapatkan data yang memenuhi standar data yang ditetapkan.

Pengumpulan data dapat dilakukan dalam berbagai *setting*, berbagai *sumber*, dan berbagai *cara*. Bila dilihat dari *setting*-nya, data dapat

B. Proses Analisis Data

Analisis data dalam penelitian kualitatif dilakukan sejak sebelum memasuki lapangan, selama di lapangan, dan setelah selesai di lapangan. Dalam hal ini Nasution (1988) menyatakan "Analisis telah mulai sejak merumuskan dan menjelaskan masalah, sebelum terjun ke lapangan, dan berlangsung terus sampai penulisan hasil penelitian. Analisis data menjadi pegangan bagi penelitian selanjutnya sampai jika mungkin, teori yang *"grounded"*. Namun dalam penelitian kualitatif, analisis data lebih difokuskan selama proses di lapangan bersamaan dengan pengumpulan data. *In fact, data analysis in qualitative research is an on going activity that occurs throughout the investigative process rather than after process.* Dalam kenyataannya, analisis data kualitatif berlangsung selama proses pengumpulan data dari pada setelah selesai pengumpulan data.

1. Analisis Sebelum di lapangan

Penelitian kualitatif telah melakukan analisis data sebelum peneliti memasuki lapangan. Analisis dilakukan terhadap data hasil studi pendahuluan, atau data sekunder, yang akan digunakan untuk menentukan fokus penelitian. Namun demikian fokus penelitian ini masih bersifat sementara, dan akan berkembang setelah peneliti masuk dan selama di lapangan. Jadi ibarat seseorang ingin mencari pohon jati di suatu hutan. Berdasarkan karakteristik tanah dan iklim, maka dapat diduga bahwa hutan tersebut ada pohon jatinya. Oleh karena itu peneliti dalam membuat proposal penelitian, fokusnya adalah ingin menemukan pohon jati pada hutan tersebut, berikut karakteristiknya.

Setelah peneliti masuk ke hutan beberapa lama, ternyata hutan tersebut tidak ada pohon jatinya. Kalau peneliti kuantitatif tentu akan membatalkan penelitiannya. Tetapi kalau peneliti kualitatif tidak, karena fokus penelitian bersifat sementara dan akan berkembang setelah di lapangan. Bagi peneliti kualitatif, kalau fokus penelitian yang dirumuskan pada proposal tidak ada di lapangan, maka peneliti akan merubah fokusnya, tidak lagi mencari kayu jati lagi di hutan, tetapi akan berubah dan mungkin setelah masuk hutan tidak lagi tertarik pada kayu jati lagi, tetapi beralih ke

Dalam mereduksi data, setiap peneliti akan dipandu oleh tujuan yang akan dicapai. Tujuan utama dari penelitian kualitatif adalah pada temuan. Oleh karena itu, kalau peneliti dalam melakukan penelitian, menemukan segala sesuatu yang dipandang asing, tidak dikenal, belum memiliki pola, justru itulah yang harus dijadikan perhatian peneliti dalam melakukan reduksi data. Ibarat melakukan penelitian di hutan, maka pohon-pohon atau tumbuh-tumbuhan dan binatang-binatang yang belum dikenal selama ini, justru dijadikan fokus untuk pengamatan selanjutnya.

Reduksi data merupakan proses berfikir sensitif yang memerlukan kecerdasan dan keluasan dan kedalaman wawasan yang tinggi. Bagi peneliti yang masih baru, dalam melakukan reduksi data dapat mendiskusikan pada teman atau orang lain yang dipandang ahli. Melalui diskusi itu, maka wawasan peneliti akan berkembang, sehingga dapat mereduksi data-data yang memiliki nilai temuan dan pengembangan teori yang signifikan.

b. Data Display (penyajian data)


Setelah data direduksi, maka langkah selanjutnya adalah mendisplaykan data. Kalau dalam penelitian kuantitatif penyajian data ini dapat dilakukan dalam bentuk tabel, grafik, pie chart, pictogram dan sejenisnya. Melalui penyajian data tersebut, maka data terorganisasikan, tersusun dalam pola hubungan, sehingga akan semakin mudah difahami.

Dalam penelitian kualitatif, penyajian data bisa dilakukan dalam bentuk uraian singkat, bagan, hubungan antar kategori, *flowchart* dan sejenisnya. Dalam hal ini Miles and Huberman (1984) menyatakan "*the most frequent form of display data for qualitative research data in the past has been narrative text*". Yang paling sering digunakan untuk menyajikan data dalam penelitian kualitatif adalah dengan teks yang bersifat naratif.

Dengan mendisplaykan data, maka akan memudahkan untuk memahami apa yang terjadi, merencanakan kerja selanjutnya berdasarkan apa yang telah difahami tersebut. "*looking at displays help us to understand what is happening and to do some thing-further analysis or caution on that understanding*" Miles and Huberman (1984). Selanjutnya disarankan, dalam melakukan display data, selain dengan teks yang naratif, juga dapat berupa, grafik, matrik, *network* (jejaring kerja) dan *chart*. Untuk mengecek apakah peneliti telah memahami apa yang didisplaykan, maka perlu dijawab pertanyaan berikut. Apakah anda tahu, apa isi yang didisplaykan?

Dalam ilustrasi seperti yang ditunjukkan pada gambar 13.2 terlihat bahwa, setelah peneliti mampu mereduksi data ke dalam huruf besar, huruf kecil dan angka, maka langkah selanjutnya adalah mendisplaykan data. Dalam mendisplaykan data, huruf besar, huruf kecil dan angka disusun ke dalam urutan sehingga strukturnya dapat difahami. Selanjutnya setelah

Berdasarkan data yang terkumpul dan setelah dianalisis, selanjutnya dapat dikategorikan bahwa, penyebab utama yang mempengaruhi benda kerja yang dihasilkan oleh pekerja menjadi rusak (*reject*) sehingga tidak diterima, dapat dikelompok menjadi adanya empat kesalahan. Kesalahan pertama, yaitu kesalahan langsung dari pekerja/operator mesin, kesalahan operator tidak langsung, kesalahan di luar operator, dan kesalahan yang tidak diketahui. Setiap kategori kesalahan dapat dijabarkan pada kesalahan-kesalahan yang lebih kecil. Sebagai contoh, kesalahan yang disebabkan oleh kesalahan operator langsung, adalah kesalahan meng-set fixture, membaca proses kerja, mengoperasikan mesin, repair benda kerja dan lain-lain.



Gambar 13.4. Data display menggunakan diagram tulang ikan, tentang beberapa kesalahan yang mempengaruhi *reject*

c. Conclusion Drawing/verification

Langkah ke tiga dalam analisis data kualitatif menurut Miles and Huberman adalah penarikan kesimpulan dan verifikasi. Kesimpulan awal yang dikemukakan masih bersifat sementara, dan akan berubah bila tidak ditemukan bukti-bukti yang kuat yang mendukung pada tahap pengumpulan data berikutnya. Tetapi apabila kesimpulan yang dikemukakan pada tahap awal, didukung oleh bukti-bukti yang valid dan konsisten saat peneliti kembali ke lapangan mengumpulkan data, maka kesimpulan yang dikemukakan merupakan kesimpulan yang kredibel.

Dengan demikian kesimpulan dalam penelitian kualitatif mungkin dapat menjawab rumusan masalah yang dirumuskan sejak awal, tetapi mungkin juga tidak, karena seperti telah dikemukakan bahwa masalah dan

rumusan masalah dalam penelitian kualitatif masih bersifat sementara dan akan berkembang setelah penelitian berada di lapangan.

Kesimpulan dalam penelitian kualitatif adalah merupakan temuan baru yang sebelumnya belum pernah ada. Temuan dapat berupa deskripsi atau gambaran suatu obyek yang sebelumnya masih remang-remang atau gelap sehingga setelah diteliti menjadi jelas, dapat berupa hubungan kausal atau interaktif, hipotesis atau teori. Data display yang dikemukakan pada gambar 6.3 dan 6.4 bila telah didukung oleh data-data yang mantap, maka dapat dijadikan kesimpulan yang kredibel. Berdasarkan gambar 6.3a dapat disimpulkan bahwa struktur pendidikan tenaga kerja pada industri modern, pada bidang produksi berbentuk "belah ketupat" Tenaga lulusan SMK yang terbanyak, dan pada bidang teknologi atau penelitian dan pengembangan berbentuk kerucut terbalik (sarjana terbanyak). Kesimpulan ini sebagai hipotesis, dan bila didukung oleh data pada industri lain yang luas, maka akan dapat menjadi teori.

3. Analisis data Selama di Lapangan model Spradley

Spradley (1980) membagi analisis data dalam penelitian kualitatif berdasarkan tahapan dalam penelitian kualitatif. Tahapan penelitian kualitatif menurut Spradley ditunjukkan pada gambar 13.5 berikut.

Berdasarkan gambar 13.5 tersebut terlihat bahwa, proses penelitian kualitatif setelah memasuki lapangan, dimulai dengan menetapkan seseorang informan kunci "*key informant*" yang merupakan informan yang berwibawa dan dipercaya mampu "membukakan pintu" kepada peneliti untuk memasuki obyek penelitian. Setelah itu peneliti melakukan wawancara kepada informan tersebut, dan mencatat hasil wawancara. Setelah itu perhatian peneliti pada obyek penelitian dan memulai mengajukan pertanyaan deskriptif, dilanjutkan dengan analisis terhadap hasil wawancara. Berdasarkan hasil dari analisis wawancara selanjutnya peneliti melakukan analisis domain. Pada langkah ke tujuh peneliti sudah menentukan fokus, dan melakukan analisis taksonomi. Berdasarkan hasil analisis taksonomi, selanjutnya peneliti mengajukan pertanyaan kontras, yang dilanjutkan dengan analisis komponensial. Hasil dari analisis komponensial, selanjutnya peneliti menemukan tema-tema budaya. Berdasarkan temuan tersebut, selanjutnya peneliti menu *n* laporan penelitian etnografi.

Jadi proses penelitian berangkat dari yang luas, kemudian memfokus, dan meluas lagi. Terdapat tahapan analisis data yang dilakukan dalam penelitian kualitatif, yaitu analisis domain, taksonomi, dan komponensial, analisis tema kultural. Hal ini dapat digambarkan seperti gambar 13.5 berikut.

13. E. Sapir, 1929

The Status of Linguistics as a Science

E. Sapir

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Language is a guide to 'social reality'. Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.

The understanding of a simple poem, for instance, involves not merely an understanding of the single words in their average significance, but

14. F. R. Palmer, 1981



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It can, however, be maintained that there are no real synonyms, that no two words have exactly the same meaning. Indeed it would seem unlikely that two words with exactly the same meaning would both survive in a language. If we look at possible synonyms there are at least five ways in which they can be seen to differ.

First, some sets of synonyms belong to different dialects of the language. For instance, the term *fall* is used in the United States and in some western counties of Britain where others would use *autumn*. The works of dialectologists are full of examples like these. They are especially interested in the words to do with farming; depending where you live you will say *cowshed*, *cowhouse* or *byre*, *haystack*, *hayrick* or *haymow*. Even the domestic *tap* is either a *faucet* or a *spigot* in most of the United States. But these groups of words are of no interest at all for semantics. Their status is no different from the translation-equivalents of, say, English and French. It is simply a matter of people speaking different forms of the language having different vocabulary items.

Secondly, there is a similar situation, but a more problematic

one, with the words that are used in different 'styles' or 'registers'. *A nasty smell* might be, in the appropriate setting, *an obnoxious effluvium* or *an 'orrible stink*. The former is, of course, jocularly very 'posh', and the latter colloquial. Similar trios (though not with quite the same stylistic characteristics, but differing rather in degrees of formality) are *gentleman*, *man* and *chap*, *pass away*, *die* and *pop off*. These are more difficult to deal with because there is a far less clear distinction between the styles than between the geographically defined dialects. We do not normally pass from one dialect to another, but we can within a single conversation change our style, and in particular, can change the vocabulary items to achieve different effects. The problem is, then, whether a change of

Thirdly, as we saw in 2.4, some words may be said to differ only in their emotive or evaluative meanings. The remainder of their meaning, their 'cognitive' meaning, remains the same. Examples were *statesman/politician*, *hide/conceal*; a further trio is *thrifty*, *economical*, *stingy*, and there is the related problem of the meaning of words such as *fascist* and *liberal*. Such words are often discussed in detail in books on semantics. They are, of course, interesting in the way in which they are used for persuading or influencing others, for propaganda, etc.

Fourthly, some words are collocationally restricted (see 5.2), i.e. they occur only in conjunction with other words. Thus *rancid* occurs with *bacon* or *butter*, *addled* with *eggs* or *brains*. This does not seem to be a matter of their meaning, but of the company they keep. It could, perhaps, be argued that these are true synonyms – differing only that they occur in different environments. But, on the other hand, as we shall see shortly, some scholars have actually thought that the test of synonyms is whether they occur in identical environments!

Fifthly, it is obviously the case that many words are close in meaning, or that their meanings overlap. There is, that is to say, a loose sense of synonymy. This is the kind of synonymy that is exploited by the dictionary maker. For *mature* (adjective), for instance, possible synonyms are *adult*, *ripe*, *perfect*, *due*. For *govern* we may suggest *direct*, *control*, *determine*, *require*, while *loose* (adjective) will have an even larger set – *inexact*, *free*, *relaxed*, *vague*, *lax*, *unbound*, *inattentive*, *slack*, etc. If we look for the synonyms for each of these words them-

selves, we shall have a further set for each and shall, of course, get further and further away from the meaning of the original word. Dictionaries, unfortunately (except the very large ones), tell us little about the connections between words and their defining synonyms or between the synonyms themselves.

15. Nicholas Rescher, 2001

Cognitive Pragmatism

The Theory of Knowledge in Pragmatic Perspective

NICHOLAS RESCHER

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Metaphysical realism is clearly not an inductive inference secured through the scientific systematization of our observations. Rather it represents a regulative presupposition that makes science possible in the first place. If we did not assume from the very outset that our sensations somehow relate to an extramental reality, we could clearly make no use of them to draw any inference whatever about "the real world." The realm of mind-independent reality is something we cannot *discover*—we do not learn that it exists as a result of inquiry and investigation. How could we ever learn from our observations that our mental experience is itself largely the causal product of the machinations of a mind-independent matrix, that all those phenomenal appearances are causally rooted in a physical reality? This is obviously something we have to suppose from the very outset. What is at issue is, all too clearly, a *precondition* for empirical inquiry—a presupposition for the usability of observational data as sources of objective information. That experience is indeed objective, that what we take to be evidence *is* evidence, that our sensations yield information about an order of existence outside the experiential realm itself, and that this experience constitutes not just a mere phenomenon but an appearance of something extramental belonging to an objectively self-subsisting order—all this is something that we must always *presuppose* in using experiential data as "evidence" for how things stand in the world.

The fact is that we do not learn or discover that there is a mind-independent physical reality; we have no alternative but to *presume or postulate* it. Objectivity represents a postulation made on *functional* (rather than *evidential*) grounds: we endorse it in order to be in a position to learn by experience at all. As Kant clearly saw, objective experience is possible only if the existence of such a real, objective world is *presupposed* from the outset rather than being seen as a matter of *ex post facto* discovery about the nature of things.³⁶

To be sure, once we have made a start by accepting an objective reality and its concomitant causal aspect, more or less by sheer postulation, then principles of inductive systematization, of explanatory economy, and of common-cause consilience can work wonders in exploiting the phenomena of experience to provide the basis for plausible claims about the nature of the real. But we indispensably need that initial existential presupposition to make a start. Without a commitment from the very outset to a reality to serve as ground and object of our experience, its cognitive import will be

lost. Only on this basis can we proceed evidentially with the exploration of the interpersonally public and objective domain of a physical world order that we share in common.

Of course that second, descriptive (epistemic) component of realism stands on a very different footing. Unlike its *existence*, reality's *nature* is something about which we can only make warranted claims through examining it. Substantive information must come through inquiry—through evidential validation. Once we are willing to credit our observational data with objectivity, and thus with evidential bearing, then we can, of course, make use of them to inform ourselves as to the nature of the real. But that initial presumption has to be there from the start.

Let us consider this basic reality postulate somewhat more closely. Our standard conception of inquiry involves recognition of the following facts:

1. The world (the realm of physical existence) has a nature whose characterization in point of description, explanation, and prediction is the object of empirical inquiry.
2. The real nature of the world is in the main independent of the process of inquiry that the real world canalizes or conditions.
3. By virtue of these considerations, we can stake neither total nor final claims for our purported knowledge of reality. Our knowledge of the world must be presumed incomplete, incorrect, and imperfect, with the consequence that "our reality" must be considered to afford an inadequate characterization of "reality itself."

Our commitment to realism thus centers on a certain practical *modus operandi*, encapsulated in the precept "Proceed in matters of inquiry and communication on the basis that you are dealing with an objective realm, existing quite independently of the doings and dealings of minds." Accordingly we usually operate on the basis of the "presumption of objectivity" reflected in the guiding precept "Unless you have good reason to think otherwise (that is, as long as *nihil obstat*), treat the materials of inquiry and communication as veridical—as representing the nature of the real." The ideal of objective reality is the focus of a family of effectively indispensable regulative principles—a functionally useful instrumentality that enables us to transact our cognitive business in the most satisfactory and effective way.

The foundations of objectivity are thus not provided by the findings of science. They precede and underlie science, which would itself not be

possible without a precommitment to the capacity of our senses to warrant claims about an objective world order. Mind transcendence is not a *product* of inquiry; we must precommit ourselves to it to make inquiry as we understand it possible. It is a necessary (a priori) input into the cognitive project and not a contingent (a posteriori) output thereof. The objective bearing of experience is not something we can pre-establish; it is something we must presuppose in the interest of honoring Peirce's pivotal injunction never to bar the path of inquiry.

What we learn from science is not *that* an unobservable order of physical existence causally undergirds nature as we observe it, but rather *what* these underlying structures are like. Science does not (cannot) teach us that the observable order is explicable in terms of underlying causes and that the phenomena of observation are signs or symptoms of this extra- and subphenomenal order of existence; we must acknowledge this prior to any venture in developing an empirical science. It is something we must accept a priori to hold of any world in which observation as we understand it can transpire. (After all, observations are, by their very nature, results of intentions.) What science does teach us (and metaphysics cannot) is what the descriptive character of this extraphenomenal order can reasonably be supposed to be in the light of our experience of it.

3. Induction as Estimation


Conceived of along the foregoing lines, induction is not so much a process of inference as one of estimation—its conclusion is not so much *extracted* (or *derived*) from data as *suggested* (or *indicated*) by them. It involves filling a gap in our information. And clearly we want to accomplish this gap-filling step in the least risky, minimally problematic way, as determined by plausibilistic best-fit considerations.

Induction accordingly *leaps* to its conclusion instead of literally *deriving* it from the given premises by *drawing* the conclusion from them through some extractive process. Whewell put the point nicely. "Deduction," he wrote, "descends steadily and methodically, step by step: Induction mounts by a leap which is out of the reach of method [or, at any rate, mechanical routine]. She bounds to the top of the stairs at once."⁴ We cannot pass by any sort of inference or cognitive calculation from the "premises" of an inductive "argument" to its "conclusion" because (ex hypothesi) this would be a deductive non sequitur—the conclusion (in the very nature of the case) asserts something regarding which its premises are altogether silent.⁵ Clearly the paradigm mode of *inference*—of actually deriving a conclusion from the premises—is actual *deduction*,⁶ and this paradigm does not fit induction smoothly. As one writer has felicitously put it, our inductive "conclusions" are "not *derived* from the observed facts, but *invented* in order to account for them."⁷

It has been a common tendency among recent cognitive theorists to think of induction as a process of *inference*—a matter of characteristic modes of ampliative inference for drawing larger conclusions from informatively lesser premises. The present approach is very different in its orientation. It sees induction not as a characteristic mode of drawing conclusions but as an *estimation technique*, a methodology for obtaining answers to our factual questions through optimal exploitation of the information at our disposal. Thus regarded, induction is at bottom an *erotetic* (question-answering) rather than an *inferential* (conclusion-deriving) procedure.

In view of the information transcendence at issue in such truth estimation, we *know* that induction does not *guarantee* the truth of its product. Indeed if the history of science has taught us any one thing, it is that the best estimate of the truth that we can make at any stage of the cognitive game is generally to be seen, with the wisdom of hindsight, as being far

16. George Yule, 1996



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Deixis and distance

Deixis is a technical term (from Greek) for one of the most basic things we do with utterances. It means 'pointing' via language. Any linguistic form used to accomplish this 'pointing' is called a **deictic expression**. When you notice a strange object and ask, 'What's that?', you are using a deictic expression ('that') to indicate something in the immediate context. Deictic expressions are sometimes called **indexicals**. They are among the first forms to be spoken by very young children and can be used to indicate people via **person deixis** ('me', 'you'), or location via **spatial deixis** ('here', 'there'), or time via **temporal deixis** ('now', 'then'). All these expressions depend, for their interpretation, on the speaker and hearer sharing the same context. Indeed, deictic expressions have their most basic uses in face-to-face spoken interaction where utterances such as [1] are easily understood by the people present, but may need a translation for someone not right there.

[1] I'll put this here.

(Of course, you understood that Jim was telling Anne that he was about to put an extra house key in one of the kitchen drawers).

Deixis is clearly a form of referring that is tied to the speaker's context, with the most basic distinction between deictic expressions being 'near speaker' versus 'away from speaker'. In English, the 'near speaker', or **proximal** terms, are 'this', 'here', 'now'. The 'away from speaker', or **distal** terms, are 'that', 'there', 'then'. Proximal terms are typically interpreted in terms of the speaker's location or the **deictic center**, so that 'now' is generally understood as referring to some point or period in time that has the time of speaker's utterances as its center. Distal terms can simply indicate 'away from

speaker', but, in some languages, can be used to distinguish between 'near addressee' and 'away from both speaker and addressee'. Thus, in Japanese, the translation of the pronoun 'that' will distinguish between 'that near addressee' '*sore*' and 'that distant from both speaker and addressee' '*are*' with a third term being used for the proximal 'this near speaker' '*kore*'.

Person deixis

The distinction just described involves person deixis, with the speaker ('I') and the addressee ('you') mentioned. The simplicity of these forms disguises the complexity of their use. To learn these deictic expressions, we have to discover that each person in a conversation shifts from being 'I' to being 'you' constantly. All young children go through a stage in their learning where this distinction seems problematic and they say things like 'Read you a story' (instead of 'me') when handing over a favorite book.

Person deixis clearly operates on a basic three-part division, exemplified by the pronouns for first person ('I'), second person ('you'), and third person ('he', 'she', or 'it'). In many languages these deictic categories of speaker, addressee, and other(s) are elaborated with markers of relative social status (for example, addressee with higher status versus addressee with lower status). Expressions which indicate higher status are described as **honorifics**. The discussion of the circumstances which lead to the choice of one of these forms rather than another is sometimes described as **social deixis**.

A fairly well-known example of a social contrast encoded within person deixis is the distinction between forms used for a familiar versus a non-familiar addressee in some languages. This is known as the **T/V distinction**, from the French forms '*tu*' (familiar) and '*vous*' (non-familiar), and is found in many languages including German ('*du/Sie*') and Spanish ('*tú/Usted*'). The choice of one form will certainly communicate something (not directly said) about the speaker's view of his or her relationship with the addressee. In those social contexts where individuals typically mark distinction between the social status of the speaker and addressee, the higher, older, and more powerful speaker will tend to use '*tu*' version to a lower, younger, and less powerful addressee, and be addressed by the

'vous' form in return. When social change is taking place, as for example in modern Spain, where a young businesswoman (higher economic status) is talking to her older cleaning lady (lower economic status), how do they address each other? I am told that the age distinction remains more powerful than the economic distinction and the older woman uses 'tú' and the younger uses 'Usted'.

The Spanish non-familiar version ('Usted') is historically related to a form which was used to refer to neither first person (speaker) nor second person (addressee), but to third person (some other). In deictic terms, third person is not a direct participant in basic (I-you) interaction and, being an outsider, is necessarily more distant. Third person pronouns are consequently distal forms in terms of person deixis. Using a third person form, where a second person form would be possible, is one way of communicating distance (and non-familiarity). This can be done in English for an ironic and humorous purpose as when one person, who's very busy in the kitchen, addresses another, who's being very lazy, as in [2].

[2] Would his highness like some coffee?

The distance associated with third person forms is also used to make potential accusations (for example, 'you didn't clean up') less direct, as in [3a.], or to make a potentially personal issue seem like an impersonal one, based on a general rule, as in [3b.].

- [3] a. Somebody didn't clean up after himself.
b. Each person has to clean up after him or herself.

Of course, the speaker can state such general 'rules' as applying to the speaker plus other(s), by using the first person plural ('we'), as in [4].

[4] We clean up after ourselves around here.

There is, in English, a potential ambiguity in such uses which allows two different interpretations. There is an **exclusive 'we'** (speaker plus other(s), excluding addressee) and an **inclusive 'we'** (speaker and addressee included). Some languages grammaticize this distinction (for example, Fijian has 'keimamai' for exclusive first person plural and 'kada' for inclusive first person plural). In English, the ambiguity present in [4] provides a subtle opportunity for a hearer to decide what was communicated. Either the hearer decides

that he or she is a member of the group to whom the rule applies (i.e. an addressee) or an outsider to whom the rule does not apply (i.e. not an addressee). In this case the hearer gets to decide the kind of 'more' that is being communicated.

The inclusive-exclusive distinction may also be noted in the difference between saying 'Let's go' (to some friends) and 'Let us go' (to someone who has captured the speaker and friends). The action of going is inclusive in the first, but exclusive in the second.

Spatial deixis

The concept of distance already mentioned is clearly relevant to spatial deixis, where the relative location of people and things is being indicated. Contemporary English makes use of only two adverbs, 'here' and 'there', for the basic distinction, but in older texts and in some dialects, a much larger set of deictic expressions can be found. Although 'yonder' (more distant from speaker) is still used, words like 'hither' (to this place) and 'thence' (from that place) now sound archaic. The last two adverbs include the meaning of motion toward or away from the speaker. Some verbs of motion, such as 'come' and 'go', retain a deictic sense when they are used to mark movement toward the speaker ('Come to bed!') or away from the speaker ('Go to bed!').

One version of the concept of motion toward speaker (i.e. becoming visible), seems to be the first deictic meaning learned by children and characterizes their use of words like 'this' and 'here' (=can be seen). They are distinct from 'that' and 'there' which are associated with things that move out of the child's visual space (=can no longer be seen).

In considering spatial deixis, however, it is important to remember that location from the speaker's perspective can be fixed mentally as well as physically. Speakers temporarily away from their home location will often continue to use 'here' to mean the (physically distant) home location, as if they were still in that location. Speakers also seem to project themselves into other locations prior to actually being in those locations, as when they say 'I'll come later' (= movement to addressee's location). This is

sometimes described as **deictic projection** and we make more use of its possibilities as more technology allows us to manipulate location. If 'here' means the place of the speaker's utterance (and 'now' means the time of the speaker's utterance), then an utterance such as [5] should be nonsense.

[5] I am not here now.

However, I can say [5] into the recorder of a telephone answering machine, projecting that 'now' will apply to any time someone tries to call me, and not to when I actually record the words. Indeed, recording [5] is a kind of dramatic performance for future audience in which I project my presence to be in required location. A similar deictic projection is accomplished via dramatic performance when I use direct speech to represent the person, location, and feelings of someone or something else. For example, I could be telling you about a visit to a pet store, as in [6].

[6] I was looking at this little puppy in a cage with such a sad look on its face. It was like, 'Oh, I'm so unhappy here, will you set me free?'

The 'here' of the cage is not the actual physical location of the person uttering the words (the speaker), but is instead the location the location of that person performing in the role of the puppy.

It may be that the truly pragmatic basis of spatial deixis is actually **psychological distance**. Physically close objects will tend to be treated by the speaker as psychologically close. Also, something that is physically distant will generally be treated as psychologically distant (for example, 'that man over there'). However, a speaker may also wish to mark something that is physically close (for example, a perfume being sniffed by the speaker) as psychologically distant 'I don't like that'. In this analysis, a word like 'that' does not have a fixed (i.e. semantic) meaning; instead, it is 'invested' with meaning in a context by a speaker.

Similar psychological processes seem to be at work in our distinctions between proximal and distal expressions used to mark temporal deixis.

Temporal deixis

We have already noted the use of the proximal form 'now' as indicating both the time coinciding with the speaker's utterance and the time of the speaker's voice being heard (the hearer's 'now'). In contrast to 'now', the distal expression 'then' applies to both past [7a.] and future [7b.] time relative to the speaker's present time.

- [6] a. November 22nd, 1963? I was in Scotland then.
b. Dinner at 8.30 on Saturday? Okay, I'll see you then.

It is worth noting that we also use elaborate system of non-deictic temporal reference such as calendar time (dates, as in [7a.]) and clock time (hours, as in [7b.]). However, these forms of temporal reference are learned a lot later than the deictic expression like 'yesterday', 'tomorrow', 'today', 'tonight', 'next week', 'last week', 'this week'. All these expressions depend for their interpretation on knowing the relevant utterance time. If we don't know the utterance (i.e. scribbling) time of a note, as in [8], on an office door, we won't know if we have a short or a long wait ahead.

[8] Back in an hour.

Similarly, if we return the next day to a bar that displays the notice in [9], then we will still be (deictically) one day early for free drink.

[9] Free Beer Tomorrow.

The psychological basis of temporal deixis seems to be similar to that of spatial deixis. We can treat temporal events as objects that move towards us (into view) or away from us (out of view). One metaphor used in English is of events coming toward the speaker from the future (for example, 'the coming week', 'the approaching year') and going away from the speaker to the past (for example, 'in days gone by', 'the past week'). We also seem to treat the near or immediate future as being close to utterance time by using the proximal deictic 'this', as in 'this (coming weekend' or 'this (coming) Thursday'.

One basic (but often unrecognized) type of temporal deixis in English is in the choice of verb tense. Whereas other languages have

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
Reference and inference

Throughout the preceding discussion of deixis, there was an assumption that the use of words to refer to people and things was a relatively straightforward matter. It is indeed fairly easy for people to do, but it is rather difficult to explain how they do it. We do know that words themselves don't refer to anything. People refer. We might best think of **reference** as an act in which a speaker, or a writer, uses linguistic forms to enable a listener, or reader, to identify something.

Those linguistic forms are **referring expressions**, which can be proper nouns (for example, 'Shakespeare', 'Cathy Revuelto', 'Hawaii'), noun phrases which are definite (for example, 'the author', 'the singer', 'the island'), or indefinite (for example, 'a man', 'a woman', 'a beautiful place'), and pronouns (for example, 'he', 'her', 'it', 'them'). The choice of one type of referring expression rather than another seems to be based, to a large extent, on what the speaker assumes the listener already knows. In shared visual contexts, those pronouns that function as deictic expressions (for example, 'Take this'; 'Look at him!') may be sufficient for successful reference, but where identification seems more difficult, more elaborate noun phrases may be used (for example, 'Remember the old foreign guy with the funny hat?').

Reference, then, is clearly tied to the speaker's goals (for example, to identify something) and the speaker's beliefs (i.e. can the listener be expected to know that particular something?) in the use of language. For successful reference to occur, we must also recognize the role of **inference**. Because there is no direct relationship between entities and words, the listener's task is to infer correctly which entity the speaker intends to identify by using a particular

17. George Yule, 2014



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Pragmatics

In many ways, pragmatics is the study of “invisible” meaning, or how we recognize what is meant even when it isn’t actually said or written. In order for that to happen, speakers (or writers) must be able to depend on a lot of shared assumptions and expectations when they try to communicate. The investigation of those assumptions and expectations provides us with some insights into how we understand more than just the linguistic content of utterances. From the perspective of pragmatics, more is always being communicated than is said.

There are lots of illustrations of this pragmatic principle. Driving by a parking garage, you may see a large sign like the one in the picture (Figure 10.1). You read the sign, knowing what each of the words means and what the sign as a whole means. However, you don’t normally think that the sign is advertising a place where you can park your “heated attendant.” (You take an attendant, you heat him/her up, and this is where you can park him/her.) Alternatively, the sign may indicate a place where parking will be carried out by attendants who have been heated. (Maybe they will be more cheerful.)

The words in the sign may allow these interpretations, but we would normally understand that we can park a car in this place, that it’s a heated area, and that there will



18. Pra,bors FM, 2021

Setelah menempatkan album perdananya, "Sour", di posisi puncak Billboard 200, **Olivia Rodrigo** kembali meraih prestasi gemilang di Billboard.

Seluruh lagu dari album tersebut berhasil masuk ke tangga lagu Billboard Hot 100 edisi 5 Juni 2021 dan berada di peringkat Top 30.

Dengan pencapaian ini, **Olivia Rodrigo** menjadi artis perempuan pertama sekaligus artis keempat secara keseluruhan, yang menempatkan judul lagu terbanyak di peringkat Top 30 Billboard Hot 100 secara bersamaan.

Drake memegang rekor keseluruhan dengan 17 lagu pada 14 Juli 2018 melalui album "Scorpion". Urutan terbanyak kedua adalah Post Malone dengan 12 lagu pada 12 Mei 2018 berkat peluncuran album ketiganya, "Hollywood's Bleeding".

Ketiga, ada J. Cole yang baru saja menempatkan 11 lagunya minggu lalu pada 29 Mei 2021 lewat album "The Off-Season".

Seperti laporan dari *MRC Data* sebelumnya, bahwa "Sour" yang dirilis pada 21 Mei 2021, berhasil debut di No. 1 di Billboard 200 dengan total penjualan 295.000 unit dalam satu minggu pertama.

Angka tersebut merupakan jumlah penjualan album tertinggi dalam satu minggu pertama sepanjang 2021, melampaui penjualan album Taylor Swift, "Fearless (Taylor's Version)".

19. Billboard, 2022

[Olivia Rodrigo](#) adds another accolade to her still-young career, as her *Sour* album becomes the longest-running debut album in the top 10 on the [Billboard 200](#) chart this century. On the July 2-dated chart, the set spends a 52nd nonconsecutive week in the top 10 ([it's No. 10](#)). It surpasses the 51 nonconsecutive weeks in the top 10 for [Lady Gaga](#)'s debut effort *The Fame* (2009-17).

Sour debuted at No. 1 on the Billboard 200 dated June 5, 2021, and has spent five nonconsecutive weeks atop the tally. The set spun off four top 10 hits on the [Billboard Hot 100](#) songs chart: "Drivers License" (No. 1 for eight weeks), "Deja Vu" (No. 3), "Good 4 U" (No. 1 for one week) and "Traitor" (No. 9).

Rodrigo closed 2021 as *Billboard's* [top new artist](#) and top female artist, while the *Sour* album finished at No. 2 on the 2021 [year-end Billboard 200 Albums tally](#).

Rodrigo took home [three Grammy Awards](#) at the 2022 ceremony on April 3: best new artist, best [pop](#) vocal album (for *Sour*), and best pop solo performance ("Drivers License"). Then, at the 2022 Billboard Music Awards on May 15, Rodrigo [was the biggest winner](#) of the night, taking home seven trophies, including top Billboard 200 album (for *Sour*), top new artist, as well as top female artist.

In total, *Sour* has earned 3.7 million equivalent album units in the United States (through June 23), according to Luminate. Of that sum, traditional album sales comprise 767,000. (Her debut release [finished](#) 2021 as the No. 2 most popular album in the U.S., according to Luminate, with 2.86 million units earned.)