

# COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS

FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE

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that it could be represented equally by just any other sequence is proved by differences among languages and by the very existence of different languages: the signified "ox" has as its signifier *b-ō-f* on one side of the border and *o-k-s* (*Ochs*) on the other.

No one disputes the principle of the arbitrary nature of the sign, but it is often easier to discover a truth than to assign to it its proper place. Principle I dominates all the linguistics of language; its consequences are numberless. It is true that not all of them are equally obvious at first glance; only after many detours does one discover them, and with them the primordial importance of the principle.

One remark in passing: when semiology becomes organized as a science, the question will arise whether or not it properly includes modes of expression based on completely natural signs, such as pantomime. Supposing that the new science welcomes them, its main concern will still be the whole group of systems grounded on the arbitrariness of the sign. **In fact, every means of expression used in society is based, in principle, on collective behavior or—what amounts to the same thing—on convention.** Polite formulas, for instance, though often imbued with a certain natural expressiveness (as in the case of a Chinese who greets his emperor by bowing down to the ground nine times), are nonetheless fixed by rule; it is this rule and not the intrinsic value of the gestures that obliges one to use them. Signs that are wholly arbitrary realize better than the others the ideal of the semiological process; that is why language, the most complex and universal of all systems of expression, is also the most characteristic; in this sense linguistics can become the master-pattern for all branches of semiology although language is only one particular semiological system.

**The word *symbol* has been used to designate the linguistic sign, or more specifically, what is here called the signifier.** Principle I in particular weighs against the use of this term. One characteristic of the symbol is that it is never wholly arbitrary; it is not empty, for there is the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other symbol, such as a chariot.

The word *arbitrary* also calls for comment. The term should not

imply that the choice of the signifier is left entirely to the speaker (we shall see below that the individual does not have the power to change a sign in any way once it has become established in the linguistic community); I mean that it is unmotivated, i.e. arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified.

In concluding let us consider two objections that might be raised to the establishment of Principle I:

1) *Onomatopoeia* might be used to prove that the choice of the signifier is not always arbitrary. But onomatopoeic formations are never organic elements of a linguistic system. Besides, their number is much smaller than is generally supposed. Words like French *fouet* 'whip' or *glas* 'knell' may strike certain ears with suggestive sonority, but to see that they have not always had this property we need only examine their Latin forms (*fouet* is derived from *fāgus* 'beech-tree,' *glas* from *classicum* 'sound of a trumpet'). The quality of their present sounds, or rather the quality that is attributed to them, is a fortuitous result of phonetic evolution.

As for authentic onomatopoeic words (e.g. *glug-glug*, *tick-tock*, etc.), not only are they limited in number, but also they are chosen somewhat arbitrarily, for they are only approximate and more or less conventional imitations of certain sounds (cf. English *bow-wow* and French *ouaoua*). In addition, once these words have been introduced into the language, they are to a certain extent subjected to the same evolution—phonetic, morphological, etc.—that other words undergo (cf. *pigeon*, ultimately from Vulgar Latin *pīpiō*, derived in turn from an onomatopoeic formation): obvious proof that they lose something of their original character in order to assume that of the linguistic sign in general, which is unmotivated.

2) *Interjections*, closely related to onomatopoeia, can be attacked on the same grounds and come no closer to refuting our thesis. One is tempted to see in them spontaneous expressions of reality dictated, so to speak, by natural forces. But for most interjections we can show that there is no fixed bond between their signified and their signifier. We need only compare two languages on this point to see how much such expressions differ from one language to the next (e.g. the English equivalent of French *aié!* is *ouch!*). We know, moreover, that many interjections were once

# INTRODUCTION TO COMMUNICATION STUDIES

JOHN FISKE



ROUTLEDGE

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## 5 SIGNIFICATION

Saussure's theories on the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations of the sign take us only so far towards understanding how signs work. Saussure was interested primarily in the linguistic system, secondarily in how that system related to the reality to which it referred, and hardly at all in how it related to the reader and his or her socio-cultural position. He was interested in the complex ways in which a sentence can be constructed and in the way its form determines its meaning; he was much less interested in the fact that the same sentence may convey different meanings to different people in different situations.

In other words, he did not really envisage meaning as being a process of negotiation between writer/reader and text. He emphasized the text, not the way in which the signs in the text interact with the cultural and personal experience of the user (and it is *not* important here to distinguish between writer and reader), nor the way that the conventions in the text interact with the conventions experienced and expected by the user. It was Saussure's follower, Roland Barthes, who first set up a systematic model by which this negotiating, interactive idea of meaning could be analysed. At the heart of **Barthes's theory is the idea of two orders of signification.**

### Denotation

The first order of signification is the one on which Saussure worked. It describes the relationship between the signifier and signified within the sign, and of the sign with its referent in external reality. Barthes refers to this order as denotation. This refers to the common-sense, obvious



# MESSAGES, SIGNS, AND MEANINGS:

A Basic Textbook in Semiotics  
and Communication Theory

Third Edition

Studies in Linguistic and Cultural Anthropology

Marcel Danesi

- If it is the color of the flag used by someone at a construction site, then it is a signal of “danger.”
- If it is used in an expression such as “turning red,” then it is a figure of speech that allows people to refer to emotional states without naming them precisely.

In sum, *red* is an example of a *sign*. It is something, *X* (a color), that stands for something else, *Y* (a traffic signal, a political ideology and so on). Describing and investigating the nature of the  $X = Y$  relation constitutes, *tout court*, the subject matter of semiotics. The distinguishing characteristic of our species is its remarkable ability to portray the world in this way—that is, to use *X*'s such as colors, pictures, vocal sounds, hand gestures, and the like to refer to things. This ability is the reason why, over time, the human species has come to be regulated not by force of natural selection, but by “force of history,” that is, by the accumulated meanings that previous generations have captured, preserved, and passed on in the form of signs. As opposed to Nature, Culture is everywhere “meaningful,” everywhere the result of an innate need to seek meaning to existence.

Since the middle part of the twentieth century, semiotics has grown into a truly enormous field of study, encompassing, among other endeavors, the study of body language, art forms, rhetorical discourse, visual communication, media, myths, narratives, language, artifacts, gesture, eye contact, clothing, advertising, cuisine, rituals—in a phrase, anything that is used, invented, or adopted by human beings to produce meaning. The purpose of this chapter is to sketch a general picture of what semiotics is and purports to do, introducing its fundamental notions and principles.

## SIGNS

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A sign is anything—a color, a gesture, a wink, an object, a mathematical equation, etc.—that stands for something other than itself. The word *red*, as we saw, qualifies as a sign because it does not stand for the sounds *r-e-d* that comprise it, but rather for a certain kind of color and other things.

Actually, the term *semeiotics* (spelled in this way) was coined by Hippocrates (460–377 BC), the founder of Western medical science, as the science of symptoms. The symptom, Hippocrates claimed, was a *semeion*—the Greek word for a physical “mark” or “sign.” Unraveling *what* a symptom

**A THEORY OF  
SEMIOTICS**

BY UMBERTO ECO

I am only assuming that semiotics cannot define these subjects except within its own theoretical framework, in the same way in which, examining referents as contents, it does not deny the existence of physical things and states of the world, but assigns their verification (and their analysis in terms of concrete properties, change, truth and falsity) to other types of approach.

In this book semiotics has been provided with a paramount subject matter, *semiosis*. Semiosis is the process by which empirical subjects communicate, communication processes being made possible by the organization of signification systems. Empirical subjects, from a semiotic point of view, can only be defined and isolated as manifestations of this double (systematic and processual) aspect of semiosis. This is not a metaphysical statement, but a methodological one; physics knows Caesar and Brutus as spatio-temporal events defined by an interrelationship of elementary particles and must not be concerned with the motivation of their acts, nor with ethical evaluation of the result of these acts. Semiotics treats subjects of semiotic acts in the same way: either they can be defined in terms of semiotic structures or – from this point of view – they do not exist at all.


As Peirce said: “Since man can think only by means of words or other external symbols, these might turn round and say: ‘You mean nothing which we have not taught you, and then only so far as you address some word as the interpretant of your thought’. In fact, therefore, men and words reciprocally educate each other; each increase of a man’s information involves, and is involved by, a corresponding increase of a word’s information . . . . It is that the word or sign which man uses IS the man itself. For, as the fact that every thought is a sign, taken in conjunction that life is a train of thought, proves that man is a sign; so that every thought is an *external* sign, proves that man is an external sign. That is to say, the man and the external signs are identical, in the same sense in which the words *homo* and *man* are identical. Thus my language is the sum total of myself: for the man is the thought” (Peirce, 5.313-314).

Obviously when empirical subjects are able to criticize the ideological adjustment of a signification system, one is witnessing a concrete act of social practice; but this act is made possible by the fact that a code can



H A N D B O O K O F

# SEMIOTICS



W I N F R I E D N Ö T H

## 2. The Sign as a Triadic Relation

As a phenomenon of thirdness, the sign participates in the three categories as follows (Peirce § 2.274): there is a first, called *representamen*, which stands in a triadic relation to a second, called its *object*, "as to be capable of determining a third, called its *interpretant*." For partial terminological equivalents to this triad in other triadic models of the sign, see Sign (3.).

### 2.1 The Sign and the Process of Semiosis

Peirce defined the sign in terms of a triadic process, called semiosis.

#### 2.1.1 Peirce's Definition of the Sign

In his definitions of the sign, Peirce introduced an idiosyncratic and often changing terminology which has been adopted by few of his followers. In neutral terms, Peirce once referred to his sign model as consisting of a "triple connection of *sign, thing signified, cognition produced in the mind*" (§ 1.372). One of his more elaborate definitions is:

A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea. (§ 2.228)

One of the central tenets of Peirce's semiotics is its relational or *functional* character of the sign (see also Greenlee 1973: 23-33). Signs are not a class of objects. They exist only in the mind of the interpreter: "Nothing is a sign unless it is interpreted as a sign" (§ 2.308).

#### 2.1.2 Semiosis

Peirce (§ 5.472) defined this triadic "action of the sign," this process in which the sign has a cognitive effect on its interpreter (§ 5.484), as *semiosis* (or *semiosis*). Strictly speaking, semiosis, and not the sign, is thus the proper object of semiotic study (cf. Fisch 1978: 42). In one of his definitions, "*semiotic* is the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis" (Peirce § 5.488). The term *semiosis* is derived from a treatise of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus (cf. Fisch 1978: 41). Peirce explained that "σημειωσις" [...] meant the action of almost any kind of sign; and my definition confers on anything that so acts the title of a 'sign'" (§ 5.484).

### 2.2 The Representamen

*Representamen* is Peirce's term for the "perceptible object" (§ 2.230) functioning as a sign. Other semioticians have designated this correlate of the sign as the *symbol* (Ogden & Richards), the *sign vehicle* (Morris), the *signifier* (Saussure), or *expression* (Hjelmslev). Peirce also described it as "a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without," as the sign in its "own material nature" or "as in itself" (§§ 1.339, 8.333-34). Theoretically, Peirce distinguished clearly between the sign, which is the complete triad, and the representamen, which is its first correlate. Terminologically, however, there is an occasional ambiguity because Peirce sometimes also used the less technical term *sign* instead of *representamen* (for example, §§ 2.230, 8.332). Once, Peirce even speaks of the "sign or representamen" (§§ 2.228-29), but in this context his term for the sign vehicle is *ground*.

### 2.3 Object

Peirce's second correlate of the sign, the object, corresponds to the *referent* of other models of the sign (see Sign 3.2; cf. also Meaning).

#### 2.3.1 Definition of the Object

The object is that which the sign "represents," usually "something else," but in the borderline case of *self-reference*, representamen and object can also be the same entity (Peirce §§ 2.230). This correlate can be a material "object of the world" with which we have a "perceptual ac-

quaintance" (§ 2.330) or a merely mental or imaginary entity "of the nature of a sign or thought" (§ 1.538). It can be a "single known existing thing" (§ 2.232) or a class of things. "The Sign can only represent the Object and tell about it. It cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object. [...] It presupposes an acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it" (§ 2.231).

### 2.3.2 Immediate and Dynamical Object

Peirce distinguished between two kinds of objects (cf. Eco 1976a and Deledalle 1981), the *immediate* and the *mediate* or *dynamical* object. The immediate object is the "Object within the Sign" (1977b: 83), the object "as the Sign itself represents it, and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Representation of it in the Sign" (§ 4.536). It is thus a mental representation of an object, whether this object actually "exists" or not. The mediate, real, or dynamical object is the "Object outside of the Sign" (1977b: 83). It is "the Reality which by some means contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation" (§ 4.536) or that "which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot express, which it can only *indicate* and leave the interpreter to find out by *collateral experience*" (§ 8.314). Peirce's definitions of the dynamical object seem to have committed him to an ontological realism, but in fact, his semiotic philosophy has overcome the realism-idealism dichotomy (cf. Oehler 1981a). Hesitating to use the term *real object*, Peirce added "perhaps the Object is altogether fictive" (§ 8.314).

### 2.4 The Interpretant

*Interpretant* is Peirce's term for the meaning of a sign. Occasionally, Peirce defined it as "significance" (§ 8.179), "signification," or "interpretation" (§ 8.184).

#### 2.4.1 Pragmatic and Sign Nature of the Interpretant

Peirce gave a pragmatic account of the nature of meaning (cf. Gentry 1952, Alston 1956: 82-85) when he defined the interpretant as "the proper significate outcome" or "effect of the sign" (§§ 5.474-75), or as "something created in the Mind of the Interpreter" (§ 8.179). In accordance with his theory of thought being a sign and his view of interpretation as a process of semiosis, Peirce also defined the interpretant as a sign: "A sign addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign" (§ 2.228).

#### 2.4.2 Unlimited Semiosis

Since every sign creates an interpretant which in turn is the representamen of a second sign, semiosis results in a "series of successive interpretants" *ad infinitum* (Peirce §§ 2.303, 2.92). There is no "first" nor "last" sign in this process of unlimited semiosis. Nor does the idea of infinite semiosis imply a vicious circle. It refers instead to the very modern idea that "thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue—a dialogue between different phases of the *ego*—so that, being dialogical, it is essentially composed of signs" (§ 4.6). Since "every thought must address itself to some other" (§ 5.253), the continuous process of semiosis (or thinking) can only be "interrupted," but never really be "ended" (§ 5.284). As Gallie points out, "this endless series is essentially a *potential* one. Peirce's point is that any actual interpretant of a given sign *can* theoretically be interpreted in some further sign, and that in another without any necessary end being reached. [...] The exigencies of practical life inevitably cut short such potentially endless development" (1966: 126).

#### 2.4.3 The Three Interpretants

Differentiating between the effects of the sign on the interpreter's mind, and in application of his triadic categorial principles, Peirce distinguished three main types of interpretant (§§ 4.536, 5.475-76, 8.314-15, 8.343; cf. Gentry 1952, Greenlee 1973: 117ff., Eco 1976a, Almeder 1980: 28). The first category is the *immediate* interpretant. It is "the *Quality* of the

Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not any actual reaction" (§ 8.315). In accordance with his definition of firstness, Peirce defined the immediate interpretant as a semantic *potentiality*: "I understand it to be the total unanalyzed effect that the Sign is calculated to produce, or naturally might be expected to produce [...], the effect the sign first produces or may produce upon a mind, without any reflection upon it." It refers to the "peculiar Interpretability" of the sign "before it gets any Interpreter" (1977b: 110-11). The second category is the *dynamical* interpretant. It is the "direct effect actually produced by a Sign upon an Interpreter of it, [...], that which is experienced in each act of Interpretation and is different in each from that of any other" (*ibid.*).

The third category, the *final* interpretant, is associated with the third category of habit and law. "It is that which *would finally* be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached" (§ 8.184) or "the one Interpretative result to which every Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered" (1977b: 111). Meaning as studied in lexicology would be a study of final interpretants. Peirce furthermore distinguished between the *emotional*, the *energetic*, and the logical interpretant. This typology has been interpreted by some as synonymous with the above trichotomy (cf. Greenlee 1973: 117), while others (cf. Fitzgerald 1966: 80, Almeder 1980: 28) have interpreted it as a subdivision of the dynamical interpretant.

### 3. Peirce's Classification of Signs

Peirce developed an elaborate typology of signs (§§ 2.233-71), beginning with a triadic classification of the sign correlates representamen, object, and interpretant into three trichotomies. Considering the possibilities of combining firstness, secondness, and thirdness, he arrived at ten major classes of signs. Later, Peirce postulated ten trichotomies and sixty-six and even  $3^{10} = 59,049$  classes of signs (§§ 1.291, 4.530, 8.343; cf. Sanders 1970).

#### 3.1 First Trichotomy

From the point of view of the representamen, Peirce subdivided signs into *qualisigns* (belonging to the category of firstness; cf. 1.4), *sinsigns* or *tokens* (secondness), and *legisigns* or *types* (thirdness) "according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law" (§ 2.243). "A *Qualisign* is a quality which is a Sign. It cannot actually act as a sign until it is embodied" (§ 2.244), but in this case it is already a *sinsign*. The representamen of a *sinsign* or token is "an actual existent thing or event" (a "*singular*" sign) (§ 2.245).

"A *Legisign* is a law that is a Sign. [...] Every conventional sign is a legisign. It is not a single object, but a general type which, it has been agreed, shall be significant." Thus, every word of a language is a legisign. But in an individual utterance, the word is also a *sinsign*. Peirce defined such *sinsigns* which are occurrences of legisigns as *replicas*: "Every legisign signifies through an instance of its application, which may be termed a *Replica* of it. Thus, the word 'the' will usually occur from fifteen to twenty-five times on a page. It is in all these occurrences one and the same word, the same legisign. Each single instance of it is a *Replica*. The *Replica* is a *Sinsign*" (§ 2.246). In linguistics, Peirce's distinction between legisigns and replicas has been widely adopted, but the terms generally used are *type* (for *legisign*) and *token* (for *replica*).

#### 3.2 Second Trichotomy: Icon, Index, Symbol

This trichotomy classifies signs with respect to the relation between the representamen and object (cf. Burks 1949). Peirce referred to this trichotomy as "the most fundamental division of signs" (§ 2.275). The three members of this trichotomy are *icon* (firstness), *index* (secondness), and *symbol* (thirdness). Peirce's definition of the first class is discussed in detail in Icon (1). For his criteria of indexicality, see Typology (4.2.2). The symbol, according to Peirce, is the category

of arbitrary and conventional signs: "A *Symbol* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas" (§ 2.449). "Any ordinary word as 'give,' 'bird,' 'marriage,' is an example of a *symbol*" (§ 2.298). "Every symbol is necessarily a *legisign*" (§ 8.335).

### 3.3 The Third Trichotomy

According to the nature of the interpretant, a sign is either a *rheme*, a *dicent*, or an *argument*. This trichotomy "corresponds to the old division [of logic], Term, Proposition, and Argument, modified so as to be applicable to signs generally" (§ 8.337). A term is "simply a class-name or proper-name," while a rheme is "any sign that is not true nor false, like almost any single word except 'yes' and 'no'" (§ 8.337). A rheme (Gr.  $\rho\eta\mu\alpha$  "word") is a "simple or substitutive sign" (§ 2.309). It is a "Sign of qualitative Possibility [ . . . ] representing such and such a kind of possible Object" (§ 2.250).

A *dicent* (or *dicisign*) "is a Sign of actual existence" (§ 2.251). Like a proposition, it is an "informational sign" (§ 2.309), but it "does not assert" (§ 8.337). "The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a *Dicisign* or not is that a *Dicisign* is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons for being so" (§ 2.310). An argument is "a Sign of law" (§ 2.252), "namely, the law that the passage from all such premises to such conclusions tends to the truth" (§ 2.263). While a *dicent* only affirms the existence of an object, the argument proves its truth.

### 3.4 Ten Principal Classes of Signs

Since every sign is determined by its three correlates, and there are three ways in which every correlate may be characterized, as summarized in Figure P 2, there are theoretically  $3^3 = 27$  possible classes of signs. However, some of the possible combinations are semiotically impossible. For example, a qualisign can be only iconic and thematic, a sinsign cannot be a symbol, and an index cannot be an argument. Such restrictions reduce the number of valid combinations to the following ten principal classes of signs (§§ 2.254-63, 8.341). The semiotically superfluous (presupposed) characterizations are placed in parentheses:

Trichotomy Category	I of the represent- tamen	II of relation to object	III of relation to interpretant
Firstness	qualisign (icon)	icon	rheme
Secondness	sinsign (index)	index	dicent
Thirdness	legisign (symbol)	symbol	argument

Fig. P 2.  
Peirce's three trichotomies of signs.

- I. 1. (Rhematic) *Iconic Qualisign*: "a feeling of 'red.'"
- II. 2. (Rhematic) *Iconic Sinsign*: "an individual diagram."
3. *Rhematic Indexical Sinsign*: "a spontaneous cry."
4. *Dicent (Indexical) Sinsign*: "a weathercock."
- III. 5. (Rhematic) *Iconic Legisign*: "a diagram, apart from its factual individuality."
6. *Rhematic Indexical Legisign*: "a demonstrative pronoun."
7. *Dicent Indexical Legisign*: "a street cry," traffic signs, commands.
8. *Rhematic Symbolic Legisign*: "a common noun."
9. *Dicent Symbolic Legisign*: "an ordinary proposition."
10. *Argument (Symbolic Legisign)*: "a syllogism."

## 4. Text Semiotic Studies on Peircean Foundations

Parallel to Peircean approaches to language and linguistics, there have been text semiotic studies on Peircean principles since the 1960s. These studies have shown that semiotic features of texts can be revealed with respect to all three

correlates of the Peircean sign, its representamen, its object relation, and its interpretant.

#### 4.1 Survey of Research

The earliest Peircean approaches to the study of texts were proposed in the framework of Bense's (1962) Stuttgart School of Semiotics. A paper by Walther (1962), entitled *Textsemiotik*, was the first in a series of studies concerned with the application of Peirce's typology of signs to mostly literary texts (Walther 1965a, 1965b; 1971, Gerhardt 1969). The foundations of this approach are outlined in Bense (1967: 73-79; 1969: 91-96). Other analytic studies of literary texts on Peircean principles are Browne (1971), Pignatari (1974), Zoest (1974), Nöth (1980: 66-100), and Eco & Sebeok, eds. (1983). The theory of literature and literary semiotics is examined from the point of view of Peircean semiotics by Köller (1977; 1980), Sheriff (1981), and Johansen (1986a). Other areas in the field of text semiotics which have become topics of research from a Peircean point of view are rhetoric, stylistics (Kirstein 1982, Podlewski 1982), and the theory of metaphor (Gumpel 1984).

The main concern of Bense's text semiotic research was the classification of texts in aesthetic and semantic respects (cf. 1967: 73). However, the essence of textual, and particularly literary, signs cannot be exhausted by a merely taxonomic approach. Within the Peircean framework, a given sign cannot be assigned unambiguously to one class only. Its classification can change with its function, history, the perspective and process of its interpretation. An essential insight into the nature of texts gained from Peirce's semiotics is that "language signs do not have a static structure but form a dynamic event, and that language cannot be adequately studied from the perspective of *system*, but only from the perspective of *process*" (Köller 1977: 73). The following quote can therefore be taken as a motto of text semiotic research in the spirit of Peirce: "Symbols grow. They come into being by development out of other signs, particularly from icons, or from mixed signs partaking of the nature of icons and symbols. [...] A symbol, once in being, spreads among the peoples. In use and in experience, its meaning grows" (§ 2.302).

#### 4.2 Textual Representamen

As Bense points out (1967: 73-74), the textual representamen can be qualisign, sinsign, or legisign. Only the study of the particular case can reveal the dominant sign character of a given text. Texts, like all language signs, consist in the first place of legisigns, since they are signs that belong to the repertoire of a general code. This is the most general characterization of textuality. However, in every specific act of text production and text reception, the representamen is a sinsign, being unique in time, space, and communicative situation. More specific features which make a text a sinsign are its characteristics of style, textual originality, and creativity (cf. *ibid.*).

The focus is on the text as a qualisign, whenever its phonetic-graphemic quality, its visual or sound effects, are considered. In a Peircean interpretation, the Jakobsonian poetic function ("focus on the message for its own sake"; cf. Poetry 1.2) is one of a qualisign. Poeticalness of deviation (see Poetry 2.2), by contrast, is based on sinsigns. The legisign character of poetry and literary texts lies in their historical codification through the codes of rhetoric and poetic theory. In Peirce's own aesthetics, art and literature are essentially associated with the category of firstness. The essence of aesthetic creation has to do with "qualities of feelings" (Peirce § 1.43, cf. Sheriff 1981: 66), thus with qualisigns.

#### 4.3 Icon, Index, Symbol

Also from the point of view of its object relation, the textual sign is polyfunctional (see also Johansen 1986a: 115). The text is a symbol insofar as it consists of arbitrary signs. It is predominantly indexical when its primary function is conative (appellative), as in commands, instructions, questions (cf. Bense 1967: 74). Dramatic

texts are predominantly indexical (cf. Theater 3.3.3). Indexicality is furthermore characteristic of realism in literature (cf. Betterini 1971) because of the textual reference to persons, objects, and events in a (more or less) precise temporal, spatial, and social setting.

Textual iconicity can have the form of an *image*, a *diagram*, or a *metaphor* (cf. Icon 1.3). Visual poetry, depicting its objects in the form of its typography (cf. Whiteside 1988), and onomatopoeic poems are examples of texts functioning as images. A case of diagrammatic iconicity is the *ordo naturalis*, the natural order in a narrative (cf. Browne 1971: 337): the sequence of the textual signs is a linear icon of the sequence of events depicted in the text. Jakobson (1965: 27) quoted Caesar's "veni, vidi, vici" (I came, I saw, I conquered) as an example. For further aspects of textual iconicity, see Literature (2.1) and Metaphor (4).

#### 4.4 Interpretant and Interpretation

From the point of view of its interpretant, the text is a rheme when it is incomplete, when it has a predominantly expressive function, or when its structure is open to many interpretations (cf. Bense 1967: 75). The rheme, as the sign of possibility, and not of factuality, is characteristic of literary and poetic textuality. The essence of fiction and imagination is of a rhematic nature (cf. Johansen 1986a).

Descriptive texts, whether fictional or nonfictional, have the character of a dicent, since they are informational, but nonassertive (cf. 3.3). Scientific and legal texts are predominantly arguments as to their interpretant. From a pragmatic point of view, texts can further be characterized as having different interpretants according to their effects on their interpreters (cf. Kirstein 1982). In this respect, the categories of the dynamical and final interpretant are particularly relevant. Texts that arouse emotions or provoke immediate action, such as Larmoyant novels, literature of agitation, and party advertising, have a dynamical interpretant. The final interpretant is predominant in legal texts and in texts that tend to result in new habits, such as ideologies or fashions.

Triad Color Scheme

How Colors Impact Our Daily Life  
In Business, Art, Work And Love

# The Meaning Of Colors

By: *Herman Cerrato*

Tertiary Color Scheme

Complimentary Color Scheme





## Colors

**M**ore recently, studies have shown that colors can affect you when you don't see them. Noted neuropsychologist Kurt Goldstein confirmed in his classic, *The Organism*, that a blindfolded person will experience physiological reactions under rays of different colors. In other words, the skin reads color, and our bodies, minds, and emotions respond. Exactly how does this happen? Attached to the human brain is the pineal gland, which controls the daily rhythms of life. When light enters through the eyes or skin, it travels along neurological pathways to this pineal gland. Different colors give off different wavelength frequencies, and these different frequencies have different effects on us. Source <http://www.catholic.org>

### Red

excitement, strength, sex, passion, speed, danger.

- Red is the color of fire and blood, so it is associated with energy, war, danger, strength, power, determination as well as passion, desire, and love.
- Red is a very emotionally intense color. It enhances human metabolism, increases respiration rate, and raises blood pressure.
- It has very high visibility that's why stop signs, stoplights, and fire equipment are usually painted red.
- In heraldry, red is used to indicate courage. It is the color found in many national flags.
- Red brings text and images to the foreground.
- Use it as an accent color to stimulate people to make quick decisions; it is a perfect color for 'Buy Now' or 'Click Here' buttons on Internet banners and websites.
- Red is widely used to indicate danger (high voltage signs, traffic lights).
- This color is also commonly associated with energy, so you can use it when promoting energy drinks, games, cars, and items related to sports and high physical activity.


If you want to draw attention, use red. It is often where the eye looks first. Red is the color of energy. It's associated with movement and excitement. People surrounded by red find their heart beating a little faster and often report feeling a bit out of breath. It's absolute the wrong color for a baby's room but perfect to get people excited. Wearing red clothes will make you appear a bit heavier and certainly more noticeable. (Some studies show red cars get more tickets but that maybe because the red car owners drive faster or the ticket giver notices the movement of the red car more prominently). Red is not a good color to overuse but using a spot of red in just the right place is smart in some cases (one red accent in a otherwise neutral room draws the eye; a red tie with a navy blue suit and white shirts adds just the right amount of energy to draw the eye (no wonder it's the "uniform of the day" at the seats of government). Red is the symbol of life (red blooded life!) and, for this reason, it's the color worn by brides in China. Red is used at holidays that are about love and giving (red roses, Valentines hearts, Christmas, etc.) but the true color of love is pink. Pink is the most calming of all colors often our most dangerous criminals are housed in pink cells as studies show that color drains the energy and calms aggression. Think of pink as the color of romance, love, and gentle feelings, to be in the pink is to be soothed.

### Red color meanings in business

Red is a warm and positive color, a very physical color which draws attention to itself and calls for action to be taken.

In color psychology red means energy, passion, action, strength and excitement.

Red stimulates the physical senses such as the appetite, lust and sexual passion. Although it is often used to express love, it really relates more to sexual passion and lust pink relates more to romantic love



UNDERSTANDING

**MEDIA**

THEORIES OF MASS COMMUNICATION

MARSHALL MCLUHAN and ERIC S. RAYMOND

icon of this fruit as its logo, symbolizing the fact that it, too, provides access to 'forbidden' knowledge to those who buy and use its products. Incidentally, the logo shows an apple that has had a bite taken from it, thus reinforcing the link between the company icon and the Genesis story by associating the use of Apple computers and products with Eve, the mother of humanity.

Logos can sometimes harbour more than one signification system. Consider the Playboy logo of a bunny wearing a bow tie. Its ambiguous design opens up at least two 'connotative chains' of meaning:

- 1 rabbit = 'female' = 'highly fertile' = 'sexually active' = 'promiscuous' = etc.
- 2 bow tie = 'elegance' = 'night club scene' = 'finesse' = etc.

The appeal and staying power of this logo is due, arguably, to its inbuilt ambiguity. As we shall see below, ambiguity is a fundamental characteristic of advertising textuality. It is the reason, in fact, why advertising is so 'semiotically powerful'.

Logos are now displayed on products for all to see. Until the 1970s, logos on clothes, for instance, were concealed discretely inside a collar or on a pocket. But since then, they can be seen conspicuously. Ralph Lauren's polo horseman and Lacoste's alligator, to mention but two, are now shown prominently on clothing items, evoking images of heraldry and, thus, nobility. They constitute symbols of 'cool' (Klein 2000: 69) that legions of people are seemingly eager to put on view in order to convey an aura of high class 'blue-blooded' fashionableness.

### Advertising textuality

The signification systems that are built into brand names and logos are transferred creatively to ad texts. 'Advertising textuality' can be defined simply as the construction of advertisements and commercials on the basis of the specific signification systems built intentionally into products. Among the many textual strategies used to bring out such systems, the following five are the most common:

- the use of jingles which typically bring out some aspect of the product in a memorable way;
- the use of certain music genres to emphasize lifestyle: e.g. the use of jazz or classical music to convey a sense of superiority and high-class aspirations;
- the creation of fictitious characters so as to assign a visual portraiture to the product: e.g. *Speedy*, *Ronald McDonald*, *Tony the Tiger*, *Mr Clean*, etc.;

- using famous personages – actors, sports figures, etc. – to endorse the product;
- creating ads and commercials to represent the product's signification system in some specific way (e.g. through some visual depiction, through some narrative, etc.).

As an example of the last strategy, a popular television commercial for Miller beer that was shown during Sunday afternoon football games on American television in the early 1990s can be recalled here. The action of the commercial can be broken down into a sequence of actions as follows:

- As the commercial began, we saw a young handsome man who was seated at a bar counter in a crowded, smoke-filled room, with a beer glass nearby.
- He was surrounded by a group of male companions chatting and confabulating in ways young men are purported to do in such situations.
- At the other end of the bar, a matched group of males had congregated around another young handsome 'leader of the pack'.
- Suddenly, an attractive female entered the scene. Instantaneously, the 'leaders' of both male cliques made their way towards her.
- To block the second leader from getting to her, the first male clique cut off his path to the female in a strategic manner, leaving the first leader to 'get his prize'.
- The whole 'action' was described by the voice of a football announcer in a 'play-by-play' fashion.
- The commercial ended with the phrase 'Love is a game' appearing on the screen.

Given that the commercial was shown – i.e. positioned – during football game telecasts, and given that the actions took place in the context of a football game, a straightforward interpretation can easily be formulated. In a phrase, the action of the two cliques simulated an action play between two football teams. 'Winning' the game in this case is 'getting to' the female first. In order to accomplish this, the first male leader, or 'quarterback', needed the support of his 'team' to be successful in carrying out the crucial play, which of course he was able to do. By successfully blocking the path of the other team's quarterback, the first team won the 'game'. As a reward, the heroic quarterback 'scored' sexually, as the expression goes.

This interpretation was reinforced by the play-by-play description of an announcer whose voice simulated that of a television football announcer, as well as by the concluding metaphorical statement that appeared on the screen: 'Love is a game'. In sum, the commercial constituted a specific representation of the beer's signification system:

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# RESEARCH DESIGN

Qualitative,  
Quantitative,  
and  
Mixed Methods  
Approaches

JOHN W. GRESWELL



### *The Constructivist Worldview*

Others hold a different worldview. Constructivism or social constructivism (often combined with interpretivism) is such a perspective, and it is typically seen as an approach to qualitative research. The ideas came from Mannheim and from works such as Berger and Luekmann's (1967) *The Social Construction of Reality* and Lincoln and Guba's (1985) *Naturalistic Inquiry*. More recent writers who have summarized this position are Lincoln and colleagues (2011), Mertens (2010), and Crotty (1998), among others. **Social constructivists** believe that individuals seek understanding of the world in which they live and work. Individuals develop subjective meanings of their experiences—meanings directed toward certain objects or things. These meanings are varied and multiple, leading the researcher to look for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings into a few categories or ideas. The goal of the research is to rely as much as possible on the participants' views of the situation being studied. The questions become broad and general so that the participants can construct the meaning of a situation, typically forged in discussions or interactions with other persons. The more open-ended the questioning, the better, as the researcher listens carefully to what people say or do in their life settings. Often these subjective meanings are negotiated socially and historically. They are not simply imprinted on individuals but are formed through interaction with others (hence social constructivism) and through historical and cultural norms that operate in individuals' lives. Thus, constructivist researchers often address the processes of interaction among individuals. They also focus on the specific contexts in which people live and work in order to understand the historical and cultural settings of the participants. Researchers recognize that their own backgrounds shape their interpretation, and they position themselves in the research to acknowledge how their interpretation flows from their personal, cultural, and historical experiences. The researcher's intent is to make sense of (or interpret) the meanings others have about the world. Rather than starting with a theory (as in postpositivism), inquirers generate or inductively develop a theory or pattern of meaning.

For example, in discussing constructivism, Crotty (1998) identified several assumptions:

1. Human beings construct meanings as they engage with the world they are interpreting. Qualitative researchers tend to use open-ended questions so that the participants can share their views.
2. Humans engage with their world and make sense of it based on their historical and social perspectives—we are all born into a world of meaning bestowed upon us by our culture. Thus, qualitative researchers seek to understand the context or setting of the participants through visiting this context and gathering information personally. They also interpret what they find, an interpretation shaped by the researcher's own experiences and background.
3. The basic generation of meaning is always social, arising in and out of interaction with a human community. The process of qualitative research is largely inductive; the inquirer generates meaning from the data collected in the field.

### *The Transformative Worldview*

Another group of researchers holds to the philosophical assumptions of the transformative approach. This position arose during the 1980s and 1990s from individuals who felt that the postpositivist assumptions imposed structural laws and theories that did not fit marginalized individuals in our society or issues of power and social justice, discrimination, and oppression that needed to be addressed. There is no uniform body of literature characterizing this worldview, but it includes groups of researchers that are critical theorists; participatory action researchers; Marxists; feminists; racial and ethnic minorities; persons with disabilities; indigenous and postcolonial peoples; and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and queer communities. Historically, the transformative writers have drawn on the works of Marx, Adorno, Marcuse, Habermas, and Freire (Neuman, 2009). Fay (1987), Heron and Reason (1997), Kemmis and Wilkinson (1998) Kemmis and McTaggart (2000), and Mertens (2009, 2010) are additional writers to read for this perspective.

In the main, these inquirers felt that the constructivist stance did not go far enough in advocating for an action agenda to help marginalized peoples. A **transformative worldview** holds that research inquiry needs to be intertwined with politics and a political change agenda to confront social oppression at whatever levels it occurs (Mertens, 2010). Thus, the research contains an action agenda for reform that may change lives of the participants, the institutions in which individuals work or live, and the researcher's life. Moreover, specific issues need to be addressed that speak to important social issues of the day, issues such as empowerment, inequality, oppression, domination, suppression, and alienation. The researcher often begins with one of these issues as the focal point of the study. This research also assumes that the inquirer will proceed collaboratively so as to not further marginalize the participants as a result of the inquiry. In this sense, the participants may help design questions, collect data, analyze information, or reap the rewards of the research. Transformative research provides a voice for these participants, raising their consciousness or advancing an agenda for change to improve their lives. It becomes a united voice for reform and change.

This philosophical worldview focuses on the needs of groups and individuals in our society that may be marginalized or disenfranchised. Therefore, theoretical perspectives may be integrated with the philosophical assumptions that construct a picture of the issues being examined, the people to be

## Research Designs

The researcher not only selects a qualitative, quantitative, or mixed methods study to conduct; the inquirer also decides on a type of study within these three choices. Research designs are types of inquiry within qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approaches that provide specific direction for procedures in a research design. Others have called them *strategies of inquiry* (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The designs available to the researcher have grown over the years as computer technology has advanced our data analysis and ability to analyze complex models and as individuals have articulated new procedures for conducting social science research. Select types will be emphasized in Chapters 8, 9, and 10—designs that are frequently used in the social sciences. Here I introduce those that are discussed later and that are cited in examples throughout the book. An overview of these designs is shown in Table 1.2.

### Quantitative Designs

During the late 19th and throughout the 20th century, strategies of inquiry associated with quantitative research were those that invoked the postpositivist worldview and that originated mainly in psychology. These include *true experiments* and the less rigorous experiments called *quasi-experiments* (see, an original, early treatise on this, Campbell & Stanley, 1963). An additional experimental design is *applied behavioral analysis or single-subject experiments* in which an experimental treatment is administered over time to a single individual or a small number of individuals (Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007; Neuman & McCormick, 1995). One type of nonexperimental quantitative research is *causal-comparative research* in which the investigator compares two or more groups in terms of a cause (or independent variable) that has already happened. Another nonexperimental form of research is the *correlational design* in which investigators use the correlational statistic to describe and measure the degree or association (or relationship) between two or more variables or sets of scores (Creswell, 2012). These designs have been elaborated into more complex relationships among variables found in techniques of structural equation modeling, hierarchical linear modeling, and logistic regression. More recently, quantitative strategies have involved complex experiments with many variables and treatments (e.g., factorial designs and repeated measure designs). They have also included elaborate structural equation models that incorporate causal paths and the identification of the collective strength of multiple variables. Rather than discuss all of these quantitative approaches, I will focus on two designs: surveys and experiments.

Table 1.2 Alternative Research Designs

Quantitative	Qualitative	Mixed Methods
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Experimental designs</li><li>• Nonexperimental designs, such as surveys</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Narrative research</li><li>• Phenomenology</li><li>• Grounded theory</li><li>• Ethnographies</li><li>• Case study</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Convergent</li><li>• Explanatory sequential</li><li>• Exploratory sequential</li><li>• Transformative, embedded, or multiphase</li></ul>



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Introduction to  
**Qualitative**  
Research Methods

A Guidebook and Resource

Steven J. Taylor  
Robert Bogdan  
Marjorie L. DeVault

WILEY

*The Urban Villagers* (Gans, 1962); *Tally's Corner* (Liebow, 1967); *Tomorrow's Tomorrow* (Ladner, 1971); *Outsiders in a Hearing World* (Higgins, 1980); *The Managed Heart* (Hochschild, 1983); *Gender Play* (Thorne, 1993); *Hiring Epilepsy* (Schneider & Conrad, 1983); *Streetwise* (E. Anderson, 1990); *Feeding the Family* (DeVault, 1991); *Making Gray Cold* (Diamond, 1992); *Speaking of Sadness* (Karp, 1996); *Unequal Childhoods* (Larrou, 2001); *Children of Global Migration* (Parreñas, 2005); and *Longing and Belonging* (Pugh, 2009) are examples of insightful, clearly written studies. *The Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* and *Qualitative Sociology* are good resources for finding qualitative studies, and *Qualitative Inquiry* publishes postmodern and creative qualitative works.

Because qualitative data analysis is an intuitive and inductive process, most qualitative researchers analyze and code their own data. Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research usually lacks a division of labor between data collectors and coders—although it can be useful to work as a team. Data analysis is a dynamic and creative process. Throughout analysis, researchers attempt to gain a deeper understanding of what they have studied and to continually refine their interpretations. Researchers also draw on their firsthand experience with settings, informants, or documents to interpret their data.

Data analysis, as we see it, entails certain distinct activities. The first and most important one is ongoing discovery—identifying themes and developing concepts and propositions. It is perhaps misleading to have a separate chapter on working with data, since data analysis is an ongoing process in qualitative research (Rossman & Rallis, 2012). Kvale (1996, p. 176) referred to what he called the “1,000-page question” often asked by qualitative researchers: “How shall I find a method to analyze the 1,000 pages of interview transcripts I have collected?” As Kvale argued, the question is posed too late. If you have collected 1,000 (or fewer) pages of data and not conducted any analysis, you will be in trouble.

In qualitative research, data collection and analysis go hand in hand. Throughout participant observation, in-depth interviewing, and other qualitative research, researchers are constantly theorizing and trying to make sense of their data. They keep track of emerging themes and ideas, read through their field notes or transcripts, and develop concepts and propositions to begin to interpret their data. As their studies progress, they begin to focus their research interests, ask directive questions, check out informants' stories, and follow up on leads and hunches. In many instances researchers hold off on selecting additional settings, people, or documents for study until they have conducted some initial data analysis. Both grounded theory's strategy of theoretical sampling and analytic induction's search for negative cases require this. Similarly, institutional ethnographies often begin with an exploration of some group's experience. Analysis of the puzzles inherent