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Pragmatics

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Definitions and background

Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader). It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. *Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning.*

This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speakers organize what they want to say in accordance with who they're talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances. *Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning.*

This approach also necessarily explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker's intended meaning. This type of study explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part of what is communicated. We might say that it is the investigation of invisible meaning. *Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said.*

This perspective then raises the question of what determines the choice between the said and the unsaid. The basic answer is tied to the notion of distance. Closeness, whether it is physical, social, or conceptual, implies shared experience. On the assumption of how close or distant the listener is, speakers determine how much needs to be said. *Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance.*

These are the four areas that pragmatics is concerned with. To understand how it got to be that way, we have to briefly review its relationship with other areas of linguistic analysis.

Chapter i with the 'bicycle' example, and is further illustrated in [15].

[15] a. I just rented a house. The kitchen is really big.
b. We had Chardonnay with dinner. The wine was the best part.
c. The bus came on time, but he didn't stop.

Making sense of [15a.] requires an inference (i.e. if x is a house, then x has a kitchen) to make the anaphoric connection. Such inferences depend on assumed knowledge which, as in [15b.], may be much more specific (i.e. Chardonnay is a kind of wine). In addition, the inference can be considered so automatic for some speakers (for example, a bus has a driver), that they can go straight to a pronoun for anaphoric reference, as in [15c.]. In this example, note that the antecedent ('the bus') and the anaphor ('he') are not in grammatical agreement (i.e. normally a bus would be 'it'). As pointed out already, successful reference does not depend on some strictly literal, or grammatically 'correct', relationship between the properties of the referent and the referring expression chosen. The word 'sandwich' can identify a person and the pronoun 'he' can be an anaphor for a thing. The key to making sense of reference is that pragmatic process whereby speakers select linguistic expressions with the intention of identifying certain entities and with the assumption that listeners will collaborate and interpret those expressions as the speaker intended.

The social dimension of reference may also be tied to the effect of collaboration. The immediate recognition of an intended referent, even when a minimal referring expression (for example, a pronoun) is used, represents something shared, something in common, and hence social closeness. Successful reference means that an intention was recognized, via inference, indicating a kind of shared knowledge and hence social connection. The assumption of shared knowledge is also crucially involved in the study of presupposition.

Presupposition and entailment

In the preceding discussion of reference, there was an appeal to the idea that speakers assume certain information is already known by their listeners. Because it is treated as known, such information will generally not be stated and consequently will count as part of what is communicated but not said. The technical terms presupposition and entailment are used to describe two different aspects of this kind of information.

It is worth noting at the outset that presupposition and entailment were considered to be much more central to pragmatics in the past than they are now. In more recent approaches, there has been less interest in the type of technical discussion associated with the logical analysis of these phenomena. "Without some introduction to that type of analytic discussion, however, it becomes very difficult to understand how the current relationship between semantics and pragmatics developed. Much of what follows in this chapter is designed to illustrate the process of thinking through a number of problems in the analysis of some aspects of invisible meaning. Let's begin by defining our terms.

A **presupposition** is something the speaker assumes to be the case prior to making an utterance. Speakers, not sentences, have presuppositions. An **entailment** is something that logically follows from what is asserted in the utterance. Sentences, not speakers, have entailments.

We can identify some of the potentially assumed information that would be associated with the utterance of [1].

[1] Mary's brother bought three horses. In producing the

utterance in [1], the speaker will normally be expected to have the presuppositions that a person called Mary exists and that she has a brother. The speaker may also hold the more specific presuppositions that Mary has only one brother and that he has a lot of money. All of these presuppositions are the speaker's and all of them can be wrong, in fact. The sentence in [i] will be treated as having the entailments that Mary's brother bought something, bought three animals, bought two horses, bought one horse, and many other similar logical consequences. These entailments follow from the sentence, regardless of whether the speaker's beliefs are right or wrong, in fact. They are communicated without being said. Because of its logical nature, however, entailment is not generally discussed as much in contemporary pragmatics as the more speaker-dependent notion of presupposition.

Presupposition

In many discussions of the concept, presupposition is treated as a relationship between two propositions. If we say that the sentence in [2a.] contains the proposition p and the sentence in [2b.] contains the proposition q, then, using the symbol >> to mean 'presupposes', we can represent the relationship as in [2c.].

[2] a. Mary's dog is cute. *i=p)*
b. Mary has a dog. (=q)
c. p » q

Interestingly, when we produce the opposite of the sentence in [2a.] by negating it (= NOT p), as in [3a.], we find that the relationship of presupposition doesn't change. That is, the same proposition q, repeated as [3b.], continues to be presupposed by NOT p, as shown in [3c.].

[3] a. Mary's dog isn't cute. (=NOTp)
b. Mary has a dog. (=q)
c. NOT/? »q

This property of presupposition is generally described as **constancy under negation.** Basically, it means that the presupposition of a statement will remain constant (i.e. still true) even when that statement is negated. As a further example, consider a situation in

which you disagree (via a negative, as in [4b.]) with someone who has already made the statement in [4a.].

[4] a. Everybody knows that John is gay. (=p)
b. Everybody doesn't know that John is gay. (=NOTp)
c. John is gay. (=q)
d. p » g & NOTp » q

Notice that, although both speakers disagree about the validity of p (i.e. the statement in [4a.]), they both assume the truth of q (i.e. [4c.]) in making their statements. The proposition q, as shown in [4d.], is presupposed by both p and NOT p, remaining constant under negation.

Types of presupposition

In the analysis of how speakers' assumptions are typically expressed, presupposition has been associated with the use of a large number of words, phrases, and structures. We shall consider these linguistic forms here as indicators of **potential presuppositions,** which can only become actual presuppositions in contexts with speakers.

As already illustrated in examples [1] to [3], the possessive construction in English is associated with a presupposition of existence. The **existential presupposition** is not only assumed to be present in possessive constructions (for example, 'your car' >> 'you have a car'), but more generally in any definite noun phrase. By using any of the expressions in [5], the speaker is assumed to be committed to the existence of the entities named.

[5] the King of Sweden, the cat, the girl next door, the Counting Crows

We shall reconsider the basis of existential presuppositions latei, but first we should note that there was a different type of presupposition present in [4]. In [4], the verb 'know' occurs in a structure, 'Everybody knows that q\ with q as the presupposition. The presupposed information following a verb like 'know' can be treated as a fact, and is described as a **factive presupposition.** A number of other verbs, such as 'realize' in [6a.] and 'regret' in 1.6b.], as well as phrases involving 'be' with 'aware' [6c], 'odd' [6d.], and 'glad' [6e.] have factive presuppositions.

[6] a. She didn't realize he was ill. (» He was ill)
b. We regret telling him. (» We told him)
c. I wasn't aware that she was married. (» She was married)
d. It isn't odd that he left early. (» He left early)
e. I'm glad that it's over. (»It's over)

There are also a number of other forms which may best be treated as the source of lexical presuppositions. Generally speaking, in lexical presupposition, the use of one form with its asserted meaning is conventionally interpreted with the presupposition that another (non-asserted) meaning is understood. Each time you say that someone 'managed' to do something, the asserted meaning is that the person succeeded in some way. When you say that someone 'didn't manage', the asserted meaning is that the person did not succeed. In both cases, however, there is a presupposition (non-asserted) that the person 'tried' to do that something. So, 'managed' is conventionally interpreted as *asserting* 'succeeded' and *presupposing* 'tried'. Other examples, involving the lexical items, 'stop', 'start', and 'again', are presented, with their presuppositions, in [7].

[7] a. He stopped smoking. (>> He used to smoke)
b. They started complaining. (» They weren't complaining before)
c. You're late again. (» You were late before)

In the case of lexical presupposition, the speaker's use of a particular expression is taken to presuppose another (unstated) concept, whereas in the case of a factive presupposition, the use of a particular expression is taken to presuppose the truth of the information that is stated after it.

In addition to presuppositions which are associated with the use of certain words and phrases, there are also structural presuppositions. In this case, certain sentence structures have been analyzed as conventionally and regularly presupposing that part of the structure is already assumed to be true. We might say that speakers can use such structures to treat information as presupposed (i.e. assumed to be true) and hence to be accepted as true by the listener. For example, the w^-question construction in English, as shown in [8a.] and [8b.], is conventionally interpreted

with the presupposition that the information after the *wh-iovm* (i e. 'When' and 'Where') is already known to be the case.

[8] a. When did he leave? (» He left)
b. Where did you buy the bike? (» You bought the bike)

The type of presupposition illustrated in [8] can lead listeners to believe that the information presented is necessarily true, rather than just the presupposition of the person asking the question. For example, let's say that you were standing at an intersection one evening. You didn't notice whether the traffic signal had turned to red before a car went through the intersection. The car was immediately involved in a crash. You were witness to the crash and later you are asked the question in [9].

[9] How fast was the car going when it ran the red light?

If you answer the question as asked (Just answer the question!) and estimate the speed of the car, then you would appear to be accepting the truth of the presupposition (i.e. >> the car ran the red light). Such structurally-based presuppositions may represent subtle ways of making information that the speaker believes appear to be what the listener should believe.

So far, we have only considered contexts in which presuppositions are assumed to be true. There are, however, examples of non-factive presuppositions associated with a number of verbs in English. A non-factive presupposition is one that is assumed not to be true. Verbs like 'dream', 'imagine', and 'pretend', as shown in [10], ire used with the presupposition that what follows is not true.

[10] a. I dreamed that I was rich. (>> I was not rich)
b. We imagined we were in Hawaii. (>> We were not in Hawaii)
c. He pretends to be ill. (>> He is not ill)

We have already noted, at the end of the discussion of deixis, a structure that is interpreted with a non-factive presupposition ('If I had a yacht, ...'). Indeed, this type of structure creates a counterfactual presupposition, meaning that what is presupposed is not only not true, but is the opposite of what is true, or 'contrary to facts'. A conditional structure of the type shown in [11], generally called a counterfactual conditional, presupposes that the information in the z/-clause is not true at the time of utterance.

SECOND EDITION

Pragmatics

An Introduction

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mann of how he (Biermann) only had been able to work in the East thanks to Sasha Andersen's intercession and support, among other things, as a publisher and printer of Biermann's songs.

In a pragmatic perspective, the most interesting feature of this conversation was that at a given point, the two friends started addressing each other by the formal *Sie* for 'you', whereas they before had used the familiar *du* (as they probably had been doing all their lives). This sudden and total change of register was due to the fact that the *context* had changed: from a relaxed one, in which the two friends indulged in camaraderie and good-natured banter, to a matter of (literally) life and death. Much to the discomfort of whoever happened to watch the scene, accusations and invectives were hurled across the table; one could literally observe how beyond a certain, 'critical' point the familiar form *du* no longer could be tolerated, in the same way as water cannot exist as a liquid above a certain, critical temperature. This critical point, however, was only implied in the context, never exactly specified; still, both interlocutors spontaneously obeyed its unwritten law. In the changed context, certain forms of speaking were simply 'canceled' and the 'nicer' speech acts were made pragmatically impossible.

It is characteristic of a pragmatic view of contextual problems to acknowledge, and to want to explain, this tension between the interactants' spontaneous and allowed ways of expressing themselves. Pragmatics does this by appealing to the use of language (among other things, in speech acting and in choice of register) as not only prescribed grammatically, 'grammaticalized', but mainly affordable pragmatically, 'pragmaticalized', so to speak. The next section will give some particulars.

3.1.2 Context and convention

No matter how natural our language facilities or how convention-bound their use, as language users, we always operate in contexts. Therefore, the context looms large, and has to be taken into account whenever we formulate our thoughts about language.

There is a built-in contradiction between the conventionalized and more or less rigid forms that the language puts at our disposal, and the spontaneous, individual expression of our thoughts that we all strive to realize. This is true not only of the more technical rules of the grammar (especially those governing the inflection of words and the structure of sentences), but also of what is usually discussed under the general heading of 'meaning represented in propositions'. As the Danish linguist Johan Nicolai Madvig expressed it one and a half centuries ago, "Humans want to speak, not just name isolated representations. Language begins with the sentence" (1843:31). In other words, humans are made for 'speaking' (that is, communicating in spoken sentences or utterances), rather than


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[1] What does *X* mean? [2] What did you mean by *X*?

Semantics traditionally deals with meaning as a dyadic relation, as in [1], while pragmatics deals with meaning as a triadic relation, as in [2]. Thus meaning in pragmatics is defined relative to a speaker or user of the language, whereas meaning in semantics is defined purely as a property of expressions in a given language, in abstraction from particular situations, speakers, or hearers. This is a rough-and-ready distinction which has been refined, for particular purposes, by philosophers such as Morris (1938, 1946) or Carnap (1942).[8] I shall redefine pragmatics for the purposes of linguistics, as the study of meaning in relation to speech situations (see 1.4 below).

The view that semantics and pragmatics are distinct, though complementary and interrelated fields of study, is easy to appreciate subjectively, but is more difficult to justify in an objective way. It is best supported negatively, by pointing out the failures or weaknesses of alternative views. Logically, two clear alternatives are possible: it may be claimed that the uses of meaning shown in [1] and [2] are both the concern of semantics; or that they are both the concern of pragmatics. The three views I have now mentioned may be diagrammed and labelled as shown in Fig. 1.1.



'Semanticism' 'Complementarism' 'Pragmaticism'

FIGURE 1.1

Because of difficulties of terminology and definition, it is hard to pin down clear cases of semanticism and pragmaticism. In practice, one notices a preference of a semantic type of explanation to a pragmatic one, or vice versa. In a modified sense, therefore, the labels 'semanticist' and 'pragmaticist' may be applied to those who assimilate as much of the study of meaning to one position as possible.

Examples of each position are the following. In the philosophy of language, there has been an influential tradition of philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, Austin, Alston, and Searle, who have been sceptical of traditional approaches to meaning in terms


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1

Introduction

1.1. What is pragmatics?

1.1.1. A definition

Pragmatics is one of the most vibrant and rapidly growing fields in contemporary linguistics and the philosophy of language. In recent years, it has also become increasingly a central topic in cognitive science, artificial intelligence, informatics, neuroscience, language pathology, anthropology, and sociology.

But what is pragmatics? Pragmatics can be broadly defined as the study of language in use. However, such a definition may be too general and too vague to be of much use. This is because pragmatics is a particularly complex subject with all kinds of disciplinary influence, and few, if any, clear boundaries (see e.g. Levinson 1983: 5–35 and Ariel 2010 for a discussion of how to define pragmatics).[1] Here, I shall not repeat Levinson's and

[1] In Huang (2013a), the representative research areas in contemporary pragmatics are surveyed and an authoritative, up-to-date, and comprehensive description of the contemporary landscape of pragmatics is presented.

(1.15) 'China suffered a lot during Mao's Cultural Revolution.'

(1.16) 'Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested; that is, some books are to be read only in parts; others to be read but not curiously; and some few to be read wholly, with diligence and attention. Some books also may be read by deputy, and extracts made of them by others.' (Francis Bacon)

Of these, (1.15) is an instantiation of the sentence in (1.11). In such a case, it is widely assumed (*à la* Bar-Hillel 1954) that an utterance is the pairing of a sentence and a context, that is, the situation in which the sentence is uttered (Levinson 1983: 18–19). **Utterance-meaning** or **speaker-meaning** (as it is often called), then, is definable as what a speaker intends to convey by making an utterance. The study of utterance-meaning normally falls under pragmatics.

Finally, there is the notion of a **proposition**. A proposition is what is expressed by a declarative sentence when that sentence is used to make a statement, that is, to say something, true or false, about some state of affairs in the external world. Put the other way round, a declarative sentence, when uttered to make a statement, is said to convey a proposition. (1.19), for example, is the proposition underlying both sentences (1.17) and (1.18).

(1.17) *Liszt adored Chopin.*

(1.18) *Chopin was adored by Liszt.*

(1.19) LISZT ADORED CHOPIN

The **propositional content** of a sentence is that part of its meaning that can be reduced to a proposition. This notion allows semanticists and pragmaticists to claim that different (types of) sentences may share the same propositional content, even though they differ in other aspects of meaning. For example, the interrogative sentence in (1.20) is said to have the same propositional content as the active declarative sentence in (1.17) and the passive declarative sentence (1.18), namely (1.19). The difference is that while in saying (1.17) and (1.18) the speaker asserts the corresponding proposition, that is to say, he or she commits him- or herself to the truth of the proposition, in uttering (1.20), the speaker questions its truth.

(1.20) *Did Liszt adore Chopin?*

Propositions may be true or false (to be discussed below), may be known, believed, or doubted, may be asserted or denied, and may be held constant

1.3.2. Context

We move next to context. **Context** is one of those notions that is used widely in the linguistics literature, but to which it is difficult to give a precise definition. From a relatively theory-neutral point of view, however, context may in a broader sense be defined as referring to any relevant features of the dynamic setting or environment in which a linguistic unit is systematically used. Furthermore, context can be seen as composed of three different sources—a view known as the 'geographic' division of context (Ariel 1990). In the first place, there is the **physical context**, which refers to the physical setting of the utterance. For example, the interpretation of (1.26) depends on the knowledge computable from the physical context of the utterance, that is, the spatio-temporal location of the utterance.

(1.26) *He*'s not the chief executive; *he* is. *He*'s the managing director.

The second type is the **linguistic context**, which refers to the surrounding utterances in the same discourse. What has been mentioned in the previous discourse, for instance, plays a crucial role in understanding the elliptical construction used by Mary in (1.27).

(1.27) John: Who gave the waiter a large tip?
Mary: Helen.

Thirdly and finally, we have the **general-knowledge context**.[11] The information derivable from this type of context explains why (1.28a) is pragmatically well-formed but (1.28b) is pragmatically anomalous. This is because, given our real-world knowledge, we know that whereas there is a Forbidden City in Beijing, there is no such tourist attraction in Paris.

(1.28) a. I went to Beijing last month. The Forbidden City was magnificent.
b. ?I went to Paris last month. The Forbidden City was magnificent.

Clearly, what is involved here is a set of (true) background assumptions shared by the speaker and the addressee. Stalnaker (1974) called this **common ground**. The notion of common ground has been further developed by Clark (1996), who distinguished **communal** from **personal common ground**.

on the other hand, the investigation of presupposition is concerned with a much wider range of phenomena, centring around the general debates over the interaction and division of labour between semantics and pragmatics.

The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 discusses the general phenomenon of presupposition. Next, Section 3.2 examines the properties of presupposition, covering constancy under negation in Section 3.2.1, defeasibility in Section 3.2.2, and the projection problem in Section 3.2.3. Finally, Section 3.3 presents an overview of three influential accounts of presupposition, namely, the filtering-satisfaction analysis (3.3.2), the cancellation analysis (3.3.3), and the accommodation analysis (3.3.4).

3.1. Phenomena of presupposition

3.1.1. What is presupposition?

Presupposition can be informally defined as a piece of information or a proposition whose truth is taken for granted in the utterance of a sentence. Its main function is to act as a precondition of some sort for the appropriate use of that sentence. This background assumption will remain in force when the sentence that contains it is negated. Furthermore, three conceptions of presupposition can be identified. First, presupposition is definable as a relation between sentences or statements. This is **semantic presupposition**, also called **conventional, sentence**, or **statement presupposition**. The conception of semantic presupposition is usually attributed to the British philosopher Peter Strawson, though it may be traced back to Frege (1892). Secondly, presupposition can by contrast be defined as a belief a speaker takes for granted in making an assertion. On this view, a speaker presupposes in uttering a sentence rather than a sentence itself presupposes. In other words, it is speakers or utterances but not sentences or statements that carry presupposition. Presupposition normally represents given information in one sense or another, and is part of the (relevant) context (or common ground), and in particular, the **speaker's commitment slate** in which the sentence is uttered. This is the concept of **pragmatic presupposition**, also known as **conversational**, **speaker**, or **utterance presupposition**. The champion of this pragmatic approach to presupposition is the American

PRAGMATICS

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London and New Yor

WHAT IS PRAGMATICS? 1

We explore the different meanings of *meaning* and the kinds of issues which are dealt with by semantics and pragmatics.

What do these children still need to learn about using language?

> A little boy comes in the front door.
> Mother: **Wipe your feet, please.**
> He removes his muddy shoes and socks and carefully wipes his clean feet on the doormat.
>
> A father is trying to get his 3-year-old daughter to stop lifting up her dress to display her new underwear to the assembled guests.
> Father: **We don't DO that.**
> Daughter: **I KNOW, Daddy. You don't WEAR dresses.**

The children's knowledge of vocabulary and grammar does not appear to be the problem. When the little boy's mother asked him to wipe his feet, that is exactly what he did. The little girl explained why her father was not participating in the underwear show with perfect grammar and quite impeccable logic. The problem is that the children appear to have understood what the words meant but not what their parents meant. As adults, we usually arrive at the speaker's meaning so effortlessly that we tend to be unaware of the considerable amount of skill and knowledge that we used to accomplish this.

Semantics and **pragmatics** are the two main areas of linguistic study that look at the knowledge we use both to extract meaning when we hear or read, and to convey meaning when we speak or write. Within linguistics itself, the dividing line between these two

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the implication or inference that speaker or addressee is a child is as available when *bunny* is written on an anonymous postcard as it is when said in some concrete appropriate context (Gazdar, 1979a: 3). And that of course is because the kind of appropriate speaker or addressee is encoded by the term *bunny*.

Here we come to the heart of the definitional problem: the term *pragmatics* covers both context-dependent aspects of language structure and principles of language usage and understanding that have nothing or little to do with linguistic structure. It is difficult to forge a definition that will happily cover both aspects. But this should not be taken to imply that pragmatics is a hodge-podge, concerned with quite disparate and unrelated aspects of language; rather, pragmaticists are specifically interested in the inter-relation of language structure and principles of language usage. Let us now consider some potential definitions that are more plausible candidates.

We may begin with a definition that is specifically aimed at capturing the concern of pragmatics with features of language structure. The definition might go as follows:

(8) Pragmatics is the study of those relations between language and context that are **grammaticalized**, or encoded in the structure of a language[7]

Or, putting it another way, one could say that pragmatics is the study of just those aspects of the relationship between language and context that are relevant to the writing of grammars. Such a definition restricts pragmatics to the study of certain aspects of linguistic structure, and stands in strong contrast to Katz's proposal, outlined above, that would restrict pragmatics to the study of grammatically irrelevant aspects of language usage. Such a scope for pragmatics would include the study of **deixis**, including honorifics and the like, and probably the study of **presupposition** and **speech acts**, i.e. much of the present book. It would exclude the study of principles of language usage that could not be shown to have repercussions on the grammar of languages, and this could be an embarrassment,

of such sentences only against a set of background assumptions about the contexts in which the sentence could be appropriately uttered."

[7] The term *grammaticalization* is used throughout this book in the broad sense covering the encoding of meaning distinctions – again in a wide sense – in the lexicon, morphology, syntax and phonology of languages.

entailments, on a par with the rest of a sentence's meaning (Russell's approach)

In addition, a certain range of presuppositional phenomena had been adduced in the philosophical literature, including the presuppositions of:

(a) singular terms, e.g. definite descriptions, proper names
(b) quantified noun phrases, e.g. *All of John's children* can be claimed to presuppose 'John has children' (Strawson, 1952)
(c) temporal clauses (as in Frege's example quoted above)
(d) change-of-state verbs: e.g. *Bertrand has stopped beating his wife* can be claimed to presuppose 'Bertrand had been beating his wife' (Sellars, 1954)

When Strawson's notion of presupposition came to the attention of linguists, it seemed to open up a new and interesting possibility. Up till this point linguists had been operating with one crucial semantic relation in particular, namely **entailment** or **logical consequence**.[5] This relation can be defined in terms of valid rules of inference, or alternatively in terms of the assignment of truth and falsity ('semantically' as logicians say). **Semantic entailment** is thus definable as follows:

(17) A *semantically entails* B (written A $\Vdash$ B) iff every situation that makes A true, makes B true (or: in all worlds in which A is true, B is true)

Such a relation is basic to semantics. Not only does it capture logical truths, but all the other essential semantic relations (like equivalence, contradiction) can be directly defined in terms of it. The interesting possibility opened up by the notion of presupposition was that we might be able to add a new and distinct semantic relation to the inventory of the well-known ones. In doing so we would be bringing logical models more into line with natural language semantics. This programme, the creation of a new, well-defined semantic relation that would play a role within formal semantic theories, was realized within a number of theories of **semantic presupposition** (to be contrasted with pragmatic theories of presupposition below).

[5] Caveat: in just some logical systems (those with truth-value gaps or non-bivalence) one may wish to make a distinction between the notions of entailment and logical consequence, but logical terminology is not consistent here.


Prof. Dr. Henry Guntur Tarigan
PENGAJARAN
PRAGMATIK
PENERBIT ANGKASA BANDUNG

konteks ujaran, tujuan ujaran, ... presuposisi atau perkiraan/persangkaan, percakapan atau konversasi, dan presuposisi atau perkiraan/persangkaan.

B. BATASAN PRAGMATIK

Untuk memperoleh gambaran yang lebih jelas, ada baiknya kita melih batasan atau pengertian pragmatik dari berbagai sumber.

Pragmatik menelaah ucapan-ucapan khusus dalam situasi-situasi khus dan memusatkan perhatian pada aneka ragam cara yang merupakan wada aneka konteks sosial. Performansi bahasa dapat mempengaruhi tafsiran ata interpretasi. Pragmatik bukan saja menelaah pengaruh-pengaruh fon suprasegmental, dialek, dan register, tetapi memandang performansi ujar pertama sebagai suatu kegiatan sosial yang ditata oleh aneka ragam konve sosial. Para teoritikus pragmatik telah mengindentifikasi adanya tiga je prinsip kegiatan ujaran, yaitu kekuatan ilokusi (*illocutionary force*), prin prinsip percakapan (*conversational principles*), dan presuposisi (*presupposition* (Heatherington, 1980: 155).

Pragmatik (atau *semantik behavioral*) menelaah keseluruhan peril insan, terutama dalam hubungannya dengan tanda-tanda dan lambang-la bang. Pragmatik memusatkan perhatian pada cara insan berperilaku da keseluruhan situasi pemberian dan penerimaan tanda. (*George, 1964:*

Dalam bukunya yang berjudul *Pragmatics*, Stephen C. Levin mengumpulkan sejumlah batasan pragmatik yang berasal dari berba sumber dan pakar, yang dapat kita rangkum seperti berikut ini.

Pragmatik adalah telaah mengenai, "hubungan tanda-tanda dengan p penafsir" (Morris 1938:6). Teori pragmatik menjelaskan alasan atau pem para pembicara dan penyimak dalam menyusun korelasi dalam suatu ko sebuah tanda kalimat dengan suatu proposisi (rencana atau masalah). Da hal ini teori pragmatik merupakan bagian dari performansi.

Pragmatik adalah telaah mengenai hubungan antara bahasa dan ko yang tergramatisasikan atau disandikan dalam struktur suatu bahasa


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CHAPTER 10

Pragmatics

In the late 1960s, two elderly American tourists who had been touring Scotland reported that, in their travels, they had come to a Scottish town in which there was a great ruined cathedral. As they stood in the ruins, they saw a small boy and they asked him when the cathedral had been so badly damaged. He replied *in the war*. Their immediate interpretation, in the 1960s, was that he must be referring to the Second World War which had ended only twenty years earlier. But then they thought that the ruins looked as if they had been in their dilapidated state for much longer than that, so they asked the boy which war he meant. He replied *the war with the English*, which, they eventually discovered, had formally ended in 1745.

Brown (1998)

In the previous chapter, we focused on conceptual meaning and the relationships between words. There are other aspects of meaning that depend more on context and the communicative intentions of speakers. In Gill Brown's story, the American tourists and the Scottish boy seem to be using the word *war* with essentially the same basic meaning. However, the boy was using the word to refer to something the tourists didn't expect, hence the initial misunderstanding. Communication clearly depends on not only recognizing the meaning of words in an utterance, but also recognizing what speakers mean by their utterances. The study of what speakers mean, or "speaker meaning," is called **pragmatics**.

Pragmatics

In many ways, pragmatics is the study of "invisible" meaning, or how we recognize what is meant even when it isn't actually said or written. In order for that to happen, speakers (or writers) must be able to depend on a lot of shared assumptions and expectations when they try to communicate. The investigation of those assumptions and expectations provides us with some insights into how we understand more than just the linguistic content of utterances. From the perspective of pragmatics, more is always being communicated than is said.

There are lots of illustrations of this pragmatic principle. Driving by a parking garage, you may see a large sign like the one in the picture (Figure 10.1). You read the sign, knowing what each of the words means and what the sign as a whole means. However, you don't normally think that the sign is advertising a place where you can park your "heated attendant." (You take an attendant, you heat him/her up, and this is where you can park him/her.) Alternatively, the sign may indicate a place where parking will be carried out by attendants who have been heated. (Maybe they will be more cheerful.)

The words in the sign may allow these interpretations, but we would normally understand that we can park a car in this place, that it's a heated area, and that there will

There is a much less common pattern, called **cataphora**, which reverses the antecedent–anaphora relationship by beginning with a pronoun (*It*), then later revealing more specific information. This device is more common in stories, as in this beginning: *It suddenly appeared on the path a little ahead of me, staring in my direction and sniffing the air. An enormous grizzly bear was checking me out.*

Anaphora is, however, the more common pattern and can be defined as subsequent reference to an already introduced entity. Mostly we use anaphora in texts to maintain reference. The connection between an antecedent and an anaphoric expression is created by use of a pronoun (*it*), or a phrase with *the* plus the antecedent noun (*the puppy*), or another noun that is related to the antecedent in some way (*The little dog ran out of the room*). The connection between antecedents and anaphoric expressions is often based on inference, as in these examples:

We found a house to rent, but the kitchen was very small.
I got on a bus and asked the driver if it went near the downtown area.

In the first example, we must make an inference like "if X is a house, then X has a kitchen" in order to interpret the connection between antecedent *a house* and anaphoric expression *the kitchen*. In the second example, we must make an inference like "if X is a bus, then X has a driver" in order to make the connection between *a bus* and *the driver*. In some cases, the antecedent can be a verb, as in: *The victim was shot twice, but the gun was never recovered*. Here the inference is that any "shooting" event must involve a gun.

We have used the term "inference" here to describe what the listener (or reader) does. When we talk about an assumption made by the speaker (or writer), we usually talk about a "presupposition."

Presupposition

When we use a referring expression like *this*, *he* or *Jennifer*, we usually assume that our listeners can recognize which referent is intended. In a more general way, we design our linguistic messages on the basis of large-scale assumptions about what our listeners already know. Some of these assumptions may be mistaken, of course, but mostly they're appropriate. What a speaker (or writer) assumes is true or known by a listener (or reader) can be described as a **presupposition**.

If someone tells you *Your brother is waiting outside*, there is an obvious presupposition that you have a brother. If you are asked *Why did you arrive late?*, there is a presupposition that you did arrive late. And if you are asked the question *When did you stop smoking?*, there are at least two presuppositions involved. In asking this question, the speaker presupposes that you used to smoke and that you no longer do so. Questions like this, with built-in presuppositions, are very useful devices for interrogators or trial lawyers. If the defendant is asked by the prosecutor, *Okay,*

Essential INTRODUCTORY LINGUISTICS

Grover Hudson

c. Promises that X
   1. The speaker believes the hearer desires X
   2. The speaker is able and willing to bring about X
d. Warnings that X
   1. The speaker is knowledgeable about X
   2. The speaker believes the hearer does not desire X

Felicity conditions may be thought of as part of the meaning of the performative verbs which express an illocution, but whether they are fulfilled or not must be judged by pragmatic inference. For example, do we consider something to be a promise if the speaker is certainly unable and/or unwilling to fulfill it? And if the speaker is unable or unwilling to fulfill a promise, is it then a 'false promise' or not a promise at all? In either case, our ability to recognize an indirect illocution, as well as a direct one, depends on our understanding of its felicity conditions.

2.5. Presupposition

2.5.1. Presupposed and asserted information

A **presupposition** is something assumed (presupposed) to be true in a sentence which asserts other information. For example, sentence 22a presupposes 22b, 23a presupposes 23b, and 24a presupposes 24b.

22. a. Christopher realized that Winnie was gone.
    b. Winnie was gone.
23. a. Christopher stopped looking.
    b. Christopher had been looking.
24. a. The owl sneezed again.
    b. The owl had sneezed before.

That the information of the second sentences is presupposed, rather than entailed or included some way in the first, is apparent in the fact that if the first sentence is negated the truth of the second sentence is unchanged: 25, 26, and 27 also presuppose 22b, 23b, and 24b, respectively.

25. Christopher didn't realize that Winnie was gone.
26. Christopher didn't stop looking.
27. The owl didn't sneeze again.

In presupposition, furthermore, if the second sentence is false the first is false or unreasonable. Thus the respective truth of 28, 29, and 30 makes 22a, 22b, and 23b false or unreasonable.

28. Winnie wasn't gone. (So Christopher could not have realized that he was.)
29. Christopher had not been looking. (So he could not have stopped looking.)
30. The owl hadn't sneezed before. (So it could not have sneezed again.)

PRESUPPOSITION

by

DAVID E. COOPER

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need to be amended later on (see chapter 6). I shall use the term 'presupposition' to refer not only to sentences which are presupposed by others, but also to the relation which holds between a presupposing and presupposed pair of sentences. I shall, for example, speak of "cases of presupposition", meaning cases where one sentence presupposes another. I will employ the term 'entailment' in a sense familiar to logicians: a sentence S entails a sentence S′ if and only if (a) if S is true then S′ must be true, and (b) if S′ is false then S must be false. Sometimes I shall also speak of a sentence's "being an entailment", meaning a sentence which is entailed by another. By 'assertion' I shall, for the moment, mean either (a) the act of asserting, or (b) a sentence which a speaker asserts, or (c) some part of a sentence which a speaker asserts (e.g. one conjunct in a conjunction), or (d) some sentence other than the one asserted which is equivalent in some sense to the one asserted. (For example, if a speaker says 'Yes' in reply to the question "Is S true?", then although he has not uttered S he has asserted it since, in this context, asserting by saying 'Yes' is equivalent to asserting by uttering S.) Considerable amendment will be required in this terminology later.

LOGIC

According to Russell a sentence is either true, false, or meaningless.[4] Consider then the sentence

(1) The king of France is bald

as uttered in 1972. It is not meaningless, and it is certainly not true. So, for Russell, it must be false. And Russell indeed analyses (1) in such a way that its falsity is apparent — into the form: There is one and only one king of France, and he is bald. Since the claim that there is a king of France is false, the whole sentence is therefore false.

[4] "On Denoting", *Mind* 14 (1905).



Pejoration. A semantic process, sometimes referred to as **deterioration**, in which a word takes on a negative evaluation, for example *gossip*, which originally meant 'god-relative' and now means 'idle talk'. Similarly *officious*, which once had the meaning 'kindly', now means 'interfering'. The opposing process is AMELIORATION. Pejoration is usually studied in **historical linguistics**.

Polysemy. A SENSE RELATION in which a word, or LEXEME, has acquired more than one meaning. Distinct from HOMONYMY, in which two lexemes happen to have the same sound, or written form. The term *flight*, for example, can mean all of the following: (i) the power of flying; (ii) an air journey; (iii) a series of steps; (iv) a digression; (v) a unit of the air force. These senses are clearly related and it is possible to see how they might derive from the same word. Many NOUNS acquire new meanings by having a literal and a metaphoric meaning, for example, parts of the body, *eye*, *leg*, *hand*, *foot*, applied to *needle*, *chair*, *clock*, and *bed*. And some nouns acquire a concrete and an abstract SENSE. So *text*, *book*, and *thesis*, can be used to refer to a specific item, as in *I've had my thesis bound*, or to a more general one, as in *I agree with your thesis*. Words which are capable of more than one meaning are **polysemic**, as opposed to those which can only bear one meaning, termed **monosemic**.

Presupposition. A term used in both semantics and pragmatics to refer to assumptions implicitly made by speakers and listeners which are necessary for the correct interpretation of utterances. The statement *I'm sorry it's raining*, for example, presupposes that it is raining. The presupposition also holds if the statement is negated: *I'm not sorry it's raining*, also presupposes *it's raining*. This is an important difference between presupposition and ENTAILMENT, a logical relationship with which presupposition is sometimes confused. Presupposition deals with the necessary preconditions for statements to be true. So the sentence *My cat was run over yesterday* assumes as a necessity the truth of *I have a cat*.

Presupposition allows us the freedom not to make everything absolutely explicit in our communications. If we had to spell out all the details every time we spoke, then communicating would be an extremely lengthy and tedious business. Being able



An Introduction to English Semantics and Pragmatics

Patrick Griffiths

more on semantic distinctions encoded in the language than on encyclopedic knowledge – and trying to specify in detail how they are calculated.

8.2 Presuppositions

Chapter 5 introduced **presuppositions**, the shared background assumptions that are taken for granted when we communicate. These are important in pragmatics because (as will be shown in Chapter 9) they are essential to the construction of connected discourse. Shared background presuppositions are also the obvious starting point for a reader or listener wondering what the author of a message might regard as relevant (see Section 8.1.3, above). People who know each other well can build up quite accurate impressions of what assumptions are shared between them, but it is harder to be aware of which aspects of that information the other person is thinking about at any point in a communicative interaction; and for communications between strangers it is even harder to know what is presupposed. **Presupposition** is also employed more specifically as the term for a particular kind of inference to be set out in this section. Inferences in this class are of interest here because they are an important way for speakers and writers to give hints, in the process of making each utterance, as to what assumptions they are currently taking for granted.

If, having missed out on the first distribution of dessert, you are asked "Would you like some more dessert?" you cannot really answer with a simple "Yes, please" or "No, thank you". The problem is that *more* indicates that the questioner presupposes you have already had some. Both answers would pick up and preserve part of the question: "Yes, please (I would like some more)" and "No, thank you (I would not like any more)". That means that *more* is still in there pointing to the same false presupposition that you have already had some dessert.

The pronoun gender distinction of English (*she–he, her–him, hers–his*) is presuppositional. This is illustrated in the exchange between A and B in (8.15). The presuppositions are on the right, following the symbol +<. (This symbol is meant to be easy to remember: the material on the left can be appropriately added to contexts in which the proposition to the right is true.)

(8.15) A: "Where is the head of department's office? I want to speak to him." +< 'The HoD is male'
B: "She is female." +< 'The HoD is female'

What is presupposed is background information. It is not asserted, so it does not count as the overtly presented information carried by an

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PAUL GOCHET

OUTLINE OF A NOMINALIST THEORY OF PROPOSITIONS

An Essay in the Theory of Meaning and in the Philosophy of Logic

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CHAPTER IV

THE PRAGMATIC DEFINITION OF PROPOSITION IN TERMS OF ASSERTION OR ASSERTABILITY

1. THE PRAGMATIC DEFINITION OF PROPOSITION IN TERMS OF ASSERTABILITY

We saw that Johnson defined the proposition as that of which one can predicate the 'true' and the 'false'. But, this distinction has its roots in another, according to that author, the distinction between the correct and erroneous:

> Thus, though we may predicate of a certain proposition ... that it is true or that it is false, what this ultimately means is, that any and every thinker who might at any time assert the proposition would be either exempt or not exempt from error.[1]

As the distinction between correct and mistaken appears fundamental to him, Johnson constructs a new definition of the proposition whose role is to bring out the relations between the proposition and the assertion.

> In order to mark the important distinction, and at the same time the close connection, between the proposition and the act of assertion, I propose to take the term 'assertum' as a synonym for 'proposition'... Thus, the assertum will coïncide, not exactly with that which *has been* asserted, but with that which is, in its nature, assertible.[2]

One may find it surprising that Johnson considers the opposition between 'correct' and 'mistaken' as *more fundamental* than the opposition of 'true' and 'false'. The notion of error does not actually seem to deserve this privilege. It is not more fundamental, but simply more general and less precise, than the notions of 'true' and 'false' in the sense that it applies likewise to cases of linguistic error (the subject was wrong about words) and to factual error (the subject was mistaken about 'facts'), whereas the opposition of 'true' and 'false' applies only to the second case. Moreover, the notion of error is an *epistemological* concept which the notion of falsity is not. One must, however, give Johnson credit for having drawn attention, by shifting toward pragmatics, to the *problematic* character of the false, and to the asymmetry of the false with respect to the true, an asymmetry for which we shall have to account.

From his pragmatic definition of the notion of proposition, Johnson draws certain conclusions with respect to its ontological status. According to him, "the

SENTENCES, UTTERANCES, AND PROPOSITIONS

UNIT 2

PROPOSITION

- Definition: A PROPOSITION is that part of the *meaning* of the utterance of a declarative sentence which describes some state of affairs.

- A proposition is a claim about the world. It has just the form of an idea.
- A proposition is a (potential) fact about the world, which can be true or false.
- e.g. The boy is playing football.

  Two plus two makes five.



PROPOSITION

- The state of affairs typically involves persons or things referred to by expressions in the sentence and the situation or action they are involved in.

- In uttering a declarative sentence a speaker typically asserts a proposition.
- E.g. Two plus two makes five.



- The notion of truth can be used to decide whether two sentences express different propositions.

- Thus, if there is any conceivable set of circumstances in which one sentence is true, while the other is false, we can be sure that they express different propositions.

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The Role of Context in Discourse Analysis

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***Abstract*—Discourse analysis involves many aspects, such as adjacency pairs, coherence, cohesion, and so on, among which context plays an important role. This paper intends to explore the role of context in discourse analysis on the basis of introducing different definitions and classifications of context.**

***Index Terms*—discourse analysis, context, social environment**

I. Introduction

The study of context has been gaining popularity in recent years, either in linguistics itself or in many other interdisciplinary subjects such as semantics, pragmatics, and discourse analysis as well. However, context theories are not formed overnight. They involve a long process of development, during which comparative linguistics, structural linguistics and transformational-generative linguistics all contributed to the theoretical foundations of context theories.

When we introduce context theories to the field of discourse analysis, we must take into consideration not only the discourse itself, but also the context in which the discourse takes place. Just like what Fillmore (1977, P, 119) said, "The task is to determine what we can know about the meaning and context of an utterance given only the knowledge that the utterance has occurred … I find that whenever I notice some sentence in context, I immediately find myself asking what the effect would have been if the context had been slightly different." (Gillian Brown & George Yule, 2000, p.35)

II. Definitions of Context

Different linguists seek to define context from different point of view in order to answer questions encountered in their own fields, and to support their own ideas and theories.

H. G. Widdowson, when focusing his study on language meaning, thought "context" as "those aspects of the circumstance of actual language use which are taken as relevant to meaning." He further pointed out, "in other words, context is a schematic construct... the achievement of pragmatic meaning is a matter of matching up the linguistic elements of the code with the schematic elements of the context." (H.G. Widdowson, 2000, p.126)

When Guy Cook was studying the relationship between discourse and literature, he took "context" into consideration as well. In his definition, context is just a form of knowledge the world and "the term 'context' can be used in a broad and narrow sense. In the narrow sense, it refers to (knowledge of) factors outside the text under consideration. In the broad sense, it refers to (knowledge of) these factors and to (knowledge of) other parts of the text under consideration, sometimes referred to as 'co-text'." (Guy Cook, 1999, p. 24)

When studying reference and inference, George Yule also took "context" into account. He provided us with a somewhat general definition, "Context is the physical environment in which a word is used." (George Yule, 2000, 128)

Although they are viewed from different perspectives for different purposes, these definitions have an important point in common: one main point of the context is the environment (circumstances or factors by some other scholars) in which a discourse occurs.

III. Classifications of Context

Opinions on how to classify context vary from one to another. Some linguists divide context into two groups, while some insist on discussing context from three, four, or even six dimensions. According to different circumstances mentioned in the above definitions, I would like to divide context into linguistic context, situational context and cultural context.

A. Linguistic Context

Linguistic context refers to the context within the discourse, that is, the relationship between the words, phrases, sentences and even paragraphs. Take the word "bachelor" as an example. We can't understand the exact meaning of the sentence "He is a bachelor." without the linguistic context to make clear the exact meaning of this word.

Linguistic context can be explored from three aspects: deictic, co-text, and collocation.

In a language event, the participants must know where they are in space and time, and these features relate directly to the deictic context, by which we refer to the deictic expressions like the time expressions now, then, etc., the spatial expressions here, there, etc., and the person expressions I, you, etc... Deictic expressions help to establish deictic roles which derive from the fact that in normal language behavior the speaker addresses his utterance to another person and may refer to himself, to a certain place, or to a time.

In recent years, some linguists began to pay attention to the previous discourse co-ordinate. Levis introduces this co-ordinate to take account of the aforementioned sentences. It is the case that any sentence other than the first in a fragment of discourse, will have the whole of its interpretation forcibly constrained by the preceding text, not just those phrases which obviously and specifically refer to the preceding text. The interpretations of the words which occur in discourse are constrained by, following Halliday, their co-text.

In 1934, Porzig argued for the recognition of the importance of syntagmatic relations, between, e.g., bite and teeth, bark and dog, blond and hair, which Firth called collocation. Collocation is not simply a matter of association of ideas. Although milk is white, we should not often say white milk, while the expression white paint is common enough.

B. Situational Context

Situational context, or context of situation, refers to the environment, time and place, etc. in which the discourse occurs, and also the relationship between the participants. This theory is traditionally approached through the concept of register, which helps to clarify the interrelationship of language with context by handling it under three basic headings: field, tenor, and mode.

Field of discourse refers to the ongoing activity. We may say field is the linguistic reflection of the purposive role of language user in the situation in which a text has occurred. Tenor refers to the kind of social relationship enacted in or by the discourse. The notion of tenor, therefore, highlights the way in which linguistic choices are affected not just by the topic or subject of communication but also by the kind of social relationship within which communication is taking place. Mode is the linguistic reflection of the relationship the language user has to medium of transmission. The principal distinction within mode is between those channels of communication that entail immediate contact and those that allow for deferred contact between participants.

C. Cultural Context

Cultural context refers to the culture, customs and background of epoch in language communities in which the speakers participate. Language is a social phenomenon, and it is closely tied up with the social structure and value system of society. Therefore, language can not avoid being influenced by all these factors like social role, social status, sex and age, etc.

Social roles are culture-specific functions, institutionalized in a society and recognized by its members. By social status, we mean the relative social standing of the participants. Each participant in the language event must know, or make assumptions about his or her status in relation to the other, and in many situations, status will also be an important factor in the determination of who should initiate the conversation. Sex and age are often determinants of, or interact with, social status. The terms of address employed by a person of one sex speaking to an older person, may differ from those which would be employed in otherwise similar situations by people of the same sex or of the same age.

IV. The Role of Context

As we can see, context plays a very important role in discourse analysis. Let's try to generalize its role as follows.

A. Eliminating Ambiguity

Ambiguity refers to a word, phrase, sentence or group of sentences with more than one possible interpretation or meaning. There are two kinds of ambiguities: lexical ambiguity and structural ambiguity. Lexical ambiguity is mostly caused by homonymy and polysemy. For example, these four words, right, rite, write and wright, are all pronounced as [rait], but they are quite different from each other. Let's also have a look at the following sentence:

They passed the port at midnight.

This sentence is lexically ambiguous. However, it would normally be clear in a given context which can indicate the meaning of the word "port", meaning either harbor or a kind of fortified wine.

Structural ambiguity arises from the grammatical analysis of a sentence or a phrase. For example, the phrase young men and women can be analyzed as either "young /men and women/" (i.e. both are young) or "/young men/ and women" (i.e. only the men are young). Let us also examine the following sentence:

I like Bill more than Mary.

This sentence can mean "I like Bill more than Mary does." or "I like Bill more than I like Mary." In such examples, a given context can indicate what the sentence exactly means.

B. Indicating Referents

To avoid repetition, we usually use such words like I, you, he, this, that, etc. to replace some noun phrases, or words like do, can, should, etc. to replace verb phrases, or then, there, etc. to replace adverbial phrase of time and place. Therefore, context is of great importance in understanding the referents of such words. The following dialogue is written by the well-known linguist, Firth:

-- Do you think he will?

-- I don't know. He might.

-- I suppose he ought to, but perhaps he feels he can't.

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Figure 1.2 Reference and sense in the vocabulary



1.6.1 Reference and sense

One important point made by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1974), whose ideas have been so influential in the development of modern linguistics, is that the meaning of linguistic expressions derives from two sources: the language they are part of and the world they describe. Words stand in a relationship to the world, or our mental classification of it: they allow us to identify parts of the world, and make statements about them. Thus if a speaker says *He saw Paul* or *She bought a dog*, the underlined nominals allow her to identify, pick out, or **refer** to specific entities in the world. However, words also derive their value from their position within the language system. The relationship by which language hooks onto the world is usually called **reference**. The semantic links between elements within the vocabulary system is an aspect of their **sense**,[8] or meaning.

Saussure (1974: 115) used the diagram in figure 1.2 to show this patterning. Each oval is a word, having its own capacity for reference, but each is also linked to other words in the same language, like a cell in a network. His discussion of this point is excellent and we cannot really do it justice here, except to recommend the reader to the original. His well-known examples include a comparison of English *sheep* and French *mouton*. In some cases they can be used to refer in a similar way but their meaning differs because they are in different systems and therefore have different ranges: in English there is an extra term *mutton*, used for meat, while the French word can be used for both the animal and the meat. Thus, the meaning of a word derives both from what it can be used to refer to and from the way its semantic scope is defined by related words. So the meaning of *chair* in English is partly defined by the existence of other words like *stool*. Similarly, the scope of *red* is defined by the other terms in the color system: *brown*, *orange*, *yellow*, and so on. The same point can be made of grammatical systems: Saussure pointed out that plural doesn't "mean" the same in French, where it is opposed to singular, as it does in Sanskrit or Arabic, languages which, in addition to singular, have **dual** forms, for exactly two entities. In the French system, plural is "two or more," in the other systems, "three or more."

1.6.2 Utterances, sentences, and propositions

These three terms are used to describe different levels of language. The most concrete is **utterance**: an utterance is created by speaking (or writing) a piece of language. If I say *Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny*, this is one utterance. If another person in the same room also says *Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny*, then we would be dealing with two utterances.

The Handbook of

Pragmatics

Edited by

Laurence R. Horn and Gregory Ward

Blackwell Publishing

to that audience. Thus it would seem that ethnographic studies of such relationships and the study of discourse should be central to speech act theory, but in fact, they are not. Such studies have been carried out rather independently of the concerns of those philosophers and linguists who have devoted their attention to speech acts. This is perhaps not a good thing, as Croft (1994) has argued, but since it is the case, anthropological and discourse-based approaches to speech acts will not be covered in this handbook entry.

1 Austin

The modern study of speech acts begins with Austin's (1962) engaging monograph *How to Do Things with Words*, the published version of his William James Lectures delivered at Harvard in 1955. This widely cited work starts with the observation that certain sorts of sentences, e.g., *I christen this ship the Joseph Stalin; I now pronounce you man and wife*, and the like, seem designed to **do** something, here to christen and wed, respectively, rather than merely to **say** something. Such sentences Austin dubbed PERFORMATIVES, in contrast to what he called CONSTATIVES, the descriptive sentences that until Austin were the principal concern of philosophers of language – sentences that seem, pretheoretically, at least, to be employed mainly for saying something rather than doing something.

While the distinction between performatives and constatives is often invoked in work on the law, in literary criticism, in political analysis, and in other areas, it is a distinction that Austin argued was **not** ultimately defensible. The point of Austin's lectures was, in fact, that every normal utterance has **both** a descriptive and an effective aspect: that saying something is also doing something.

1.1 *Locutions, illocutions, and perlocutions*

In place of the initial distinction between constatives and performatives, Austin substituted a three-way contrast among the kinds of acts that are performed when language is put to use, namely the distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, all of which are characteristic of most utterances, including standard examples of both performatives and constatives.

LOCUTIONARY ACTS, according to Austin, are acts **of** speaking, acts involved in the construction of speech, such as uttering certain sounds or making certain marks, using particular words and using them in conformity with the grammatical rules of a particular language and with certain senses and certain references as determined by the rules of the language from which they are drawn.

ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS, Austin's central innovation, are acts done **in** speaking (hence illocutionary), including and especially that sort of act that is the apparent purpose for using a performative sentence: christening, marrying, and so forth. Austin called attention to the fact that acts of stating or asserting, which are presumably illocutionary acts, are characteristic of the use of canonical constatives, and such sentences are, by assumption, not performatives. Furthermore, acts of ordering or requesting are typically accomplished by using imperative sentences, and acts of asking whether something is the case are properly accomplished by using interrogative sentences, though such forms are at best very dubious examples of performative sentences. In Lecture XXI of Austin (1962), the conclusion was drawn that the locutionary aspect of speaking is what we attend to most in the case of constatives, while in the case of the standard examples of performative sentences, we attend as much as possible to the illocution.

The third of Austin's categories of acts is the PERLOCUTIONARY ACT, which is a consequence or by-product of speaking, whether intended or not. As the name is designed to suggest, perlocutions are acts performed **by** speaking. According to Austin, perlocutionary acts consist in the production of effects upon the thoughts, feelings, or actions of the addressee(s), speaker, or other parties, such as causing people to refer to a certain ship as the Joseph Stalin, producing the belief that Sam and Mary should be considered man and wife, convincing an addressee of the truth of a statement, causing an addressee to feel a requirement to do something, and so on.

Austin (1962: 101) illustrates the distinction between these kinds of acts with the (now politically incorrect) example of saying "Shoot her!," which he trisects as follows:

Act (A) or Locution
He said to me "Shoot her!" meaning by *shoot* "shoot" and referring by *her* to "her."

Act (B) or Illocution
He urged (or advised, ordered, etc.) me to shoot her.

Act (C) or Perlocution
He persuaded me to shoot her.

Though it is crucial under Austin's system that we be able to distinguish fairly sharply between the three categories, it is often difficult in practice to draw the requisite lines. Especially irksome are the problems of separating illocutions and locutions, on the one hand, and illocutions and perlocutions on the other, the latter being the most troublesome problem according to Austin himself.

Austin's main suggestion for discriminating between an illocution and a perlocution was that the former is "*conventional*, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the latter could not" (Austin 1962: 103). This, however, is more a characterization of **possible** illocutionary act than a practicable test for the illocution of a particular sentence or an utterance of it. While the test can give direct evidence as to what is **not** an


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Emma. **2** to send sth so that it can be officially recorded: [Vn] *file a complaint.*

■ **ˈfiling cabinet** (*Brit*) (*US* **ˈfile cabinet**) *n* a piece of office furniture with deep drawers for storing files.

ˈfiling clerk (*US* **ˈfile clerk**) *n* a person who files letters, etc and does general office tasks.

file² /faɪl/ *n* a line of people or things one behind the other. IDM **(in) Indian/single ˈfile** (in) one line, one behind the other: *walking in single file along the narrow path.* See also THE RANK AND FILE.

▶ **file** *v* – **in, out, off, past, etc** to march or walk in the specified direction in a single line: [Vpr] *The men filed onto the parade-ground and past the general.* [Vp] *The children filed silently in.*

file³ /faɪl/ *n* a metal tool with a rough surface for cutting or shaping hard substances or for making them smooth. See also NAIL-FILE.

▶ **file** *v* to cut or shape sth or to make sth smooth with a file: [Vpr] *file through one's prison bars* [Vn, Vn-adj] *file one's fingernails (smooth)* [also Vnpr]. PHRV **ˌfile sth ˈdown** to make sth smooth and smaller in size by using a file. **filings** /ˈfaɪlɪŋz/ *n* [pl] the small pieces removed by a file: *iron filings.*

filial /ˈfɪliəl/ *adj* [usu attrib] of or expected from a son or daughter: *filial duty/affection.*

filibuster /ˈfɪlɪbʌstə(r)/ *n* (*esp US*) a long speech made in order to delay or prevent the making of decisions, eg in a parliament. ▶ **filibuster** *v* (*esp US*): [V] *filibustering tactics.*

filigree /ˈfɪlɪgriː/ *n* [U] fine ornamental work using gold, silver or copper wire: *a filigree brooch.*

filings ⇨ FILE³.

fill¹ /fɪl/ *v* **1**(**a**) – **sth** (**with sth**); – **sth** (**for sb**) to make sth full of sth; to occupy all of the space in sth: [Vnpr] *fill a hole with earth/a tank with petrol/a hall with people* ○ *Please fill this glass for me.* ○ *The tankard was filled to the brim.* ○ *The air was filled with a high-pitched whistling.* ○ (*fig*) *I am filled with admiration for his bravery.* [Vn] *Smoke filled the room.* ○ *fill a vacuum/a void* ○ *aim to fill a gap in the market* ○ *The wind filled the sails* (ie made them swell out). [Vn-adj] *fill a bucket full of water* [also Vnn]. (**b**) – (**with sth**) to become full: [V] *The hall soon filled.* [Vpr] *Her eyes suddenly filled with tears.* ○ *The sails filled with wind.* **2** – **sth** (**with sth**) to block a hole, gap, etc: [Vn] *The dentist filled two of my teeth.* [Vnpr] *I must fill that crack in the wall with plaster.* See also FILLING. **3** (**a**) to hold a position: [Vn] *She fills the post satisfactorily* (ie performs her duties well). (**b**) to appoint sb to a position: [Vn] *The vacancy has already been filled.* IDM **fill/fit the bill** ⇨ BILL¹. **fill sb's shoes** to take over sb's function, duties, etc and perform them in a satisfactory way. PHRV **ˌfill ˈin (for sb)** to take sb's place for a short time: *My partner is on holiday this week so I'm filling in (for him).* **ˌfill sth ˈin 1** (*US* also **ˌfill sth ˈout**) to add what is necessary to make sth complete: *fill in an application form* (ie write one's name and other details required) ○ *To order, fill in the coupon on p 54.* **2** to fill sth completely: *The hole has been filled in.* **3** to spend time while waiting for sth: *He filled in the rest of the day watching television.* **ˌfill sb ˈin (on sth)** to give sb full details about sth: *Can you fill me in on what has been happening?* **ˌfill ˈout** to become larger, rounder or fatter: *Her cheeks began to fill out.* ○ *He used to be a very thin child but he's filled out a lot recently.* **ˌfill sth ˈout** ⇨ FILL STH IN 1. **ˌfill (sth) ˈup** to become or make sth completely full: *The gutter has filled up with mud.* ○ *fill up the tank with oil.*

▶ **filler** *n* [U, C] a substance used to fill a hole in sth or to increase the size of sth. **ˈfiller cap** *n* a cap for covering the pipe through which petrol is put into a motor vehicle.

ˈfilling-station *n* = PETROL STATION.

fill² /fɪl/ *n* **1** [C] the amount needed to fill sth: *a fill of tobacco/petrol/oil.* **2** [U] **one's** – (**of sth/sb**) (*fml*) (**a**) as much as one can eat or drink. (**b**) as much as one can tolerate: *She felt she had had her fill of entertaining and needed a rest.*

fillet /ˈfɪlɪt; *US* fɪˈleɪ/ *n* [C, U] a piece of meat or fish without bones: *plaice fillets* ○ *a/some fillet steak.*

▶ **fillet** *v* to cut meat or fish into fillets: [Vn] *grilled filleted sole.*

filling /ˈfɪlɪŋ/ *n* **1** [C] (**a**) the process of using a substance to fill a hole in a tooth: *I had to have two fillings at the dentist's today.* (**b**) this substance in one tooth: *One of my fillings came out this morning.* **2** [C, U] food put between slices of bread to make a sandwich, or between layers of cake, etc: *pie fillings* ○ *a cake with jam filling.*

fillip /ˈfɪlɪp/ *n* a thing that stimulates or encourages sth; a BOOST *n*(2): *an advertising campaign to give a much-needed fillip to sales.*

filly /ˈfɪli/ *n* a young female horse. Compare COLT 1, MARE 1.

film¹ /fɪlm/ *n* **1** [C] (*esp Brit*) a story, etc recorded as a set of moving pictures to be shown on television or at the cinema; a MOVIE: *Have you seen the new 'Star Trek' film?* ○ *my favourite horror film* ○ *an international film festival* ○ *a film crew/producer/critic* ○ *a feature film* ○ *My cousin is in films* (ie works in the film industry). **2** [C, U] a roll or sheet of thin flexible plastic that is sensitive to light, for use in photography: *She put a new film in her camera.* ○ *expose/develop 50 feet of film.* ⇨ picture at CAMERA. **3** [C usu sing] – (**of sth**) a thin covering on or over sth: *a film of dust* ○ *a film of oil on water* ○ *A film of mist lay over the fields.*

▶ **filmy** *adj* [usu attrib] thin and almost transparent: *a filmy cotton blouse.*

■ **ˈfilm-maker** *n* (*esp Brit*) a person who makes films for television and the cinema.

ˈfilm star (*esp Brit*) (also *esp US* **movie star**) *n* a well-known cinema actor.

film² /fɪlm/ *v* to make a film¹(1) of a scene, story, etc: [Vn] *They're filming a new comedy.* ○ *A scene went wrong during the filming of 'Death Wish III'.* [Vn.ing] *The TV crew filmed the candidates speaking in the town square.* [V] *They've been filming on location for six months.* PHRV **ˌfilm ˈover** to become covered with a thin layer of sth: *Her eyes filmed over with tears.*

Filofax /ˈfaɪləʊfæks/ *n* (*propr*) a DIARY with pages that can be moved around, for recording information in as well as for making notes of appointments, etc.



filter /ˈfɪltə(r)/ *n* **1** a device containing paper, sand, cloth, etc that is used to hold back certain materials in a liquid or gas passed through it: *an ˈoil filter* ○ *a ˈcoffee filter* ○ *filter-paper* ○ *I only smoke cigarettes with filters.* ○ *Change the filter in your water-filter jug every two weeks.* ⇨ picture. **2** a screen that allows



4th Edition
Introduction to
Qualitative
Research Methods
A Guidebook and Resource
Steven J. Taylor
Robert Bogdan
Marjorie L. DeVault
WILEY

Paralleling the growing interest in qualitative research in sociology has been an increased acceptance of these methods in other disciplines and applied fields. Such diverse disciplines as geography (DeLyser, Herbert, Aitken, Crang, & McDowell, 2010; Hay, 2010), political science (McNabb, 2004), and psychology (Camic, Rhodes, & Yardley, 2003; Fischer, 2005; *Qualitative Research in Psychology*) have seen the publication of edited books, texts, and journals on qualitative research methods over the past decade and a half. The American Psychological Association started publishing the journal *Qualitative Psychology* in 2014. Qualitative methods have been used for program evaluation and policy research (Bogdan & Taylor, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; M. Q. Patton 1987, 2008, 2010, 2014; Rist 1994). Journals and texts on qualitative research can be found in such diverse applied areas of inquiry as health care and nursing (Latimer, 2003; Munhall, 2012; Streubert & Carpenter, 2010; *Qualitative Health Research*), mental health, counseling, and psychotherapy (Harper & Thompson, 2011; McLeod, 2011), education (Bogdan & Biklen, 2006; *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*; Lichtman, 2010; *Qualitative Research in Education*), music education (Conway, 2014), public health (Ulin, Robinson, & Tolley, 2005), business (Meyers, 2013), theology (Swinton & Mowat, 2006), disability studies (Ferguson et al., 1992), human development (Daly, 2007; Jessor, Colby, & Shweder, 1996), social work (Sherman & and Reid, 1994; *Qualitative Social Work*), and special education (Stainback & Stainback, 1988).

One does not have to be a sociologist or to think sociologically to practice qualitative research. Although we identify with a sociological tradition, qualitative approaches can be used in a broad range of disciplines and fields.

Just as significant as the increasing interest in qualitative research methods has been the proliferation of theoretical perspectives rooted in the phenomenological tradition underlying this form of inquiry. We consider the relationship between theory and methodology more fully later in this chapter.

QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY

The phrase *qualitative methodology* refers in the broadest sense to research that produces descriptive data—people's own written or spoken words and observable behavior. As Ray Rist (1977) pointed out, qualitative methodology, like quantitative methodology, is more than a set of data-gathering techniques. It is a way of approaching the empirical world. In this section we present our notion of qualitative research.

1. *Qualitative researchers are concerned with the meaning people attach to things in their lives*. Central to the phenomenological perspective and hence qualitative research is understanding people from their own frames of reference and


RESEARCH
METHODS
FOR EVERYDAY
LIFE
Blending Qualitative and
Quantitative Approaches
SCOTT W. VANDERSTOEP AND DEIRDRE D. JOHNSTON

- assume varying roles in the research process (e.g., data collection, data analysis)
- contribute specialized skills
- provide mutual internal checks on validity and reliability
- provide support to fellow team members

Lincoln and Guba warn that nonhuman instruments can only tap into the dimensions built into the instrument. In contrast, human instruments are shaped by experience and can respond and adapt to the research encounter. "[Nonhuman] instruments cannot reflect the constructions of the respondents, but only those of the instrument maker" (1981, p. 239).

An Example of Development of a Qualitative Instrument An interesting study that demonstrates the development of a qualitative instrument was conducted by John Robertson et al. (Robertson, Johnson, Benton, Janey, Cabral, & Woodford, 2002). In an effort to define gender constructs (e.g., "women are more ______," or "men are more ______"), Robertson showed respondents six drawings and asked respondents to describe the person who made each drawing and guess whether the artist was male or female. Robertson employed a team approach to data analysis. Using a Consensual Qualitative Research (CQR) system, team members were assigned to three- or four-person groups for data analysis. Working individually, each team member assessed similarities in meaning across the written responses and placed these sentences, words, or phrases into categories. Next, the individual proposed his or her categories to the team, and the team worked to develop consensus on the title and content of each category. The categories were then reviewed by auditors from another group. Only when the auditors and the original group reached consensus were the categories considered to be fully defined. The final step was reaching consensus among all coders to develop a final list of categories and their defining features. Redundancy in categories across the coding groups had to be eliminated. This process created a list of central ideas reflecting how people in the sample construct what "feminine" and "masculine" mean. The results? The three top constructs for females were: low self-esteem, emotionally distressed, and restricted/oppressed. The top constructs for males were more positive: successful/accomplished, adventuresome/risk-taker, strong/determined, and problem solver. The one negative construct associated with males was emotionally distressed.

Guiding Question #5: How Will Data Be Collected?

At this point it is important to understand the range of available data-collection techniques. Qualitative studies use **interviewing** (face-to-face question-and-answer process), **ethnographic observation** (observing people enacting culture), analysis of **documents and material culture** (written texts or cultural artifacts), and **visual analysis** (e.g., interpretation of mediated communication texts such as films or television programs).

Two questions should guide the data-collection process, according to Lincoln and Guba (1981). First, what is the degree of **fidelity** in the reproduction of the data? *Fidelity* refers to the purity of the recorded data in comparison to the actual lived experience being assessed. Consider, for example, the difference in fidelity between field notes describing a dance versus a videotape of the performance.


Matthew B. Miles ■ A. Michael Huberman ■ Johnny Saldaña
Qualitative
Data Analysis
A Methods Sourcebook
Edition 3

preoccupied with data condensation (calculating means, standard deviations), with display (correlation tables, regression printouts), and with conclusion drawing/verification (significance levels, experimental/control group differences). But their activities are carried out through well-defined, familiar methods; are guided by canons; and are usually more sequential than iterative or cyclical. Qualitative researchers are in a more fluid and more humanistic position.

Thus, as we've suggested, qualitative analysis needs to be well documented as a process—mainly to help us learn. We need to understand more clearly just what is going on when we analyze data, in order to reflect, refine our methods, and make them more generally usable by others.

Display 1.1

Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model



Source: Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Suggestions for Readers

Recommendations for what a reader should do with any particular book are often presumptuous, mistaken, or both. Authors have no control over who reads their books or what readers may find useful. Nevertheless, we offer a few suggestions for different types of users.

Students and Other Novice Researchers

We give some direct advice here, keeping in mind that you will often be working alone, usually on a single case, and may be feeling worried about the quality of your study—dissertation or not.

1. *This book* focuses on *analysis*. Use other, introductory books to help with the basics of fieldwork (see the Appendix for recommended titles and resources).
2. Learn by doing. Use your own study (whether it is in the planning stage or under way) as a vehicle and apply it to relevant methods in each chapter.
3. Compensate for the problem of having to work alone by finding someone to be a critical friend or mentor to respond to your work as you proceed.
4. Keep an informal log or journal of what you are running up against. This tactic will help your learning and will be useful when you write up your study.
5. Don't worry about the jargon-like names of particular displays; the issue is what a display can do for you.
6. The biggest enemy of your learning is the gnawing worry that you're not "doing it right." Dissertation work tends to encourage that. But any given analytic problem can be approached in many useful ways. Creativity—that is, inventing your way out of a problem—is definitely the better stance.

Experienced Researchers

This is a sourcebook. Colleagues have told us that they have used it in several ways:

1. *Browsing:* The book contains a wide range of material, so simply exploring it in an unstructured way can be fruitful.
2. *Problem solving:* Anyone opening the book comes to it with more or less specifically defined problems in doing qualitative data analysis. The index has been designed to be "problem sensitive" to permit easy access to appropriate sections of the book. The Contents can also be used in this way.
3. *"A to Z":* Some readers prefer to go through a book sequentially, from start to finish. We have organized the book so that it makes sense that way.
4. *Operational use:* For readers conducting an ongoing qualitative research project, either alone or with colleagues, it's useful to read particular sections focusing on upcoming analysis tasks (e.g., the formation of research questions, coding, time-ordered displays), then discuss them with available colleagues, and finally plan the next steps in the project, revising the methods outlined here or developing new ones.
5. *Research consulting:* The book can be used by people with an advisory or consulting role in the start-up and ongoing life of research projects. Assuming good problem identification, a research consultant can work with the client in either a problem-solving or a direct-training mode to aid in thoughtful project design and coping with early problems.

Teachers of Qualitative Research Methods Courses

Some colleagues have used this book as a primary text, others as a supplementary one. In either case, our advice is to engage students in active data collection and analysis. The book is not designed to be helpful in the type of methods course that is "about" qualitative research and provides no direct experience in doing it. Actual data are needed.

For each topic, we have used a learning approach like this, carried out by individuals or working pairs, who stay together throughout a workshop:

1. *Introductory* lecture and/or reading to clarify the main conceptual points of the section
2. A brief learning task (e.g., drawing a conceptual framework, coding a data excerpt, designing a matrix template, drawing a network, interpreting a filled-out matrix, or writing an initial analysis)
3. Comparing the products of individuals or pairs, drawing generalizations, and discussing future applications of the method

The same general principles apply when the book is used in a semester-long course, although the coverage will be deeper. Interim exercises focusing on actual research tasks, critiqued in class, are particularly productive. Active, reflective self-documentation through personal logs or journals is also beneficial.

Closure and Transition

This Introduction provided some brief groundwork for the rest of the book. Analysis is doing, so let's proceed in the next chapter to preparatory research design decisions that will later play important roles in analytic work.

METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION

Chapter · July 2016

1 author:

Syed Muhammad Sajjad Kabir
Curtin University

methods encompass multifaceted approaches that combine to capitalize on strengths and reduce weaknesses that stem from using a single research design. Using this approach to gather and evaluate data may assist to increase the validity and reliability of the research. Some of the common areas in which mixed-method approaches may be used include –

- Initiating, designing, developing and expanding interventions;
- Evaluation;
- Improving research design; and
- Corroborating findings, data triangulation or convergence.

Some of the challenges of using a mixed methods approach include –

- Delineating complementary qualitative and quantitative research questions;
- Time-intensive data collection and analysis; and
- Decisions regarding which research methods to combine.

Mixed methods are useful in highlighting complex research problems such as disparities in health and can also be transformative in addressing issues for vulnerable or marginalized populations or research which involves community participation. Using a mixed-methods approach is one way to develop creative options to traditional or single design approaches to research and evaluation.

There are many ways of classifying data. A common classification is based upon who collected the data.

PRIMARY DATA

Data that has been collected from first-hand-experience is known as primary data. Primary data has not been published yet and is more reliable, authentic and objective. Primary data has not been changed or altered by human beings; therefore its validity is greater than secondary data.

Importance of Primary Data: In statistical surveys it is necessary to get information from primary sources and work on primary data. For example, the statistical records of female population in a country cannot be based on newspaper, magazine and other printed sources. A research can be conducted without secondary data but a research based on only secondary data is least reliable and may have biases because secondary data has already been manipulated by human beings. One of such sources is old and secondly they contain limited information as well as they can be misleading and biased.

Sources of Primary Data: Sources for primary data are limited and at times it becomes difficult to obtain data from primary source because of either scarcity of population or lack of cooperation. Following are some of the sources of primary data.

Experiments: Experiments require an artificial or natural setting in which to perform logical study to collect data. Experiments are more suitable for medicine, psychological studies, nutrition and for other scientific studies. In experiments the experimenter has to keep control over the influence of any extraneous variable on the results.

Survey: Survey is most commonly used method in social sciences, management, marketing and psychology to some extent. Surveys can be conducted in different methods.

Questionnaire: It is the most commonly used method in survey. Questionnaires are a list of questions either open-ended or close-ended for which the respondents give answers. Questionnaire can be conducted via telephone, mail, live in a public area, or in an institute, through electronic mail or through fax and other methods.

Interview: Interview is a face-to-face conversation with the respondent. In interview the main problem arises when the respondent deliberately hides information otherwise it is an in depth source of information. The interviewer can not only record the statements the interviewee speaks

Statistical methods are the methods of collecting, summarizing, analyzing, and interpreting variable(s) in numerical data. Statistical methods can be contrasted with deterministic methods, which are appropriate where observations are exactly reproducable or are assumed to be so. Data collection involves deciding what to observe in order to obtain information relevant to the questions whose answers are required, and then making the observations. Sampling involves choice of a sufficient number of observations representing an appropriate population. Experiments with variable outcomes should be conducted according to principles of experimental design. Data summarization is the calculation of appropriate statistics and the display of such information in the form of tables, graphs, or charts. Data may also be adjusted to make different samples more comparable, using ratios, compensating factors, etc.

Statistical analysis relates observed statistical data to theoretical models, such as probability distributions or models used in regression analysis. By estimating parameters in the proposed model and testing hypotheses about rival models, one can assess the value of the information collected and the extent to which the information can be applied to similar situations. Statistical prediction is the application of the model thought to be most appropriate, using the estimated values of the parameters. More recently, less formal methods of looking at data have been proposed, including exploratory data analysis.

9.5 METHODS OF SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION

Secondary data is the data that is collected from the primary sources which can be used in the current research study. Collecting secondary data often takes considerably less time than collecting primary data where you would have to gather every information from scratch. It is thus possible to gather more data this way.

Secondary data can be obtained from two different research strands -

- Quantitative: Census, housing, social security as well as electoral statistics and other related databases.
- Qualitative: Semi-structured and structured interviews, focus groups transcripts, field notes, observation records and other personal, research-related documents.

Secondary data is often readily available. After the expense of electronic media and internet the availability of secondary data has become much easier.

Published Printed Sources: There are varieties of published printed sources. Their credibility depends on many factors. For example, on the writer, publishing company and time and date when published. New sources are preferred and old sources should be avoided as new technology and researches bring new facts into light.

Books: Books are available today on any topic that you want to research. The use of books start before even you have selected the topic. After selection of topics books provide insight on how much work has already been done on the same topic and you can prepare your literature review. Books are secondary source but most authentic one in secondary sources.

Journals/periodicals: Journals and periodicals are becoming more important as far as data collection is concerned. The reason is that journals provide up-to-date information which at times books cannot and secondly, journals can give information on the very specific topic on which you are researching rather talking about more general topics.

Magazines/Newspapers: Magazines are also effective but not very reliable. Newspapers on the other hand are more reliable and in some cases the information can only be obtained from newspapers as in the case of some political studies.