AN ANALYSIS OF IMPOLITENESS IN
HELL'S KITCHEN: LAS VEGAS OF SEASON 19

THESIS

Submitted to The School of Foreign Language – JIA as a partial fulfillment of requirements for the undergraduate degree in English Literature Programme

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LIST OF SOURCES

CHAPTER I

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

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2. What is 'impoliteness'?

After decades of work inspired by Brown and Levinson's ([1978] 1987) seminal work on politeness, politeness research is on the move again with both revisions to the classic model being suggested and alternative conceptions of politeness, which have been in existence for over a decade, being further tested, applied and developed. As the chapters in this collection show, research on impoliteness is inextricably linked to these developments. All contributors have previously worked in the field of politeness studies and have now decided to answer the call and extend their frameworks in such a way that a meaningful discussion of impoliteness becomes possible. For readers familiar with politeness research, it will also be immediately clear from a quick glance over the list of contributors that they will not find one single methodological approach to impoliteness phenomena in this collection. It was indeed the editors' aim to invite researchers from rather different theoretical camps to contribute their ideas to this endeavour in order to encourage a critical exchange. Since none of the chapters pursue a purely 'classical' Brown and Levinson line of argumentation, it is hoped that this collection can also contribute to broadening the horizons of research into im/politeness by making new paths of research more visible.

Coming from different theoretical camps means that the actual subject of study is already hotly contested. While there is a fair amount of agreement that politeness and impoliteness issues can (some would say should) be discussed together, and that impolite utterances have an impact on the ties between social actors, there is no solid agreement in the chapters as to what 'impoliteness' actually is. The lowest common denominator, however, can be summarised like this: *Impoliteness is behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context.* Most researchers would propose that this is ultimately insufficient and have indeed proposed more elaborate definitions. One of the main differences that emerges when comparing some of these is the role assigned to the recognition of intentions in the understanding of impoliteness:

(1) I take impoliteness as constituting the issuing of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive face-threatening acts (FTAs) that are purposefully performed. (Bousfield, this volume: 132)

(2) Impoliteness, as I would define it, involves communicative behaviour intending to cause the "face loss" of a target or perceived by the target to be so. (Culpeper, this volume: 36)

(3) *impoliteness* occurs when the expression used is not conventionalised relative to the context of occurrence; it threatens the addressee's face (and, through that, the

Source 1. 2 (Yule, 1996)



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1
Definitions and background

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Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader). It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. *Pragmatics is the study of speaker meaning.* (1)

This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speakers organize what they want to say in accordance with who they're talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances. *Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning.* (2)

This approach also necessarily explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker's intended meaning. This type of study explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part of what is communicated. We might say that it is the investigation of invisible meaning. *Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said.* (3)

This perspective then raises the question of what determines the choice between the said and the unsaid. The basic answer is tied to the notion of distance. Closeness, whether it is physical, social, or conceptual, implies shared experience. On the assumption of how close or distant the listener is, speakers determine how much needs to be said. *Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance.* (4)

These are the four areas that pragmatics is concerned with. To understand how it got to be that way, we have to briefly review its relationship with other areas of linguistic analysis.

CHAPTER II

**For George Yule 1996, see pages 3*

**For George Yule, 1996, p.3, see page 4*

adhering to the principles. These kinds of expressions are called hedges.

Hedges

The importance of the maxim of **quality** for cooperative interaction in English may be best measured by the number of expressions we use to indicate that what we're saying may not be totally accurate. The initial phrases in [3a.–c.] and the final phrase in [3d.] are notes to the listener regarding the accuracy of the main statement.

[3] a. As far as I know, they're married.
b. I may be mistaken, but I thought I saw a wedding ring on her finger.
c. I'm not sure if this is right, but I heard it was a secret ceremony in Hawaii.
d. He couldn't live without her, I guess.

The conversational context for the examples in [3] might be a recent rumor involving a couple known to the speakers. Cautious notes, or **hedges**, of this type can also be used to show that the speaker is conscious of the **quantity** maxim, as in the initial phrases in [4a.–c.], produced in the course of a speaker's account of her recent vacation.

[4] a. As you probably know, I am terrified of bugs.
b. So, to cut a long story short, we grabbed our stuff and ran.
c. I won't bore you with all the details, but it was an exciting trip.

Markers tied to the expectation of relevance (from the maxim of **relation**) can be found in the middle of speakers' talk when they say things like 'Oh, by the way' and go on to mention some potentially unconnected information during a conversation. Speakers also seem to use expressions like 'anyway', or 'well, anyway', to indicate that they may have drifted into a discussion of some possibly non-relevant material and want to stop. Some expressions which may act as hedges on the expectation of relevance are shown as the initial phrases in [5a.–c.], from an office meeting.

Both types of factors, external and internal, have an influence not only on what we say, but also on how we are interpreted. In many cases, the interpretation goes beyond what we might have intended to convey and includes evaluations such as 'rude' and 'inconsiderate', or 'considerate' and 'thoughtful'. Recognizing the impact of such evaluations makes it very clear that more is being communicated than is said. The investigation of that impact is normally carried out in terms of politeness.

Politeness

It is possible to treat politeness as a fixed concept, as in the idea of 'polite social behavior', or etiquette, within a culture. It is also possible to specify a number of different general principles for being polite in social interaction within a particular culture. Some of these might include being tactful, generous, modest, and sympathetic toward others. Let us assume that participants in an interaction are generally aware that such norms and principles exist in the society at large. Within an interaction, however, there is a more narrowly specified type of politeness at work. In order to describe it, we need the concept of face.

As a technical term, **face** means the public self-image of a person. It refers to that emotional and social sense of self that everyone has and expects everyone else to recognize. **Politeness**, in an interaction, can then be defined as the means employed to show awareness of another person's face. In this sense, politeness can be accomplished in situations of social distance or closeness. Showing awareness for another person's face when that other seems socially distant is often described in terms of respect or deference. Showing the equivalent awareness when the other is socially close is often described in terms of friendliness, camaraderie, or solidarity. The first type might be found in a student's question to his teacher, shown as [1a.], and a second type in the friend's question to the same individual, as in [1b.].

[1] a. Excuse me, Mr Buckingham, but can I talk to you for a minute?
b. Hey, Bucky, got a minute?

It follows from this type of approach that there will be different kinds of politeness associated (and marked linguistically) with the assumption of relative social distance or closeness. In most English-speaking contexts, the participants in an interaction often have to determine, as they speak, the relative social distance between them, and hence their 'face wants'.

Face wants

In this discussion, let's assume that the participants involved in interactions are not living in a context which has created rigidly fixed social relationships. Within their everyday social interactions, people generally behave as if their expectations concerning their public self-image, or their **face wants**, will be respected. If a speaker says something that represents a threat to another individual's expectations regarding self-image, it is described as a **face threatening act**. Alternatively, given the possibility that some action might be interpreted as a threat to another's face, the speaker can say something to lessen the possible threat. This is called a **face saving act**.

Imagine a late night scene, where a young neighbor is playing his music very loud and an older couple are trying to sleep. One of them, in [2], proposes a face threatening act and the other suggests a face saving act.

[2] Him: I'm going to tell him to stop that awful noise right now!

Her: Perhaps you could just ask him if he is going to stop soon because it's getting a bit late and people need to get to sleep.

Because it is generally expected that each person will attempt to respect the face wants of others, there are many different ways of performing face saving acts.

Negative and positive face

When we attempt to save another's face, we can pay attention to their negative face wants or their positive face wants. A person's **negative face** is the need to be independent, to have freedom of action, and not to be imposed on by others. The word 'negative'

Self and other: say nothing

One way to see the relevance of the relationship between these politeness concepts and language use is to take a single speech event and map out the different interpretations associated with different possible expressions used within that event. For example, you arrive at an important lecture, pull out your notebook to take notes, but discover that you don't have anything to write with. You think that the person sitting next to you may provide the solution. In this scenario, you are going to be 'Self', and the person next to you is going to be 'Other'.

Your first choice is whether to say something or not. You can, of course, rummage in your bag, search rather obviously through your pockets, go back into your bag, without uttering a word, but with the vague intention that your problem will be recognized. This 'say nothing' approach may or may not work, but if it does, it's because the other offers and not because the self asks, as in [3].

[3] Self: (looks in bag)
Other: (offers pen) Here, use this.

Many people seem to prefer to have their needs recognized by others without having to express those needs in language. When those needs are recognized, as in [3], then clearly more has been communicated than was said.

Source 2. 1 *(Leech, 1983)*

Principles of Pragmatics

Geoffrey N. Leech

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corporate meaning into a formal linguistic theory, and it was not long before the 'California or bust' spirit led to a colonization of pragmatics. Lakoff, with others, was soon arguing (1971) that syntax could not be legitimately separated from the study of language use. So pragmatics was henceforth on the linguistic map. Its colonization was only the last stage of a wave-by-wave expansion of linguistics from a narrow discipline dealing with the physical data of speech, to a broad discipline taking in form, meaning, and context.

But this is only part of the story. First, all the names mentioned in the preceding paragraph are American, for it describes the progress of mainstream American linguistics. It is probably more true of linguistics than of other subjects that its dominating influences have been American; but we should not forget that many influential scholars, both in the USA and elsewhere, have continued to work outside the 'American mainstream'. We should not overlook independent thinkers such as Firth, with his early emphasis on the situational study of meaning, and Halliday, with his comprehensive social theory of language. And equally important, we should not overlook the influences of philosophy. When linguistic pioneers such as Ross and Lakoff staked a claim in pragmatics in the late 1960s, they encountered there an indigenous breed of philosophers of language who had been quietly cultivating the territory for some time. In fact, the more lasting influences on modern pragmatics have been those of philosophers; notably, in recent years, Austin (1962), Searle (1969), and Grice (1975).

The widening scope of linguistics involved a change in the view of what language is, and how linguistics should define its subject. The American structuralists were happiest with the idea that linguistics was a physical science, and therefore did their best to rid the subject of appeals to meaning.[2] But by accepting ambiguity and synonymy as among the basic data of linguistics, Chomsky opened a door for semantics. Subsequently, Chomsky's disaffected pupils in the generative semantics school went a stage further in taking semantics to be base for their linguistic theories. But once meaning has been admitted to a central place in language, it is notoriously difficult to exclude the way meaning varies from context to context, and so semantics spills over into pragmatics. In no time the generative semanticists found they had bitten off more than they could chew. There is a justifiable tendency in scientific thought to assume that an existing theory or paradigm works until it is shown to fail. On this basis, the generative semanticists tried to apply the paradigm of generative grammar

[1] What does *X* mean? [2] What did you mean by *X*?

Semantics traditionally deals with meaning as a dyadic relation, as in [1], while pragmatics deals with meaning as a triadic relation, as in [2]. Thus meaning in pragmatics is defined relative to a speaker or user of the language, whereas meaning in semantics is defined purely as a property of expressions in a given language, in abstraction from particular situations, speakers, or hearers. This is a rough-and-ready distinction which has been refined, for particular purposes, by philosophers such as Morris (1938, 1946) or Carnap (1942).[8] I shall redefine pragmatics for the purposes of linguistics, as the study of meaning in relation to speech situations (see 1.4 below).

The view that semantics and pragmatics are distinct, though complementary and interrelated fields of study, is easy to appreciate subjectively, but is more difficult to justify in an objective way. It is best supported negatively, by pointing out the failures or weaknesses of alternative views. Logically, two clear alternatives are possible: it may be claimed that the uses of meaning shown in [1] and [2] are both the concern of semantics; or that they are both the concern of pragmatics. The three views I have now mentioned may be diagrammed and labelled as shown in Fig. 1.1.



FIGURE 1.1

Because of difficulties of terminology and definition, it is hard to pin down clear cases of semanticism and pragmaticism. In practice, one notices a preference of a semantic type of explanation to a pragmatic one, or vice versa. In a modified sense, therefore, the labels 'semanticist' and 'pragmaticist' may be applied to those who assimilate as much of the study of meaning to one position as possible.

Examples of each position are the following. In the philosophy of language, there has been an influential tradition of philosophers, such as Wittgenstein, Austin, Alston, and Searle, who have been sceptical of traditional approaches to meaning in terms ing-point, is not the whole story; we may note, as an exception, that pragmatically related aspects of phonology (*eg* the polite use of a rising tone) interact directly with pragmatics, rather than indirectly, via syntax and semantics.

1.4 Aspects of speech situations

The question inevitably arises: how do we know we are dealing with pragmatic, rather than with semantic phenomena? Since pragmatics studies meaning in relation to speech situation, reference to one or more of the following aspects of the speech situation will be a criterion.

(i) Addressers or addressees
Following the practice of Searle and others, I shall refer to addressers and addressees, as a matter of convenience, as *s* ('speaker') and *h* ('hearer'). These will be a shorthand for 'speaker(s)/writer(s)' and 'hearer(s)/reader(s)'. Thus the use of the abbreviations *s* and *h* does not restrict pragmatics to the spoken language. A significant distinction can be made (*cf* Lyons 1977:34) between a receiver (a person who receives and interprets the message) and an addressee (a person who is an *intended* receiver of the message). A receiver, that is, might be a bystander or an eavesdropper, rather than an addressee. This distinction is relevant to the present inquiry, in that the analyst of pragmatic meaning is best thought of as a receiver: a proverbial 'fly on the wall' who tries to make sense of the content of a discourse according to whatever contextual evidence is available. The use of the symbol *h*, however, will always signify one or more addressees, or persons to whom the utterance is *addressed* by *s*.

(ii) The context of an utterance
CONTEXT has been understood in various ways, for example to include 'relevant' aspects of the physical or social setting of an utterance. I shall consider context to be any background knowledge assumed to be shared by *s* and *h* and which contributes to *h*'s interpretation of what *s* means by a given utterance.

(iii) The goal(s) of an utterance
I shall often find it useful to talk of a *goal* or *function* of an utterance, in preference to talking about its *intended* meaning, or *s*'s intention in uttering it (see further 2:3.3.1). The term *goal* is more neutral than *intention*, because it does not commit its user

to dealing with conscious volition or motivation, but can be used generally of goal-oriented activities. The term *intention* can be misleading on this score.

(iv) The utterance as a form of act or activity: a speech act
Whereas grammar deals with abstract static entities such as sentences (in syntax) and propositions (in semantics), pragmatics deals with verbal acts or performances which take place in particular situations, in time. In this respect, pragmatics deals with language at a more concrete level than grammar.

(v) The utterance as a product of a verbal act
There is another sense in which the word 'utterance' can be used in pragmatics: it can refer to the *product* of a verbal act, rather than to the verbal act itself. For instance, the words *Would you please be quiet?*, spoken with a polite rising intonation, might be described as a sentence, or as a question, or as a request. However, it is convenient to reserve terms like *sentence* and *question* for grammatical entities derived from the language system, and to reserve the term *utterance* for *instances* of such entities, identified by their use in a particular situation. Hence an utterance may be a sentence-instance, or sentence-token; but strictly speaking, it cannot be a sentence. In this second sense, utterances are the elements whose meaning we study in pragmatics. In fact, we can correctly describe pragmatics as dealing with utterance meaning, and semantics as dealing with sentence meaning. However, there is no need to assume that all utterances are sentence-tokens. We may wish to isolate as an utterance a piece of language which is either too short or too long to be classified as a single sentence.

The meaning of *utterance* in (iv) and the meaning of *utterance* in (v) can be easily confused: there is a difference, but not a particularly marked one, between describing *Would you please be quiet?* as an utterance (as in (v)), and describing the *act* of uttering *Would you please be quiet?* as an utterance (as in (iv)).[16] Fortunately, the confusion can be alleviated, since it is generally convenient to say that 'utterance' in the sense of (iv) corresponds to 'speech act', or more precisely to ILLOCUTIONARY ACT, in the sense of that term employed by Austin (1962:100). This means we can use *illocutionary act* or *illocution* for the utterance-action as described in (iv), and can keep the term *utterance* for the linguistic product of that act. When we try to work out the meaning of an utterance, this can be thought of as an attempt to re-struct what act, considered as a goal-directed communicatio it a goal of the speaker to perform in producing the utt

Thus the meaning of an utterance, in this sense, can be called its ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE. (Austin in fact distinguished illocutionary acts from other kinds of acts, notably locutionary and perlocutionary acts. But the other kinds of act (see further 9.1) can be largely discounted in an account of pragmatics).

From the above-mentioned elements of (i) addresser and addressee, (ii) context, (iii) goals, (iv) illocutionary act, and (v) utterance, we can compose a notion of a SPEECH SITUATION, comprising all these elements, and perhaps other elements as well, such as the time and the place of the utterance. Pragmatics is distinguished from semantics in being concerned with *meaning in relation to a speech situation*.

1.5 Rhetoric

Earlier I characterized the present approach to pragmatics as 'rhetorical'. This use of the term 'rhetorical' is very traditional, referring to the study of the effective use of language in communication. But whereas rhetoric has been understood, in particular historical traditions, as the art of using language skilfully for persuasion, or for literary expression, or for public speaking, I have in mind the effective use of language in its most general sense, applying it primarily to everyday conversation, and only secondarily to more prepared and public uses of language. The point about the term *rhetoric*, in this context, is the focus it places on a goal-oriented speech situation, in which *s* uses language in order to produce a particular effect in the mind of *h*.

I shall also use the term RHETORIC as a countable noun, for a set of conversational principles which are related by their functions. Using a distinction familiar in the work of Halliday, I shall distinguish two rhetorics, the INTERPERSONAL and the TEXTUAL rhetoric (Fig. 1.4) (see also 3.3). Each of the two rhetorics (whose functions will be explained later) consists of a set of principles, such as the CP and the PP already mentioned. The principles, in turn, consist of a set of maxims, in accordance with Grice's terminology. Grice's 'maxim', however, I shall call a 'submaxim', thereby introducing another level into the hierarchy. But I do not wish to insist too rigidly on this four-level hierarchy, since it is not always clear to what level a given precept belongs. For example, of Grice's two Maxims of Quality (which I call submaxims), the second seems to be a predictable extension of the first:

Maxim 1: Do not say what you believe to be false.

Source 2. 2 (Griffith, 2006)



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1 Studying meaning

Overview

This is a book about how English enables people who know the language to convey meanings. Semantics and pragmatics are the two main branches of the linguistic study of meaning. Both are named in the title of the book and they are going to be introduced here. **Semantics** is the study of the "toolkit" for meaning: knowledge encoded in the vocabulary of the language and in its patterns for building more elaborate meanings, up to the level of sentence meanings. **Pragmatics** is concerned with the use of these tools in meaningful communication. Pragmatics is about the interaction of semantic knowledge with our knowledge of the world, taking into account contexts of use.

> *Bold print for explanations of terms*
> In the index at the back of the book, bold printed page numbers indicate places where technical terms, such as **semantics** and **pragmatics** in the paragraph above, are explained. The point is to signal such explanations and to make it fairly easy to find them later, should you want to.

Example (1.1) is going to be used in an initial illustration of the difference between semantics and pragmatics, and to introduce some more terms needed for describing and discussing meanings.

(1.1) Hold out your arm. That's it.

Language is for communicating about the world outside of language. English language expressions like *arm* and *your arm* and *hold out* are linked to things, activities and so on. A general-purpose technical term that will appear fairly often in the book is **denote**. It labels the connections between meaningful items of language and aspects of the world – real or imagined – that language users talk and write about. *Hold out your arm*

Source 2. 3 (Mey, 2001)



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morphological and syntactic elements under the direction of grammatical rules; this is what Levinson means by 'grammaticalized'. He does not tell us, however, how we may connect user and grammar, or how language and context relate, with or without grammar's helping hand (the problem of 'contextualization'; see section 3.1).

The other point of view takes language use to be whatever happens when users are 'doing things' in and with language; pragmatics comprises everything that characterizes people as users of language. Some (like Levinson) have called this a "very broad usage of the term [pragmatics]"; in fact, it is but a natural extension of the notion of pragmatics as a theory of use. Also, it "still [is] the one generally used on the Continent", as Levinson further comments, somewhat regretfully, it might seem (1983:2). It rests on the assumption that the language users, being members of society, depend on the rules and norms that are valid at any time, in any place, in the community they belong to.[4]

The next section will expand on this societal character of pragmatics in order to arrive at a definition and clear up some of the 'boundary problems' that we have encountered.

1.2 Pragmatics: definition and delimitation

1.2.1 A definition

As we have seen in the previous section, restricting pragmatics to purely linguistic matters is not an acceptable point of view for those who want to include the whole of human language use (even though such a restriction may strengthen the definition as such; Levinson 1983:11). So-called 'extralinguistic' factors can only be excluded from a pragmatic evaluation on the penalty of neglecting the user. A truly pragmatic consideration has to deal with the users in their *social context*; it cannot limit itself to the grammatically encoded aspects of contexts, as the 'grammaticalization requirement' seems to imply.

Communication in society happens chiefly by means of language. However, the users of language, as social beings, communicate and use language on society's premises; society controls their access to the linguistic and communicative means. Pragmatics, as the study of the way humans use their language in communication, bases itself on a study of those premises and determines how they affect, and effectualize, human language use. Hence:

> *Pragmatics studies the use of language in human communication as determined by the conditions of society.*[5]

Having propounded this definition, our next task will be to look into what characterizes pragmatics in relation to its closest neighbors. 'To define' means:

Source 2. 4 (O'Keeffe et. al, 2011)



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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 WHAT IS PRAGMATICS?

The term *pragmatics* is often used in linguistic research to refer to the study of the interpretation of meaning. Although it has proven difficult to determine an exact definition for the term pragmatics (Levinson discusses the issue over more than 50 pages in his influential 1983 work *Pragmatics*), a user-friendly definition is suggested by Fasold (1990: 119): 'the study of the use of context to make inferences about meaning'. In this definition, inferences refer to deductions made by participants based on available evidence (Christie, 2000). This available evidence is, according to pragmaticists, provided by the context within which the utterance takes place. Cutting (2008: 3–11) distinguishes between three different types of spoken context: *situational*, what speakers know about what they can see around them; *background knowledge*, what they know about each other (interpersonal knowledge) and the world (cultural knowledge); and *co-textual*, what they know about what they have been saying (see also Chapter 3). Therefore, the pragmatic choices made by conversational participants can simultaneously encode indications of position and time and interpersonal and cultural indicators such as power, status, gender and age. Thus, as Christie (2000: 29) maintains, pragmatics provides 'a theoretical framework that can account for the relationship between the cultural setting, the language user, the linguistic choices the user makes, and the factors that underlie those choices'.

> The modern usage of the term *pragmatics* in the study of language is attributable to the philosopher Charles Morris (1938), who envisaged a three-part distinction: *syntax*, *semantics* and *pragmatics*.

For example, the utterance *I've got a headache* carries a variety of meanings according to when it is used, who uses it, who the person is talking to, where the conversation takes place, and so forth:

- If a patient said it to a doctor during a medical examination, it could mean: *I need a prescription.*

- If a mother said it to her teenage son, it could mean: *Turn down the music.*
- If two friends were talking, it could mean: *I was partying last night.*
- If it were used as a response to an invitation from one friend to another, such as *Do you fancy going for a walk?*, it could simply mean: *No.*

Therefore, depending on the context it occurs in, the utterance *I've got a headache* can function as an appeal, an imperative, a complaint or a refusal, and so on. In any language, what is *said* is often quite distinct to what is *meant*, or to put it another way, *form* is often very different to *content*. As such pragmatics does not assume a one-to-one relationship between language form and utterance function, but is concerned instead with accounting for the processes that give rise to a particular interpretation of an utterance that is used in a particular context. As Romero-Trillo (2008) lyrically puts it, pragmatics sails the sea between sentence meaning and intended meaning.

There are many other single utterances that can have a variety of meanings according to the contexts in which they occur. Consider the number of meanings that can be attributed to:

The door is open.
It's raining.

Utterances such as these provide evidence that speakers frequently mean *more* than they say. Rühlemann (2010) claims that pragmatics is particularly interested in this 'more', while Mey (1991: 245) refers to pragmatics as 'the art of the analysis of the unsaid.'

Hymes (1974) refers to two different types of competence: the first, *grammatical competence*, relates to the ability to create and understand grammatically correct sentences; and the second, *communicative competence*, is associated with the ability to produce and understand sentences that are appropriate and acceptable in a particular situation. Christie (2000) notes that it is axiomatic to pragmatics that our grammatical competence does not provide conversational participants with sufficient knowledge to be able to understand examples of language use. Therefore, it is within Hymes' notion of communicative competence that the study of pragmatics is located.

1.2 PRAGMATICS IN USE

The title of this book places a strong focus on the notion of *in use* both from the point of view of the linguistic data used and the study of pragmatics. In terms of language in use, traditionally, research within the area of pragmatics has not used attested, or 'real-life', examples of language in use and has not been concerned with the link between language form and function. Recently, however, there has been a marked shift towards the use of

Source 2. 5 (Cruse, 2006)



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but the main ones that have attracted the attention of linguists are: **euphemism**, **hyperbole**, **irony**, **metaphor**, **metonymy**, **simile**, and **understatement**.

figure and ground These notions were introduced by the gestalt psychologists in their account of perception. The basic idea is that any act of perception involves the highlighting of some portion of the perceptual field (the figure) and the backgrounding of the rest (the ground). Attention is focused on the figure, which is thereby more fully present to consciousness than the ground. The cognitive linguistic notions of **profile** and **base**, and **trajector** and **landmark** are developments of this basic notion. (Some linguists draw a distinction between figure (vs ground), focus of attention, and foreground (vs background), but the arguments are too subtle and complex to go into here.)

flouting the (conversational) maxims Some **conversational implicatures** arise when a speaker tries as far as possible to follow the **maxims of conversation**, but others can arise when a speaker deliberately goes against one or more of the maxims, provided that (1) it is clear to the hearer that the 'flouting' is deliberate and (2) the speaker can nonetheless be assumed to be obeying the **Co-operative Principle** and is therefore breaking the rules for good communicative reasons. Consider the following:

A: Where did you go last night?
B: Out.

In some circumstances B's reply could be taken as a signal of non-co-operation, equivalent to *Mind your own business*. But a situation can easily be imagined where B gives no sign of opting out of the conversation. Suppose Grandma, who has firm ideas about how

Source 2. 6 (Bousfield, 2008)



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of communication. It is viewing Grice's CP as a principle of linguistic cooperation (see Thomas 1986). Indeed, the point needs to be made that one needs to be cooperative, in a linguistic sense, in order to communicate a lack of cooperation in a social sense: i.e., when one is, for example, arguing with, or being impolite to, an interlocutor. After all, if one wants to be impolite, such impoliteness has to be communicated.

The view of Grice's CP as a principle of linguistic cooperation assumes that the only goal of a given communication is the transmission of information. Thomas (1986) terms this view as 'linguistic goal sharing' as opposed to 'social goal sharing'. Thomas argues (1986: 28) that Grice only intended the CP to apply to the conventions of interaction and presupposes no shared aims between interactants other than that of correctly establishing the speaker's illocutionary intent and getting the hearer(s) to understand the proposition which is being expressed or implied. Indeed, this would seem to fit with what we have just seen of Grice's (1975, 1989) own writings. Thomas (1986: 29) goes on to point out that, in this view, the CP does not presuppose that the proposition expressed, entailed or implied is necessarily polite, relevant to any of the hearer's real (extra-linguistic) social goals or even truthful. Indeed, it bears re-iterating here that Grice himself notes that speakers' aims '[…] may even be in conflict' (Grice 1989: 29). In effect, Thomas (1986) is arguing, correctly in my view, that the CP operates purely to allow your interlocutor to understand what you are saying or implying. This is regardless of whether the content of your message happens to be what the social goal sharers would consider 'cooperative' or 'uncooperative'; regardless of whether it be harmonious communication or conflictive; and, more importantly for this book, regardless of whether it be polite or impolite. Indeed, we must accept Leech and Thomas's observation of the CP in that it '[…] makes no claims about the good intentions of the speakers' (Leech and Thomas 1990: 181).

To summarise Thomas's (1986) view, the social goal sharing view of the CP states: Say to your interlocutor what they want to hear, whereas the linguistic goal sharing view of the CP states: Use language in such a way that your interlocutor can understand what you are stating, presupposing[4] or implying. I believe it is upon this view – that Grice's CP is a model of linguistic cooperation – that the approach to politeness of Brown and Levinson (1987) is founded. Furthermore it is clear to me that this understanding of the CP is, for obvious reasons, absolutely necessary for a full(er) understanding and conceptualisation of im/politeness and its use.

4. For presupposition and conversational implicature see Grice (1989: 269–282).

Source 2. 7 (Cutting, 2002)



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The units concerned with these two ways of approaching the structure of discourse are A4, B4, C4 and D4 Conversation. They also discuss **interactional sociolinguistics**, which combines the conversation analysis approach, in that it studies the structural patterns of conversation, with a pragmatics approach, studying social interaction, and giving importance to context, function, and social norms, conventions and principles.

Pragmatics differs from discourse analysis in the importance given to the **social principles** of discourse. Pragmatics can explain the example thus: the Queen complied with the social maxims of being relevant, precise, clear and sincere, and her courtiers expected her to do so, and she obeyed the social principles of politeness in that her request for the courtiers to stop is indirect, which aims to avoid offence. Pragmatics takes a socio-cultural perspective on language usage, examining the way that the principles of social behaviour are expressed is determined by the social distance between speakers. It describes the unwritten maxims of conversation that speakers follow in order to cooperate and be socially acceptable to each other. In this book, units dealing with these issues of pragmatics are: A3–D3 Speech acts, A5–D5 Cooperative principle, and A6–D6 Politeness principle.

Context outside text

A1.2

We said that Units A1 to D1 deal with the meaning of words in context (the physical and social world) and assumptions of knowledge that speaker and hearer share. Take a look at this excerpt from a conversation between MSc students in the common room of the Applied Linguistics department of the University of Edinburgh. DM, an Englishman, had planned to go to Spain for Easter but could not afford the tickets; he tells AF, a Scottish woman, that he ended up going hill walking in Arran, an island off the west coast of Scotland. What knowledge do they assume that they share?

AF (2) So you went to Arran. A bit of a come-down isn't it! ((laughing))
DM It was nice actually. Have you been to Arran?
AF No I've not. (1) Like to go.
DM Did a lot of climbing.
AF // (heh)
DM // I went with Francesca (0.5) and David.
AF Uhuh?
DM Francesca's room-mate. (2) And Alice's – a friend of Alice's from London (1). There were six of us. Yeah we did a lot of hill walking. (0.5) We got back (1) er (2) Michelle and I got home she looked at her knees. (0.5) They were like this. Swollen up like this. Cos we did this enormous eight hour stretch.
AF Uhm.

(Students on hill walking 1996)

Typically, there are three sorts of context to observe here:

- the **situational context**, what speakers know about what they can see around them
- the **background knowledge context**, what they know about each other and the world
- the **co-textual context**, what they know about what they have been saying. We will come to this last sort in Units A2–D2 Co-text.

A1.3 Situational context

In the excerpt about hill walking in Arran, there is an example of words taking on meaning in the situational context: 'They were like this. Swollen up like this.' DM must be making a gesture that he knows AF can see, holding his hands open and rounded to show what Michelle's knees looked like. You may have seen people talking on the telephone and making gestures with their hands or face; what is funny about this is that hearer and speaker do not share the situational context, so the gestures do not add meaning to the words. The situational context is the immediate physical co-presence, the situation where the interaction is taking place at the moment of speaking. It is not by chance that DM uses the words 'like this'. 'This' is a demonstrative pronoun, used for pointing to something, an entity, that speaker and hearer can see. Any overhearer who cannot see DM's hands would not know how badly his wife's knees were swollen.

Let us look at another example, this time from the classroom, (taken from the British National Corpus, a database of 100 million words of naturally occurring written and spoken text). A male lecturer from London is explaining a mathematical problem to a male pupil from London, named Berkam:

Lecturer Forty-nine? Why do you say forty-nine?
Pupil Cos there's another one here.
Lecturer Right, we've got forty-nine there, haven't we? But here there's two, okay? Now, what is it that we've got two of? Well, let me give you a clue. Erm, this here is forty, that's four tens, four tens are forty.

(BNC: jjs Bacons College lesson, date unknown)

The situational context is obviously the classroom, and presumably the lecturer and the pupil are pointing to either the blackboard or an exercise book. Their 'here' and 'there' are demonstrative adverbs indicating a figure in an equation, and the 'this here' is a demonstrative pronoun and adverb together emphatically indicating what is being puzzled over. Without the surrounding situation, the exchange makes little sense.

Let us take an example from written language, now. You may be familiar with *The English Struwwelpeter*, a book from the beginning of the twentieth century that contains moralistic, humorous tales about naughty children who are punished for their bad behaviour. There is one such tale called *The story of Augustus who would not have any soup*. The tale begins with Augustus as 'a chubby lad who ate and drank as he was told, and never let his soup grow cold'. Then one day he screams 'I won't have any soup today.' Here is verse two:

Next day, now look, the picture shows
How lank and lean Augustus grows!
Yet, though he feels so weak and ill,
The naughty fellow cries out still –
'Not any soup for me, I say:
O take the nasty soup away!
I won't have any soup today.'

Needless to say, by the fifth day, he was dead. The poem is meant to be read to a child who can look at the book in front of them: the words 'the picture' refer to the one in the book, and the name 'Augustus' refers to the boy in the picture. The child who does not look at the picture will not know exactly 'how lank and lean' the boy is. The picture adds a visible situational context.

Background knowledge context

A1.4

The second type of context is that of assumed background knowledge. This can be either

- **cultural** general knowledge that most people carry with them in their minds, about areas of life
- **interpersonal** knowledge, specific and possibly private knowledge about the history of the speakers themselves

Cultural

In the hill-walking-in-Arran excerpt, AF and DM share cultural background knowledge about the low mountains on the island: AF does not appear surprised that DM and his friends went 'hill walking', that they could walk for eight hours there, or that the walk was strenuous enough to make somebody's knees swell. If interlocutors establish that they are part of the same group, they can assume mutual knowledge of everything normally known by group members (Sperber and Wilson 1995). Here, the community of people who could be assumed to know about the mountains are British people, or people who have visited or studied the British Isles.

Groups with mutual knowledge vary in size. The community of people who share knowledge of the cultural background context can be much larger than the one in the hill-walking excerpt. For example, most nationalities of the world would understand a conversation assuming knowledge of the fact that stars come out at night, the sun is high at midday or the world is round. The community can also be relatively small: in the hill-walking example, out of all the forty or so students on the course, maybe only AF and DM know that 'Francesca' is David's girlfriend, and that 'Alice' is from London. Take the next example, from Sawyer's book *B. B. King*:

> Rock music was born twins: there were two sibling styles, one derived from country and western, one from rhythm and blues. These two sources were distinct and separate corners of the music industry, one white, stemming from Nashville, Tennessee, and Wheeling, West Virginia, the other black, stemming from Chicago, Memphis, Houston, St. Louis, and Kansas City. But of course, there was an overlap between the two styles and their locations, especially both had wide national followings.
>
> (Sawyer 1992: 82)

The community who could fully appreciate the meaning of these words would be people with an interest in North American popular music. Within that community there will be a smaller group of people who know all about rhythm and blues, its singers and bands, its history and geography. Within that community, there will be an even smaller group of people who know every song that a particular rhythm and blues band has recorded, as well as the life histories of each of the band members. These smaller groups may form what Swales (1990) calls **discourse communities,** if they have the broadly agreed common public goals, special mechanisms for communication and they have a special lexis or vocabulary.

Going back to the hill-walking excerpt, AF and DM think that they share the cultural background knowledge about 'Arran' itself, but in any conversation the participants will have different kinds of knowledge about almost anything that is mentioned (Wardhaugh 1985: 18). AF assumes that DM shares her knowledge of it as 'a bit of a come-down after Spain'. Arran is portrayed in books as beautiful but cold, rainy and mosquito-ridden. None of this context is mentioned; something negative is assumed. AF is wrong; DM finds that 'It was nice actually.' DM then wonders if they do in fact share experience of Arran or if AF just knows about Arran from books. It emerges that she has not been there.

Talk assuming shared knowledge of cultural context often shows an assumption of shared attitude towards that cultural context. Once AF knows that DM found Arran 'nice', she modifies her attitude to make it less hostile to Arran, saying that she would 'Like to go.' When speakers modify their expressions to reflect that of their interlocutors, they can be seen as accommodating their attitudes in order to be accepted and be seen as belonging to the same group. In this case, it is the group of people who can overlook the mosquitoes and see the beauty of the island.

It is this cultural context and shared attitude of a group that can make the humour of one country difficult to understand for people of another country, and the humour of one generation incomprehensible to another generation. There is a cartoon from *Punch*, the humorous London magazine, dated 1894, that depicts a young girl in a grocer's shop; the caption reads: 'Arf a pound er margarine, please, an' mother says will yer put the cow on it, 'cos she's got company!' The context seems to be that the grocer had barrels of margarine and butter, and when he made up a packet of butter, he would put a stamp with the shape of a cow on it. The grocer and the mother would have known that margarine was cheaper, that the mother could not afford butter, and that she wanted to impress her guests by making them think that she could afford it. Today, we might not find this funny. This 1894 humour reflects a middle-class attitude of the time, that it is amusing that the poor try to hide their poverty, in vain.

Interpersonal

In the hill-walking excerpt, we see that AF and DM know who 'Michelle' is. This is the interpersonal context. DM will have told AF in a previous conversation that his wife's name is 'Michelle'; he might also have told her where 'home' is – AF might have actually been to DM's home and learnt quite a lot about Michelle. Shared interpersonal knowledge is knowledge acquired through previous verbal interactions or joint activities and experiences, and it includes privileged personal knowledge about the interlocutor.

There was a US television advertisement that featured a telephone dialogue like this:

Her How are you?
Him OK.
Her Did you have friends in and get a video last night?

Him Oh, I had friends in, but we just watched a little TV.
Her Ah right.
Him That was great. How do you feel?
Her OK.

It is only when she says 'OK' at the end that there is a flashback and we see that she won a gold medal in an Olympics event. At this point, we understand that 'Oh, I had friends in, but we just watched a little TV' means 'I had friends in to watch you playing on TV and I know you won.' The interpersonal knowledge shared by a husband and wife is obviously enormous: this is why reference to any part of it can be so vague, implicit and minimal.

Referring to context

A1.5

The act of using language to refer to entities in the context is known as **reference**: an act in which a speaker uses linguistic forms to enable the hearer to identify something. The speaker uses linguistic forms, known as **referring expressions**, to enable the hearer to identify the entity being referred to, which is in turn known as the **referent**. For example, in the words '*I* went with *Francesca* (0.5) and *David*', the first person singular personal pronoun 'I' is a referring expression which refers to the person speaking, who is the referent. Similarly, the proper nouns 'Francesca' and 'David' are the referring expressions that refer to the two people whose names are Francesca and David, the latter being the referents.

When this is the first mention of the referent, in the sense that there is no previous mention of the reference in the preceding text, we call it **exophoric** reference. Exophora is dependent on the context outside the text. Thus, in

DM // I went with Francesca (0.5) and David.
AF Uhuh?
DM Francesca's room-mate. (2) And Alice's – a friend of Alice's from London (1). There were six of **us**. Yeah **we** did a lot of hill walking.

the 'us' and the 'we' are not exophoric because they refer back to DM, Francesca, David, Francesca's room-mate, the friend of Alice's, and Michelle, who are all mentioned elsewhere in the text. The nouns 'Francesca' and 'David' are used as exophoric reference because they point to people who are in the cultural context and are not referred to previously in the text.

In this unit, we have said that some words actually point to the entity that they refer to. If the referring expression points to the referent in the context (whether interlocutors can see it or not), it is known as **deixis**. There are three types of deixis: person, place and time. When we talk of **person deixis** we mean the use of expressions to point to a person, with the personal pronouns 'I', 'you', 'he', 'she', 'it', 'we' and 'they':

- **We** are not amused
- So **you** went to Arran.
- **We** got back (1) er (2) Michelle and **I** got home **she** looked at her knees. (0.5)
- **They** were like this.
- Yet, though **he** feels so weak and ill.

Spatial or **place deixis** is words used to point to a location, the place where an entity is in the context, as in the demonstrative adverbs 'there', 'here', the demonstrative adjectives and pronouns 'this', 'that', 'these', 'those':

- They were like **this**.
- **That** was great.
- Cos there's another one **here**.
- Right, we've got forty-nine **there**, haven't we?

Time deixis is expressions used to point to a time, as in 'next day', 'then' and 'now':

Next day, now look, the picture shows

All of these take part of their meaning from the context of utterance.

Finally, when a referring item refers to entities in the background knowledge, whether cultural or interpersonal, that have obviously been mentioned in a previous conversation or text, or have occurred in a previously shared situation or activity, we call this **intertextuality** (de Beaugrand and Dressler 1981). In the telephone call about the Olympic medal, the 'that' of 'That was great' is an example of intertextuality because it refers back to the wife's performance in the Olympic event which she won. The previous text becomes part of background knowledge. Since 'That was great' refers to an event that millions of viewers around the world would have seen, it is in the cultural context. If the husband had been referring to a romantic evening beside the fire with his wife, the intertextuality would have been interpersonal. Intertextuality is more often interpersonal than cultural, since it usually refers to knowledge gained in previous conversations between the people who are speaking. Common ground is a result of the interpenetrating biographies of the participants, of which the conversation of the moment is only a part (Coulthard 1986).

CO-TEXT

Understanding concepts

- grammatical cohesion
  - endophoric reference
  - substitution and ellipsis
- lexical cohesion

A2.1 Co-textual context

We saw in Unit A1 that there are three sorts of context: the situational, the cultural and interpersonal background one, and the co-textual. This unit deals with the co-textual context, the context of the text itself, known as the **co-text**. If we go back to the hill walking excerpt:

DM // I went with Francesca (0.5) and David.
AF Uhuh?

DM Francesca's room-mate. (2) And Alice's – a friend of Alice's from London (1). There were six of us. Yeah we did a lot of hill walking.
/.../ AF Uhm.

We can see that the personal pronouns 'us' and the 'we' refer back to Francesca, David, the room-mate and the friend, who are all mentioned elsewhere in the text. The interlocutors assume that everyone in the conversation has enough knowledge of what they have been saying, to be able to infer who the 'us' and the 'we' include.

Grammatical cohesion

A2.2

Reference

We can look at how the co-text hangs together from the point of view of reference, which, as you will remember from Unit A1, is the act of using referring expressions to refer to referents in the context. We saw then that when there is no previous mention of the referent in the text, we call it exophoric reference, dependent on the context outside the text for its meaning. In the excerpt above, the example was the proper nouns 'Francesca' and 'David' pointing to people not already mentioned in the conversation but in the common cultural background. The reference of the 'us' and 'we', on the other hand, is not exophoric because the pronouns refer to items within the same text; it is **endophoric** reference.

When a referring expression links with another referring expression within the co-text, we say that it is cohesive with the previous mention of the referent in the text. This is part of what is known as **grammatical cohesion**; it is what meshes the text together. Let us take another example:

> We have been established by an Act of Parliament as an independent body to eliminate discrimination against disabled people and to secure equal opportunities for them. To achieve this, we have set ourselves the goal of: 'A society where all disabled people can participate fully as equal citizens'.
>
> (The Disability Rights Commission leaflet 2000)

Here, the personal pronoun 'them' refers to the same referent as the noun 'disabled people' did. There is also grammatical cohesion through the phrase 'To achieve this', in which the demonstrative pronoun 'this' is cohesive with the aim of eliminating 'discrimination against disabled people' and 'securing equal opportunities for them'. Endophora avoids unnecessary repetition. This is how the example would have sounded without it:

> We have been established by an Act of Parliament as an independent body to eliminate discrimination against disabled people and to secure equal opportunities for disabled people. To achieve the aim of eliminating discrimination against disabled people and securing equal opportunities for disabled people, we have set ourselves the goal of: 'A society where all disabled people can participate fully as equal citizens'.

Notice how the repetition makes the text now seem over-explicit; it sounds as if the writer is assuming that readers will not understand unless it is all spelt out. It gives more information than is needed, as all readers would be able to make the connection between the pronoun and the phrase that it links with, if their short-term memory is functioning normally.

There are two types of endophora. In the example above, the pronouns 'them' and 'this' link back to something that went before in the preceding text. This is called **anaphora**, and it is the most frequent of the two types. The other, **cataphora**, is the opposite – pronouns link forward to a referent in the text that follows. This is in evidence in the next example, which is typical of the opening sentences of books:

> Students (not unlike yourselves) compelled to buy paperback copies of his novels – notably the first, *Travel Light*, though there has lately been some academic interest in his more surreal and 'existential' and perhaps even 'anarchistic' second novel, *Brother Pig* – or encountering some essay from *When the Saints* in a shiny heavy anthology of mid-century literature costing $12.50, imagine that Henry Bech, like thousands less famous than he, is rich. He is not.
>
> (Updike 1970: 11)

Here, we meet 'copies of his novels' before we know who 'he' is. It is only several lines later that we learn that the possessive adjective 'his' links forward to the proper nouns 'Henry Bech' in the text that comes after. As you can see, whereas anaphora refers back, cataphora refers forward. Here, it is a stylistic choice, to keep the reader in suspense as to who is being talked about. More usually, the noun that the pronoun links forward to follows soon after:

> An actor with whom she was rehearsing caught Coral Browne's fancy. Informed by a colleague that she was *most* unlikely to get anywhere with that particular man, she bet the colleague a pound that she would. Next morning, the colleague who had accepted her bet asked her, loudly and meaningfully, in the presence of the actor, 'Well, dear, do you owe me anything?' Browne replied, disappointedly: 'Seven and six'.
>
> (Rees 1999: 30)

Here, the 'she' links cataphorically with 'Coral Browne'. Since seven shillings and six pence was much less than a pound, we must suppose that she was not very successful.

We can summarise reference with a diagram to make it easier to grasp:



There are occasions when the noun phrases (these can be nouns or pronouns) are not linked explicitly to each other, but one noun phrase is linked to entities simply associated with the other noun phrase. This is called **associative endophora.** Here is an example from an article entitled 'Pay attention, please' from the British national newspaper the *Guardian*:

> Students are almost twice as likely to get top degree grades if they are taught by good university teachers, new research shows. The study suggests that the wide differences in numbers of firsts and upper second class degree awarded at universities comes down in large part to the work of inspirational lecturers, not just extra spending on students for books, libraries or computers.
>
> (Major and Plomin, the *Guardian*: 14 April 2001)

Here, readers can infer what 'lecturers', 'students', 'books, libraries or computers' are being talked about, by drawing from their knowledge of the **presuppositional pool** of 'universities'. Associative endophora is half way between endophora and exophora, because it depends partly on knowledge of what went before or after within the same text, and partly on background knowledge of the cultural or interpersonal context, in this case what is associated with 'universities'.

Substitution

Endophoric reference, with personal and demonstrative pronouns and possessives, is only one form of grammatical cohesion. There are two other forms: substitution and ellipsis. Let us start with **substitution**. Many of you will be familiar with the song about the characterless little houses of the pretentious lower-middle class:

Little boxes on the hillside,
Little boxes made of ticky-tacky,
Little boxes, little boxes,
Little boxes, all the same.
There's a green one and a pink one
And a blue one and a yellow one
And they're all made out of ticky-tacky
And they all look just the same.
(Reynolds 1963)

The lines 'There's a green one and a pink one / And a blue one and a yellow one' contain the substitute 'one'. As with endophoric reference, substitution holds the text together and avoids repetition: 'a green one' replaces 'a green box', the 'one' 'substituting' for the 'box'. The plural substitute is 'ones'. We could have substituted 'boxes' in line 2 of the song with 'ones', and said 'Little ones made of ticky-tacky', but then the song would have lost some of its cynicism. Substitution tends to be endophoric: the noun phrase being substituted is usually in the text. Take this children's poem:

The Polar Bear is unaware
Of cold that cuts me through:
For why? He has a coat of hair.
I wish I had one too.
(Belloc 1896)

Here, readers know from the co-text that, in 'I wish I had one too', the 'one' 'replaces a coat of hair'. In the next example, the substitute 'so' coheres with an adjectival phrase. It is from a *Guardian* women's page article entitled 'Does length matter?':

> Self-confidence should not be a gender issue. Boys are not born more confident than girls. Society makes them so because it traditionally values their skills and aptitudes above those of women.
>
> (Winterson, the *Guardian*: 14 April 2001)

We understand 'makes them so' to mean 'makes them more confident than girls'.

Ellipsis

The other form of grammatical cohesion is **ellipsis**. Take a look at this snatch from *Catch 22*, the famous World War II novel:

> "He's afraid of you," Yossarian said. "He's afraid you're going to die of pneumonia."
> "He'd better be afraid," Chief White Halfoat said. A deep low laugh rumbled through his massive chest. "I will, too, the first chance I get. You just wait and see."
>
> (Heller 1962)

'I will, too' is an example of ellipsis: Chief White Halfoat misses out a piece of text. He means 'I will die of pneumonia' but he omits 'die of pneumonia' because it is not necessary. Just like substitution, ellipsis avoids repetition and depends on the hearer or reader's being able to retrieve the missing words from the surrounding co-text. The same happens in the next snippet of a conversation between two 16-year-old female students:

Catriona What was he doing? Tell me, make me cringe.
Jess Oh nothing to make you cringe or anything. He was just, he was just like . . . saying you know just stuff that was really pretty well sick.
Catriona Oh last night, last night he was as well with Romeo and Juliet.

(BNC: kp6 Catriona, 1993.)

Catriona uses ellipsis in her 'he was as well', and thus avoids saying 'he was saying stuff that was really pretty well sick as well'. Ellipsis is a typical feature of both spoken and written text, although it occurs more often in conversation because conversation tends to be less explicit. Even in literature, when conversation is included, it is often full of ellipsis. In the Graham Greene novel, *The Human Factor* (1978), one character asks, 'How are things with you, if I may ask, sir?' and another replies, 'My boy's sick. Measles. Oh, nothing to worry about. No complications.' Here, the informal utterances 'Measles. Oh, nothing to worry about. No complications' would have read less naturally as 'He's got measles. Oh, there's nothing to worry about. He has no complications.'

Both substitution and ellipsis can only be used when there is no ambiguity as to what is being substituted or ellipted. If there is more than one possibility, the result can be confusion. Take this advertisement, quoted by Richard Lederer in his *More Anguished English* (1987): 'FOR SALE: Very unique home in downtown Craigsville. Large lot. Many trees. One you will enjoy living in.' The advertisement reads strangely because of the fact that, since 'One you will enjoy living in' comes straight after 'Many trees', it sounds as if the 'One' contains ellipsis of 'tree' and means 'One tree you will enjoy living in.' Of course 'One' is a substitute for 'a home', but because 'Very unique home in downtown Craigsville' is far away from 'One you will enjoy living in' and the phrases have become separated by other nouns, the idea would have been more clearly expressed by repeating the noun, as in 'A home you will enjoy living in.'

Finally, it should be noted that the use of grammatical cohesion varies from genre to genre. It is much less likely to occur in texts which strive to be completely unambiguous, such as legal texts, or some kinds of instruction texts.

Lexical cohesion

We began this unit by saying that grammatical cohesion (reference, substitution and ellipsis) holds texts together. Cohesion is also maintained by lexical cohesion. The following diagram summarises what both types of cohesion consist of, and points to what the rest of this unit will discuss, in terms of lexical cohesion.



Repetition

Of all the lexical cohesion devices, the most common form is **repetition**, which is simply repeated words or word-phrases, threading through the text. Take this example from D. H. Lawrence's short story *Odour of Chrysanthemums*:

> The child put the pale chrysanthemums to her lips, murmuring:
>
> 'Don't they smell beautiful!'
>
> Her mother gave a short laugh.
>
> 'No,' she said, 'not to me. It was chrysanthemums when I married him, and chrysanthemums when you were born, and the first time they ever brought him home drunk, he'd got brown chrysanthemums in his button-hole.'
>
> (Lawrence 1981)

Here, the repeated 'chrysanthemums' have the effect of pounding through the text and showing how they have been a repeated and unwelcome feature of the mother's life. We saw a similar repetition in the song 'Little boxes on the hillside' above, where the repetition contributed to the cynicism. Substitution and ellipsis avoid repetition; lexical repetition exploits it for stylistic effect.

Synonyms

Instead of repeating the exact same word, a speaker or writer can use another word that means the same or almost the same. This is a **synonym**. Here, we are back to avoiding repetition. Take this little excerpt from the *Times Higher Education Supplement*

> At some 75 cm across and capable of cracking open a coconut shell with its formidable claws, the land-dwelling coconut crab is your beach lounger's worst nightmare. Fortunately for the sunbather, the world's largest terrestrial arthropod has seemingly always been confined to tropical islands across the Pacific and Indian oceans.
>
> (*THES*: 17 November 2000)

Here you will see that 'the land-dwelling coconut crab' and 'the world's largest terrestrial arthropod' are two ways of referring to the same animal, just as 'your beach lounger' and 'the sunbather' are the same person. As the saying goes, 'variety is the spice of life': using different ways of referring to an entity makes for more interesting prose or conversation.

Superordinates

In order to observe the lexical cohesion device of **superordinates**, let us go back to *Odour of Chrysanthemums* and continue with the story:

> The candle-light glittered on the lustre-glasses, on the two vases that held some of the pink chrysanthemums, and on the dark mahogany. There was a cold, deathly smell of chrysanthemums in the room. Elizabeth stood looking at the flowers.
>
> (Lawrence 1981)

Here again there is repetition of 'chrysanthemums', but then they are referred to with the words 'the flowers'. This not a synonym of 'chrysanthemums'; it is a more general term known as a superordinate, an umbrella term that includes 'pansies', 'tulips', 'roses' and so on. This is another way of avoiding repetition and still referring to the referent with a noun. Lawrence could have used a personal pronoun in endophoric reference instead, and said 'Elizabeth stood looking at them', although this might have given them less prominence, and he does want them at the centre of his story.

We can use what we know about superordinates to help explain the absurdity of the rhyme:

The elephant is a bonny bird
It flits from bough to bough
It makes its nest in a rhubarb tree
And whistles like a cow

Of course, 'bird' is the wrong superordinate for 'elephant', because 'bird' includes 'seagull', 'blackbird', 'hummingbird' and so on, and 'elephant' comes under the superordinate 'animal', which includes 'giraffe', 'cow', 'dog' and so on. Even these can be superordinates on a lower level, for example 'dog' is the overall term including 'labrador', 'poodle', 'Irish wolfhound' and so on.

General words

The last form of lexical cohesion that we are going to cover here is the **general word**. These can be general nouns, as in 'thing', 'stuff', 'place', 'person', 'woman' and 'man', or general verbs, as in 'do' and 'happen'. In a way, the general word is a higher level superordinate: it is the umbrella term that can cover almost everything. In the following, Peter, a 49-year-old chemist, uses the general noun 'place' to refer back either to the 'poly' or to the city:

> and so he went off to Wolverhampton Poly which he selected for, you know, all the usual reasons, reasonable **place**, reasonable course, a reasonable this a reasonable that t-term to do computer science which of course all the kids want to do now erm twentieth centu – no it isn't it's a sort of nineteen eighties version of wanting to be an engine driver.
>
> (BNC: kc3 Frederick, 1992)

General nouns and verbs do not carry much information, in themselves; they mostly depend on the co-text for their meaning, so are used when hearers and readers can identify what is being referred to from the rest of the text. Like pronouns, substitutes, ellipsis, synonyms and superordinates, they avoid repetition, and give just the amount of information as is necessary.

Once again, just as with grammatical cohesion, it should be noted that lexical cohesion varies from genre to genre. Synonyms and superordinates are unsuitable for some types of text, such as technical or scientific ones where key words cannot be substituted for other more general terms without precise meaning being lost.

SPEECH ACTS

Understanding concepts — A3.1

- direct speech acts
- felicity conditions
- indirect speech acts
- interactional / transactional function

Introduction — A3.2

> To a hostess who had sent an invitation stating that on a certain day she would be 'At home', George Bernard Shaw succinctly replied: 'So will G. Bernard Shaw'.
>
> (Rees 1999)

At the risk of killing a funny tale, we can explain what happened here in terms of speech acts. The hostess's invitation will have read something like 'Mrs Eleanor Higgins will be at home 10 April 7–9 pm', which are words usually taken as performing the speech act of 'inviting'. Shaw pretended to read it literally as a statement of where she would be and responded in kind; his answer consisted of words to be taken as performing the speech act of 'declining'.

A5.2

Introduction

The excerpt that opens this unit comes from a sociological survey of the living conditions of senior citizens in Scotland, and the factors affecting their housing satisfaction. X is the interviewer and Y is a lady living in sheltered housing, (apartments for retired people with a warden living on site, responsible keeping an eye on them and alerting public services if help is needed):

X Do you find the place is warm enough?
Y Yes, oh yes. Very comfortable I think. It's all that you need really, you don't need any more.
X And you say that the warden is a nice person.
Y Oh yes, you will get other opinions, but that's my opinion.
X Well you can't please everybody can you?
Y She's been very good to me.
X What would the other people say?
Y Ah well I don't know. I wouldn't like to repeat it because I don't really believe half of what they are saying. They just get a fixed thing into their mind. But it's always been, I mean, we had another one – this is our second one. But if she's off ill and that it's, oh off ill again and I mean she's got certificates to prove it. But they just seem, what irks them really is we can't get a warden that will be overnight you see.
X Right, sort of 24 hrs, 7 days a week.

(Wilson and Murie 1995)

Verbal exchanges, whether interviews, conversations or service encounters, tend to run more smoothly and successfully when the participants follow certain social conventions. This interview is no exception. The interviewer asks questions and the lady gives answers that give just the right amount of information, and which are relevant to the question, truthful and clear. When asked if the place is warm enough, for example, her answer 'Yes, oh yes. Very comfortable I think', says all that is needed; she is presumably being honest; she is keeping to the topic established by the interviewer; and she is not saying anything that is ambiguous. She is following the conversational maxims of the **cooperative principle** (Grice 1975). Let us look at the four maxims of the principle, by seeing how they are observed.

A5.3

Observing the maxims

The first maxim of the cooperative principle is the maxim of **quantity**, which says that speakers should be as informative as is required, that they should give neither too little information nor too much. Some speakers like to point to the fact that they know how much information the hearer requires or can be bothered with, and say something like, 'Well, **to cut a long story short**, she didn't get home till two.' People who give too little information risk their hearer not being able to identify what they are talking about because they are not explicit enough; those who give more information than the hearer needs risk boring them.

The second maxim is that of **quality**, which says that speakers are expected to be sincere, to be saying something that they believe corresponds to reality. They are assumed not to say anything that they believe to be false or anything for which they lack evidence. Some speakers like to draw their hearers' attention to the fact that they are only saying what they believe to be true, and that they lack adequate evidence. In

A I'll ring you tomorrow afternoon then.
B Erm, I shall be there **as far as I know**, and in the meantime have a word with Mum and Dad if they're free. Right, bye-bye then sweetheart.
A Bye-bye, bye.

(BNC: kc8 Gillian, 1991)

B says 'as far as I know', meaning 'I can't be totally sure if this is true', so that if A rings up and finds that B is not there, B is protected from accusations of lying by the fact that she did make it clear that she was uncertain. Most hearers assume that speakers are not lying, and most speakers know that.

The third is the maxim of **relation**, which says that speakers are assumed to be saying something that is relevant to what has been said before. Thus, if we hear 'The baby cried. The mommy picked it up' (Garfinkel 1967), we assume that the 'mommy' was the mother of the crying baby and that she picked the baby up because it was crying. Similarly, in the following exchange:

A There's somebody at the door.
B I'm in the bath.

B expects A to understand that his present location is relevant to her comment that there is someone at the door, and that he cannot go and see who it is because he is in the bath. Some speakers like to indicate how their comment has relevance to the conversation, as in the following from a market research meeting:

A I mean, **just going back to your point**, I mean to me an order form is a contract. If we are going to put something in then let's keep it as general as possible.
A Yes.

(BNC: j97 British Market Research Monthly Meeting, 1994)

The last is the maxim of **manner**, which says that we should be brief and orderly, and avoid obscurity and ambiguity. In this exchange from a committee meeting, the speaker points to the fact that he is observing the maxim:

> Thank you Chairman. Jus – **just to clarify one point**. There is a meeting of the Police Committee on Monday and there is an item on their budget for the provision of their camera.
>
> (BNC, j44 West Sussex Council Highways Committee Meeting, 1994)

When speakers appear not to follow the maxims but expect hearers to appreciate the meaning implied, as in the case of the dress shop assistant, the romantic date and the chilly room, we say that they are 'flouting' the maxims. Just as with an indirect speech act, the speaker implies a function different from the literal meaning of form; when flouting a maxim, the speaker assumes that the hearer knows that their words should not be taken at face value and that they can infer the implicit meaning.

Flouting quantity

The speaker who flouts the maxim of quantity seems to give too little or too much information. In

A Well, how do I look?
B Your *shoes* are nice . . .

B does not say that the sweatshirt and jeans do not look nice, but he knows that A will understand that implication, because A asks about his whole appearance and only gets told about part of it. If we look again at the old lady in the sheltered home, in the example that started this unit, we see that she flouts the maxim of quantity when she says, 'Oh yes, you will get other opinions, but that's my opinion.' The interviewer knows that she is not giving all the information that he needs in order to fully appreciate what is being said. This will be why he later asks 'What would the other people say?' The old lady knew that the interviewer would know that she had more information, but maybe she wanted to be pressured for it. It is similar to 'I had an amazing time last night', which invites 'Go on – tell me what happened then!'

Flouting quality

The speaker flouting the maxim of quality may do it in several ways. First, they may quite simply say something that obviously does not represent what they think. We saw an incidence of this in Sir Maurice's 'I think you would be happier in a larger – or a smaller – college', which flouts the maxim if he knew that the student would understand what he was getting at, and hear the message behind his words.

Speakers may flout the maxim by exaggerating as in the **hyperbole** 'I could eat a horse', or

Lynn Yes **I'm starving** too.
Martin Hurry up girl.
Lynn Oh dear, stop eating rubbish. You won't eat any dinner.

(BNC: kd6 Martin, 1992)

in which 'I'm starving' is a well-established exaggerating expression. No speaker would expect their hearer to say, 'What, you could eat a whole horse?' or 'I don't think you are dying of hunger – you don't even look thin.' Hearers would be expected to know that the speaker simply meant that they were very hungry. Hyperbole is often at the basis of humour. Take this example from *Social Studies*:

> Remember that as a teenager you are at the last stage in your life when you will be happy to hear that the phone is for you.
>
> (Leobowitz 1985: 368)

Violating the maxims

A speaker can be said to 'violate' a maxim when they know that the hearer will *not* know the truth and will only understand the surface meaning of the words. They intentionally generate a misleading implicature (Thomas 1995: 73); maxim violation is unostentatiously, quietly deceiving. The speaker deliberately supplies insufficient information, says something that is insincere, irrelevant or ambiguous, and the hearer wrongly assumes that they are cooperating.

If a speaker violates the maxim of **quantity**, they do not give the hearer enough information to know what is being talked about, because they do not want the hearer to know the full picture. The speaker is not implying anything; they are 'being economical with the truth'. You may know the Peter Sellers film in which the Pink Panther asks a hotel receptionist about a little dog beside the desk:

A Does your dog bite?
B No.
A *[Bends down to stroke it and gets bitten]* Ow! You said your dog doesn't bite!
B That isn't my dog.

The receptionist knew that he was talking about the dog in front of her and not her dog at home, yet she intentionally did not give him enough information, for reasons best known to herself. Let us take another example:

Husband How much did that new dress cost, darling?
Wife Less than the last one.

Here, the wife covers up the price of the dress by not saying *how much* less than her last dress.

The wife, when asked 'How much did that new dress cost, darling?' could have violated the maxim of **quality** by not being sincere, and giving him the wrong information: 'Thirty-five pounds'. If Sir Maurice Bowra, in the example above, knew that the young man did not realise that he had failed the interview because of his performance, and if he knew that the young man would believe that it was the size of the college that was wrong for him, then he could be said to be telling a lie, because he was violating the maxim of quality.

Needless to say, not all violations of the maxim of quality are blameworthy. In many cultures it is perfectly acceptable to say to a child of five, 'Mummy's gone on a little holiday because she needs a rest', rather than 'Mummy's gone away to decide whether she wants a divorce or not.' A lie that protects is a lie with good intentions, what we call a white lie. If Sir Maurice knew that the young man did not realise that he had failed the interview, and that he would be devastated to be told that, then he is telling a white lie, and covering up the truth to be kind.

In answer to 'How much did that new dress cost, darling?' the wife could have answered violating the maxim of **relation**, in order to distract him and change the topic: 'I know, let's go out tonight. Now, where would you like to go?' She could have violated the maxim of **manner**, and said, 'A tiny fraction of my salary, though probably a bigger fraction of the salary of the woman that sold it to me', in the hope that that could be taken as an answer and the matter could be dropped. In the sheltered

Source 2. 8 (Grice, 1989)

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quence in question fail to hold. So *some* implicatures are conventional, unlike the one with which I introduced this discussion of implicature.

I wish to represent a certain subclass of nonconventional implicatures, which I shall call *conversational* implicatures, as being essentially connected with certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite, or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the participants (as in a casual conversation). But at each stage, *some* possible conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative Principle.

On the assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall certain more specific maxims and submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative Principle. Echoing Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. The category of Quantity relates to the quantity of information to be provided, and under it fall the following maxims:

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

(The second maxim is disputable; it might be said that to be overinformative is not a transgression of the Cooperative Principle but merely a waste of time. However, it might be answered that such overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side issues; and there may also be an indirect effect, in that the hearers may be misled as a result of thinking that there is some particular *point* in the provision of the excess of information. However this may be, there is perhaps a different reason for doubt about the admission of this second maxim, namely, that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which concerns relevance.)

Under the category of Quality falls a supermaxim—"Try to make your contribution one that is true"—and two more specific maxims:

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Under the category of Relation I place a single maxim, namely, "Be relevant." Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in later work.

Finally, under the category of Manner, which I understand as relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said but, rather, to *how* what is said is to be said, I include the supermaxim—"Be perspicuous"—and various maxims such as:

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

And one might need others.

It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false. Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing; other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied. While this may be correct, so far as the generation of impl tures is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different fr other maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at l treat it as a member of the list of maxims.

Source 2. 9 (Thomas, 2013)



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returning home was a bereavement) was false.

Pragmatically misleading (or potentially pragmatically misleading) utterances of this sort are regularly encountered in certain **activity types** (see chapter 7), such as trials, parliamentary speeches and arguments. So regularly do they occur, in fact, that they could be seen as the norm for this type of interaction, and be interpreted in that light by participants. I return to this point in section 3.7.4.

At first blush, it might appear that violating a maxim is the exact opposite of flouting a maxim. In example 21, Alice says something which is 'true' (as far as it goes) in order to imply an untruth. In the case of a flout (as in example 3), the speaker blatantly fails to observe the maxim of Quality at the level of what is said, but nevertheless implies something which is true. All the examples of flouts which Grice himself gives are of this order. However, there is no principled reason to expect that an implicature will be 'true' — speakers can imply a lie as easily as they can say one (as in example 7).

3.7.2 Infringing a maxim

A speaker who, with no intention of generating an implicature and with no intention of deceiving, fails to observe a maxim is said to 'infringe' the maxim. In other words, the non-observance stems from imperfect linguistic performance rather than from any desire on the part of the speakers to generate a conversational implicature. This type of non-observance could occur because the speaker has an imperfect command of the language (a young child or a foreign learner), because the speaker's performance is impaired in some way (nervousness, drunkenness, excitement), because of some cognitive impairment, or simply because the speaker is constitutionally incapable of speaking clearly, to the point, etc.

3.7.3 Opting out of a maxim

A speaker opts out of observing a maxim by indicating unwillingness to cooperate in the way the maxim requires. Examples of opting out occur frequently in public life, when the s[illegible] cannot, perhaps for legal or ethical reasons, reply in t[illegible] normally expected. On the other hand, the speaker wi[illegible] avoid generating a false implicature or appearing uncoope[illegible] Examples of such cases could include a priest, counsellor or even

Source 2. 10 (Black, 2006)



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situation where one is not certain of the accuracy of some information, and hence uncertain whether to say something which may be helpful, but where one's evidence is inadequate. One may therefore hedge one's contribution. Phrases such as *I understand that,* or *it seems to me* may indicate this.

4. **Flouting**: this is the most interesting way of breaking a maxim. One makes clear to the hearer that one is aware of the co-operative principle and the maxims, so that the audience is led to consider why the principle or a maxim was broken. The assumption, in other words, is not that communication has broken down, but that the speaker has chosen an indirect way of achieving it. It may be that something in the situation prevents giving a direct answer to a question; considerations of politeness may inhibit the speaker. This is one of the most crucial aspects of Grice's theory for the interpretation of literary texts. We assume that flouts generate implicatures, and it is up to the reader to pick up appropriate ones. Thus the maxim of manner is flouted when we use a metaphor or irony, but we assume that it has communicative effects. The same maxim is involved when a non-chronological order is selected for telling a story. If I begin a conventional whodunnit with the murderer approaching his victim, I will spoil the story, and doubtless lose all my readers, unless, of course, it turns out that what amounts to a flout within the genre of detective fiction turns out to be a psychological study of the motivation of murderers, where the loss of the mystery element may be insignificant. In considering the effects of the implicatures that may be generated by flouting a maxim, we should always remember that the whole act of reading a novel is a slow process, which takes place over time (in that way, it is comparable to music, and perhaps contrasts with the initial impact of looking at a painting). It is easy to lose sight of the fact that during the reading process, implicatures will accumulate, and that we balance one against another in order to arrive at an interpretation. In that respect, a book like this, which inevitably deals with short extracts, traduces the reading process. It can only be hoped that readers will consult their memories, and their own knowledge of texts, to supply examples and so enrich the reading process.

2.5 CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE

Conversational implicatures arise from a combination of language and situation: the same utterance on different occasions might not generate an implicature, or might suggest a different one. They are rooted in the situation in which they occur, and must be interpreted taking the context into account. If we assume that our interlocutor is obeying the co-operative principle when one of the maxims appears not to be fulfilled, we will attempt to infer the meaning intended. Exploiting a maxim may happen because allowing the hearer to work out the point of a remark may be a polite way of avoiding what are known as face threatening acts (FTA). For instance, if you ask me to lend you five pounds, I may find it difficult to refuse politely. If yo simply say that you will have to walk home because you have no money, th

Source 2. 11 (Watts, 2003)



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M's utterance at the first double-shafted arrow in score 11 displays expressive politeness$_1$ in the formulaic indirect request *can I come back in now*, but it merely prefaces her critical remark at the second double-shafted arrow in score 12 in which she upbraids J and C for having left her out of the interaction. She has after all called to participate in the programme and is left hanging on the phone listening to J and C when *she* has the right to participate and *they* have the obligation to allow her to participate. There is also a clear change of footing immediately after this utterance. She inserts a pause and signals a shift to a further topic by using the pause filler *er*. After the exchange is completed, there is a significant pause of roughly one second after which the moderator C, at the third double-shafted arrow in score 15, assesses the significance of M's criticism – *felt she put me in my place there* – acknowledges his mistake – *fair enough* – and her right to intervene – *I think that's quite right*.

THE DISCURSIVE DISPUTE OVER POLITENESS$_1$

(Im)politeness$_1$, therefore, reveals a great deal of vacillation on how behaviour is evaluated as 'polite' at the positive end of the scale when compared with the negative end. It would also seem that whether or not a participant's behaviour is evaluated as polite or impolite is not merely a matter of the linguistic expressions that s/he uses, but rather depends on the interpretation of that behaviour in the overall social interaction. The interpretations are thus first-order evaluations which are often not expressed in terms of the cluster of adjectives associated with (im)politeness. If they are, it is far more likely to be impolite behaviour which is commented on. If the researcher wishes to locate polite behaviour, s/he must begin by examining very closely what happens in the flow of social interaction in order to identify the kinds of behaviour that seem to warrant the attribution of the term 'polite'.

At this point, however, we encounter a further difficulty, one which may at first sight seem insurmountable. The term 'politeness' itself is in dispute among lay members of society in that they appear to be engaged in a discursive struggle over the value of the term. We saw in the first section of this chapter that characterisations of politeness in English-speaking societies range from socially 'correct' or appropriate behaviour, through cultivated behaviour, considerateness displayed to others, self-effacing behaviour, to negative attributions

It would be hard to find many people who would still subscribe to this evaluation of the two terms today, even amongst those who associate politeness$_1$ with dishonesty. But it is interesting to see that by the time we reach British society in the late nineteenth century, writers like H. E. Norton saw politeness$_1$ as something purely superficial, denying any connection between a person's character and the degree of politeness s/he displayed towards others.

The claim that successful social interaction among human beings depends upon the will of the participants to cooperate in localised forms of social endeavour does not prevent certain forms of human social interaction from being confrontational and competitive, with the result that success and failure will then be measured by who wins and who loses. But the very fact that human beings are social animals ensures that cooperation will ultimately prevail over competition. The mutually shared forms of consideration for others that are the basis of social cooperation from culture to culture will obviously differ, since, as we have seen, politeness$_1$ is a culturally and historically relative term.

Systems of politeness$_1$, however, may be part of a discourse that discriminates against and excludes large groups of the population from highly valued symbolic and material resources. Well-developed first-order systems of politeness can even provide a means for those in possession of the relevant resources to discriminate between 'haves' and 'have-nots' linguistically, socially, genderwise and possibly also racially. They are thus used by those in positions of power to provide a justification for the construction of social classes, and they remain relatively stable over lengthy periods of time. During the course of time, some aspects of polite linguistic performance may become pragmaticalised or grammaticalised in the structure of the language.

To give a brief illustration of the elitist and socially exclusive nature of politeness$_1$ systems and the role that language plays in constructing and reproducing them, I shall, in this final section, consider the development of the British social class system and the role played by language and politeness in that development. To begin with, consider a sentence in the quotation from Langford (1989) given above: 'The essence of politeness was often said to be that *je ne sais quoi* which distinguished the innate gentleman's understanding of what made for civilized conduct . . .' The sentence is resonant with implied meanings which I will now attempt to unravel.

Firstly, those who talked about politeness$_1$ in the eighteenth century considered that the concept was formed around a meaningful core ('the essence of politeness'). But, secondly, those same people

Source 2. 12 (Mey 2009)




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(problematic for traditional approaches: Eelen, 2001: 141) can be accounted for within the same framework.

Second, the relation between the cultural/social and the individual is seen as less deterministic. On the one hand, the cultural is part of an individual's repertoire: it is internalized and accumulated through all past interactions experienced by an individual, thus determining the nature of that individual's *habitus* (or set of learned dispositions; Bourdieu, 1991). On the other hand, the cultural can be acted on – be maintained or challenged – to various extents by individuals, depending on those individuals' resources, or symbolic *capital*; the cultural is never an immutable entity.

This *discursive* understanding of politeness enables us to capture the functional orientation of politeness to actions of social inclusion or exclusion, alignment or distancing (and incidentally uncovers the fundamentally ideological nature of scientific metapragmatic talk on politeness, as one type of goal oriented social practice; see Glick, 1996: 170) (*see* **Discourse Markers**).

Politeness ceases to be deterministically associated with specific linguistic forms or functions (another problem for past approaches): it depends on the subjective *perception* of the meanings of such forms and functions. Moreover, in Watts's (2003) view, behavior that abides by an individual's expectations based on 'habitus' (i.e., unmarked appropriate behavior) is not necessarily considered politeness: it is instead simply *politic behavior*. Politeness may thus be defined as behavior in excess of what can be expected (which can be received positively or negatively but is always argumentative), whereas impoliteness similarly is characterized as nonpolitic behavior (on the important issue of the theoretical status of *impoliteness*, see Eelen, 2001: 87 and Watts, 2003: 5).

As sketched here, the path followed by the discourse on politeness illustrates how the struggle over the meaning and the social function of politeness is at the very centre of current theorizing. Watts adopts a rather radical position and rejects the possibility of a theory of politeness2 altogether: scientific notions of politeness (which should be nonnormative) cannot be part of a study of social interaction (normative by definition) (Watts, 2003: 11). Others, like House (2003, 2005), or O'Driscoll (1996) before her, maintain that a descriptive and explanatory framework must include universal (the first two below) and culture/language-specific levels (the last two below):

1. a fundamental biological, psychosocial level based on animal drives (*coming together* vs. *noli-me-tangere*)
2. a philosophical level to capture biological drives in terms of a finite number of principles, maxims, or parameters
3. an empirical descriptive level concerned with the particular (open-ended) set of norms, tendencies, or preferences
4. a linguistic level at which sociocultural phenomena have become 'crystallized' in specific language forms (either honorifics or other systemic distinctions)

(adapted from House, 2003, 2005).

Future Perspectives

Although the legacy of the 'mainstream' pragmatic approaches described above is clearly still very strong (see, for instance, Fukushima, 2000; Bayraktaroğlu and Sifianou, 2001; Hickey and Stewart, 2005; Christie, 2004), the critical thoughts introduced in the current debate on linguistic politeness promise to deliver a body of work radically different from the previous one.

The future program of politeness research begins from the task of elaborating a full-fledged theoretical framework from the seminal ideas recently proposed. It must acknowledge the disputed nature of notions of politeness and explore the interactional purposes of evaluations (see, for example, Mills's 2003 study on gender, or Watts's 2003 'emergent networks'; compare also Locher's 2004 study on the uses of politeness in the exercise of power). It must articulate how norms come to be shared and how they come to be transformed; it must explore the scope and significance of variability. Relevance theory, Critical Discourse Analysis, and Bourdieuian sociology have all been proposed as promising frameworks for investigation. Empirical research that can provide methodologically reliable data for these questions must also be devised: the new paradigm would dictate that the situatedness of the very experimental context, the argumentativity of the specific practice observed are recognized as integral part of the relevant data.

Politeness consistently features in international symposia, and has, since 1998, had a meeting point on the Internet; the year 2005 will see the birth of a dedicated publication, the *Journal of Politeness Research*.

See also: Communicative Principle and Communication; Cooperative Principle; Discourse Markers; Face; Goffman, Erving; Grice, Herbert Paul; Intercultural Pragmatics and Communication; Maxims and Flouting; Metapragmatics; Relevance Theory; Speech Acts; Vygotskij, Lev Semenovich.

Source 2. 13 (Lakoff 1990)

TALKING POWER

The Politics of Language in Our Lives

ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF

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to much more effort in order to interpret powerful people's utterances: their wish is our command.

Examples abound in history and literature in which those with power have taken advantage of the willingness of others to interpret, thereby saving themselves from the responsibility for a particularly loathsome act. In Shakespeare's *King Richard II,* Richard, the king, has been deposed and imprisoned by a group of nobles led by Henry Bolingbroke. Though Henry has been crowned king, he must worry as long as Richard is alive about the possibility of another coup. What happens next is told indirectly in a bit of dialogue between Exton, a member of Bolingbroke's entourage, and a servant:

EXTON: Didst thou not mark the king, what words he spake,
"Have I no friend will rid me of this living fear?"
Was it not so?
SERVANT: These were his very words.
EXTON: "Have I no friend?" quoth he: he spake it twice,
And urged it twice together, did he not?
SERVANT: He did.
EXTON: And speaking it, he wistly look'd on me;
As one should say, "I would thou wert the man
That would divorce this terror from my heart;"
Meaning the king at Pomfret [Richard]. Come, let's go:
I am the king's friend, and will rid his foe.
[5.4]

What Henry wants, of course, is for Exton to kill Richard; but even though he is king, Henry cannot quite bring himself to say it. He frames his desire as a request for information, theoretically satisfied with a simple yes (or no). If Henry were not king of England, his interlocutor would no doubt understand that the question was more than it seemed, but interpret it (openly at any rate) as no more than a request for reassurance: "Yes, of course you do. No need to worry—there, there." But, since Exton is anxious to please, he interprets the king's question further: not only is it a wish, it constitutes a command. Henry underscores the sincerity and importance of his speech act (without clarifying for Exton exactly what it is) by repetition and nonverbal language, which Exton again takes special pains to interpret. But Henry has not *said* in so many words what he wants. Exton carries out what he believes to have been Henry's command and later enters Henry's presence along with Richard in his coffin.

EXTON: Great king, within this coffin I present
Thy buried fear: herein all breathless lies

The mightiest of thy greatest enemies,
Richard of Bordeaux, by me hither brought.
BOLINGBROKE: Exton, I thank thee not; for thou hast wrought
A deed of slander with thy fatal hand
Upon my head and all this famous land.
EXTON: From your own mouth, my lord, did I this deed.
[5.6.30–37]

By assuming the privileges of royalty, Henry has it both ways: his enemy is dead, and he is not responsible (at least officially).

Politeness

Indirectness can function as a form of politeness.[2] Politeness is a system of interpersonal relations designed to facilitate interaction by minimizing the potential for conflict and confrontation inherent in all human interchange. We like to think of conversation as conflict-free, with speakers normally being able to satisfy one another's needs and interests. But, in fact, we enter every conversation—indeed, every kind of discourse—with some personal desideratum in mind: perhaps as obvious as a favor or as subtle as the desire to be likeable. For some of these needs, participants can accede to each other, and both gain their desires; but with others, one must lose, however minimally, for the other to win. One person must tell another something that the other doesn't want to hear; one person must refuse another's request; one person must end a conversation before the other is quite willing to go. In such cases, there is the danger of insult and, consequently, the breakdown of communication. If societies did not devise ways to smooth over moments of conflict and confrontation, social relationships would be difficult to establish and continue, and essential cohesion would erode. Politeness strategies are the means to preserve at least the semblance of harmony and cohesion.

Politeness is most necessary when the interaction is an end in itself. Friendly conversation is the clearest case. In the many kinds of discourse in which we engage for other motives, we may still employ conflict-reducing strategies, but forms of communication designed to achieve clarity may supersede them if there is a conflict between the two. In the courtroom, for instance, uncovering the truth is considered more relevant than not offending someone (at least, unless that someone can hurt you if they take umbrage: the judge or the jury). So one excuse for the peculiarities of legal language is that it must be extremely clear and explicit, lacking the usual dodges we have come to expect in ordinary conversation, which help us make sense of it. When these are absent we feel adrift, as if we were communicating with faceless interlocutors. As long as an interchange

Source 2. 14 (Goffman 2017)



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ON FACE-WORK*

An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction

Every person lives in a world of social encounters, in-volving him either in face-to face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of these contacts, he tends to act out what is sometimes called a *line*—that is, a pattern of verbal and nonverbal acts by which he expresses his view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself. Regardless of whether a person intends to take a line, he will find that he has done so in effect. The other participants will assume that he has more or less willfully taken a stand, so that if he is to deal with their response to him he must take into consideration the impression they have possibly formed of him.

The term *face* may be defined as the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms of approved social attributes—albeit an image that others may share, as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion by making a good showing for himself.[1]

A person tends to experience an immediate emotional response to the face which a contact with others allows him; he cathects his face; his "feelings" become attached to it. If the encounter sustains an image of him that he has long taken for granted, he probably will have few feelings about the matter. If events establish a face for him that is better than he might have expected, he is likely to "feel good"; if his ordinary expectations are not fulfilled, one expects that he will "feel bad" or "feel hurt." In general, a person's attachment to a particular face, coupled with the ease with which discontinuing information can be conveyed by himself and others, provides one reason why he finds that participation in any contact with others is a

Source 2. 15 (Brown & Levinson)



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3.00 THE ARGUMENT: INTUITIVE BASES AND DERIVATIVE DEFINITIONS

3.1 Assumptions: Properties of interactants

We make the following assumptions: that all competent adult members of a society[7] have (and know each other to have)

(i) 'face', the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself, consisting in two related aspects:

 (a) negative face:[8] the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to non-distraction – i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition

 (b) positive face: the positive consistent self-image or 'personality' (crucially including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) claimed by interactants

(ii) certain rational capacities, in particular consistent modes of reasoning from ends to the means that will achieve those ends.

3.1.1 Face. Our notion of 'face' is derived from that of Goffman (1967) and from the English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or humiliated, or 'losing face'. Thus face is something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction. In general, people cooperate (and assume each other's cooperation) in maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone's face depends on everyone else's being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others' faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each others' face, that is to act in ways that assure the other participants that the agent is heedful of the assumptions concerning face given under (i) above. (Just what this heedfulness consists in is the subject of this paper.)

Furthermore, while the content of face will differ in different cultures (what the exact limits are to personal territories, and what the publicly relevant content of personality consists in), we are assuming that the mutual knowledge of members' public self-image or face, and the social necessity to orient oneself to it in interaction, are universal.

3.1.2 Face as wants. It would have been possible to treat the respect for face as norms or values subscribed to by members of a society (as perhaps most anthropologists would assume). Instead, we treat the aspects of face as basic wants, which every member knows every other member desires, and which in general it is in the interests of every member to partially satisfy. In other words, we take in Weberian terms the more strongly rational *zweckrational* model of individual action, because the *wert-rational* model (which would treat face respect as an unquestionable value or norm) fails to account for the fact that face respect is not an unequivocal right. In particular, a mere bow to face acts like a diplomatic declaration of good intentions; it is not in general required that an actor fully satisfy another's face wants. Secondly, face can be, and routinely is, ignored, not just in cases of social breakdown (affrontery) but also in cases of urgent cooperation, or in the interests of efficiency.[9]

Therefore, the components of face given above in section 3.1 may be restated as follows. We define:

> **negative face**: the want of every 'competent adult member' that his actions be unimpeded by others.
> **positive face**: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others.

Negative face, with its derivative politeness of non-imposition, is familiar as the formal politeness that the notion 'politeness' immediately conjures up. But positive face, and its derivative forms of positive politeness, are less obvious. The reduction of a person's public self-image or personality to a want that one's wants be desirable to at least some others can be justified in this way. The most salient aspect of a person's personality in interaction is what that personality requires of other interactants – in particular, it includes the desire to be ratified, understood, approved of, liked or admired. The next step is to represent this desire as the want to have one's goals thought of as desirable. In the special sense of 'wanting' that we develop, we can then arrive at positive face as here defined. To give this some intuitive flesh, consider an example. Mrs B is a fervent

(f) unwilling promises and offers (S commits himself to some future action although he doesn't want to; therefore, if his unwillingness shows, he may also offend H's positive face)

(ii) Those that directly damage S's positive face:[13]

(a) apologies (S indicates that he regrets doing a prior FTA, thereby damaging his own face to some degree – especially if the apology is at the same time a confession with H learning about the transgression through it, and the FTA thus conveys bad news)

(b) acceptance of a compliment (S may feel constrained to denigrate the object of H's prior compliment, thus damaging his own face; or he may feel constrained to compliment H in turn)

(c) breakdown of physical control over body, bodily leakage, stumbling or falling down, etc.

(d) self-humiliation, shuffling or cowering, acting stupid, self-contradicting

(e) confessions, admissions of guilt or responsibility – e.g. for having done or not done an act, or for ignorance of something that S is expected to know

(f) emotion leakage, non-control of laughter or tears

These two ways of classifying FTAs (by whether S's face or H's face is mainly threatened, or by whether it is mainly positive face or negative face that is at stake) give rise to a four-way grid which offers the possibility of cross-classifying at least some of the above FTAs. However, such a cross-classification has a complex relation to the ways in which FTAs are handled.[14]

3.3 Strategies for doing FTAs

In the context of the mutual vulnerability of face, any rational agent will seek to avoid these face-threatening acts, or will employ certain strategies to minimize the threat. In other words, he will take into consideration the relative weightings of (at least) three wants: (a) the want to communicate the content of the FTA x, (b) the want to be efficient or urgent,[15] and (c) the want to maintain H's face to any degree. Unless (b) is greater than (c), S will want to minimize the threat of his FTA.

The possible sets of strategies may be schematized exhaustively as in Fig. 1. In this schema, we have in mind the following definitions.

An actor goes **on record** in doing an act A if it is clear to participants what communicative intention led the actor to do A (i.e., there is just



Fig. 1. Possible strategies for doing FTAs

one unambiguously attributable intention with which witnesses would concur). For instance, if I say 'I (hereby) promise to come tomorrow' and if participants would concur that, in saying that, I did unambiguously express the intention of committing myself to that future act, then in our terminology I went 'on record' as promising to do so.

In contrast, if an actor goes **off record** in doing A, then there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that the actor cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent. So, for instance, if I say 'Damn, I'm out of cash, I forgot to go to the bank today', I may be intending to get you to lend me some cash, but I cannot be held to have committed myself to that intent (as you would discover were you to challenge me with 'This is the seventeenth time you've asked me to lend you money'). Linguistic realizations of off-record strategies include metaphor and irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautologies, all kinds of hints as to what a speaker wants or means to communicate, without doing so directly, so that the meaning is to some degree negotiable.

Doing an act **baldly, without redress**, involves doing it in the most direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible (for example, for a request, saying 'Do X!'). This we shall identify roughly with following the specifications of Grice's Maxims of Cooperation (Grice 1967, 1975). Normally, an FTA will be done in this way only if the speaker does not fear retribution from the addressee, for example in circumstances where (a) S and H both tacitly agree that the relevance of face demands may be suspended in the interests of urgency or efficiency; (b) where the danger to H's face is *very* small, as in offers, requests, suggestions that are clearly in H's interest and do not require great sacrifices of S (e.g., 'Come in' or 'Do sit down'); and (c) where S is vastly superior in power to H, or can enlist audience support to destroy H's face without losing his own.

By **redressive action** we mean action that 'gives face' to the addressee, that is, that attempts to counteract the potential face damage of the FTA by doing it in such a way, or with such modifications or additions, that

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Managing rapport in talk: Using rapport sensitive incidents to explore the motivational concerns underlying the management of relations☆

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the motivational concerns that underlie the management of relations. In linguistics, the management of relations has been discussed extensively within politeness theory, and so the paper starts by identifying four key issues of controversy in politeness theory: (a) should 'polite' language use be explained in terms of face (e.g. Brown, Penelope, Levinson, Stephen C., 1987. Politeness. Some Universals in Language Usage, CUP, Cambridge. [Originally published as Universals in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomenon. In: Goody, Esther, (Ed.), Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction. CUP, New York, 1978), conversational maxims (e.g. Leech, Geoffrey N., 1983. Principles of Pragmatics. Longman, London), and/or conversational rights (e.g. Fraser, Bruce, 1990. Perspectives on politeness. Journal of Pragmatics 14 (2), 219–236); (b) why are speech acts such as orders interpersonally sensitive — is it because they are a threat to our autonomy (Brown and Levinson, 1987 [1978]), or because of cost–benefit concerns (Leech, 1983); (c) is Brown and Levinson's concept of negative face too individually focused, and should a social identity component be included (Matsumoto, Yoshiko, 1988. Reexamination of the universality of face: politeness phenomena in Japanese. Journal of Pragmatics 12, 403–426); and (d) is face just a personal/individual concern or can it be a group concern (Gao, Ge, 1996. Self and other: a Chinese perspective on interpersonal relationships. In: Gudykunst, W.B., Ting-Toomey, S., Nishida, T. (Eds.), Communication in Personal Relationships Across Cultures, Sage, London. pp. 81–101.)? The paper then uses reports of authentic rapport sensitive incidents to throw light on these controversial issues and to find out the relational management concerns that people perceive in their everyday lives. It maintains that such data is important to politeness theory, because linguistic politeness needs to be studied within the

☆ The author would like to thank Xiong Zhaoning for collecting the data reported in this paper.

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Although many of the incidents reported above describe concerns over general behaviour rather than strictly linguistic behaviour, I maintain that they are nevertheless very relevant to politeness theory. They illustrate the fundamental types of issues that people get concerned about, and that people therefore need to pay attention to during verbal interaction if they are to 'maintain the social equilibrium and friendly relations' (Leech, 1983: 132). However, unlike politeness theory that takes language use as its starting point, I propose a model that starts with the management of relations and I call this a rapport management model.

I suggest that the motivational force for rapport management involves two main components: the management of face and the management of sociality rights. Face management, as the term indicates, involves the management of face needs and, following Goffman (1972: 5), I define face as 'the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself [sic] by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact' [my emphasis]. I define sociality rights as the 'fundamental personal/social entitlements that a person effectively claims for him/herself in his/her interactions with others', and I suggest that they are derived primarily from personal/social expectancies and need to be handled appropriately. In other words, face is associated with personal/social value, and is concerned with people's sense of worth, credibility, dignity, honour, reputation, competence and so on. Sociality rights, on the other hand, are concerned with personal/social entitlements, and reflect people's concerns over fairness, consideration, social inclusion/exclusion and so on.

I suggest that face has the following two interrelated aspects:

1. *Quality face*: We have a fundamental desire for people to evaluate us positively in terms of our personal qualities; e.g. our competence, abilities, appearance etc. *Quality face* is concerned with the value that we effectively claim for ourselves in terms of such personal qualities as these, and so is closely associated with our sense of personal self-esteem.

2. *Social identity face*: We have a fundamental desire for people to acknowledge and uphold our social identities or roles, e.g. as group leader, valued customer, close friend. *Social identity face* is concerned with the value that we effectively claim for ourselves in terms of social or group roles, and is closely associated with our sense of public worth.

Similarly, I suggest that sociality rights have two interrelated aspects:

3. *Equity rights*: We have a fundamental belief that we are entitled to personal consideration from others, so that we are treated fairly: that we are not unduly imposed upon or unfairly ordered about, that we are not taken advantage of or exploited, and that we receive the benefits to which we are entitled. There seem to be two components to this equity entitlement: the notion of *cost–benefit* (the extent to which we are exploited, disadvantaged or benefitted, and the belief that costs and benefits should be kept roughly in balance through the principle of reciprocity), and the related issue of *autonomy–imposition* (the extent to which people control us or impose on us).

4. *Association rights*: We have a fundamental belief that we are entitled to association with others that is in keeping with the type of relationship that we have with them. These association rights relate partly to *interactional association/dissociation* (the type and extent of our involvement with others), so that we feel, for example, that we are entitled to an appropriate amount of conversational interaction and social chit-chat with others (e.g. not ignored on the one hand, but not overwhelmed on the other). They also relate to *affective association/dissociation* (the extent to which we share concerns, feelings and interests). Naturally, what counts as 'an appropriate amount' depends on the nature of the relationship, as well as sociocultural norms and personal preferences.

The components of the model, and their interrelationships, are shown diagrammatically in Table 1.

As can be seen, rapport management is conceptualised as having two motivational sources: concerns over face and concerns over sociality rights. Face, of course, is central to Brown and Levinson's (1987 [1978]) model; however, their model primarily emphasises a personal or individual conceptualisation of face, and so this model develops it by making the interpersonal or social component much more explicit. It thereby incorporates the important distinction between independent and interdependent perspectives that was suggested by Markus and Kitayama (1991) and developed by people such as Morisaki and Gudykunst (1994) and Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998). The model also takes account of the valid criticisms of people such as Matsumoto (1988), Ide (1989) and Mao (1994) that Brown and Levinson's model is too focused on individual autonomy.

The notion of sociality rights relates partly to Brown and Levinson's (1987 [1978]) concept of negative face but is not synonymous with it, in that it is broader in scope and is not limited to autonomy–imposition issues. It includes concerns about association as well as cost–benefit issues, and does not assume that autonomy/independence is always the preferred option. Moreover, sociality rights are not treated as face issues, in that an infringement of sociality rights may simply lead to annoyance or irritation, rather than to a sense of face threat or loss (although it is possible, of course, that both will occur). Similarly, a request for help, which could be regarded as an imposition or 'costly' act, may not in fact be regarded as an infringement of equity rights at all. On the contrary, it may be regarded as a boost to quality face,

Table 1
Components of rapport management[a]

	Rapport management	
	Face management (personal/social value)	Sociality rights management (personal/social entitlements)
Personal/independent perspective	Quality face (cf. Brown and Levinson's positive face)	Equity rights (cf. Brown and Levinson's negative face)
Social/interdependent perspective	Social identity face	Association rights

[a] Source: Spencer-Oatey, 2000: 15.

Source 2. 16 (Culpeper et al. 1998)



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that pragmatic theories, particularly politeness theories, have tended to concentrate on how communicative strategies maintain or promote social harmony. In the case of drama, the key 'dramatic' points often occur at times of interactional conflict. Thus, one of the tasks of this chapter is to begin to investigate *impoliteness* strategies: strategies that are designed to cause offence and social disruption.

In the second section of this chapter I will approach impoliteness by first outlining a framework of linguistic politeness, and in the third section I will briefly consider why it is that the study of impoliteness is important for drama, particularly recent twentieth-century drama. In the fourth section I conduct an extended discussion of dialogue extracts from the film *Scent of a Woman* (1992), focusing, in particular, on how (im)politeness relates to characterization. Then I conclude the main body of the chapter, and finally introduce a number of exercises involving extracts from recent twentieth-century plays.

FROM POLITENESS TO IMPOLITENESS

Politeness

Brown and Levinson (1987) explain politeness with reference to the notion of *face*. In the everyday sense of the word, face is involved in notions such as reputation, prestige and self-esteem. Brown and Levinson (1987) suggested that face consists of two basic socio-psychological wants. *Positive face* is the want to be approved of. For example, I may assume that you want me to acknowledge your existence, approve of your opinions, or express admiration of you and what you say. *Negative face* is the want to be unimpeded. For example, I may assume that you want me to let you attend to what you want, do what you want, and say what you want. Life would be wonderful if our faces remained unassailed. However, even in relatively mundane interactions our actions often threaten the other person's face. For example, requests typically threaten negative face; criticism typically threatens positive face. Acts such as these are called *Face Threatening Acts* (FTAs).

How face threatening any particular act is depends upon a number of factors, but in particular (a) the relationship between the participants and (b) the size of the imposition involved in the act to be performed. If I have been slaving away in my office for hours and I am desperate for a cup of tea, it is going to be easier for me to ask a long-standing colleague than a new one. That is because in terms of *social distance* I am closer to the colleague I have known for ages than the one I have only known for a few days. If the head of my department happened to be in my office at the time, it would be more difficult to ask him than to ask my new colleague. That is because he is more *powerful* than I am, whereas my new colleague would be more or less equal with me in terms of power. If I popped in after work to visit a friend and was asked if I would like a drink, asking for a glass of water would be less face impoliteness, given a suitable context, for several reasons: (1) 'shit' is a taboo word (more so than 'crap'), and (2) the criticism is per-sonalized through the use of 'you', and (3) the speaker flouts Grice's Maxim of Quality in order to implicate the impolite belief that the writer has absolutely no intelligence. What about the utterance 'It was bad' in the middle of the scale? Whether one interprets this as polite or impolite would depend very much on the context. For example, if it were not part of someone's role (as a tutor, say) to make the criticism, and if it were known that the addressee was particularly sensitive to criticism, then 'It was bad' would seem to be impolite. It should be noted that the key difference between politeness and impoliteness is a matter of (the hearer's understanding of) *intention:* whether it is the speaker's intention to support face (politeness) or to attack it (impoliteness). Of course, there are a number of other types of rudeness. For example, a speaker might unintentionally cause offence or might use *mock* impoliteness (banter), perhaps to reinforce social solidarity. These would not constitute cases of 'genuine' impoliteness, as I have defined it here.[3]

IMPOLITENESS AND DRAMA

Why is impoliteness important for the study of drama? Impoliteness is a type of aggression, and aggression has been a source of entertainment for thousands of years. It is made intriguing by the fact that generally it is–thankfully–fairly rare and by the fact that it is socially outlawed (the compul-sive desire of children to do what they have been told not to is evidence of how what is forbidden attracts interest). Moreover, it is from a position of relative safety and comfort that theatre audiences can watch violent conflict. Lucretius, writing in the first century BC, noted the positive feelings that can arise when one in safety watches others in danger:

> It is pleasant, when on the great sea the winds are agitating the waters,
> to look from the land on another's great struggle;
> not because it is a delectable joy that anyone be distressed,
> but because it is pleasant to see what ills you yourself are free from.[4]
>
> (*De Rerum Natura,* Book II, 1–4)

In the case of drama, this aggression often takes place in dialogue. It is not surprising that the courtroom has provided the basis for so many plays, films and television dramas. Here prosecutors are licensed to aggravate a witness's face. The courtroom provides a socially respectable and legitimate form of verbal aggression.

In drama, impoliteness is not thrown in haphazardly for audience entertainment: it serves other purposes. Conflict in interaction appears either as a symptom, or as a cause of, social disharmony, and where there are tensions between characters we are more likely to see developments in

Source 2. 17 (Trask & Stockwell)



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For a consonant involving two simultaneous constrictions, we use the *-al* ending twice, so that [w], for example, is ***labial-velar*** (though the unsystematic ***labio-velar*** is also found).

See also: **consonant**; **manner of articulation**

Further reading: Ashby 1995; Ball and Rahilly 1999; Collins and Mees 2003; Ladefoged 1971.

POLITENESS

The linguistic expression of courtesy and social position. While ***politeness*** has non-linguistic aspects, we are here concerned only with its linguistic expression. Except when we are deliberately looking for a confrontation, we normally take care to ensure that what we say (and what we don't say) is chosen appropriately so as to avoid embarrassing or offending anyone.

Sociolinguists often discuss politeness phenomena in terms of ***face***. Face is what you lose when you are embarrassed or humiliated in public. We may distinguish your ***positive face*** (your need to maintain and demonstrate your membership in a social group) from your ***negative face*** (your need to be individual and independent, to get what you want without offending anyone). A ***face-threatening act*** is any piece of behaviour which can easily make another person lose face; a ***face-saving act*** is any piece of behaviour which lessens or removes the threat of losing face.

The linguistic aspects of politeness have been much studied in recent years, and a number of important variables have been identified: tone of voice, markers of status, terms of address, degrees of certainty or confidence, discourse markers (like English *please*), the choice between speaking and remaining silent, acceptability of direct questions, and others. The rules of politeness vary considerably from society to society, and it is very easy to give inadvertent offence when talking to speakers of another language.

For example, speakers of Malagasy (in Madagascar) consider it impolite to give direct answers to questions or to make predictions that might turn out to be wrong. Speakers of Navaho (in the USA) consider it impolite to speak at all in the presence of a higher-ranking person, or to provide their own names. Both Javanese and Japanese have rich and complex systems for the overt linguistic marking of status among speaker, listener and person talked about,

Source 2. 18 (Culpeper 1996)

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Towards an anatomy of impoliteness☆

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Abstract

Politeness theories have focussed on how communicative strategies are employed to promote or maintain social harmony in interaction. On the other hand, little work has been done on communicative strategies with the opposite orientation, that of attacking one's interlocutor and causing disharmony. In this paper, I consider the notions of inherent and mock impoliteness, and discuss contextual factors associated with impoliteness. In particular, I attempt to build an impoliteness framework which is parallel but opposite to Brown and Levinson's (1987) theory of politeness. Finally, I demonstrate that in some contexts – specifically that of army training and literary drama – impoliteness behaviour is not a marginal activity, and that we need an appropriate descriptive framework in order to account for it.

1. Introduction

Over the last twenty years politeness theories have concentrated on how we employ communicative strategies to maintain or promote social harmony:

[The role of the Politeness Principle is] "to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place." (Leech, 1983: 82)

"... politeness, like formal diplomatic protocol (for which it must surely be the model), presupposes that potential for aggression as it seeks to disarm it, and makes possible communication between potentially aggressive parties." (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 1)

☆ An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Poetics and Linguistics Association conference held at Sheffield Hallam University (April 1994). I would like to thank participants for their comments. In addition, I especially thank my sister Helen Culpeper for furnishing me with the army camp data, and Elena Semino and Mick Short for reading and commenting on drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to the comments of two anonymous reviewers. Needless to say, responsibility for the final version lies with me.

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(1) *Bald on record* – the FTA is performed "in the most direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way possible" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 69).
(2) *Positive politeness* – the use of strategies designed to redress the addressee's positive face wants.
(3) *Negative politeness* – the use of strategies designed to redress the addressee's negative face wants.
(4) *Off-record* – the FTA is performed in such a way that "there is more than one unambiguously attributable intention so that the actor cannot be held to have committed himself to one particular intent" (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 69). In other words, perform the FTA by means of an implicature (Grice, 1975).
(5) *Withhold the FTA*.

Each of these politeness superstrategies has its opposite impoliteness superstrategy. They are opposite in terms of orientation to face. Instead of enhancing or supporting face, impoliteness superstrategies are a means of attacking face.

(1) *Bald on record impoliteness* – the FTA is performed in a direct, clear, unambiguous and concise way in circumstances where face is not irrelevant or minimised. It is important to distinguish this strategy from Brown and Levinson's Bald on record. For Brown and Levinson, Bald on record is a *politeness* strategy in fairly specific circumstances. For example, when face concerns are suspended in an emergency, when the threat to the hearer's face is very small (e.g. "Come in" or "Do sit down"), or when the speaker is much more powerful than the hearer (e.g. "Stop complaining" said by a parent to a child). In all these cases little face is at stake, and, more importantly, it is not the intention of the speaker to attack the face of the hearer.

(2) *Positive impoliteness* – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's positive face wants.

(3) *Negative impoliteness* – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's negative face wants.

(4) *Sarcasm or mock politeness* – the FTA is performed with the use of politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface realisations. My understanding of sarcasm is close to Leech's (1983) conception of irony. He states the Irony Principle (IP) as follows:

"If you must cause offence, at least do so in a way which doesn't overtly conflict with the PP [Politeness Principle], but allows the hearer to arrive at the offensive point of your remark indirectly, by way of an implicature." (1983: 82)

This definition is not far removed from Brown and Levinson's notion of Off record politeness. However, Leech (1983) later expands:

"Apparently, then, the IP is *dys*-functional: if the PP promotes a bias towards comity rather than conflict in social relations, the IP, by enabling us to bypass politeness, promotes the 'antisocial' use of language. We are ironic at someone's expense, scoring off others by politeness that is obviously insincere, as a substitute for impoliteness." (1983: 142)

This is, of course, the opposite of the social harmony that is supposed to be promoted through Brown and Levinson's Off record politeness. I prefer the use of the term sarcasm to Leech's irony, since irony can be used for enjoyment and comedy.[6] Sarcasm (mock politeness for social disharmony) is clearly the opposite of banter (mock impoliteness for social harmony).

(5) *Withhold politeness* – the absence of politeness work where it would be expected. Brown and Levinson touch on the face-damaging implications of withholding politeness work:

"... politeness has to be communicated, and the absence of communicated politeness may, *ceteris paribus*, be taken as the absence of a polite attitude." (1987: 5)

For example, failing to thank somebody for a present may be taken as deliberate impoliteness.

Brown and Levinson's formula for assessing the weightiness of an FTA still applies for impoliteness. The greater the imposition of the act, the more powerful and distant the other is, the more face-damaging the act is likely to be. But how impoliteness superstrategies relate to the degree of face attack of an act and how they promote to the overall impoliteness of an utterance is an area for future research to investigate.

Much of Brown and Levinson's work is devoted to the linguistic realisations of output strategies for positive and negative politeness. Each output strategy is a means of satisfying the strategic ends of a superstrategy. Brown and Levinson provide open-ended lists of possible output strategies. Below I suggest a provisional list of some output strategies for positive and negative impoliteness. It must be stressed that this list is not exhaustive and that the strategies depend upon an appropriate context to be impolite.

Positive impoliteness output strategies:

Ignore, snub the other – fail to acknowledge the other's presence.

Exclude the other from an activity

Disassociate from the other – for example, deny association or common ground with the other; avoid sitting together.

Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic

Use inappropriate identity markers – for example, use title and surname when a close relationship pertains, or a nickname when a distant relationship pertains.

Use obscure or secretive language – for example, mystify the other with jargon, or use a code known to others in the group, but not the target.

Seek disagreement – select a sensitive topic.

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[6] Leech (1983) does acknowledge that irony varies from comic irony to sarcasm, but in his definitions and description he does not allow for non-offensive irony. Leech's own example of comic irony, "*Some of his words were not Sunday school words* (Mark Twain)" (1983: 143), is clearly non-offensive. For 'enjoyable' ironic acts see Roy (1981).

6. Impoliteness in an army training camp

There are two basic reasons for the prevalence of impoliteness in army recruit training discourse. Firstly, there is great inequality of power. The American and British armies, and indeed many other armies in the world,[8] have a rigid hierarchical power structure, and recruits are at the bottom. This power structure is rigorously maintained. The vast majority of a recruit's training is undertaken by Non-commissioned officers (NCOs). These NCOs exert control over innumerable aspects of a recruit's life including where they are, who they are with, what they do, what they say, what they wear, and even what they think. Secondly, there is the particular training philosophy. The training program is designed to cast the recruit in the mould of the ideal soldier. In essence, this means getting the recruit to conform to various physical and pychological standards. They should be physically fit, able to perform drills, fire a gun, endure hardship, and so on. Most importantly, they should obey orders without question or hesitation. A general assumption is that the best way of achieving these goals is to destroy the recruits' individuality and self-esteem, and then rebuild it in the desired mould. In effect, impoliteness is used to depersonalize the recruits. Politeness behaviour involves, amongst other things, a recognition that the interlocutor is a person like oneself; impoliteness behaviour denies that recognition. In the context of the army, impoliteness is not the haphazard product of, say, a heated argument, but is deployed by the sergeants in a systematic way as part of what they perceive to be their job.

The source of my data is the documentary *Soldier Girls* (Broomfield and Churchill, 1981). This was filmed at an American recruit training base in 1980. As a 'fly on the wall' study, the documentary follows the fortunes of a group of women recruits. My data is drawn from one particular, though not unrepresentative, interview lasting approximately six and a half minutes. The participants are the recruit Private Alves (PA) and three sergeants (S1, S2, S3), one of whom (S3) is a woman.[9] Alves has performed consistently badly in the training program and proved intractable in the face of repeated attempts by the NCOs to force her to improve. As punishment for her latest failure, she is consigned to digging a hole under the supervision of a squad leader. After digging a substantial hole, she refuses to continue and ends up screaming hysterically whilst the squad leader tries physically to force her to keep digging.

The interview takes place in an office shortly after this event. From the point of view of the sergeants, she is not only guilty of failing to try hard enough in the training program, but also of the far more heinous crime of 'insubordination'.

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[8] The Israeli army is a notable exception. It has many more junior officers and thus a much flatter power structure.

[9] There do not appear to be any obvious differences in the way the male sergeants and the female sergeant interact with Private Alves in this interview. However, this issue could benefit from specific study across a wider range of data.

6.1. Conversational structure

Alves is denied speaking rights. This is clear at the beginning of the interview:[10]

S1: you're going to mess up one of my squad leaders
PA:

S1: [*indistinct*] any way you can how about it= =don't
PA: =I=

S1: bullshit me now Alves you want to jump you want to
PA:

S1: jump on somebody= =JUMP ON ME then ....
PA: =no= who

S1: shut up Alves you're the one who is
PA: said that sergeant

S1: running your little mouth again you're the one
PA:

S1: intimidating and threatening my squad leaders ....
PA:

S1: bullshit tell that god damn lie to someone
PA: I didn't sergeant

S1: that believes your ass private you've already been
PA:

S1: proven to be a damn habitual liar
PA:

Alves is interrupted, told not to speak, or, when she denies that she "wants to jump on somebody", has her response ignored. All of these are impoliteness acts. In addition, her ability to tell the truth is discredited. Cumulatively, the effect is to oppress her negative face wants in that she is denied the opportunity to present a more favourable version of events. Alves manages to say only five words in the rest of the interview.

---

[10] This transcription is organised in 'staves', with a line for each participant. Only the speakers Sergeant 1 (S1) and Private Alves (PA) are represented. The other participants, Sergeant 2 and Sergeant 3, say nothing in this part of the interview. Overlap is shown as simultaneous speech on both lines. Pauses are shown as full stops (each full stop represents approximately half a second). An equals sign shows one utterance immediately following on from another. Capital letters show loud speech.

**For Bousfield & Locher, 2008 p.3, go to page 2*

Source 2. 19 (Bousfield 2008)



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of communication. It is viewing Grice's CP as a principle of linguistic cooperation (see Thomas 1986). Indeed, the point needs to be made that one needs to be cooperative, in a linguistic sense, in order to communicate a lack of cooperation in a social sense: i.e., when one is, for example, arguing with, or being impolite to, an interlocutor. After all, if one wants to be impolite, such impoliteness has to be communicated.

The view of Grice's CP as a principle of linguistic cooperation assumes that the only goal of a given communication is the transmission of information. Thomas (1986) terms this view as 'linguistic goal sharing' as opposed to 'social goal sharing'. Thomas argues (1986: 28) that Grice only intended the CP to apply to the conventions of interaction and presupposes no shared aims between interactants other than that of correctly establishing the speaker's illocutionary intent and getting the hearer(s) to understand the proposition which is being expressed or implied. Indeed, this would seem to fit with what we have just seen of Grice's (1975, 1989) own writings. Thomas (1986: 29) goes on to point out that, in this view, the CP does not presuppose that the proposition expressed, entailed or implied is necessarily polite, relevant to any of the hearer's real (extra-linguistic) social goals or even truthful. Indeed, it bears re-iterating here that Grice himself notes that speakers' aims '[...] may even be in conflict' (Grice 1989: 29). In effect, Thomas (1986) is arguing, correctly in my view, that the CP operates purely to allow your interlocutor to understand what you are saying or implying. This is regardless of whether the content of your message happens to be what the social goal sharers would consider 'cooperative' or 'uncooperative'; regardless of whether it be harmonious communication or conflictive; and, more importantly for this book, regardless of whether it be polite or impolite. Indeed, we must accept Leech and Thomas's observation of the CP in that it '[...] makes no claims about the good intentions of the speakers' (Leech and Thomas 1990: 181).

To summarise Thomas's (1986) view, the social goal sharing view of the CP states: Say to your interlocutor what they want to hear, whereas the linguistic goal sharing view of the CP states: Use language in such a way that your interlocutor can understand what you are stating, presupposing[4] or implying. I believe it is upon this view – that Grice's CP is a model of linguistic cooperation – that the approach to politeness of Brown and Levinson (1987) is founded. Furthermore it is clear to me that this understanding of the CP is, for obvious reasons, absolutely necessary for a full(er) understanding and conceptualisation of im/politeness and its use.

4. For presupposition and conversational implicature see Grice (1989: 269–282).

4.5.2 Defining impoliteness

Before I examine or undertake to produce a descriptive framework which accounts for impoliteness there is another issue. How should we define impoliteness? I take impoliteness to be the broad opposite of politeness, in that, rather than seeking to mitigate face-threatening acts (FTAs), impoliteness constitutes the communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts (FTAs) which are purposefully delivered:

i. Unmitigated, in contexts where mitigation is required, and/or,
ii. With deliberate *aggression*, that is, with the face threat exacerbated, 'boosted', or maximised in some way to heighten the face damage inflicted.

Furthermore, for impoliteness to be considered successful impoliteness, the intention of the speaker (or 'author') to 'offend' (threaten/damage face) must be understood by those in a receiver role.

With the above definition then, quite obviously, impoliteness does not exist where one, but not both of the participants (in two-party interaction) intends / perceives face-threat. Whilst this might appear to be problematic, it is easily explained, thus:

i. If the Speaker (or someone in a producer role) intends face-damage and the Hearer (or someone in a receiver role) *perceives* the Speaker's (Producer's) intention to damage face (cf. Goffman 1967: 14), then *impoliteness is successfully conveyed*. We should note that such impoliteness may later be defended against by the hearer or a third party using a counter-strategy (see Chapter 7, below).
ii. If the Speaker/Producer intends face-damage but the Hearer/Receiver fails to *perceive* the speaker's intent/any face-damage, then *the attempt at impoliteness fails*.[6]

6. Though it should be noted that two of the possible defensive counter strategies identified by Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann (2003: 1566–1567) and discussed by Bousfield (2007), of 'dismiss, make light of face damage, joke' and 'ignore the face attack' mean that it is virtually impossible for the analyst to identify whether (i) the impoliteness was successfully conveyed, but defended against; or (ii) the attempt at impoliteness failed. Such is the nature of impoliteness in interaction. Further, within this category is the possibility of the speaker intending face-damage, the hearer understanding that face-damage was intended but the face-damaging effects on the hearer are negligible. For example, my nephew calling me a 'pooh-pooh head!' or daughter saying 'naughty daddy!' when, in the name of safety, I stop them from engaging in life-and-limb risking acts of fun and horseplay that they really want to try. I'm not at all offended by such comments in these situations but I understand they are intended to (a) harm and, (b) exert

In doing so his approach remains sympathetic and complementary to the work done previously on this model. However, simply relating Brown and Levinson's Postitive/Negative approach to face Spencer-Oatey's (2002) approach to rapport management (including 'Face' and 'Sociality Rights'); by, in short, linking the two together, simply doesn't solve the issue of the, more often than not multi-face-directedness of the linguistic impoliteness strategies. Indeed, when we consider that Spencer-Oatey (2007: 16) argues that face is a multi-faceted phenomenon, then it's obvious that the linguistic impoliteness strategies identified by Culpeper (1996), Culpeper et al. (2003) and Cashman (2006) don't purely indict one type of face, or one type of sociality right, over another. I would therefore suggest though that the evolutionary steps that Culpeper (2005: 41–42) makes have not *yet* gone far enough to solve such issues facing the model.[12]

The 5-point model identifies a number of separate ways ('superstrategies') in which impoliteness can be generated and conveyed. I should stress here that what follows is a paraphrased explanation of the model in its most recent (2005) incarnation:

(1) **Bald on record impoliteness**
According to the developments of the model (Culpeper 1996, 2005), *bald, on record impoliteness* is seen as typically being deployed where there *is* much face at stake, and where there *is* an intention on the part of the speaker to attack the face of the hearer and/or where the speaker does not have the power to (safely) utter an impolite utterance. That is, the utterance is deployed in a direct, clear and unambiguous manner (fully in accordance with Grice's ([1975]1989) maxims), "...where face is not irrelevant, or minimized" (Culpeper 2005: 41).

(2) **Positive impoliteness** (Attacking your want to be approved of, which Culpeper (2005: 40) explicitly links with Spencer-Oatey's (2002) QUALITY FACE and elements of SOCIALITY FACE).
Positive Impoliteness, according to the latest instantiation of the model (Culpeper 2005: 41) involves "the use of strategies deployed to damage the recipient's positive face wants." Examples of such strategies from Culpeper 1996 include 'ignore, snub the other', 'exclude the other from the activity', 'disassociate from the other', 'be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic', 'use inappropriate identity markers', 'use obscure or secretive language', 'seek disagreement', 'make the other feel uncomfortable (e.g. do not avoid silence, joke, or use small talk)', 'use taboo words', 'call the other names', etc.

12. As, indeed, I am sure Culpeper would agree.

(3) **Negative impoliteness** (Attacking your freedom of action, which Culpeper (2005: 40) explicitly links with Spencer-Oatey's (2002) EQUITY RIGHTS. Further, he (2005: 41) suggests that this negative face also overlaps with ASSOCIATION RIGHTS, to some extent.)
Negative Impoliteness, according to the latest instantiation of the model (Culpeper 2005: 41) involves "the use of strategies deployed to damage the recipient's negative face wants." Examples of such strategies from Culpeper 1996 include 'frighten', 'condescend, scorn, or ridicule', 'invade the other's space', 'explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect', 'put the other's indebtedness on record', etc.

(4) **Off-record impoliteness**
This superstrategy was introduced by Culpeper (2005: 43–44) as a replacement to the 'meta-strategic' nature of sarcasm (which had previously been considered on the same level as the other superstrategies; cf. Culpeper 1996). 'Off-record impoliteness' is one where the offence is conveyed indirectly by way of an implicature and could be cancelled (e.g., denied, or an account, post-modification or other type of elaboration offered, etc.) but where, according to Culpeper (2005: 44). "...one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others".

(5) **Withhold politeness** (Keep silent or fail to act where politeness work is expected)
Culpeper (1996: 357) notes that impoliteness may be realised through, "[...] the absence of politeness work where it would be expected." Culpeper (2005: 42) gives the example that "failing to thank someone for a present may be taken as deliberate impoliteness." Culpeper further notes that Brown and Levinson would appear to agree with the face-threatening aspects and implications surrounding the withholding of politeness when they claim:

> [...] politeness has to be communicated, and the absence of communicated politeness may, *ceteris paribus*, be taken as the absence of a polite attitude.
> (Brown and Levinson 1987: 5, as cited in Culpeper 1996: 357)

Obviously, as might be supposed from what I have argued above (Section 4.3.1) there is also an issue with the viability of the 'bald, on record' superstrategy where it occurs in impoliteness models, just as there is where it occurs in the original politeness model. There is also the issue of equally balanced on- and off-record superstrategies containing positive/negative strategies for performing and communicating impoliteness (see Figure 2, above). However, this leads us to the next, perhaps more fundamental issue in that a strict positive/negative dichotomy does not, in actual fact, exist. In light of the discussion made above and the following

ing Ray in an impolite round of haranguing, challenging, complaints and accusations, the van's owner finally tries to close the conversation as Ray is still trying to speak. S1 is Ray, the clamping supervisor, S2, the van's owner, S3 – Miguel – does not speak throughout this portion of the extract.

[…]

22. S1: well I fully appreciate what you're saying but what
    S2: legalised extortion does it
23. S1: I'm saying to you I can take your notes I can take your notes on
    S2: I'm sure you do I'm sure you hear it ten times a day
24. S1: board but there's nothing I personally can do I simply work do my
    S2: just do your job
25. S1: job for the council I do my job for the coun if you want me to
    S2: *I don't care what you do*
26. S1: explain then if you want to be like that then I can walk away I don't
    S2:
27. S1: have to talk to you if I don't want to if you're going to be rude to me
    S2:
28. S1: yeah I that's fine then sir I
    S2: *I don't really want to talk to you* you're not going to do anything
29. S1:
    S2: about it are you

[…]

Here, the two utterances of *I don't care what you do* (stave 25) and *I don't really want to talk to you* (stave 28) seem to be moves, by S2, to *snub* S1. They show a clear unwillingness on the part of S2 to attend to S1's apparent need to exonerate himself as indeed S1 attempts to do through abrogating blame for the clamping.[3] In failing to attend to what S1 is saying in this way, in effect, being dismissive of S1's stated needs, S2's utterances effectively amount to an aggravated, and thus, impolite, attack against S1's face.

3. Abrogation, as a linguistic defensive counter strategy, will be discussed in full in Chapter 7. At this point it needs to be noted that the act of clamping can be viewed as a Face Threatening 'trigger' responsible for causing S2 to embark on an impolite filled exchange with S1.

effect. As such, the model proposed here accounts for both first, second (and even 'third') order principles.

5.3 Withholding politeness

Culpeper points out that impoliteness may be realised through, 'the absence of politeness work where it would be expected.' (Culpeper 1996: 357). Indeed, as Culpeper (1996: 357) notes, Brown and Levinson would appear to agree with the face-threatening aspects and implications surrounding the withholding of politeness when they claim:

> [...] politeness has to be communicated, and the absence of communicated politeness may, *ceteris paribus*, be taken as the absence of a polite attitude.
>
> (Brown and Levinson 1987: 5)

Examples of withheld impoliteness are, by their very nature, hard to identify with any degree of certainty. Instances can only be clearly identified when an interactant in an exchange goes *on record* to withhold politeness which may be expected at a particular juncture. An example of this, on-record withheld politeness occurs in the following example, taken from **The Clampers, Extract 2.**

[23] ***Context:*** *S1 is a tribunal officer for Southwark council. He hears and decides upon appeals concerning parking tickets. S2 and S3 are a husband and wife (respectively) who are appealing against a ticket they received. This extract is taken from the terminal stages of their appeal hearing whereupon the tribunal officer, S1, has refused their appeal on the grounds that the prefers the council's evidence to that of the plaintiffs, S2 and S3. After a brief exchange of argumentation, S1 closes the conversational floor and requests that the plaintiffs leave. They are unhappy with both he decision and the fact that they have no further time or leave to argue their case.*

[...]

12. S1: will you please leave the room
S2: for what reason
S3: that's being babyish isn't it

13. S1: I've finished I've finished .. the hearing
S2: are you turning us out for what reason I'm
S3: give us <--Indistinct-->

14. S1: erm right I understand I mean people do get cross erm
S2: furious there's been no
S3:

15. S1: er Mr Culp well thank you very
S2: compassion at all I don't understand
S3:

16. S1: much for coming good day
S2: *I don't thank you at all*
S3:

End.

Note here the 'on-record' withholding of politeness where it may otherwise be expected. Generally speaking, when a greeting is given by one interlocutor to another, another greeting is, usually, forthcoming immediately afterwards. This is one of many adjacency pairs (cf. Schegloff and Sacks 1973), which, as an aspect of preference organisation within the field of conversational analysis, I discuss in greater depth in Chapter 8.

In staves 15–16, S2 goes on record to say that *I don't thank you at all*. In breaking the expectations of the adjacency pairs, in refusing to reciprocate thanks, S2's on record withholding of politeness is highly marked and, thus, interpretable as a form of impoliteness given the context. In the model outlined earlier (Chapter 4) I suggested that 'withhold politeness' is an off-record sub-tactic – this is because it is predominantly 'conspicuous by its absence', that is to say, when an interlocutor withholds politeness, it's difficult to say whether or not its meant as impoliteness (hence, it is, predominantly, *off-record*). The example here, whilst rare, does serve as a good example of the variable nature of the strategies with regards to 'on' or 'off' record realisation. The distinctions between the varieties are, therefore, best viewed as scalar and non-discrete.

5.4 Strategies from Culpeper (1996) not realised in the corpus

There were a number of strategies predicted by Culpeper (1996) to be possible devices for conveying impoliteness that simply did not occur in any of the examples from the whole corpus here studied. These were, *Use obscure or secretive language – for example, mystify the other with jargon, or use a code known to others in the group, but not the target* (Culpeper 1996: 357); *Invade the other's space – literally (e.g. position yourself closer to the other than the relationship permits) or metaphorically (e.g. ask for, or speak about information which is too intimate given the relationship),* (Culpeper 1996: 358); and *Put the other's indebtedness on record* (Culpeper 1996: 358). Even though no clear or specific examples of these strategies appeared in the data taken from the data sets studied, this does not mean that within other discourses (and even in other activity types to the ones discussed) is a critical and pressing area for future research on impoliteness.

6.3 Utterance 'ends'

Having seen some of the most significant ways in which impoliteness can pattern in complex ways within utterances, it is now worth considering how when utterances or turns-at-talk end, can aid in the delivery, and interpretation of impoliteness.

6.3.1 Post-intensifying interrogatives: Forcing feedback

Consider the following example taken from **Boiling Point, Extract 64.**

[50] ***Context***: *Henry, S2, another Chef de Partie has overcooked the artichokes and, thus, held up another dish for another table. S1 chooses to talk to S2 about this.*

1. S1: <and you see> you you yeah come on the path a minute on the path
   S2:
2. S1: [S1 physically manhandles S2 onto the 'path'] if you send me six
   S2:
3. S1: fucking main courses like that again and I I I'll I'll grab you by the
   S2:
4. S1: fucking scruff of the neck and throw you on the street *do you*
   S2:
5. S1: *understand*
   S2: yes Gordon

[...]

We should note the device, used in stave 4, by chef S1 to force feedback from staff member S2: *do you understand?* This is what I have termed a post-intensifying interrogative and is closely linked to the phenomena I discuss in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4.3, *Challenges, Questions, Tags and Conducivity*) below.

In context, the utterance: *if you send me six fucking main courses like that again and I I I'll I'll grab you by the fucking scruff of the neck and throw you on the street* is already impolite as it is, as it combines (see above) two instances of 'taboo language' (cf. Culpeper 1996: 358) which are boosting the 'threat/frighten' strategy (cf. Culpeper 1996: 358, see Section 5.3 above, also) of being thrown out on

7.2.1 Choices when faced with an offending event[6]

Thomas (1986: ii) states that ' [...] naturally-occurring interaction [...] far from being "cooperative" in the everyday (i.e. social-goal sharing) sense of the word is "confrontational" or "gladiatorial"'. Impoliteness, of course, is one way of being 'confrontational' or 'gladiatorial', but it is only one side of the battle: it takes two to have a fight. As Culpeper et al. (2003) note, research on both politeness and impoliteness has tended to overlook what the recipient of an offending event such as a face threat or a face attack does in response.

7.2.1.1 *Respond vs. do not respond*

Analysis of the data sets indicates that when a recipient of an utterance perceives an initial offending event, or a mid-discourse strategic impoliteness act, that is, an exacerbated face threatening act (FTA) has been performed, they have two choices open to them: they can choose either to respond or not to respond (i.e. Stay Silent).

Choosing not to respond

There is one major consideration for any researcher here. This is the sheer difficulty of analysing and interpreting any given 'silence'. Staying Silent may signal any number of phenomena, or intended participant aims, within a conversational exchange. For example, defending one's own face is one such possible reason for Staying Silent in the face of an impolite attack. Other reasons include being offensive, that is, refusing to speak when an expectation to speak exists, as noted by Thomas (1995: 175), but perhaps more so, if the expectation to be polite exists as noted by Culpeper (1996: 357). Other reasons include (a) the participant not hearing the content of the utterance of one's interlocutor; (b) accepting the FTA; or (c) simply not having understood the content of the utterance of one's interlocutor, amongst others.

Staying Silent may indicate cognitive thinking time in shaping how one wants to respond; it may even indicate that the individual who is Staying Silent is simply 'struck dumb' or 'lost for words' given their interlocutor's utterance turn. It may even indicate that the individual Staying Silent simply hasn't got anything to

6. It needs to be noted, at this point, that I draw upon, and (re)elaborate on the points, concepts and overall discussion we made in Culpeper et al. (2003). The work discussed here is based on earlier drafts of this chapter, and the input of my co-authors for the aforementioned paper. As the authors of this paper, we decided, for reasons of space and expediency, to present only the initial, basic ideas upon which I now (re)elaborate and present with a wider set of examples.

say on the subject. Indeed, there are as many reasons to Stay Silent as there are contexts in which conversation can take place. As such, it has been my task to analyse and interpret 'silences' by deciding, from a conversation analysis point of view – by what comes after a silence – whether such silences are of significance to impoliteness and, if so, how so. In short, one has had to choose those instances of silence which are strategically played for some aspect of face importance. In sum, choosing not to respond to a face attack presents particular problems for both the other participants in the original speech event and the researcher, who must depend solely on contextual factors in interpreting the meaning of the silence. The other participants, however, do not seem to be limited with the constraints of the analyst. Some interlocutors do assign meaning to silences and (re)act accordingly. Therefore, the problem with Staying Silent, whether strategic or enforced for whatever reason, is the riskiness of the strategy as the following example shows, taken from **Redcaps, Extract 53.**

[61] ***Context****: Following his unsatisfactory showing at the morning's barrack room inspection, Private Baxter (S2) has an appointment with the Company Sergeant Major (S1). Baxter marches into the CSM's office as the extract starts.*

[…]

7. S1: why why are you in front of me now .. I'LL TELL YOU WHY because
S2:

8. S1: you've failed to comply with two verbal orders is that true or is that not
S2:

9. S1: true IT IS TRUE ISN'T IT but what is the first one you have failed on
S2: sir

10. S1: monday evening you were told to put your name in all your military items
S2:

11. S1: of clothing did you do it . NO YOU DIDN'T . WHY NOT
S2: no excuse sir

12. S1:NO EXCUSE you don't walk in my office and say no excuse and <unclear>
S2:

13. S1: off the top of my head you ensure that if you're given a verbal order you
S2:

14. S1: CARRY OUT that instruction do you understand= and the second
S2: =YES SIR

15. S1: offence what's the second offence which you failed to comply with
S2: failed

Choosing to respond
Participants who choose to *respond* to the impoliteness act have a further theoretical set of choices open to them: they can either *accept* the face attack or they can attempt to *counter* it.

7.2.1.2 *Counter vs. accept*

In accepting the face attack, the recipient may, for instance, assume responsibility for the impoliteness act being issued in the first place or they may agree with the impolite assessment contained within the exacerbated FTA. Thus, repeated, strong and personalised complaints (i.e. an impoliteness act) might be met with an apology, and similarly a criticism (i.e. also an impoliteness act) may be met with an agreement. Note that this option involves increased face damage to the responder. It needs to be noted here that even Staying Silent, as discussed above, may well be an example of an individual accepting the face attack of the exacerbated, impolite, FTA.

The alternative option, to *counter* the face attack, involves a set of strategies that can be considered in terms of whether they are *offensive* or *defensive*.

7.2.1.3 *Offensive vs. defensive*

Counter strategies can be usefully classified into two groups: those offensive strategies which primarily counter face attack with face attack, and those defensive strategies which primarily defend one's own face or that of a third party. Of course, these strategy groups are not mutually exclusive: defensive strategies may, intentionally or incidentally, also be offensive (i.e. they damage an interactant's face in the process of saving one's own). It should be noted that my discussion here encompasses counter strategies to all kinds of potential face damage – intentional, incidental and accidental. In opting to counter a perceived, antecedent, FTA, participants may opt for an offensive or a defensive stance.

Offensive counter strategies are those which are typified by researchers such as Culpeper (1996) or Lachenicht (1980) (see also Chapter 4, Section 4.1, above). How one responds can lead to a 'pairing' effect. An impolite offence may be met with an impolite defence as a counter, to provide an offensive-defensive (OFF-DEF) pairing. Conversely, an impolite offence may be met with an impolite offence as a counter, to provide an offensive-offensive (OFF-OFF) pairing.

The OFF-OFF pairing, as the name suggests, involves offensive strategies primarily countering face attack with face attack; this is the pattern referred to by Harris et al. (1986). Such offensive counter strategies are, of course, the impoliteness strategies of researchers like Culpeper (1996) or Lachenicht (1980).

Source 2. 20 (Culpeper et al. 2003)

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Impoliteness revisited: with special reference to dynamic and prosodic aspects

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Abstract

This paper focuses on impoliteness, the use of communicative strategies designed to attack face, and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony. Using television documentary recordings of disputes between traffic wardens and car owners as our data, we revisit the impoliteness framework mapped out in Culpeper [J. Prag. 25 (1996) 349]. Having justified why an impoliteness framework is needed, we explore the notion of impoliteness and consider whether the impoliteness strategies identified in Culpeper can be found in another discourse type. We argue that for impoliteness to be fully appreciated we need to move beyond the single strategy (lexically and grammatically defined) and examine both how impoliteness pans out in extended discourse and the role of prosody in conveying impoliteness. Our paper has important implications for politeness theory and discourse studies in general, and the role of prosody in discourse in particular.

1. Introduction

Although, as Leech points out, 'conflictive illocutions tend, thankfully, to be rather marginal to human linguistic behaviour in normal circumstances' (Leech, 1983: 105), there are contexts in which conflictive illocutions are rather more central. Conflictive talk has been found to play a role—and often a central one—in, for

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example, army training discourse (Culpeper, 1996), courtroom discourse (Lakoff, 1989; Penman, 1990), family discourse (Vuchinich, 1990), adolescent discourse (Labov, 1972; Goodwin and Goodwin, 1990), doctor-patient discourse (Mehan, 1990), therapeutic discourse (Labov and Fanshel, 1977; Lakoff, 1989), 'workplace' discourse (Andersson and Pearson, 1999), parliamentary discourse (Harris, 2001), 'everyday conversation' (Beebe, 1995), radio talk shows (Hutchby, 1996), and fictional texts (Culpeper, 1998; Tannen, 1990) (see also Kienpointner, 1997, for a good survey of types of 'rude' talk). In all these cases and in others, we would argue that politeness theories are unable to account fully for the interaction.

This paper focuses on the notion of impoliteness, communicative strategies designed to attack face, and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony (see, also, Kienpointner's 1997: 259–260 definition of 'rudeness', and that of Beebe, 1995: 159). Note that we are primarily concerned with what other researchers have referred to as 'strategic' (Lakoff, 1989) or 'instrumental' (Beebe, 1995) impoliteness, that is to say, it fulfills 'a function that the speaker intended, and was not [simply] failed politeness' (Beebe, 1995: 166). Also, we focus mainly on 'genuine' impoliteness, as opposed to 'mock' or 'ritual' impoliteness (cf. Labov, 1972; Leech, 1983: 144). A particular purpose of this paper is to build on the impoliteness framework mapped out in Culpeper (1996). One limitation of Culpeper (1996) is that it is focussed rather too narrowly on single impoliteness strategies, usually made up of particular grammatical or lexical items. In this paper, we will: (1) discuss the relationship between politeness and impoliteness, (2) investigate how impoliteness pans out in discourse, and (3) probe the role of prosody in communicating impoliteness. Although we focus on impoliteness, it will be clear that much of what we say has important implications for politeness theory, as well as for studies of discourse in general and the role of prosody in discourse in particular. This is not to say that we are arguing for a replacement of politeness theory. In fact, all the leading politeness theories at least mention the notion of impoliteness. The problem is that in practice they all focus solidly on politeness, with the result that their comments on impoliteness are descriptively inadequate and often conceptually biased (i.e. it is assumed that the concepts used to explain politeness can straightforwardly be applied to impoliteness) (see Eelen, 1999: chapter 1 and Eelen, 2001: chapter 3, for an elaboration of this point). We view our work here as partly a complement to politeness theory (specifically to the classical theory of Brown and Levinson, 1987), and partly a revision of parts of it. We begin with a brief description of our data and a justification as to why we chose it for our study.

2. The data

The data for this study was taken from the BBC's documentary television series *The Clampers* (1998). This series filmed the day to day activities of the London Councils' privatised traffic wardens, including the 'clampers', those traffic wardens whose task it is to apply clamps to illegally parked cars and to tow them away. It also followed the activities of legal officials who adjudicate in disputes over the

Source 2. 21(Culpeper 2005)

Impoliteness and entertainment in the television quiz show: *The Weakest Link*

JONATHAN CULPEPER

Abstract

Building on Culpeper (1996) and Culpeper et al. (2003), I first propose a new definition of impoliteness and general revisions to my model of impoliteness, both derived from data analyses. Given that my particular data in this paper, The Weakest Link, *is a television entertainment quiz show, I will briefly account for why impoliteness might be entertaining. As a backdrop to my micro-analyses of interactions, I discuss the nature of "exploitative" chat and game shows, and I examine the structure of* The Weakest Link *and how it maximizes the potential for face-damage. In my analyses, I show the formulaic and creative nature of parts of the discourse, and also how analyzing prosody is key to understanding the impoliteness. I pay special attention to "off-record impoliteness", sarcasm and mimicry, and I integrate into my model Spencer-Oatey's (2002) revisions of Brown and Levinson's (1987) concepts of negative and positive face. Finally, referring to Levinson's (1992) "activity types", I consider whether the context of the quiz show "neutralizes" the "impoliteness". I argue that the salience of "impolite" signals engulf the context, with the result that targets often take offense in contexts where they theoretically should not.*

Keywords: impoliteness; mimicry; politeness; prosody; quiz shows; sarcasm

1. Introduction

The Weakest Link was launched on the U.K.'s BBC2 in 2000 with 68 daily episodes. It was hugely successful, resulting in a second series of 90 episodes for daytime and 21 shows for primetime television. This quiz show appears to have evolved from standard quiz shows in a way that is analogous to developments in chat shows. It is an "exploitative" show, designed to humiliate contestants, not to support or celebrate them as is often the case in standard shows. As such, it offers excellent data for extending and refining my research on "impoliteness" – a key aim of

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slightly more succinct form as: "communicative strategies designed to attack face, and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony" (Culpeper et al. 2003: 1546. Reference was also made to similar definitions in the literature: Kienpointner 1997: 259–260; Beebe, 1995: 159). One problem with this original definition is the assumption that face-attack will "cause social conflict and disharmony". This element of the definition had evolved by way of contrast to how researchers had defined politeness, for example: [The role of the Politeness Principle is] "to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which enable us to assume that our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place" (Leech 1983: 82). But there are two problems here: it is not clear what this social conflict and disharmony consists of, and it is not a necessary condition of impoliteness having taken place. In fact, looking ahead to our discussion of *The Weakest Link*, it is not at all clear in what sense there is social conflict and disharmony here. Moreover, the definition fails to take adequately into account what the hearer is doing. This speaker bias is another legacy from politeness work, particularly that of Brown and Levinson (1987).

A better definition is proposed by Tracy and Tracy: "we define face-attacks as communicative acts perceived by members of a social community (and often intended by speakers) to be purposefully offensive" (1998: 227). Like me, the authors also refer to Goffman (1967), who relates such face-threat to cases where "the offending person may appear to have acted maliciously and spitefully, with the intention of causing open insult" (Goffman, 1967: 14). However, their definition still needs some unpacking (e. g., in what ways might these attacks be unintended?), and the roles of the speaker and hearer are not very transparent. I thus propose a revised definition:

> Impoliteness comes about when: (1) the speaker communicates face-attack intentionally, or (2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behavior as intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) and (2).

The key aspect of this definition is that it makes clear that impoliteness, as indeed politeness, is constructed in the interaction between speaker and hearer. Perhaps the prototypical instance of impoliteness involves both (1) and (2), the speaker communicating face-attack intentionally and the hearer perceiving/constructing it as such. For example, a potentially impolite act such as an interruption may seem just to involve activity on the part of the speaker, but, as Bilmes (1997) convincingly argues, interruptions are a reciprocal activity, involving both "doing interrupting" and "doing being interrupted" (1997: 514–550). "Doing being interrupted" involves the communication of disruptive intents to the in-

Table 1. *Revising the notion of face: Components of "rapport management" (Spencer-Oatey 2002: 540–2)*[3].

Face (defined with reference to Goffman (1972: 5): "the positive social *value* in a person effectively claims for himself [sic] by the line others assume he has taken during a particular contact" [Spencer-Oatey's emphasis])	Quality face: "We have a fundamental desire for people to evaluate us positively in terms of our personal qualities, e. g., our confidence, abilities, appearance etc." Social identity face: "We have a fundamental desire for people to acknowledge and uphold our social identities or roles, e. g., as group leader, valued customer, close friend."
Sociality rights (defined as "fundamental personal/social *entitlements* that a person effectively claims for him/herself in his/her interactions with others" [Spencer-Oatey's emphasis])	Equity rights: "We have a fundamental belief that we are entitled to personal consideration from others, so that we are treated fairly, that we are not unduly imposed upon or unfairly ordered about, that we are not taken advantage of or exploited, and that we receive the benefits to which we are entitled." Association rights: "We have a fundamental belief that we are entitled to association with others that is in keeping with the type of relationship that we have with them."

definitions based on solid empirical work. Space precludes a full outline of her proposals, but I offer a brief summary in Table 1.

The notion of face is split into two components. Quality face is clearly present in Brown and Levinson's (1987) notion of positive face, and there are hints of social identity face. Spencer-Oatey explicitly splits two very different components: the former being an individual or personal aspect, and the latter being a matter of one's identity in the group. Already, one can see how we are moving away from Brown and Levinson's (1987) emphasis on individual autonomy. Interestingly, "sociality rights" are not considered face issues, "in that an infringement of sociality rights may simply lead to annoyance or irritation, rather than to a sense of face-threat or loss (although it is possible, of course, that both will occur)" (Spencer-Oatey 2002: 541). Brown and Levinson's (1987) notion of negative face overlaps primarily with the notion of equity rights, in as far as they relate to matters of imposition and costs/benefits, but it also overlaps to a degree with association rights. I will refer to all these components in my analyses of impoliteness in *The Weakest Link*, but the most relevant components are Quality face (e. g., attacks on the inadequacy of the contestant in answering the questions) and Social Identity face (e. g., attacks on the contestant's regional accent and job).

Thanksgiving, he responds to an advertisement asking for somebody to act as a carer for a blind relative – the Colonel (COL). The dialogue below occurs a few turns into their first encounter.]

COL: Simms Charles, senior. You on student aid, Simms?
CH: Ah, yes I am.
COL: For student aid read crook. Your father peddles car telephones at a 300% mark-up; your mother works on heavy commission in a camera store, graduated to it from expresso machines. Ha, ha! **What are you ... dying of some wasting disease?**
CH: No ... I'm right here.

This is not at all cooperative in Grice's (1975) sense, and, as with off-record politeness, the "impolite" belief is conveyed by implication. It is a rhetorical question that implicates, via the maxim of quality, the impolite belief that there is evidence that Charlie is dying of a wasting disease. However, this is not like the sarcasm examples that have as one of their defining features some claim, no matter how superficial, to be polite. The Colonel's utterance has no such claim. What we have here is the off-record (in the sense that it flouts a maxim) expression of impoliteness. I thus propose an additional category for my impoliteness model:

Off-record impoliteness: the FTA is performed by means of an implicature but in such a way that one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others.

In the outline of the model above, this can take the place of sarcasm, which can be separated out as distinct from the others, given its "meta-strategic" nature. It is not to be forgotten that these more indirect forms of impoliteness, such as off-record impoliteness, should not be considered any less impolite than more direct forms. In fact, I argued in Culpeper et al. (2003), with reference to Leech (1983: 171), that there are theoretical grounds for believing it to work in the opposite direction, namely, that more indirect forms of impoliteness are more offensive. I shall illustrate off-record impoliteness further in my analyses of *The Weakest Link*, particularly in section 5.2.

4. Impoliteness as entertainment

The Weakest Link, in common with all the television data that I have collected for my impoliteness research, is designed for entertainment. Even the "documentaries" (e. g., *Red Caps*, *Clampers*, *Ramsey's Boiling Point*), for example, do not present the latest scientific discove

Source 2. 22 (Mills 2005)

Gender and impoliteness

SARA MILLS

Abstract

This article analyzes the complex relationship between gender and impoliteness. Rather than assuming that gender and impoliteness are concrete entities which can be traced in conversation, I argue that gender and impoliteness are elements which are worked out within the course of interaction. They are elements which are closely inter-related as stereotypically feminine gender identity is largely constructed around notions of "nice", supportive, co-operative behaviour, either affirming or resisting those stereotypes of femininity. Challenging the notion that women as a whole are "nicer" than men in interaction, since much current research seems to highlight women's interactional competitiveness, I argue that nevertheless supportiveness may play a role in other interactants' judgments of women's linguistic behaviour and may result in assertiveness being categorized as impoliteness.

Keywords: Gender; impoliteness; politeness; assertiveness; co-operativeness; nice

1. Introduction

This article analyzes the complex relationship between gender and impoliteness and calls for a more nuanced and context-dependent analysis of both gender and impoliteness[1]. Rather than assuming that impoliteness and gender pre-exist interactions, we need to see gender identity as constructed in slightly different ways in each interaction depending on assessments of the interactional history of particular Communities of Practice, and the stereotypes of both politeness and gender which are constituted within the course of the interaction itself. In order to analyze the way that judgments of impoliteness are informed by beliefs about what is gender-appropriate behaviour, I will begin by proposing a model of

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in fact assess these norms differently according to the Community of Practice within which the exchange takes place.

Impoliteness is often attributed to someone on the grounds of not having observed the socially sanctioned politeness behaviour which other participants assume would be expected in a particular situation, for example, the use of directness for requests which would normally be indirectly handled in English, or the lack of elements such as "please", "thank you", and "sorry". Jary argues that impoliteness and politeness are therefore to be considered fundamentally different in kind rather than simple polar opposites, since, instead of the Brown and Levinson view that "whenever the so-called polite forms/strategies are used then an additional layer of meaning is necessarily communicated ... our experiences as conversationalists tells us that polite forms often go unnoticed by participants. Although there are cases when we do comment on the politeness of someone's verbal behaviour, much of the time we don't notice this aspect of it" (Jary 1998: 2). Thus, the omission of formal greetings or thanks may well be considered to be impolite, especially if that person is not liked, or if this is not the first time that socially sanctioned politeness norms within the particular Community of Practice have been breached. Indeed, if a person is not liked, practically *any* linguistic utterance or intonation can be classified as impolite. But impoliteness is not simply a question of the omission of formal or formulaic social politeness. Impoliteness can be considered as any type of linguistic behaviour which is assessed as intending to threaten the hearer's face or social identity, or as transgressing the hypothesized Community of Practice's norms of appropriacy[7].

This notion that it is also the stability of the Community of Practice which is threatened in instances where someone is accused of impoliteness is important since very often accusations of impoliteness are concerned with problems of agreement over the assessment of the social standing of individuals in relation to one another, or the judgment of the level of familiarity between them and thus the assessment of the appropriate level of politeness to use. Accusations of impoliteness generally signal to participants that there has been a mismatch in the judgment of status, role or familiarity and thus perhaps also a mismatch in their assessment of their position in the particular Community of Practice. Where this mismatch may be significant is in the stereotypes of gender-appropriate behaviour. If one of the participants in a Community of Practice assumes that females should be submissive, linguistically and interactionally, then any form of assertive or "masculine" linguistic behaviour may be interpreted as impolite or inappropriate. Thus impoliteness is not simply a question of making statements which are offensive, but also of displaying to others an assessment of one's social standing

Source 2. 23 (Lakoff, 1989)

The limits of politeness: therapeutic and courtroom discourse[1]

ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF

Abstract

Theories and descriptions of politeness have concentrated on its form and function in ordinary dyadic conversation. This is reasonable, since the purpose of politeness is to avoid conflict, and conflict is both most apt to occur, and most dangerous, in that discourse format.

This paper extends the examination of politeness to two discourse types of which conflict is an intrinsic element: psychotherapeutic discourse and the discourse of the American trial courtroom. It argues that, in these contexts, non-polite behavior can be systematic and normal. A distinction is proposed, for genres like these, between 'non-polite' and 'rude'. Consequences are discussed in terms of power relations between participants.

Introduction

Politeness has been studied over the last fifteen years or so by a number of scholars within linguistics and related disciplines (cf. Lakoff 1973, 1979, Leech 1983, and Brown and Levinson 1987). This work has established important bases: definitions, systematicity, and universality have all been investigated. Politeness has been contrasted with as well as integrated into other pragmatic systems, particularly Gricean (1975) conversational logic, although much remains to be understood in this area. This paper examines aspects of politeness that have been given less attention, with a view toward expanding our understanding of the phenomenon: what it is, why it exists, and how it operates in competition with or alongside other forms of discourse organization.

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expectations. This creates a paradox of sorts: although other forms of discourse (unlike OC) would operate most efficiently if they eschewed all adherence to politeness rules, quite often the latter occur within them anyway, as participants find discourse lacking politeness conventions too uncomfortable to continue for any length of time, unless there is a strong interest in doing so. Nonetheless, politeness plays a much less crucial role in non-dyadic and non-reciprocal discourse types than in OC, and both its presence and absence are understood differently than they would be in OC.

Politeness, non-politeness, and rudeness

The foregoing suggests that speakers operate within a simple dichotomy: polite vs. non-polite. But the distinction is better seen as threefold: polite, non-polite, and rude. Let us call 'polite' those utterances that adhere to the rules of politeness whether or not they are expected in a particular discourse type; 'non-polite', behavior that does not conform to politeness rules, used where the latter are not expected; and 'rude', behavior that does not utilize politeness strategies where they would be expected, in such a way that the utterance can only or most plausibly be interpreted as intentionally and negatively confrontational.

Politeness is normal in discourse types when: interaction is the principal focus of the discourse; and, additionally, absence of confrontation is more useful than confrontation would be. So we might consider one or another sort of rudeness 'normal', and hence intelligible, in an OC in which provocation is seen as useful by at least one of the participants. It should also be noted that a discourse of any type works well, and is intelligible to all participants, only to the degree that all: agree on the necessity for politeness, or the opposite; and agree on the form the politeness is to take. Otherwise, one person's meaningful contribution will be read by another as anomaly, craziness, or worse. When there is a clash between expectations — whether politeness or non-politeness is appropriate, that is, a clash between interactive and informative needs — that format will win which is perceived to be most salient to the discourse function. Hence, politeness wins over clarity (non-politeness) in OC, even to the distortion of information; and in lectures, clarity wins over politeness, even if the lecturer thus tends to become remote or unconcerned with his audience. The most skillful user of any format will

Source 2. 24 (Culpeper 2011)



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1 Understanding impoliteness I: Face and social norms

1.1 Introduction: Impoliteness definitions

Surveying a recent volume of papers on impoliteness, the editors conclude 'there is no solid agreement in the chapters as to what "impoliteness" actually is' (Locher and Bousfield 2008: 3). As the following quotations illustrate, there is no commonly accepted definition of impoliteness:

(1) The lowest common denominator [underlying definitions of impoliteness in Bousfield and Locher 2008] can be summarized like this: *Impoliteness is behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context*. (Locher and Bousfield 2008: 3)

(2) [rude behaviour] does not utilise politeness strategies where they would be expected, in such a way that the utterance can only almost plausibly be interpreted as intentionally and negatively confrontational. (Lakoff 1989: 103)

(3) . . . rudeness is defined as a face threatening act (FTA) – or feature of an FTA such as intonation – which violates a socially sanctioned norm of interaction of the social context in which it occurs. (Beebe 1995: 159)

(4) . . . impoliteness, communicative strategies designed to attack face, and thereby cause social conflict and disharmony . . . (Culpeper *et al.* 2003: 1546)

(5) Impoliteness comes about when: (1) the speaker communicates face-attack intentionally, or (2) the hearer perceives and/or constructs behaviour as intentionally face-attacking, or a combination of (1) and (2). (Culpeper 2005a: 38)

(6) . . . marked rudeness or rudeness proper occurs when the expression used is not conventionalised relative to the context of occurrence; following recognition of the speaker's face-threatening intention by the hearer, marked rudeness threatens the addressee's face . . . impoliteness occurs when the expression used is not conventionalised relative to the context of occurrence; it threatens the addressee's face . . . but no face-threatening intention is attributed to the speaker by the hearer. (Terkourafi 2008: 70)

(7) . . . impoliteness constitutes the communication of intentionally gratuitous and conflictive verbal face-threatening acts (FTAs) which are purposefully delivered: (1) unmitigated, in contexts where mitigation is required, and/or, (2) with deliberate aggression, that is, with the face threat exacerbated, 'boosted', or maximised in some way to heighten the face damage inflicted. (Bousfield 2008: 72)

(8) . . . verbal impoliteness [is] linguistic behaviour assessed by the hearer as threatening her or his face or social identity, and infringing the norms of appropriate behaviour that prevail in particular contexts and among particular interlocutors, whether intentionally or not. (Holmes *et al.* 2008: 196)

(9) Rudeness is a kind of prototypically non-cooperative or competitive communicative behaviour which destabilises the personal relationships of the interacting individuals . . . creates or maintains an emotional atmosphere of mutual irreverence and antipathy, which primarily serves egocentric interests . . . (Kienpointner 1997: 259; see also Kienpointner 2008)

These definitions appear in what can be considered the linguistic pragmatics literature. If we cast the net wider, other definitions referring to the same or closely related phenomena can be found. This is particularly true of work on anti-social interaction undertaken in social psychology or communication studies. Consider, for example:

(10) *Aggression* may be defined as any form of behaviour directed towards the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment. (Baron and Richardson 1994: 37, original emphasis)

(11) *Communicative aggression* is defined as any recurring set of messages that function to impair a person's enduring preferred self image . . . (Dailey *et al.* 2007: 303, original emphasis).

(12) People feel hurt when they believe someone said or did something that caused them emotional pain. (Vangelisti 2007: 122)

(13) [Social harm involves] damage to the social identity of target persons and a lowering of their power or status. Social harm may be imposed by insults, reproaches, sarcasm, and various types of impolite behaviour. (Tedeschi and Felson 1994: 171)

Whilst there are differences amongst these definitions, there are two notable commonalities. First, all but (2), (10) and (12) refer to the notion of 'face', 'preferred self-image' or 'social identity' (regarding (8), face is mentioned in the full definition). In fact, in all but (2), (9), (10) and (12) face, or a closely related concept, plays a central role. As Locher and Bousfield note in (1) the notion of 'face-aggravating' behaviour seems to be key. Indeed, Erving Goffman (1967) himself refers to 'aggressive facework', as more recently does Watts (2003). In my work (cf. (5)), I use the term 'face-attack' or 'face-attacking', and I take this to be synonymous with 'face-aggravation' or 'face-aggravating'. A justification his scheme, only he emphasises much more the role of institutions, as I will do in the final two sections of this chapter. Affective impoliteness is not so obviously present in his scheme, but impoliteness for entertainment is, as it appears in his discussion of sociable rudeness and his discussion of rudeness in literature.

I will organise my discussion around the categories affective impoliteness, coercive impoliteness and entertaining impoliteness. I wish to state at the outset that I do not see these functions as mutually exclusive: it is quite possible to pursue all of them simultaneously. In particular, affective impoliteness leaks into the other categories. This is not surprising, given that impoliteness always involves the expression of strong emotion (see Section 2.5).

7.2 Affective impoliteness

Discussion In the aggression literature, instrumental aggression, aggression as 'a means to some other end' (Geen 2001: 5), is sometimes pitched against affective aggression, although the distinction is acknowledged not to be watertight. In fact, Buss's (1961) highlighting of instrumental aggression was partly a corrective to previous research which has concentrated on 'angry aggression', that is, aggression that is an angry response to frustration and/or provocation. That early research was associated in particular with John Dollard and his colleagues (e.g. Dollard *et al.* 1939) at Yale University. They proposed the frustation–aggression hypothesis, the idea that aggression is always caused by a frustrating event or situation. Road rage is perhaps a particularly pertinent example for contemporary times. Research has been directed towards frustration caused by socio- and economic deprivation (sometimes leading to prejudice and age-group aggression) (e.g. Catalano *et al.* 1997; Dutton *et al.* 2005). However, as an explanation for all kinds of aggression the frustration–aggression hypothesis is overly simplistic. Ultimately, it is a biological, reflexive theory of emotion – we experience emotions, particularly anger, in response to frustration, and give vent to them with aggression – and can thus be rejected for precisely the same reasons articulated in Section 2.3.1. Emotions are not hardwired to behaviours. Emotional states go through a process of cognitive appraisal, whereby the person judges what happened, why it happened, how angry he or she feels, what might be possible courses of action, and so on. A model involving cognition better accounts for the complexities of social encounters. But I also noted that such cognitive appraisal can be more impulsive or more thoughtful (cf. Anderson and Bushman 2002; Anderson *et al.* 1995). In other words, there are times when the frustration–aggression hypothesis is a more adequate account, but other times when it is not. When it is not, then aggression is more instrumental in character.

Exactly the same arguments can be made for affective impoliteness. There are times when it is more strategic, more instrumental and other times when it is because it tells wrongdoers the who, what, where, and when of their offensive acts'. To sum up then, affective impoliteness is the targeted display of heightened emotion, typically anger, with the implication that the target is to blame for producing that negative emotional state. The less targeted affective impoliteness is, the less instrumental it is.

Illustration The following text is my transcription of an answerphone message attributed to the actor Alec Baldwin. The fact that it is an answerphone message is important, because it means that the speaker received none of the participant co-text that might have shaped his message. It was produced on 11 April 2007, and posted 19 April on the website www.tmz.com. The addressee is apparently Ireland, Baldwin's 11-year-old daughter with Kim Basinger, from whom he had now split. To appreciate this text in full, it is necessary to hear it. The quality of the recording precludes instrumental analysis. However, to convey something of the prosody, I have put in bold any syllables that are exceptionally heavily stressed. Full-stops indicate clear pauses. I have also put in small capitals segments where Baldwin shouts (the term the article on the website used is 'screamed'). The latter was relatively easy to identify, as at these points the recording apparatus was unable to cope and produced some distortion.

[1]

Hey I want to tell you something okay. I wanna leave a message for you right now cos. again it's 10.30. here in New York on Wednesday. and once again I've made an **ass.** of **my**self. trying to get to a **phone** to call you at a specific **time**. when the **time** comes for me to make that phone call. I stop whatever I'm doing and I go and make that phone call at 11 o'clock in the morning in New York and if you don't pick up the phone at 10 o'clock at night and you don't even have the **GODDAMN** PHONE TURNED on. I want you to know something okay. er I'm **tired** of playing this game with you. I'm leaving this message with you to tell you. you have in**sult**ed me for the **last** time. you have in**sult**ed me you don't even have the **brains**. or the **de**cency. as a human **be**ing. I don't give a **damn** that you're 12 years old or 11 years old or that you're a **child** or that your mother was a thoughtless pain in the **ass** who doesn't care about what you do as far as I'm concerned. you have humiliated me for the **last** time on this phone. and when I come out there next week. I'M GOING TO FLY OUT THERE FOR THE **DAY**. just to straighten you **OUT**. on this issue. I'm going to let you **KNOW** just how disappointed in you I am. and how **an**gry I am with you that you've done this to me again. you've **MADE ME FEEL LIKE SHIT**. and you've **made me** feel like a **fool** **o**ver and **o**ver and **o**ver [indistinct] again. and this **CRAP** YOU PULL ON ME. with this **GODDAMN PHONE** situation that you would never **dream** of doing to your mother and you do it to me. **con**stantly and over and over again. I AM GOING TO GET ON A **PLANE** and I'm gonna come out there for the **day** and I'M GOING TO **STRAIGHTEN** YOU **out** when I see you. do you understand me. I am going to **real**ly make sure you get it [indistinct]. I'm gonna turn around and come home. so YOU'D BETTER BE READY Friday the 20th to meet with me so that I'm gonna let you know just how I feel about what a rude little **pig** you really are. you are a rude thoughtless little pig okay power', whilst 'interactants with low status can decide to exercise power over people with relatively greater status' (2004: 31, see also 208, 218; Watts 1991 and Berger 1994 are cited as making a similar point). In other words, there is no simple match between power in language and power behind it. Moreover, Watts (1991: 56) argues that a notion of power based on status (a person's position in the structure of social relationships) is not very helpful for the analysis of the exercise of power in 'face-to-face verbal interaction, particularly in the absence of overt institutionalised status differences'. Consequently, Watts (1991: 60) deploys the idea of restriction of 'freedom of action' to complement status (which is more oriented to power behind), and Locher (2004) adopts this too. This notion of the restriction of freedom of action, as Locher (2004: Chapter 2) observes, is common to several definitions of power (e.g. van Dijk 1989: 20; Wartenberg 1990: 85, 88), and indeed successfully deployed by Locher in her own analyses. Note that the restriction of a person's action-environment is not in itself enough to warrant the label 'power'. Locher's definition of power also involves a 'latent conflict and clash of interests'. This would seem to rule out more positively oriented types of power. For example, some view coercive impoliteness in the context of sports training as positive (Ruggiero and Lattin 2008). Even so, such types of power are more or less prototypical. As Watts (1991: 58) states: '[t]he central meaning of power surely involves a conflict of interests rather than a consensus'.

We have already briefly met coercive impoliteness in Section 6.5. Coercive impoliteness is impoliteness that seeks a realignment of values between the producer and the target such that the producer benefits or has their current benefits reinforced or protected (the labels producer and target need not refer to individuals, but could refer to groups or institutions). It involves coercive action that is not in the interest of the target, and hence involves both the restriction of a person's action-environment and a clash of interests. This, of course, begs the question of what coercive action is. Here, I shall take a lead from Tedeschi and Felson (1994: 168):

> A coercive action is an action taken with the intention of imposing harm on another person or forcing compliance. Actors engaged in coercive actions expect that their behaviour will either harm the target or lead to compliance, and they value one of these proximate outcomes. The value they attach to compliance or harm to the target arises from their belief about the causal relationship between compliance or harm and the terminal values. There are many values that might be pursued through coercive means. For example, actors might value harm to the target because they believe it will result in justice, or they might value the target's compliance because they believe it will lead to tangible benefits.

What is appealing about this definition is that it moves beyond behavioural compliance and includes the imposition of social harm, either of which can

[2]

(1) Carr: This your cab?
(2) Hadis: Yes, sir.
(3) Carr: It says here it's expired. What else you got?
(4) Hadis: My insurance is expired? I didn't get change, but I think I left it at my house.
(5) Carr: You didn't get it, or you left it at home?
(6) Hadis: I got it . . .
(7) Carr: Which lie are you telling me?
(8) Hadis: I'm not lying, sir, I'm just . . .
(9) Carr: Yes you are. Ran red light, no insurance and not wearing a seat belt. Sign right there. Court date's on the top.
(10) Hadis: I did not pass the red light. I was holding the brake.
(11) Carr: Let me tell you something, (expletive). You cross that white line out there, that's running the red light. You want to argue with me or you want to go to jail?
(12) Hadis: No.
(13) Carr: 'Cause I'll stick your stinking ass in jail right now, I don't care. I don't like cabdrivers in the first place. I will put you in jail. You pulled out in the middle of the intersection. That's running a red light, whether you backed up or not. I don't know what it's like in your country, but in the United States of America, in the state of Texas, we abide by all the laws. You don't like it here, leave, you got it?
(14) Hadis: OK.
(15) Carr: You understand me?
(16) Hadis: Yes, sir.
(17) Carr: Do we understand real good English here?
(18) Hadis: Yes, sir. I'm sorry.
(19) Carr: We don't need your kind here. You can go back to where you come from if you don't want to abide by our laws. You understand me?
(20) Hadis: Yes, sir.
(21) Carr: Look at my name. Remember it. Remember C-a-r-r. 'Cause the next time I find you on a city street in Houston, Texas, downtown, and you (expletive) break the law, I will put your ass in jail. Do you understand me?
(22) Hadis: Yes, sir.
(23) Carr: I'm speaking real straight, slow English.
(24) Hadis: All right, sir.

The first six turns match expectations about the activity type taking place: they follow the police–suspect encounter script. Establishing ownership of the offending item through a question is a typical first or early move. Hadis confirms with a politic 'yes, sir', and presumably hands Carr an insurance document as proof of ownership. We then have exchanges concerning the expiry of the insurance document. Hadis, in turn 4, appears to conjoin two contradictory statements: he did not change it versus he left it (where 'it' refers to the only sanctioned by the dominant group (e.g. the people who create, produce and host the show), but neutralised by the nature of the activity type. However, as I argued in Section 6.6, *in practice* things are less straightforward. People can and do still take offence in such situations. There may also be different perspectives on the same event: some people – perhaps including the real Anne Robinson – may see it all as a game and the 'impoliteness' as mock; some others – perhaps the contestants *in situ* – may not pay adequate attention to the context and view the 'impoliteness' as genuine.

7.7 Conclusion

All impoliteness has the general function of reinforcing or opposing specific identities, interpersonal relationships, social norms and/or ideologies. In this chapter I argued that there are three key, specific functional types of impoliteness event: affective impoliteness, coercive impoliteness and entertaining impoliteness. Affective impoliteness may simply involve the unrestrained expression of emotion in contexts where it is not normal or it is prohibited. But a more instrumental variant involves the targeted display of heightened emotion, typically anger, with the implication that the target is to blame for producing that negative emotional state. Coercive impoliteness is impoliteness that seeks a realignment of values between the producer and the target such that the producer benefits or has their current benefits reinforced or protected. I predicted that coercive impoliteness is more likely to occur in situations where there is an imbalance of social structural power, though it can also be used in more equal relationships to engineer a gain in social power. The perception that a person with relative coercive power is actually willing to use it – a perception that can be strengthened linguistically – plays a role in achieving beneficial terminal values. Entertaining impoliteness involves entertainment at the expense of the target of the impoliteness, and is thus always exploitative to a degree. As all genuine impoliteness, it involves a victim or at least a potential victim. I proposed that there are five sources of pleasure that can be involved in entertaining impoliteness: emotional pleasure, aesthetic pleasure, voyeuristic pleasure, the pleasure of feeling superior and the pleasure of feeling safe.

Regarding aesthetic pleasure, I focused on the way it can be achieved through linguistic creativity. Just as all creativity requires a backdrop, I argued that politeness is always in the background of impoliteness, and that the higher the politeness threshold the stronger the potential for impoliteness. I identified four types of creativity – pattern-re-forming, pattern-forming, situational deviation and unusual implicitness – and argued that they all exist in impoliteness. However, Carter (2004) suggests that pattern-forming creativity always involves 'affective connection and convergence'. This is supported by ritualised, non-genuine impoliteness patterning which does indeed tend to establish affective target, can understand the probable impoliteness effects for the target. Without this it would not be entertaining impoliteness.

Why exactly might impoliteness be entertaining? Impoliteness is nasty stuff, people get hurt or angry. Entertainment does not seem to enter the picture. However, the key problem here is that people have focused their discussions on a very narrowly defined interactive frame: it is usually one just involving a dyad comprised of producer and target. This of course is in tune with much research on pragmatics which focuses on a dyad consisting of speaker and hearer. Impoliteness, however, can be designed as much for the over-hearing audience as for the target addressee, and that audience can be entertained. The fact that people can be entertained by symbolic violations to identities and social rights, the stuff of impoliteness, is not surprising when one remembers that people were entertained by gladiatorial shows and are still entertained by boxing matches and rugby. In fact, today's television in the UK, but in many other countries too, is replete with programmes stuffed full of verbal violence. Today's chat shows, quiz shows and talent shows have developed exploitative variants, and I will consider these in Section 7.6.2. Documentaries have seen an explosion in material dealing with aggressive conflicts involving army trainers, traffic wardens, nightclub bouncers, police officers, hotel inspectors, and so on. In fact, consistent with the idea that impoliteness can be entertaining, today the TV genre with the most verbal aggression is comedies/sitcoms (Chory 2010: 182).

Let us examine in more detail the link between impolite interactions and entertainment. I propose that there are five sources of pleasure that can be involved in entertaining impoliteness:

1. *Emotional pleasure*. Observing impoliteness creates a state of arousal in the observer, and that state of arousal can be pleasurable. As Myers puts it, discussing chat shows, '[s]omething is engaging about argument for its own sake' (Myers 2001: 174). Importantly, he adds 'the thrill is in the potential for violence' (Myers 2001: 183). In other words, we don't need actual fisticuffs: the mere suggestion of fisticuffs can cause the thrill.
2. *Aesthetic pleasure*. Outside discussions of banter, little attention has been given in the literature to socially negative uses of verbal creativity. In fact, much impoliteness has elements of creativity, not least of all because of its frequently competitive nature: if one is attacked, one responds in kind or with a superior attack. And to achieve a superior attack requires creative skills. I will have more to say about creativity and impoliteness shortly.
3. *Voyeuristic pleasure*. Observing people reacting to impoliteness often involves the public exposure of private selves, particularly aspects that are emotionally sensitive, and this can lead to voyeuristic pleasure. As Richardson and Meinhoff (1999: 132) point out, talk shows 'trade in the exploitation of human weakness for the sake of voyeuristic pleasure'.

4. *The pleasure of being superior*. 'Superiority theories' (e.g. Bergson 1911 [1900]), developed within humour theory, articulate the idea that there is self-reflexive pleasure in observing someone in a worse state than oneself. Although foreshadowed in Plato and Aristotle, most theorists refer to Hobbes's *Leviathan* (1946 [1651]: Part I, chapter 6):

   > *Sudden glory*, is a passion which maketh those *grimaces* called LAUGHTER; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.

   Superiority theories have been used to explain the 'butts' of jokes.
5. *The pleasure of feeling secure*. This source overlaps with the previous. Lucretius (1947 [1st century B.C.], *De Rerum Natura*, Book II, 1–4) states it thus:

   > It is pleasant, when on the great sea the winds are agitating the waters,
   > to look from the land on another's great struggle;
   > not because it is a delectable joy that anyone be distressed,
   > but because it is pleasant to see what ills you yourself are free from.[2]

   Compare, for example, witnessing an actual fight in a pub, in which case you might feel insecure and wish to make hasty exit, with a pub fight represented in a film.

Note that the last three are related to the emotion schadenfreude.

I will consider aesthetic pleasure further in Section 7.5, not least because the aesthetic pleasure is achieved through linguistic creativity, something which some may assume not to be a characteristic of impoliteness.

Illustration The text below is a letter purportedly written by a customer of NTL (a cable company), to complain about the service he had received. The letter has been circulated on many websites. It is claimed that it is a real letter of complaint, and that it won a competition as the complaint letter of the year. We have no way of knowing whether it really is a true letter or not. But that is beside the point. What we do know is that it has been circulated on the Internet for the purpose of entertaining third parties. These are some of the reactions the letter received:

- hahahahha thats just great! 😀 What a guy!
- LOL...:)
- i had to walk out of my cubicle and go outside, this is hysterical even if it's not a real letter, who cares
- hahahaha 😀GREAT choose of words. Really amusing read, thanks for posting

Source 2. 25 (Lachenicht 1980)

Papers In Linguistic: International Journal of Human Communication 13 (4) 1980.

AGGRAVATING LANGUAGE
A STUDY OF ABUSIVE AND INSULTING LANGUAGE

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ABSTRACT

An attempt to achieve theoretical understanding of aggravating language, this paper refutes claims that (1) aggravating language is an impoverished system, and (2) that it is not possible to study such language as one entity. Aggravation is studied as a rational attempt to hurt or damage the addressee. 'Hurt' is achieved by (a) conveying that the addressee is not liked and does not belong (*positive* aggravation) and by (b) interfering with the addressee's freedom of action (*negative* aggravation). Both kinds of hurt may be rationally realized at several levels and in very many different ways. Many examples demonstrate the different possible realisations. The relation between the two kinds of 'hurt' is a recurring theme. Some allowance is made for non-intentional aggravation.

> *Insult*. Literally, to leap on (the prostrate body of a foe); hence to treat with contumely. ... The priests of Baal, to show their indignation against their gods "leaped upon the altar which they had made" (I *Kings* xviii, 26) - *Brewers Dictionary of Phrase and Fable*.

A facility in verbal abuse is a source of considerable power. Alexander Pope delighted in the deference secured by his malignant tongue:

> Yes, I am proud; and must be proud, to see,
> Men not afraid of God afraid of me.

In many cultures,social status depends greatly upon a command of in-

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to proceed smoothly for his hearer. This speaker will assess the risk he can take in aggravating his hearer, and select an 'aggravation' strategy that will produce an FTA of the required weight.

I. The aggravation strategies that can be selected are, in order of degree of threat, as follows:
   (i) Off Record: ambiguous insults, insinuations, hints, and irony. This strategy is of much the same kind as the politeness strategy, and is designed to enable the insulter to meet an aggrieved challenge from the injured person with an assertion of innocence.
   (ii) Bald on Record: directly produced FTAs and impositions ('Shut the door', 'Do your work', 'Don't talk', etc.) of the same kind as in the politeness strategy.
   (iii) Positive aggravation: an aggravation strategy that is designed to show the addressee that he is not approved of, is not esteemed, does not belong, and will not receive cooperation.
   (iv) Negative aggravation: An aggravation strategy that is designed to impose on the addressee, to interfere with his freedom of action, and to attack his social position and the basis of his social action.

J. Aggravation strategies are also sensitive to social factors. A very powerful person will probably be attacked only by off record means. Friends and intimates would probably be attacked by means of positive aggravation, whereas socially distant persons would be attacked by means of negative aggravation.

The last point (J) perhaps deserves some elaboration. If the purpose of aggravation is to hurt, then means must be chosen that

Source 2. 26 (Karina & Putri)

Impoliteness in Simon Cowell's Utterances in "The X-Factor USA" Reality Show

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Abstract

The studies on impoliteness phenomenon are still few. Impoliteness in the social interactions of this modern era, is now highly inavoidable. This study aims to discuss about impoliteness done by Simon Cowell, who is the personage of "*The X-Factor USA*". The writer hopes to find the types of impoliteness utterances that were being used and the factors that caused them. Politeness theory by Brown and Levinson (1978) was the main theory applied in anaylizing the data. Impoliteness framework by Culpeper (1996) was also used as the supporting theory. The findings show that the most used strategies is sarcasm, followed by bald on record, positive and negative impoliteness, and then, withhold politeness. The factors that affect Cowell's impoliteness are the Power Relation (P), Social Distance (D), and Rank of Imposition (R). This study also proves that there are also entertainment factors that affect Cowell's impoliteness as well.

Keywords: impoliteness, politeness, entertainment, utterances

Introduction

In daily life, we are always involved in interaction with other people, whether it is face to face, or by communication tools, such as cellphone and the internet for instance. In communicating with each other, every individual has his/her choice to perform a polite or an impolite behavior as a form of claiming their identity. As we all know, impoliteness is the opposite phenomenon of politeness, and it has not received much attention in the context of scholary works while it actually is happening more frequently and often inavoidable in today's social interactions. It is now somehow considered as important to perform the impolite behavior for the necessity of showing a sign of close and tight bound in a relationship. It also can be used for the purpose in showing one's personality and uniqueness, even a symbol of being fitted in any particular social group in the life of this modern era.

On the other hand, the study of politeness has been conducted from several decades. It has been studied in both pragmaticsand sociolingusitics subfields. Many researches focus on the model of politeness theory proposed by Brown and Levinson (1987) who state that politeness is a rational behavior to all humans and also that everyone has a positive and a negative face. The writer also uses the grand theory of politeness proposed by them. According to their work, there are four strategies of politeness in performing FTA (Face Threatening Acts), they are: bald on record, positive politeness, negative politeness, and off record. Later, Culpeper (1996) writes a research about impoliteness and constructs his own model of framework based on the politeness theory by Brown and Levinson. He divides the sub-strategies into five ways in delivering an impolite behavior. The list are:

1. Bald on record impoliteness – as in Brown and Levinson's strategy, the FTA is performed as clearly and boldly as possible, but the difference is that Brown and Levinson's strategy is a politeness strategy in situations where the threat to the hearer's face is small.
2. Positive impoliteness – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's positive face wants.
3. Negative impoliteness – the use of strategies designed to damage the addressee's negative face wants.

Impoliteness types

Bald on record impoliteness

Not to be confused with bald on record politeness by Brown and Levinson (1987), bald on record impoliteness as one of the lists in impoliteness strategies by Culpeper (1996) do also state that the FTA is performed directly, clearly, in an unambiguous and concise way. But the difference is, in Brown and Levinson's bald on record, the face attack happens in specific circumstances. For example, when the threat to hearer's face is small and when the speaker is more powerful than the hearer as in a parent to his/her child. Bald on record impoliteness can be conducted in any situation and the face is no longer relevant. (Culpeper, 1996). As the data shows it, Cowell, as a matter of fact, performs several bald on record impoliteness as one of the judge in the show. One of the examples is in the second episode:

Dialogue 1

Paulina : We don't feel you have the x factor.

Yosseline : I do. I do have the x factor.

Simon : <u>You don't have the x factor, and Denver hates you. It's a no.</u>

The fact that he performed the FTA by saying the sentence *"You don't have the x factor, and Denver hates you. It's a no."* directly, clearly, and without any minimization added, shows the face safety consideration is no longer relevant. Which is also the requirement of bald on record strategy, it occurs when the speaker wants to speak what s/he desires more than s/he wants to save the hearer's face. Another examples of bald on record strategy performed by Cowell are in these sentences:

- "You're not gonna get four yeses."
- "I've done this a long time, I mean, that's one of the worst I've ever heard."
- "I think this is one of the worst groups we've ever had on this show."
- "I let you go on because I thought, maybe it will get better, it actually got worse."
- "It was out of tune, horrible song", "Uh, you are both absolutely awful."
- "The song (the contestant's original song) was terrible."

Positive impoliteness

The next on the list is positive impoliteness. Culpeper (1996) brings up several output strategies in performing positive impoliteness: ignoring the other, excluding the other from activity, dissasociating with the other, being disinterested/unconcerned/unsympathetic, using inappropriate identity markers, using obscure/secretive language, seeking disagreement, making the other feeling uncomfortable, using taboo words, and calling the other names. The writer takes the example from the dialogue of first episode:

Dialogue 2

Kelly : I think that, if it's something that you guys really want to do, then you should do it-

Simon : (interrupts) <u>Without your mom.</u>

(audience laughs)

The fact that he said this group of family would be better if they performed without their mother, which was the leader of the group and the nurturing one, showed that Cowell's FTA excluded the others from activity, also seeked for a disagreement at the same time by selecting a sensitive topic, the family bounding. There was one more sentence that indicated a positive impoliteness by seeking disagreement: *"I'd hate to be your parents"*. Cowell said that after he saw a performance by two young girls. A family relationship, especially between parents and children, is a personal also a sensitive topic. By saying a personal opinion that he would hate to be their parents was obviously seeking a disagreement from his surroundings. We can see that directly from the comment of his fellow judge, Kelly, she argued that he should not say things like that, because of its sensitivity. The similar impoliteness was also occured in this sentence: *"Yeah, you need new friends"*. Although not as sensitive as family, a topic about group of friends and their relationship is still a relatively sensitive thing to be interfered in.

John : Yeah, I just graduated from High School.
Kelly : Oh, really? Let's hear it.
(John sings a song)
Simon : John, I think you did a better job than the iceberg.
(audience laughs)

The meaning of Cowell's sarcasm in this sentence was related with the song that the contestant chose to sing. The contestant sang 'My Heart will Go on' from the original soundtrack of the movie 'Titanic', movie that tells about a big ship that sank from hitting an iceberg (Cameron, 1997). Therefore, he decided to perform an FTA by saying that John sang better than the iceberg, means he actually did no good as a singer, yet as Cowell satirized it, at least John did not make a ship sank like the iceberg did. Then, here are Cowell's otherr sarcasm utterances using metaphor:

- "Have you ever got a shirt back from the laudry, where it's got too much starch in it? You know, like, you literally can't put it on, 'cause it's, like, made of wood? That's what you were like."
- "It'd be like trying to chop down a tree with a banana."
- "It's like a goldfish wanting to be a shark."
- "It sounded like, two-three year olds who've got the flu, trying to sing"
- "...it was like a competition as to who could sing the worst, and you both win."
- "...it did actually sound like you were drowning when you—literally, I've never heard anyone sing while they drown, but I think that's what it would sound like.
- "It was like finding out cinderella works at the playboy mansion."
- "It was like being in the chair (in a dentist's office) for three hours with—with no anesthetic."
- "Did you ever watch 'close encounters of the third kind'? If that ever happened and they sang, they would probably sound like that, because it just didn't sound human"

The second output strategy is using irony:

Dialogue 7

Simon : And whose idea was it to be in a group—your mom or you?
Cynthia : Um, well, I started singing first, around the age of eleven.
Simon : (interrupts) Right.
Cynthia : And then later on, we were like, "Wow, this is really fun, we should do this together."
Simon : (interrupts) Wow.
Cynthia : So, we started singing together.
Simon : Amazing.
Cynthia : I mean...
(Shirley & Cynthia both giggle)
Simon : What an incredible story.
(audience laughs)

Those utterances represented what Cowell believed to be false. It also involved a non-verbal way of communication. When Cowell chimed in the contestant's story by saying that it was amazing and incredible, the absence of his eye contact showed that it actually was neither amazing nor incredible, in other word, it was boring. Eye contact is essential when it comes to non-verbal communications. It communicates interests, involvements, also establishes connections with other. Therefore, lack of eye contact can be considered as rude (Rothwell, 2004). Other Cowell's sarcastic actions by being ironic are: *"I've got to be honest with you, the best part was actually when you forgot the words"* and *"Well, you totally reinvented the song."*. Cowell said that after he saw Jocelyn Hinton and Ruben Gloria performed.

Source 2. 27 (Beebe in Alatis 1995)

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Linguistics and the Education of Language Teachers: Ethnolinguistic, Psycholinguistic, and Sociolinguistic Aspects

1789

James E. Alatis,
Carolyn A. Straehle,
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and Maggie Ronkin, Editors

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Polite Fictions:
Instrumental Rudeness as Pragmatic Competence

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Introduction.

In the field of pragmatics, the myth has persisted that rudeness is merely pragmatic failure at politeness. But this is a polite fiction. In reality, rudeness can also be a reflection of pragmatic competence. In this paper it is argued that native-speaker rudeness is usually instrumental i.e. functional. It serves two functions: to get power and to vent negative feelings. The purpose of this paper is to use natural data to support the argument that rudeness is frequently instrumental and is not merely pragmatic failure. Two examples from the data illustrate situations where it is difficult to imagine that the speakers intended to be polite. It does not seem as if they miscalculated as they attempted politeness and were inadvertently rude. Rather, it appears as if they were using rudeness to serve some instrumental goal.

A man in a compact red car was trying to maneuver into a parking spot right next to a crosswalk at a corner in New York City. A woman was crossing the street with her two children as the man attempted to park. She was very thin. He had a big "beer belly." The two were arguing over whether she, the pedestrian, or he, the driver, had the right of way. Finally, the woman yelled:

Woman: Oh shut up you fat pig!
Man: Go fuck yourself.
Woman: Go on a diet!
Man: Go fuck yourself!

[source: Wendy Gavis, field notes]

It is hard to imagine how these words could possibly be intended as politeness.

In another example from the data, a young bicyclist came cycling down Central Park West in New York City and was clearly unhappy that a taxi driver had decided to slow down to let a pedestrian cross. If he kept riding straight, he would have to ride in front of the taxi who was turning right, and being reluctant to do that, he yelled,

Bicyclist: "Hey! Hey! Hey! You fuck!"

Source 2. 28 (Annette Hill 2005)



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House because the characters are engaging, but I have fallen out of love with *Big Brother* because the characters are not engaging enough. If this book were about my personal taste in reality programmes then you might learn a lot about me, but little about the social phenomenon of reality TV.

So, what is this book about? *Reality TV* is about the development of a television genre often called reality TV. Reality TV is a catch-all category that includes a wide range of entertainment programmes about real people. Sometimes called popular factual television, reality TV is located in border territories, between information and entertainment, documentary and drama. Originally used as a category for law and order popular factual programmes containing 'on-scene' footage of cops on the job, reality TV has become the success story of television in the 1990s and 2000s. There are reality TV programmes about everything and anything, from healthcare to hairdressing, from people to pets. There are reality TV formats sold all over the world, from the UK to Uruguay. There are people who love reality TV, and people who love to hate reality TV. Whatever your opinion of *Cops, Neighbours from Hell, Big Brother*, or *Survivor*, reality TV is here to stay. Rupert Murdoch, the man who gave us Fox TV and *Cops*, even has a channel devoted to the genre – Reality TV – with plans for further popular factual channels in the future. Where Murdoch leads, others follow.

Reality TV is also about the viewing experience of a developing factual television genre. It is commonly assumed that audiences cannot tell the difference between entertainment and information, or fiction and reality in popular factual television. With such concern regarding audiences and reality TV it is necessary to explore the development of this genre, and audience relationships with these types of popular factual output. If this book is about exploring the genre of reality TV, then what audiences have to say about their experience of watching reality programmes is paramount. Audience responses to reality TV can provide invaluable information and analysis for understanding the transitional terrain of the reality genre, and can enhance critical understanding of contemporary television audiences.

RATING REALITY TV

The reality genre has mass appeal. Popular series such as *American Idol* in the USA or *I'm a Celebrity …* in the UK have attracted up to and over 50 per cent of the market share, which means more than half the population of television viewers tuned into these programmes. To achieve such ratings these reality series have to be all round entertainers. The proposed reality cable channel, Reality Central, has signed up more than thirty reality stars to appear on and promote the channel in 2004. According to

Source 2. 29 (Cambridge Dictionary, Reality show)



CHAPTER III

Source 3. 1 (Creswell 2014)



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THE THREE APPROACHES TO RESEARCH

In this book, three research approaches are advanced: (a) qualitative, (b) quantitative, and (c) mixed methods. Unquestionably, the three approaches are not as discrete as they first appear. Qualitative and quantitative approaches should not be viewed as rigid, distinct categories, polar opposites, or dichotomies. Instead, they represent different ends on a continuum (Newman & Benz, 1998). A study *tends* to be more qualitative than quantitative or vice versa. **Mixed methods research** resides in the middle of this continuum because it incorporates elements of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Often the distinction between **qualitative research** and **quantitative research** is framed in terms of using words (qualitative) rather than numbers (quantitative), or using closed-ended questions (quantitative hypotheses) rather than open-ended questions (qualitative interview questions). A more complete way to view the gradations of differences between them is in the basic philosophical assumptions researchers bring to the study, the types of research strategies used in the research (e.g., quantitative experiments or qualitative **case studies**), and the specific methods employed in conducting these strategies (e.g., collecting data quantitatively on instruments versus collecting qualitative data through observing a setting). Moreover, there is a historical evolution to both approaches—with the quantitative approaches dominating the forms of research in the social sciences from the late 19th century up until the mid-20th century. During the latter half of the 20th century, interest in qualitative research increased and along with it, the development of mixed methods research. With this background, it should prove helpful to view definitions of these three key terms as used in this book:

• *Qualitative research* is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the participant's setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data. The final written report has a flexible structure. Those who engage in this form of inquiry support a way of looking at research that honors an inductive style, a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of rendering the complexity of a situation.

• *Quantitative research* is an approach for testing objective **theories** by examining the relationship among variables. These variables, in turn, can be measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered data can be analyzed using statistical procedures. The final written report has a set structure consisting of introduction, literature and theory, methods, results, and discussion. Like qualitative researchers, those who engage in this form of inquiry have assumptions about testing theories deductively, building in protections against bias, controlling for alternative explanations, and being able to generalize and replicate the findings.

• *Mixed methods research* is an approach to inquiry involving collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, integrating the two forms of data, and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks. The core assumption of this form of inquiry is that the combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches provides a more complete understanding of a research problem than either approach alone.

These definitions have considerable information in each one of them. Throughout this book, I discuss the parts of the definitions so that their meanings will become clear to you as you read ahead.

Data Collection Types	Options Within Types	Advantages of the Type	Limitations of the Type
Observations	• Complete participant—researcher conceals role • Observer as participant—role of researcher is known • Participant as observer—observation role secondary to participant role • Complete observer—researcher observes without participating	• Researcher has a firsthand experience with participant. • Researcher can record information as it occurs. • Unusual aspects can be noticed during observation. • Useful in exploring topics that may be uncomfortable for participants to discuss.	• Researcher may be seen as intrusive. • Private information may be observed that researcher cannot report. • Researcher may not have good attending and observing skills. • Certain participants (e.g., children) may present special problems in gaining rapport.
Interviews	• Face-to-face—one-on-one, in-person interview • Telephone—researcher interviews by phone • Focus group—researcher interviews participants in a group • E-mail Internet interview	• Useful when participants cannot be directly observed. • Participants can provide historical information. • Allows researcher control over the line of questioning.	• Provides indirect information filtered through the views of interviewees. • Provides information in a designated place rather than the natural field setting. • Researcher's presence may bias responses. • Not all people are equally articulate and perceptive.
Documents	• Public documents—minutes of meetings or newspapers • Private documents—journals, diaries, or letters	• Enables a researcher to obtain the language and words of participants. • Can be accessed at a	• Not all people are equally articulate and perceptive. • May be protected information unavailable to public or private access.

		• time convenient to researcher—an unobtrusive source of information. • Represents data to which participants have given attention. • As written evidence, it saves a researcher the time and expense of transcribing.	• Requires the researcher to search out the information in hard-to-find places. • Requires transcribing or optically scanning for computer entry. • Materials may be incomplete. • The documents may not be authentic or accurate.
Audio-Visual Materials	• Photographs • Videotapes • Art objects • Computer messages • Sounds • Film	• May be an unobtrusive method of collecting data. • Provides an opportunity for participants to directly share their reality. • It is creative in that it captures attention visually.	• May be difficult to interpret. • May not be accessible publicly or privately. • The presence of an observer (e.g., photographer) may be disruptive and affect responses.

NOTE: This table includes material adapted from Bogdan & Biklen (1992), Creswell (2013), and Merriam (1998).

Table 9.3 A List of Qualitative Data Collection Approaches

Observations
• Gather field notes by conducting an observation as a participant. • Gather field notes by conducting an observation as an observer. • Gather field notes by spending more time as a participant than as an observer. • Gather field notes by spending more time as an observer than as a participant. • Gather field notes first by observing as a "participant-outsider" and then moving into the setting and observing as a "participant-insider."
Interviews
• Conduct an unstructured, open-ended interview and take interview notes. • Conduct an unstructured, open-ended interview; audiotape the interview; and transcribe it. • Conduct a semistructured interview, audiotape the interview, and transcribe the interview. • Conduct a focus group interview, audiotape the interview, and transcribe it. • Conduct different types of interviews: e-mail or Internet, face-to-face, focus group, online focus group, and telephone interviews.
Documents
• Keep a journal during the research study. • Have a participant keep a journal or diary during the research study. • Collect personal letters from participants. • Analyze public documents (e.g., official memos, minutes, records, archival material). • Examine autobiographies and biographies. • Conduct chart audits. • Review medical records.
Audiovisual Materials
• Examine photographs or videotapes. • Have participants take photographs or videotapes (i.e., photo elicitation), and then interview them about the materials. • Examine physical trace evidence (e.g., footprints in the snow). • Videotape or film a social situation or an individual or group. • Examine website main pages. • Collect sounds (e.g., musical sounds, a child's laughter, car horns honking). • Collect e-mail messages, discussion board messages (e.g., Facebook), or other forms of social media messages. • Collect cell phone text messages (e.g., Twitter). • Examine possessions or ritual objects. • Collect sounds, smells, tastes, or any stimuli of the senses.

SOURCE: Adapted from Creswell (2013).



Step 1. Organize and prepare the data for analysis. This involves transcribing interviews, optically scanning material, typing up field notes, cataloguing all of the visual material, and sorting and arranging the data into different types depending on the sources of information.

Step 2. Read or look at all the data. This first step provides a general sense of the information and an opportunity to reflect on its overall meaning. What general ideas are participants saying? What is the tone of the ideas? What is the impression of the overall depth, credibility, and use of the information? Sometimes qualitative researchers write notes in margins of transcripts or observational field notes, or start recording general thoughts about the data at this stage. For visual data, a sketchbook of ideas can begin to take shape.

Step 3. Start **coding** all of the data. Coding is the process of organizing the data by bracketing chunks (or text or image segments) and writing a word representing a category in the margins (Rossman & Rallis, 2012). It involves taking text data or pictures gathered during data collection, segmenting sentences (or paragraphs) or images into categories, and labeling those categories with a term, often a term based in the actual language of the participant (called an *in vivo* term). As shown in Table 9.4, Tesch (1990) provided the eight steps typically used in forming codes.

Table 9.4 Tesch's Eight Steps in the Coding Process

1. Get a sense of the whole. Read all the transcriptions carefully. Perhaps jot down some ideas as they come to mind as you read.
2. Pick one document (i.e., one interview)—the most interesting one, the shortest, the one on the top of the pile. Go through it asking yourself, "What is this about?" Do not think about the substance of the information but its underlying meaning. Write thoughts in the margin.
3. When you have completed this task for several participants, make a list of all topics. Cluster together similar topics. Form these topics into columns, perhaps arrayed as major, unique, and leftover topics.
4. Now take this list and go back to your data. Abbreviate the topics as codes and write the codes next to the appropriate segments of the text. Try this preliminary organizing scheme to see if new categories and codes emerge.
5. Find the most descriptive wording for your topics and turn them into categories. Look for ways of reducing your total list of categories by grouping topics that relate to each other. Perhaps draw lines between your categories to show interrelationships.
6. Make a final decision on the abbreviation for each category and alphabetize these codes.
7. Assemble the data material belonging to each category in one place and perform a preliminary analysis.
8. If necessary, recode your existing data. (pp. 142–149)

In addition, give some attention to the types of codes to develop when analyzing a text transcript or a picture (or other type of visual object). I tend to think about codes as falling into three categories:

- Codes on topics that readers would expect to find, based on the past literature and common sense. When studying bullying in the schools, I might code some segments as "attitudes toward oneself." This code would be expected in a study about bullying in the schools.
- Codes that are surprising and that were not anticipated at the beginning of the study. In a study of leadership in nonprofit organizations, I might learn about the impact of geo-warming on the building of the organization and how this shapes the location and proximity of individuals to one another. Without going out to the building before the study begins and looking at it, I would not necessarily think about the codes of geo-warming and location of offices in my study of leadership.
- Codes that are unusual, and that are, in and of themselves, of conceptual interest to readers. I will use one of the codes that we discovered in our qualitative study of a campus' response to a gunman (Asmussen & Creswell, 1995). We did not anticipate the code "retriggering" to emerge in our study, and it surfaced from the perspective of a psychologist called into the campus to assess the response. The fact that individuals were reminded of past traumatic incidents—retriggering—prompted us to use the term as an important code and ultimately a theme in our analysis.

One further issue about coding is whether the researcher should (a) develop codes *only* on the basis of the emerging information collected from participants, (b) use predetermined codes and then fit the data to them, or (c) use some combination of emerging and predetermined codes. The traditional approach in the social sciences is to allow the codes to emerge during the data analysis. In the health sciences, a popular approach is to use predetermined codes based on the theory being examined. In this case, the researchers might develop a **qualitative codebook**, a table that contains a list of predetermined codes that researchers use for coding the data. Guest and colleagues (2012) discussed and illustrated the use of codebooks in qualitative research. The intent of a codebook is to provide definitions for codes and to maximize coherence among codes—especially when multiple coders are involved. This codebook would provide a list of codes, a code label for each code, a brief definition of it, a full definition of it, information about when to use the code and when not to use it, and an example of a quote illustrating the code. This codebook can evolve and change during a study based on close analysis of the data when the researcher is not starting from an emerging code perspective. For researchers who have a distinct theory they want to test in their projects, I would recommend that a preliminary codebook be developed for coding the data and permit the codebook to develop and change based on the information learned during the data analysis.

Step 4. Use the coding process to generate a description of the setting or people as well as categories or themes for analysis. *Description* involves a detailed rendering of information about people, places, or events in a setting. Researchers can generate codes for this description. This analysis is useful in designing detailed descriptions for case studies, ethnographies, and narrative research projects. Use the coding as well for generating a small number of *themes* or categories—perhaps five to seven themes for a research study. These themes are the ones that appear as major findings in qualitative studies and are often used as headings in the findings sections (or in the findings section of a dissertation or thesis) of studies. They should display multiple perspectives from individuals and be supported by diverse quotations and specific evidence.

Beyond identifying the themes during the coding process, qualitative researchers can do much with themes to build additional layers of complex analysis. For example, researchers interconnect themes into a story line (as in narratives) or develop them into a theoretical model (as in grounded theory). Themes are analyzed for each individual case and across different cases (as in case studies) or shaped into a general description (as in phenomenology). Sophisticated qualitative studies go beyond description and theme identification and form complex theme connections.

Step 5. Advance how the description and themes will be *represented* in the qualitative narrative. The most popular approach is to use a narrative passage to convey the findings of the analysis. This might be a discussion that mentions a chronology of events, the detailed discussion of several themes (complete with subthemes, specific illustrations, multiple perspectives from individuals, and quotations) or a discussion with interconnecting themes. Many qualitative researchers also use visuals, figures, or tables as adjuncts to the discussions. They present a process model (as in grounded theory), advance a drawing of the specific research site (as in ethnography), or convey descriptive information about each participant in a table (as in case studies and ethnographies).

Step 6. A final step in data analysis involves making an **interpretation in qualitative research** of the findings or results. Asking, "What were the lessons learned?" captures the essence of this idea (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). These lessons could be the researcher's personal interpretation, couched in the understanding that the inquirer brings to the study from a personal culture, history, and experiences. It could also be a meaning derived from a comparison of the findings with information gleaned from the literature or theories. In this way, authors suggest that the findings confirm past information or diverge from it. It can also suggest new questions that need to be asked—questions raised by the data and analysis that the inquirer had not foreseen earlier in the study. Ethnographers can end a study, Wolcott (1994) said, by stating further questions. The questioning approach is also used in transformative approaches to qualitative research. Moreover, when qualitative researchers use a theoretical lens, they can form interpretations that call for action agendas for reform and change. Researchers might describe how the narrative outcome will be compared with theories and the general literature on the topic. In many qualitative articles, researchers also discuss the literature at the end of the study (see the discussion in Chapter 2). Thus, interpretation in qualitative research can take many forms; be adapted for different types of designs; and be flexible to convey personal, research-based, and action meanings.

Source 3. 2 (Steven, Taylor, Bogdan 2014)



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Paralleling the growing interest in qualitative research in sociology has been an increased acceptance of these methods in other disciplines and applied fields. Such diverse disciplines as geography (DeLyser, Herbert, Aitken, Crang, & McDowell, 2010; Hay, 2010), political science (McNabb, 2004), and psychology (Camic, Rhodes, & Yardley, 2003; Fischer, 2005; *Qualitative Research in Psychology*) have seen the publication of edited books, texts, and journals on qualitative research methods over the past decade and a half. The American Psychological Association started publishing the journal *Qualitative Psychology* in 2014. Qualitative methods have been used for program evaluation and policy research (Bogdan & Taylor, 1990; Guba & Lincoln, 1989; M. Q. Patton 1987, 2008, 2010, 2014; Rist 1994). Journals and texts on qualitative research can be found in such diverse applied areas of inquiry as health care and nursing (Latimer, 2003; Munhall, 2012; Streubert & Carpenter, 2010; *Qualitative Health Research*), mental health, counseling, and psychotherapy (Harper & Thompson, 2011; McLeod, 2011), education (Bogdan & Biklen, 2006; *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education*; Lichtman, 2010; *Qualitative Research in Education*), music education (Conway, 2014), public health (Ulin, Robinson, & Tolley, 2005), business (Meyers, 2013), theology (Swinton & Mowat, 2006), disability studies (Ferguson et al., 1992), human development (Daly, 2007; Jessor, Colby, & Shweder, 1996), social work (Sherman & and Reid, 1994; *Qualitative Social Work*), and special education (Stainback & Stainback, 1988).

One does not have to be a sociologist or to think sociologically to practice qualitative research. Although we identify with a sociological tradition, qualitative approaches can be used in a broad range of disciplines and fields.

Just as significant as the increasing interest in qualitative research methods has been the proliferation of theoretical perspectives rooted in the phenomenological tradition underlying this form of inquiry. We consider the relationship between theory and methodology more fully later in this chapter.

QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY

The phrase *qualitative methodology* refers in the broadest sense to research that produces descriptive data—people's own written or spoken words and observable behavior. As Ray Rist (1977) pointed out, qualitative methodology, like quantitative methodology, is more than a set of data-gathering techniques. It is a way of approaching the empirical world. In this section we present our notion of qualitative research.

1. *Qualitative researchers are concerned with the meaning people attach to things in their lives.* Central to the phenomenological perspective and hence qualitative research is understanding people from their own frames of reference and

Source 3. 3 (Miles Huberman 2014)



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preoccupied with data condensation (calculating means, standard deviations), with display (correlation tables, regression printouts), and with conclusion drawing/verification (significance levels, experimental/control group differences). But their activities are carried out through well-defined, familiar methods; are guided by canons; and are usually more sequential than iterative or cyclical. Qualitative researchers are in a more fluid and more humanistic position.

Thus, as we've suggested, qualitative analysis needs to be well documented as a process—mainly to help us learn. We need to understand more clearly just what is going on when we analyze data, in order to reflect, refine our methods, and make them more generally usable by others.

Display 1.1

Components of Data Analysis: Interactive Model



Source: Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Suggestions for Readers

Recommendations for what a reader should do with any particular book are often presumptuous, mistaken, or both. Authors have no control over who reads their books or what readers may find useful. Nevertheless, we offer a few suggestions for different types of users.

Students and Other Novice Researchers

We give some direct advice here, keeping in mind that you will often be working alone, usually on a single case, and may be feeling worried about the quality of your study—dissertation or not.

1. *This book* focuses on *analysis*. Use other, introductory books to help with the basics of fieldwork (see the Appendix for recommended titles and resources).
2. Learn by doing. Use your own study (whether it is in the planning stage or under way) as a vehicle and apply it to relevant methods in each chapter.
3. Compensate for the problem of having to work alone by finding someone to be a critical friend or mentor to respond to your work as you proceed.
4. Keep an informal log or journal of what you are running up against. This tactic will help your learning and will be useful when you write up your study.
5. Don't worry about the jargon-like names of particular displays; the issue is what a display can do for you.
6. The biggest enemy of your learning is the gnawing worry that you're not "doing it right." Dissertation work tends to encourage that. But any given analytic problem can be approached in many useful ways. Creativity—that is, inventing your way out of a problem—is definitely the better stance.

Experienced Researchers

Source 3. 4 (Marshall & Rosmann 1999)

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Vignette 25 is just one researcher's way of managing complex and thick data. Over the years, researchers have developed a variety of data management strategies ranging from color and number codings on index cards to computer programs; these techniques are often shared as part of the "folklore of fieldwork." Schatzman and Strauss's (1973) classic suggestions on observational notes, methodological notes, theoretical notes, and analytic memos are quite useful, as is Maxwell's (1996) discussion of analytic memos. Whatever method is devised, it must enable the researcher to organize data while making them easily retrievable and manipulable. Most general introductory texts on qualitative methods provide extended discussions of processes of analyzing data; we reference several at the end of this chapter. Below we offer a process of generic data analysis; the researcher should discuss her preliminary strategies at the proposal stage.

Generic Data Analysis Strategies

Data analysis is the process of bringing order, structure, and interpretation to the mass of collected data. It is a messy, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative, and fascinating process. It does not proceed in a linear fashion; it is not neat. Qualitative data analysis is a search for general statements about relationships among categories of data; it builds grounded theory (Strauss & Corbin, 1997). It is the search among data to identify content for ethnographies and for participants' "truths."

This section of the research proposal should describe to the reader initial decisions about data analysis and should convince the reader that the researcher is sufficiently knowledgeable about qualitative analysis to consider data organization, theme development and interpretation, and report writing. Although none of these can be given exhaustive consideration in the proposal, the researcher should convince the reader that thought and awareness have gone into planning the analysis phase of the study. What follows is a discussion of some considerations the researcher should bring to this section.

Whether the researcher prefigures the analysis before data collection, begins the process during data collection, or waits until all data have been gathered is related to the qualitative genre and assumptions of the study. Generating categories of data to collect, or cells in a matrix, can be an important focusing device for the study (see Table 3.3). Tightly structured, highly organized data-gathering and data-analyzing schemes, however, often

Source 3. 5 (Jefferson 1984)



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Transcript notation

The transcript notation used in this book, and in conversation analytic research more generally, has been developed by Gail Jefferson. It is a system that continues to evolve in response to current research interests, and for some of the chapters included in the present collection it has been necessary to incorporate symbols for representing various non-vocal activities, such as gaze, gestures, and applause.

Previous experience suggests that it is useful to group symbols with reference to the phenomena they represent.

1. Simultaneous utterances

Utterances starting simultaneously are linked together with either double or single left-hand brackets:

```
[[      Tom:   [[I used to smoke a lot when I was young
        Bob:     I used to smoke Camels
```

2. Overlapping utterances

When overlapping utterances do not start simultaneously, the point at which an ongoing utterance is joined by another is marked with a single left-hand bracket, linking an ongoing with an overlapping utterance at the point where overlap begins:

```
[       Tom:   I used to smoke [a lot
        Bob:                   [He thinks he's real tough
```

The point where overlapping utterances stop overlapping is marked with a single right-hand bracket:

```
]       Tom:   I used to smoke [a lot] more than this
        Bob:                   [I see]
```

3. Contiguous utterances

When there is no interval between adjacent utterances, the second being latched immediately to the first (without overlapping it), the utterances are linked together with equal signs:

```
=       Tom:   I used to smoke a lot=
        Bob:   =He thinks he's real tough
```

The equal signs are also used to link different parts of a single speaker's utterance when those parts constitute a continuous flow of speech that has been carried over to another line, by transcript design, to accommodate an intervening interruption:

```
Tom:   I used to smoke [a lot more than this=
Bob:                   [You used to smoke
Tom:   =but I never inhaled the smoke
```

Sometimes more than one speaker latches directly onto a just-completed utterance, and a case of this sort is marked with a combination of equal signs and double left-hand brackets:

```
        Tom:   I used to smoke a lot=
=[[     Bob:   =[[He thinks he's tough
        Ann:     [So did I
```

When overlapping utterances end simultaneously and are latched onto by a subsequent utterance, the link is marked by a single right-handed bracket and equal signs:

```
        Tom:   I used to smoke [a lot]=
]=      Bob:                   [I see]
        Ann:   =So did I
```

4. Intervals within and between utterances

When intervals in the stream of talk occur, they are timed in tenths of a second and inserted within parentheses, either within an utterance:

```
(0.0)  Lil:   When I was (0.6) oh nine or ten
```

or between utterances:

```
Hal:   Step right up
       (1.3)
```

Hal: I said step right up
(0.8)
Joe: Are you talking to me

A short untimed pause within an utterance is indicated by a dash:

– Dee: Umm – my mother will be right in

Untimed intervals heard between utterances are described within double parentheses and inserted where they occur:

((pause)) Rex: Are you ready to order
((pause))
Pam: Yes thank you we are

5. Characteristics of speech delivery

In these transcripts, punctuation is used to mark not conventional grammatical units but, rather, attempts to capture characteristics of speech delivery. For example, a colon indicates an extension of the sound or syllable it follows:

co:lon Ron: What ha:ppened to you

and more colons prolong the stretch:

co::lons Mae: I ju::ss can't come
Tim: I'm so::: sorry re:::ally I am

The other punctuation marks are used as follows:

. A period indicates a stopping fall in tone, not necessarily the end of a sentence.

, A comma indicates a continuing intonation, not necessarily between clauses of sentences.

? A question mark indicates a rising inflection, not necessarily a question.

?, A combined question mark/comma indicates a rising intonation weaker than that indicated by a question mark.

! An exclamation point indicates an animated tone, not necessarily an exclamation.

–	A single dash indicates a halting, abrupt cutoff, or, when multiple dashes hyphenate the syllables of a word or connect strings of words, the stream of talk so marked has a stammering quality.

Marked rising and falling shifts in intonation are indicated by upward and downward pointing arrows immediately prior to the rise or fall:

↓ ↑	Thatcher:	I am however (0.2) very ↓fortunate (0.4) in having (0.6) a ↑mar:vlous dep↓uty

Emphasis is indicated by underlining:

Ann:	It happens to be mine

Capital letters are used to indicate an utterance, or part thereof, that is spoken much louder than the surrounding talk:

Announcer:	an the winner: ↓iz:s (1.4) RACHEL ROBERTS for Y↑ANKS

A degree sign is used to indicate a passage of talk which is quieter than the surrounding talk:

° °	M:	˙hhhh (.)°Um::°'Ow is yih mother by: th'wa:y.h

Audible aspirations (hhh) and inhalations (·hhh) are inserted in the speech where they occur:

hhh	Pam:	An thi(hh)s is for you hhh
˙hhh	Don:	˙hhhh O(hh) tha(h)nk you rea(hh)lly

A 'gh' placed within a word indicates gutturalness:

gh	J:	Ohgh(h)h hhuh huh huh ˙huh

A subscribed dot is used as a "hardener." In this capacity it can indicate, for example, an especially dentalized "t":

dotౣ	J:	Was it ↑la:s' night.

Double parentheses are used to enclose a description of some phenomenon with which the transcriptionist does not want to wrestle.

These can be vocalizations that are not, for example, spelled gracefully or recognizably:

```
((   ))       Tom:   I used to ((cough)) smoke a lot
              Bob:   ((sniff)) He thinks he's tough
              Ann:   ((snorts))
```

or other details of the conversational scene:

```
              Jan:   This is just delicious
                     ((telephone rings))
              Kim:   I'll get it
```

or various characterizations of the talk:

```
              Ron:   ((in falsetto)) I can do it now
              Max:   ((whispered)) He'll never do it
```

When part of an utterance is delivered at a pace quicker than the surrounding talk, it is indicated by being enclosed between "less than" signs:

```
>< Steel:     the Guar:dian newspaper looked through >the
              manifestoes< la:st ↑week
```

6. Transcriptionist doubt

In addition to the timings of intervals and inserted aspirations and inhalations, items enclosed within single parentheses are in doubt, as in:

```
(   )          Ted:   I ('spose I'm not)
             (Ben):   We all (t-              )
```

Here "spose I'm not," the identity of the second speaker, and "t-" represent different varieties of transcriptionist doubt.

Sometimes multiple possibilities are indicated:

```
              Ted:   I(spoke to Mark)
                      ('spose I'm not)
              Ben:   We all try to figure a (tough angle  ) for it
                                            (stuffing girl)
```

When single parentheses are empty, no hearing could be achieved for the string of talk or item in question:

Source 3. 6 (Siswantoro 2010)



METODE PENELITIAN SASTRA
Analisis Struktur Puisi
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B. Data

Penelitian disiplin apa pun tidak bisa melepaskan diri dari data. Penelitian sastra juga memerlukan data tetapi dalam bentuk *verbal*, yaitu berujud *kata*, *frasa* atau *kalimat*. Meski bersifat verbal, namun data menyajikan daya tarik serta kaya akan kedalaman interpretasi. Miles dan Huberman menjelaskan perihal daya tarik data verbal sebagai berikut:

> Data kualitatif sesungguhnya menarik. Data tersebut benar-benar sumber informasi yang berdasar teori, kaya akan deskripsi serta kaya akan penjelasan proses yang terjadi di dalam konteks. (1984: 15)

Data adalah sumber informasi yang akan diseleksi sebagai bahan analisis. Oleh karena itu, kualitas dan ketepatan pengambilan data tergantung pada *ketajaman menyeleksi* yang dipandu oleh penguasaan konsep atau teori. Dalam hal ini adalah teori *struktur puisi*, bukan struktur novel atau struktur drama.

C. Jenis Data

Data dibagi menjadi dua, yakni (1) data primer dan (2) data sekunder. Data primer adalah data utama, yaitu data yang diseleksi atau diperoleh langsung dari sumbernya tanpa perantara. Contohnya adalah data berkategori *simile*, yang diambil langsung dari puisi karya Robert Burns yang berjudul *a red, red rose*.

> *O my love is like a red, red rose,*
> *That's newly sprung in June.*
> *O my love is like the melody,*
> *That's sweetly played in tune.*

Setelah membaca kritis dengan dipandu oleh konsep *gaya bahasa*, kita temukan simile pada baris *pertama* dan *ketiga* yang ditandai oleh kata *like* (seperti). Masing-masing data adalah:

(1) O *my love is like a red, red rose* (baris 1)
'Oh kekasihku bagaikan mawar merah'
O *my love is like the melody* (baris 3)
'Oh kekasihku bagaikan nyanyian'

Seterusnya data tersebut kita catat pada kartu atau lembar pengumpul data. Data primer inilah yang akan dianalisis secara fungsional terkait dengan peran atau fungsinya di dalam pembentukan struktur puisi karya Robert Burns tersebut.

Data sekunder adalah data yang diperoleh secara tidak langsung atau lewat perantara, tetapi tetap bersandar kepada kategori atau parameter yang menjadi rujukan. Sebagai contoh adalah data sekunder tentang *simile* yang diperoleh lewat pendapat orang lain dalam hal ini Hans P. Guth di dalam bukunya *Living Literature*. Di situ, pada halaman 485 dia menulis tentang karya Robert Burns yang berjudul *a red, red rose*, khususnya yang terkait dengan gaya bahasa, yaitu *simile*:

> Simile merupakan perbandingan imajinatif yang disajikan kepada kita lewat perbandingan yang ditandai dengan kata *bagaikan* atau *seperti*.

Data sekunder tersebut seterusnya kita catat pada lembar atau kartu pengumpul data dan yang kita fungsikan untuk *memperkuat keabsahan* (validasi) data primer: *O my love is like a red, red rose* dan *O my love is like the melody*.

D. Sumber Data

Sumber data terkait dengan subjek penelitian dari mana data diperoleh. Subjek penelitian sastra adalah teks novel, novela, cerita pendek, drama dan puisi. Dalam konteks ini adalah teks puisi.

Untuk *sumber data primer*, seperti yang diangkat di dalam buku ini, adalah puisi karya William Shakespeare yang berjudul Sonnet XXX. Sedang *sumber data sekunder*, meliputi: *journal, kumpulan kritik sastra, skripsi*, tesis dan lain-lain sumber yang terkait erat dengan data primer, yang berfungsi memperkuat validasi data primer.

E. Sampel

Karakter penelitian sastra yang *kasuistik*, artinya memfokuskan kajian pada karya individual, tidak menggunakan populasi. Dengan kata lain penelitian hanya menggunakan *sampel*. Istilah lain dari sampel adalah *sumber data*. Dalam konteks ini, sejalan dengan fokus kajian tentang struktur, sampelnya adalah *Sonnet* XXX. Ini berarti bahwa karya-karya lain Shakespeare semisal Sonnet XVIII, Sonnet XX, Sonnet XV, Sonnet X dan Sonnet V dipinggirkan. Selanjutnya Sonnet XXX dikaji secara mendalam dari aspek unsur-unsur strukturnya.

F. Sampling

Kalau sampel merujuk kepada karya individu yang diteliti, sampling merujuk kepada teknik pengambilan sampel. Oleh sebab penelitian sastra yang tidak menggunakan populasi, tetapi hanya menggunakan sampel, pengambilan sampel dilakukan dengan cara *purposive sampling*.

CHAPTER IV

Source 4. 1 Internet dictionaries



andictionary.com

Search

dog you

to **beat the living shit** out of **someone**

*person: **wassup then**/make me*
bad bitch**: **ni*a i will dog you*

by Megannn the stallion stan
December 8, 2019

11 9 FLAG

dog

1. *verb* To judge or criticize someone for something.

Why are you dogging me about this? It's really not a big deal.

2. *verb* To follow or pursue someone.

You've been dogging me since I left the gas station—what's your deal, man?

3. *verb* To persistently trouble someone.

I really think she should see a therapist if memories of the accident keep dogging her like that.

4. *noun* Something of poor quality.

That movie was a real dog—I left before it was over.

5. *noun* An unattractive or unappealing female.

I'm not asking that girl out—she's a real dog!

6. *noun, slang* The phone. The term comes from rhyming slang in which "dog" is short for "dog and bone," which rhymes with "phone." Primarily heard in UK, Australia.

Is that the dog? Can someone answer it?

My sister has been blabbing on the dog for hours every night ever since she got a boyfriend. It's so annoying.

dog it

1. To be lazy; to loaf or shirk duty; to fail to put forth the effort necessary to achieve or accomplish something.

Jim became totally disheartened after losing his job and

go fuck yourself

Note: This page may contain content that is offensive or inappropriate for some readers.

go fuck yourself

rude slang A forceful expression of anger, dismissal, or contempt directed at someone.

Go fuck yourself—I have every right to be here!

See also: **fuck**, **go**

Go fuck yourself!

tv. Go to hell!; Get out of here! (Taboo. Usually objectionable.) *You worthless mungshit! Go fuck yourself!*

See also: **fuck**, **go**