AN ANALYSIS OF ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS IN *SPONGEBOB SQUAREPANTS* SEASON 7

REFERENCES

Submitted to the School of Foreign Language – JIA as a partial fulfillment of requirements for the undergraduate degree in English Literature Programme



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"A brilliant, witty, and altogether satisfying book." —New York Times Book Review

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An Instinct to Acquire an Art

As you are reading these words, you are taking part in one of the wonders of the natural world. For you and I belong to a species with a remarkable ability: we can shape events in each other's brains with exquisite precision. I am not referring to telepathy or mind control or the other obsessions of fringe science; even in the depictions of believers these are blunt instruments compared to an ability that is uncontroversially present in every one of us. That ability is language. Simply by making noises with our mouths, we can reliably cause precise new combinations of ideas to arise in each other's minds. The ability comes so naturally that we are apt to forget what a miracle it is. So let me remind you with some simple demonstrations. Asking you only to surrender your imagination to my words for a few moments, I can cause you to think some very specific thoughts:

When a male octopus spots a female, his normally grayish body suddenly becomes striped. He swims above the female and begins caressing her with seven of his arms. If she allows this, he will quickly reach toward her and slip his eighth arm into her breathing tube. A series of sperm packets moves slowly through a groove in his arm, finally to slip into the mantle cavity of the female.

Cherries jubilee on a white suit? Wine on an altar cloth? Apply club soda immediately. It works beautifully to remove the stains from fabrics.

When Dixie opens the door to Tad, she is stunned, because she thought he was dead. She slams it in his face and then tries to escape. However, when Tad says, "I love you," she lets him in. Tad comforts her, and they become passionate. When Brian interrupts, Dixie tells a stunned Tad that she and Brian were married earlier that day. With much difficulty, Dixie informs Brian that things are nowhere near finished between her and Tad. Then she



Mikhail Kissine



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
Introduction

0.1 Motivation

Anyone who has come into even the most superficial contact with pragmatics will have heard of speech acts. Language, we learn as undergrads, does not only represent the world; it also allows us to do things: to conjecture and to affirm, to command and to supplicate, to promise and to threaten, to baptise and to make oaths – to perform speech acts. Every good introductory textbook on pragmatics contains a chapter on speech acts, and the names of Austin and Searle, the founding fathers of contemporary Speech Act Theory, are often among the first ones we learn as naïve students in linguistics or philosophy of language. Beyond pragmatics, the notion of speech acts is used in syntax and semantics, in literature and cinema studies, in ethics and epistemology, in clinical and experimental psychology, and the list could be continued for a long time.

However, in spite of the acknowledged importance of speech acts, their study occupies quite a strange place within the contemporary theoretical landscape. Over the past thirty years pragmatics has seen important methodological and conceptual changes. Growing attention has been paid to the cognitive aspects of utterance interpretation, and many exciting areas of research and new empirical phenomena have been uncovered. Keeping to the general development of cognitive science, scholars in pragmatics aim at building psychologically plausible models where any component of the meaning accessed by the hearer is analysed as the output of a cognitive process that ought to be explained in rigorous, naturalistic terms. There is no reason why speech acts should be left out of this new research programme.

Studying speech acts is perhaps too often seen as an attempt to unveil natural classes. But one should not forget that, fundamentally, the object of inquiry is an aspect of the interpretation of communicative stimuli. As a purely terminological safeguard, it is convenient to equate the speech act performed by way of an utterance with the *illocutionary* force of this utterance: that is, with the illocutionary force this utterance is interpreted as having. (This way of speaking originates from Austin himself. Accordingly,



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Definition	An ACT of ASSERTION is carried out when a speaker utters a d sentence (which can be either true or false), and undertakes a ce responsibility, or commitment, to the hearer, that a particular sta affairs, or situation, exists in the world.	rtain	
Example	If I say, 'Simon is in the kitchen', I assert to my hearer that in the real world a situation exists in which a person named Simon is in a room identified by the referring expression <i>the kitchen</i> .		
Comment	There was once a strong tendency among semanticists to assume was not much more to the meanings of sentences (and utterance kind of correspondence between sentences (and utterances) and This view has been called the Descriptive Fallacy. We give a simp this below.	es) than this the world.	
Definition	The DESCRIPTIVE FALLACY is the view that the sole purpose of making assertions is to DESCRIBE some state of affairs. According to the Descriptive Fallacy view, my only purpose in uttering 'Simon is in the kitchen' would be to describe a particular state of affairs, and nothing more.		
Example			
Comment	The Descriptive Fallacy view is not wholly wrong. An element of description is involved in many utterances. But description is not indulged in only for its own sake. There is usually a more basic purpose behind an utterance.		
Practice	Would the main purpose of making the following assertions normally be simply to describe some existing state of affairs in the world?		
	(1) 'There is a wasp in your left ear'	Yes / No	
	(2) 'Someone has broken the space-bar on my typewriter'	Yes / No	
	(3) 'This gun is loaded'	Yes / No	
	(4) 'You are a fool'	Yes / No	
	(5) 'I love you'	Yes / No	
Feedback	It is doubtful whether one's main purpose in making an assertion is ever simply to describe an existing state of affairs in the world. So we would suggest that the answer in all the above cases is No.		
Practice	For each of the above five utterances state one or two purposes that the speaker may have had in mind when uttering them. As a guide, we have done the first one for you.		
	(1) To warn the hearer of the danger of being stung, or to shock	him (or both)	

UNIT 2 SENTENCES, UTTERANCES, AND PROPOSITIONS

Introduction	This unit introduces some basic notions in semantics. It is importa you master these notions from the outset as they will keep recurrin throughout the course.		
Instruction	Read the following out loud:		
	Virtue is its own reward		
	Now read it out loud again.		
Comment	The same sentence was involved in the two readings, but you made two different utterances, i.e. two unique physical events took place.		
Definition	An UTTERANCE is any stretch of talk, by one person, before and after which there is silence on the part of that person. An utterance is the USE by a particular speaker, on a particular occasion, of a piece of language, such as a sequence of sentences, or a single phrase, or even a single word.		
Practice	Now decide whether the following could represent utterances. Indicate your answer by circling Yes or No.		
	(1) 'Hello'	Yes / No	
	(2) 'Not much'	Yes / No	
	(3) 'Utterances may consist of a single word, a single phrase or a single sentence. They may also consist of a sequence of sentences. It is not unusual to find utterances that consist of one or more grammatically incomplete sentence-fragments. In short, there is no simple relation of		
	correspondence between utterances and sentences'	Yes / No	
	(4) 'Pxgotmgt'	Yes / No	
	(5) 'Schplotzenpflaaaaaargh!'	Yes / No	
Feedback	(1) Yes (2) Yes (3) Yes, even though it would be a bit of a mouthfu in one utterance (i.e. without pauses). (4) No, this string of sound from any language. (5) No, for the same reason given for (4)		



Introduction to Pragmatics



Betty J. Birner

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Defining Pragmatics

all of our linguistic knowledge, is rule-governed. The bulk of this book is devoted to describing some of the principles we follow in producing and interpreting language in light of the context, our intentions, and our beliefs about our interlocutors and their intentions. Because speakers within a language community share these pragmatic principles concerning language production and interpretation in context, they constitute part of our linguistic competence, not merely matters of performance. That is to say, pragmatic knowledge is part of our knowledge of how to use language appropriately. And as with other areas of linguistic competence, our pragmatic competence is generally implicit - known at some level, but not usually available for explicit examination. For example, it would be difficult for most people to explain how they know that My day was a nightmare means that my day (like a nightmare) was very unpleasant, and not, for example, that I slept through it. Nightmares have both properties - the property of being very unpleasant and the property of being experienced by someone who is asleep - and yet only one of these properties is understood to have been intended by the speaker of the utterance My day was a nightmare. The study of pragmatics looks at such interpretive regularities and tries to make explicit the implicit knowledge that guides us in selecting interpretations.

Because this meaning is implicit, it can be tricky to study - and people don't even agree on what is and isn't implicit. One could make a strong argument that a nightmare in My day was a nightmare is actually quite explicit, that this metaphorical meaning has been fully incorporated into the language, and that it should be considered literal, not inferential (i.e., semantic rather than pragmatic). This in itself is a very interesting question: Every figure of speech began as a brand-new but perfectly interpretable utterance - one could say My day was one long, painful slide down an endless sheet of coarse-grain sandpaper - that eventually became commonplace. Upon their first utterance, such figures of speech require pragmatic inference for their interpretation; the hearer must (whether consciously or subconsciously) work out what was intended. It's possible that this is still what's done when the figure of speech becomes commonplace; it's also possible that it becomes more like a regular word, whose meaning is simply conventionally attached to that string of sounds. If the latter is the case, it's obviously impossible to say precisely when its status changed, since there was no single point at which that happened - which is to say, the shift from pragmatic meaning to semantic meaning, if and when it occurs, is a continuum rather than a point.

One might ask why it matters – but in fact there are a great many reasons why it matters. We'll return in the last chapter to some specific real-world ramifications of pragmatics, but for the present moment, just consider a court of law: It matters enormously what counts as "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Does inferential meaning count as part of that truth? Courts have frequently found that for legal purposes, only literal truth matters; that is, in saying *There's one piece of pizza left*, you can be held responsible for the number of pieces of pizza left, but not for any additional meaning (such as "offer" vs.

6 Speech Acts

To utter something – either orally or in writing – is to do something. The act of speaking is, first and foremost, an act. This is the central insight behind the theory of speech acts, and although it seems relatively straightforward, it raises important questions about how the addressee is able to determine what sort of act the speaker intended to perform. The theory of speech acts, then, is inherently a pragmatic theory, since it involves an intention on the part of the speaker and an inference on the part of the hearer. We have seen in many ways how a speaker's intention can be more than is evident merely from the semantics of the sentence uttered, and we have also seen how the context must be taken into account when trying to infer a speaker's intended meaning. This is central to the study of speech acts: Without this type of inferencing, as we have noted previously, it would be impossible to tell whether a speaker uttering (206) intends to convey an observation about the weather, a request for the hearer to bring a blanket or close a window, a question about the thermostat setting, or an invitation to snuggle up closer – or indeed several of these things at once.

(206) I'm a little cold.

In order to know how we are able to understand a speaker's utterance, we must ask how it is that we know what sort of act the speaker intended to perform by means of this utterance. This is the question originally taken up by J.L. Austin in his theory of speech acts.

6.1 Performative Utterances

It will come as no surprise that the theory of speech acts from its inception has been closely tied to the boundary between semantic and pragmatic meaning.

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1 Defining Pragmatics

What did they mean by that? It's a relatively common question, and it's precisely the subject of the field of pragmatics. In order to know what someone meant by what they said, it's not enough to know the meanings of the words (semantics) and how they have been strung together into a sentence (syntax); we also need to know who uttered the sentence and in what context, and to be able to make inferences regarding why they said it and what they intended us to understand. There's one piece of pizza left can be understood as an offer ("would you like it?") or a warning ("it's mine!") or a scolding ("you didn't finish your dinner"), depending on the situation, even if the follow-up comments in parentheses are never uttered. People commonly mean quite a lot more than they say explicitly, and it's up to their addressees to figure out what additional meaning they might have intended. A psychiatrist asking a patient Can you express deep grief? would not be taken to be asking the patient to engage in such a display immediately, but a movie director speaking to an actor might well mean exactly that. The literal meaning is a question about an ability ("are you able to do so?"); the additional meaning is a request ("please do so") that may be inferred in some contexts but not others. The literal meaning is the domain of semantics; the "additional meaning" is the domain of pragmatics.

This chapter will largely consider the difference between these two types of meaning – the literal meaning and the intended and/or inferred meaning of an utterance. We will begin with preliminary concepts and definitions, in order to develop a shared background and vocabulary for later discussions. A section on methodology will compare the corpus-based methodology favored by much current pragmatics research with the use of introspection, informants, and experimental methods. Then, since no discussion of pragmatics can proceed without a basic understanding of semantics and the proposed theoretical bases for distinguishing between the two fields, the remainder of the chapter will be devoted to sketching the domains of semantics and pragmatics. A discussion of truth tables and truth-conditional semantics will both introduce the logical notation that will be used throughout the text and provide a jumping-off point for later discussions

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One of the most prominent issues in the field of pragmatics is that of reference - the question of what it is that a speaker is speaking of when they use an expression that, broadly speaking, picks out some entity. This issue comprises a vast number of sub-issues concerning referents within various possible worlds, mentalist vs. referential perspectives (see Chapter 1 and below), the meaning of definiteness and indefiniteness, how interlocutors establish coreference between two noun phrases (NPs), and more. Many of these issues straddle the fields of linguistics and philosophy, and several of the fundamental philosophical issues we addressed in Chapter 1 concerning possible worlds, mutual knowledge, and discourse models will arise again here. In this chapter we will begin by examining the nature of referring expressions and revisiting some of the above-mentioned issues that we touched on in Chapter 1. We will then move to deixis - the "pointing" function of many referring expressions such as that and tomorrow - and its uses, examining the four major types of deixis, in which expressions are used as pointers to the spatial, temporal, personal, or discourse context. We will discuss the difficult and unresolved problem of definiteness, focusing on the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two leading approaches to definiteness, the familiarity-based and uniqueness-based accounts. We will then move to anaphora - the use of expressions that co-refer to situationally or textually evoked elements - distinguishing between deictic and anaphoric uses of demonstrative expressions and discussing the problem of pronoun resolution and its interacting syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects. Finally, we will discuss the much-cited distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and evidence suggesting that this distinction is illusory.

4.1 Referring Expressions

What is a referring expression? We could start by saying that it's a linguistic expression that a speaker uses in order to enable an addressee to "pick out"

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something in the world. This is the sort of definition that is frequently given, but it already raises questions. What does it mean to pick something out? And what counts as the world? In the mentalist view, what is picked out is limited to entities in the discourse model, rather than anything in the "actual" world of concrete objects. And the question of what it means to pick out something brings up a morass of issues concerning what it is to know something's identity, what constitutes a "thing" at all, and how we know when two things are the same. Clearly we will only be able to make a small dent in these issues here, but they are well worth keeping in mind as we talk about reference and referring expressions.

Let us say that a **referring expression** is a linguistic form that the speaker uses with the intention that it correspond to some discourse entity and bring that discourse entity to mind for the addressee. Recall that in Chapter 1 we distinguished between the **sense** and **reference** of a referring expression, where its sense is its literal semantic meaning, and its reference is what the speaker intends to refer to, or pick out, through the use of that expression. Sense is invariant, while reference will be partly determined by contextual factors; and sense is semantic, while reference is pragmatic. Furthermore, in light of the discussion in Chapter 3, we can say that reference is a central issue in the establishment of the semantics/pragmatics boundary: Scholars disagree on how best to frame the contribution of reference resolution to truth-conditional meaning, but virtually all agree that the establishment of truth-conditional meaning depends on the prior resolution of reference.

A referring expression, then, is a linguistic expression that a speaker uses in referring to something. The thing referred to is called the referent. In a mentalist framework, the referent is a discourse entity - something that exists within a discourse model, which in turn exists only within the minds of interlocutors. In a referential framework, on the other hand, the referent is an entity in the real world. Recall from Chapter 1 that there are problems with both points of view: On the one hand, when I utter Carla is tall, I certainly don't intend to say that something in my mind is tall; clearly my intention as a speaker is to indicate something in the world. On the other hand, the referent needn't exist in the world at all; I can easily refer to fictional, imaginary, and nonexistent entities. I can felicitously speak of the woman in the corner, not realizing that there's no woman in the corner at all (I can be misled by a trick of the lighting, for example), and as long as my addressee shares my belief, the reference will go through flawlessly, despite there being nothing in the world satisfying the reference. And it's not even crucial for my addressee to share my beliefs, as shown in Strawson's famous example:

(93) X: A man jumped off a bridge.

Y: He didn't jump, he was pushed. (Strawson 1952: 187)

Here, Y's failure to ascribe to all of the properties X attributes to the referent doesn't affect the fact that the reference goes through. And lest you assume

(100) a. It's warm today; it's been that way for a week now.

b. It's John who is spreading the rumor. He's a terrible gossip.

In (100a), it doesn't seem that the second *it* picks up the reference of the first *it* in order to co-refer; rather, they both seem to indicate the ambient conditions – but the apparent impossibility of co-referring back to this *it* suggests that this indication falls short of actual reference. Similarly, in (100b), *he* is clearly co-referential with *John*; it's much harder to construe both of these NPs as being coreferential with *it*.

Referring expressions, then, come in a wide variety of subclasses, and the boundaries of the category as a whole are not clear. Most referring expressions are noun phrases of various types (including proper nouns and pronouns), but one could also argue that a word like *there* (as in, *Put the lunchmeat over there*), which functions as a prepositional phrase, nonetheless takes a particular place as a referent. In this chapter, we focus on a small number of types of referring expressions, including deictics, definites, indefinites, anaphoric expressions, and demonstratives. We will finish by discussing the oft-cited difference between two uses of definite expressions that are typically differentiated in terms of one being referential and the other not; it will be argued that in fact both types are referential, and that the intuitions that gave rise to the original claim of non-referentiality can shed light on the organization of referents and their properties in our discourse models.

4.2 Deixis

The term deixis denotes the phenomenon of using a linguistic expression to "point" to some contextually available discourse entity or property. Deictic expressions are a subtype of indexical expression. (Note that "deictic" is the adjectival form of the noun "deixis"; hence, "deixis" is the phenomenon, and "deictic" is a descriptor.) The class of indexicals includes deictics, anaphoric pronouns, and even tense - all of which are linguistic mechanisms for identifying the intended meaning of the current expression through its relationship to elements of the context of utterance. In the case of tense, an event described in the current utterance is "indexed" with respect to its temporal relationship to the time of utterance, with (for example) a simple past-tense form indicating that the event described in the current utterance occurred prior to that utterance. In the case of anaphoric pronouns, discussed below, the referent of the current pronoun is co-indexed with some previously evoked entity. In the case of deixis, a phrase is interpreted relative to the time, location, or interlocutors of the linguistic exchange in which it occurs, or relative to other linguistic material in that same exchange.

4.2.1 Personal deixis

In personal deixis, a linguistic expression is used for the purpose of picking out a specific individual in the context who may not have already been linguistically evoked. Probably the most common examples of personal deixis involve the pronouns I and you, as seen in (102c) above and the examples in (103):

(103) a. I ordered a Kindle 2 from Amazon. How could I not? (Baker 2009)
b. What will you do? my friends had asked. Will you just stay home now? (Nafisi 2003)

The word I in (103a) is interpretable only in terms of the contextually salient author of the article, and the word *you* in (103b) is interpretable only in terms of the contextually salient person being addressed by the friends – in this case, the author of the book.

There are also deictic uses of other personal pronouns; for example, if I'm at a party and one guest is being noticeably loud and ornery, I can utter (104) to a companion:

(104) Uh-oh; I think he's going to cause trouble.

In this case, the pronoun is not anaphoric in that it doesn't look back to a prior mention of the same referent (as many pronouns do; see below). Instead, the addressee locates the referent in the situational context. Thus, without knowing the context of the utterance (where and when it was uttered, and by whom, and to whom), it is impossible to determine the referent of the pronoun *he*.

Personal deixis can also be achieved with a possessive pronoun:

(105) It was our family's last day in Arizona, where I'd lived half my life and raised two kids for the whole of theirs. (Kingsolver 2007)

Here, our family is a deictic expression, since the possessive pronoun our can only be interpreted with respect to the author; without knowing who wrote the book, you cannot know whose family is being referred to. The same is true for the later possessive NP my life. Thus, personal deixis occurs anytime a linguistic expression is used to make direct reference to a person present in the context of utterance.

4.2.2 Spatial deixis

Spatial deixis is used to pick out a location relative to the location of the speaker or addressee, as seen in (102d) above and the examples in (106):

- (107) a. "I'm commutin four hours a day," he said morosely. "Come in for breakfast, go back to the sheep, evenin get em bedded down, come in for supper, go back to the sheep, spend half the night jumpin up and checkin for coyotes." (Proulx 1997)
 - b. In the kitchen a light was already on, and Charles Wallace was sitting at the table drinking milk and eating bread and jam . . .
 - "Why didn't you *come* up to the attic?" Meg asked her brother, speaking as though he were at least her own age. (L'Engle 1962)
 - c. It isn't so much that I lost my way as that I got blown off course. And when I realized that I was at little Charles Wallace's house I thought I'd just *come* in and rest a bit before proceeding on my way. (I'Engle 1962)
 - d. The next morning, before school starts, he *comes* with me to inspect the ice. (Erdrich 1986)

In (107a), both instances of come indicate movement toward the speaker's present location; the speaker is saying that he returns to his present location for breakfast and supper. In (107b), come indicates movement not toward the present location of the speaker, or even toward the present location of the addressee, but rather toward the location of the speaker at the time referenced by the past tense. In (107c), on the other hand, come indicates movement not toward the location of the speaker at the time referenced by the past tense, but rather toward the location of the addressee at that past time (which coincides with the location of the speaker at the present time). Finally, in (107d), come does not indicate movement toward the speaker or the addressee either at the present time or at some past time; instead, it indicates joint movement in the same direction. Thus, spatial deixis appears to cover a somewhat more complex range of situations than does personal deixis, potentially including current, past, and future locations of the speaker and/or addressee, movement toward or away from such locations, and even accompaniment with these interlocutors as they themselves change location.

4.2.3 Temporal deixis

Temporal deixis is deixis relative to the time of utterance, as in (108):

- (108) a. "As for you, my Lord," he said to Gumpas, "I forgive you your debt for the tribute. But before noon *tomorrow* you and yours must be out of the castle, which is now the Duke's residence." (Lewis 1952)
 - b. "I don't believe this happened," he says to himself. That is, oddly, when I lash out against his presence. (Erdrich 1986)

c. "How about that coffee?" he says.

I turn to the stove.

And then, when I turn around again with the coffeepot, I see that he is unlatching a complicated series of brass fittings that unfold his suitcase into a large stand-up display. (Erdrich 1986)

d. The wind booms down the curved length of the trailer and under its roaring passage he can hear the scratching of fine gravel and sand. It could be bad on the highway with the horse trailer. He has to be packed and away from the place *that morning*. (Proulx 1997)

In (108a), tomorrow indicates the day following the utterance; that is, it is deictic relative to the time of utterance. In (108b), that is deictic relative not to the time of utterance but rather to the time of the last-described event; the speaker is saying that she lashed out immediately after hearing the comment "I don't believe this happened." It is worth noting that that is . . . when actually does not indicate a time coinciding with the previous event, but immediately after it; that is, that in this case indicates the inferrable moment following that event. In (108c), then is similarly deictic relative to the time of the last-described event, and again picks out a moment following that event; the speaker turns around with the coffeepot after turning to the stove, not at the same time. In (108d), the situation is slightly more complicated; here, the deixis isn't, strictly speaking, relative to the time of the last-described event; rather, it is relative to the time of the entire context being described. What's relevant isn't that the character in question has to be packed and away from the place on the morning of the wind's booming, and so on, but rather that he has to be packed and away on the morning that is being described by those events. Notice in this case that the word that could be replaced by the word this felicitously, but that there would be a subtle change in the deictic reference; the reader would then feel as though they were experiencing the scene more closely from the point of view of the character, that they had in effect slipped into his shoes, due to the use of the proximal deictic. The use of the distal deictic retains a greater sense of watching from a distance. Cues such as these are frequently exploited by writers for subtle literary effect.

4.2.4 Discourse deixis

Discourse deixis is by far the least common of the four types of deixis, and it is not even universally acknowledged as a type of deixis. In discourse deixis, the deictic term is used in reference not to a part of the context of utterance (such as its time, place, or speaker), but rather to a part of the utterance itself, or a proposition evoked by the utterance itself, as in (109):

Ward 2006 for other cases where an implicature one would expect from the Givenness Hierarchy does not in fact arise.)

In short, while uniqueness, individuability, and familiarity are all relevant concepts that can explain some of the data, and while it is certainly true that different types of definite NPs mark different cognitive statuses in some sense, none of the accounts thus far proposed seems able to account for the full range of definiteness in English (much less cross-linguistically). There is still a great deal of research to be done on the subject of definiteness, and it is a topic that will recur through the remainder of this book.

4.4 Anaphora

Anaphora is a phenomenon in which one expression – typically a pronoun – is interpreted as coreferential with another expression, which in turn provides the referent. Without this coreference, it would be impossible to determine the referent of the anaphoric expression. Consider the example in (130):

(130) The Salinas Valley is in Northern California. It is a long narrow swale between two ranges of mountains, and the Salinas River winds and twists up the center until it falls at last into Monterey Bay. (Steinbeck 1952)

Here, the first instance of it is coreferential with the Salinas Valley, and the second instance of it is coreferential with the Salinas River. This is perfectly obvious to the reader, but it raises an interesting question: How does the reader know that the second instance of it is coreferential with the Salinas River and not with the Salinas Valley? You might hypothesize that it's because rivers are more likely than valleys to fall into a bay, but you will also recognize that the reader knows that the second pronoun it is coreferential with the Salinas River as soon as the pronoun is encountered, so it's not the Monterey Bay that provides the clue - nor is it the winding and twisting (although it's true that rivers are somewhat more prone to winding and twisting than are valleys). What tells the reader that the referent of the second pronoun is the river and not the valley is the fact that the river is at that point more salient, having been mentioned more recently (and having been the subject of the previous clause; see below). In this case, the pronoun is called an anaphor, and the Salinas River is its antecedent - the linguistic expression from which it takes its reference and with respect to which it is interpreted.

Notice also that although *it* is a pronoun, suggesting that it stands in for a noun, this is not quite accurate; rather, it stands in for a full noun phrase. To see this, notice that substituting the pronoun *it* for the noun *river* in the sentence *The river travels to the bay* results in the ungrammatical **The it travels to the*

Defining Pragmatics

all of our linguistic knowledge, is rule-governed. The bulk of this book is devoted to describing some of the principles we follow in producing and interpreting language in light of the context, our intentions, and our beliefs about our interlocutors and their intentions. Because speakers within a language community share these pragmatic principles concerning language production and interpretation in context, they constitute part of our linguistic competence, not merely matters of performance. That is to say, pragmatic knowledge is part of our knowledge of how to use language appropriately. And as with other areas of linguistic competence, our pragmatic competence is generally implicit - known at some level, but not usually available for explicit examination. For example, it would be difficult for most people to explain how they know that My day was a nightmare means that my day (like a nightmare) was very unpleasant, and not, for example, that I slept through it. Nightmares have both properties - the property of being very unpleasant and the property of being experienced by someone who is asleep - and yet only one of these properties is understood to have been intended by the speaker of the utterance My day was a nightmare. The study of pragmatics looks at such interpretive regularities and tries to make explicit the implicit knowledge that guides us in selecting interpretations.

Because this meaning is implicit, it can be tricky to study - and people don't even agree on what is and isn't implicit. One could make a strong argument that a nightmare in My day was a nightmare is actually quite explicit, that this metaphorical meaning has been fully incorporated into the language, and that it should be considered literal, not inferential (i.e., semantic rather than pragmatic). This in itself is a very interesting question: Every figure of speech began as a brand-new but perfectly interpretable utterance - one could say My day was one long, painful slide down an endless sheet of coarse-grain sandpaper - that eventually became commonplace. Upon their first utterance, such figures of speech require pragmatic inference for their interpretation; the hearer must (whether consciously or subconsciously) work out what was intended. It's possible that this is still what's done when the figure of speech becomes commonplace; it's also possible that it becomes more like a regular word, whose meaning is simply conventionally attached to that string of sounds. If the latter is the case, it's obviously impossible to say precisely when its status changed, since there was no single point at which that happened - which is to say, the shift from pragmatic meaning to semantic meaning, if and when it occurs, is a continuum rather than a point.

One might ask why it matters – but in fact there are a great many reasons why it matters. We'll return in the last chapter to some specific real-world ramifications of pragmatics, but for the present moment, just consider a court of law: It matters enormously what counts as "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." Does inferential meaning count as part of that truth? Courts have frequently found that for legal purposes, only literal truth matters; that is, in saying *There's one piece of pizza left*, you can be held responsible for the number of pieces of pizza left, but not for any additional meaning (such as "offer" vs.

EXPRESSION AND MEANING

Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts

JOHN R. SEARLE

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Introduction

of analysis, as I believe we should for quite independent reasons (see Searle, 1969, Ch. 1), then we find there are five general ways of using language, five general categories of illocutionary acts. We tell people how things are (Assertives),¹ we try to get them to do things (Directives), we commit ourselves to doing things (Commissives), we express our feelings and attitudes (Expressives), and we bring about changes in the world through our utterances (Declarations).

The method I use in this essay is in a sense empirical. I simply look at uses of language and find these five types of illocutionary point, and when I examine actual discourse I find, or at least claim, that utterances can be classified under these headings. But any philosopher is bound to feel that where there are categories there ought to be a transcendental deduction of the categories, that is, there ought to be some theoretical explanation as to why language provides us with these and with only these.2 The justification of these categories in terms of the nature of the mind has to wait for the next book. But one problem which immediately arises for this book is that one and the same utterance will often fit into more than one category. Suppose I say to you, for example, "Sir, you are standing on my foot." Now in most contexts when I make a statement of that sort I am making not only an Assertive, but I am also indirectly requesting and perhaps even ordering you to get off my foot. Thus the Assertive utterance is also an indirect Directive. How does such an utterance work, that is, how do both speaker and hearer go so effortlessly from the literal Assertive sentence meaning to the implied indirect Directive utterance meaning? The second essay, "Indirect speech acts", opens what is perhaps the main theme of this collection: the relations between literal sentence meaning and speaker's utterance meaning, where

¹ In the original publication I used the term "Representative", but I now prefer "Assertive" since any speech act with a propositional content is in some sense a representation.

² I do not of course claim that every one of the world's two thousand or so natural languages has the syntactical devices for expressing all five types. For all I know there may be languages that have not evolved syntactical devices for, e.g., Commissives.

Pragmatics

George Yule

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1 Definitions and background

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<u>Pragmatics is concerned with the study of meaning as communicated by a speaker (or writer) and interpreted by a listener (or reader).</u> It has, consequently, more to do with the analysis of what people mean by their utterances than what the words or phrases in those utterances might mean by themselves. *Pragmatics is the* study of speaker meaning.

This type of study necessarily involves the interpretation of what people mean in a particular context and how the context influences what is said. It requires a consideration of how speakers organize what they want to say in accordance with who they're talking to, where, when, and under what circumstances. *Pragmatics is the study of contextual meaning.*

This approach also necessarily explores how listeners can make inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker's intended meaning. This type of study explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as part of what is communicated. We might say that it is the investigation of invisible meaning. Pragmatics is the study of how more gets communicated than is said.

This perspective then raises the question of what determines the choice between the said and the unsaid. <u>The basic answer is tied to the notion of distance</u>. Closeness, whether it is physical, social, or conceptual, implies shared experience. <u>On the assumption of how close or distant the listener is, speakers determine how much needs to be said</u>. *Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance*.

These are the four areas that pragmatics is concerned with. To understand how it got to be that way, we have to briefly review its relationship with other areas of linguistic analysis.

Edited by Carol Genetti

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An Introduction to Language and Linguistics



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Introduction: language, languages, and linguistics

from generation to generation, it shifts and adapts to the ever-changing world in which it is embedded.

The preceding paragraphs emphasized that *language is a pervasive and essential part both of your own life and of who we are as humankind*. The goal of this book is to begin to address the question: *How does language work*? It is a simple question, and one that most people never think to ask. Language is so automatic – almost like breathing – that most people don't realize the complexity that underlies it and the subtle and effortless skill with which they wield it.

The question *How does language work*? may itself be simple but the answer is highly complex. It can be broken down into many smaller questions. To begin with, one must ask: *How do individual languages work*? We really can't understand the nature of language in its broad sense if we don't understand the mechanisms underlying particular languages, preferably of many and diverse kinds. Other key questions include: What are all the pieces of a language? How do the pieces combine and work together to allow for communication to occur? How are languages learned and transmitted? How do languages influence each other? How do languages change over time? These are but a small number of the many questions that define the field of **linguistics**, the scientific study of language. But before discussing the field in more detail, it is important to continue with our exploration of the nature of language.

1.1.2 Language is human and all that that implies

Language is one of the defining traits of humankind. Language is tied up with our thought processes, our ability to reason, to self-reflect, and to develop advanced civilizations. Other animal species have developed communication systems, but they pale in comparison to human language. A simple illustration of this is the fact that no system of animal communication appears to be able to communicate events that occurred in the past or events that are imaginary. Neither are there animal communication systems that have adverbs or other devices that allow for detailed descriptions of actions. Animals have nothing comparable in scale, complexity, subtlety, or adaptability to human language.

The fact that language is human has a number of important implications for the nature of language. *Language is embedded into our physiology, our cognition, and our thought processes.* Many of the details of linguistic structure are directly dependent on this. For example, the fact that no language makes sounds by curling the tip of the tongue back to touch the uvula (the small appendage hanging down in the middle of the back of the mouth) is directly explainable by the details of human anatomy. Less trivially, anatomical facts are also responsible for a number of features of sound systems, such as the common trend to pronounce a sequence of *t* and *y* as "ch" (e.g., *gotcha* from *got you*). More importantly, language processes are largely resident in the brain and so language shares characteristics with other cognitive functions; for example, language is both learnable and adaptable.



AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLINGUISTICS

Ronald Wardhaugh And Janet M. Fuller

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Introduction

language in society, but also to question both our findings and the very process of doing research. Take, for instance, the topic of nicknames. There is a stereotype that men use nicknames and women do not, exemplified in the following joke:

If Diana, Natalie, Naomi, and Maria meet for lunch, they will call each other Diana, Natalie, Naomi, and Maria. But if Matt, Peter, Kirk, and Scott go out for a brewsky, they will call each other Dutch, Dude, Doofus, and Pencil.


We could investigate this sociolinguistic phenomenon by surveying people about their nicknames and also observing or recording interactions in which they are addressed by close friends and family members. We might find, indeed, that the men in our study are often called nicknames, while the women rarely are. But we would like to go deeper than this generalization; why do we ask this question in the first place? Why do we assume that the categories of 'men' and 'women' are socially relevant? What is it about nicknames that makes using them, or not using them, significant social behavior? And even if most men are called by a nickname and most women are not, how do we explain the existence of individual men who do not have nicknames, and the individual women who do?

Thus, while in sociolinguistics we do analyze speech with the goal of making generalizations, we also question these generalizations and examine how they, in turn, influence how we use language. In short, sociolinguistics is not a study of facts (e.g., men call each other nicknames) but the study of ideas about how societal norms are intertwined with our language use (e.g., what it means to be a male or female member of a particular society may influence the terms we use to address each other).

We will come back to these points repeatedly: language, society, and sociolinguistic research findings must all be viewed in their social contexts, interpreted, and redefined. To begin, however, we will offer a starting point for discussing language in society. By **society**, we mean a group of people who are drawn together for a certain purpose or purposes; this is a rather vague and broad term, and throughout this book we will be engaged in discussing how to draw meaningful boundaries around a group of speakers for the purposes of studying their language. We use the term **language** to mean a system of linguistic communication particular to a group; this includes spoken, written, and signed modes of communication.

These terms are, as you will undoubtedly have noted, inextricably intertwined. A society must have a language or languages in which to carry out its purposes, and we label ways of speaking with reference to their speakers. This connection is inevitable and complex; our purpose here is to study the relationship between language and society in more specific ways which help us more clearly define and understand both the social groups and the ways they speak.

In this introductory chapter, we will present some of the basic concepts in the field of sociolinguistics: what it means to 'know' a language, the nature of differences across and within languages, the importance of social group membership in language use, and different ideas about the relationship between the worldviews of



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Typeset in Minion Pro by Saxon Graphics Ltd, Derby Chomskyan paradigm gained influence in linguistics, the more linguists gradually realized that the general abstractions of this paradigm neglected the reality of language that is realized in speech produced by speakers in various social, cultural and political contexts with various goals and intentions. Indeed, language is much more than a grammatical algorithm with a lexicon; it is a tool speakers use to interact socially and communicate with each other. Research in linguistic pragmatics deals with how speakers use their language(s) in various situations and contexts: what speakers do when they speak and why they do it. In the focus of pragmatics are the actual language users, their communicative behaviour, their world and their point of view, in short, 'the total human *context of* [language] *use*' (Mey 1994: 3265).

This implies that pragmatics serves a kind of 'umbrella' function, as Jan-Ola Östman (1988: 28) put it – not only for 'sociolinguistics ... and other (semi-) hyphenated areas of linguistics' but also for the other traditional subdisciplines of linguistics. As Mey (1994: 3268) wrote: 'The problems of pragmatics are not confined to the semantic, the syntactic or the phonological fields, exclusively. Pragmatics ... defines a cluster of related problems, rather than a strictly delimited area of research'. Pragmatics studies language and its meaningful use from the perspective of language users embedded in their situational, behavioural, cultural, societal and political contexts, using a broad variety of methodologies and interdisciplinary approaches depending on specific research questions and interests.

The issue of interdisciplinarity brings us back to the claim that the 1970s was the decade in which the 'pragmatic turn' in linguistics had its origin. The first volume of the *Journal of Pragmatics* was published in 1977; John Benjamins started a book series with the title Pragmatics and Beyond in 1979; the International Pragmatics Association (IPrA) was founded in 1986; and its journal *Pragmatics* started under the name *IPrA Papers in Pragmatics* a year later. However, if we look at core domains of the discipline we realize that linguistic pragmatics is relevant for, and has its predecessors in, many other disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, ethology, ethnology, sociology and the political sciences.

It will be shown in this volume that pragmatics is not only an inherently interdisciplinary field within linguistics, but that it is indeed a 'transdiscipline' that brings together and interacts with a rather broad variety of disciplines within the humanities which share the fundamental interest in social action. This interest constitutes a leitmotif for this volume, based on the conviction that 'the heart of the pragmatic enterprise [is] the description of language as social action' (Clift *et al.* 2009: 50).

The volume has three central threads that bind the chapters into a complex whole:

- Languages are used by their speakers in social interactions; they are first and foremost instruments for creating social bonds and accountability relations. The means with which languages create these bonds and relations vary across languages and cultures.
- Speech is part of the context of the situation in which it is produced, language has an essentially pragmatic character and 'meaning resides in the pragmatic function of an utterance' (Bauman 1992: 147).

Analyzing meaning

An introduction to semantics and pragmatics

Paul R. Kroeger

Textbooks in Language Sciences 5



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1 The meaning of meaning

Humpty Dumpty's claim to be the "master" of his words — to be able to use words with whatever meaning he chooses to assign them — is funny because it is absurd. If people really talked that way, communication would be impossible. Perhaps the most important fact about word meanings is that they must be shared by the speech community: speakers of a given language must agree, at least most of the time, about what each word means.


Yet, while it is true that words must have agreed-upon meanings, Twain's remark illustrates how word meanings can be stretched or extended in various novel ways, without loss of comprehension on the part of the hearer. The contrast between Mark Twain's successful communication and Humpty Dumpty's failure to communicate suggests that the conventions for extending meanings must also be shared by the speech community. In other words, there seem to be rules even for bending the rules. In this book we will be interested both in the rules for "normal" communication, and in the rules for bending the rules.

The term SEMANTICS is often defined as the study of meaning. It might be more accurate to define it as the study of the relationship between linguistic form and meaning. This relationship is clearly rule-governed, just as other aspects of linguistic structure are. For example, no one believes that speakers memorize every possible sentence of a language; this cannot be the case, because new and unique sentences are produced every day, and are understood by people hearing them for the first time. Rather, language learners acquire a vocabulary (lexicon), together with a set of rules for combining vocabulary items into well-formed sentences (syntax). The same logic forces us to recognize that language learners must acquire not only the meanings of vocabulary items, but also a set of rules for interpreting the expressions that are formed when vocabulary items are combined. All of these components must be shared by the speech community in order for linguistic communication to be possible. When we study semantics, we are trying to understand this shared system of rules that allows hearers to correctly interpret what speakers intend to communicate.

The study of meaning in human language is often partitioned into two major divisions, and in this context the term SEMANTICS is used to refer to one of these divisions. In this narrower sense, semantics is concerned with the inherent meaning of words and sentences as linguistic expressions, in and of themselves, while PRAGMATICS is concerned with those aspects of meaning that depend on or derive from the way in which the words and sentences are used. In the abovementioned quote attributed to Mark Twain, the basic or "default" meaning of good (the sense most likely to be listed in a dictionary) would be its semantic content. The negative meaning which Twain manages to convey is the result of pragmatic inferences triggered by the peculiar way in which he uses the word.







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
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Figure 1.2 Reference and sense in the vocabulary



1.6.1 Reference and sense

One important point made by the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1974), whose ideas have been so influential in the development of modern linguistics, is that the meaning of linguistic expressions derives from two sources: the language they are part of and the world they describe. Words stand in a relationship to the world, or our mental classification of it: they allow us to identify parts of the world, and make statements about them. Thus if a speaker says <u>He saw Paul</u> or <u>She bought a dog</u>, the underlined nominals allow her to identify, pick out, or **refer** to specific entities in the world. However, words also derive their value from their position within the language system. The relationship by which language hooks onto the world is usually called **reference**. The semantic links between elements within the vocabulary system is an aspect of their **sense**,⁸ or meaning.

Saussure (1974: 115) used the diagram in figure 1.2 to show this patterning. Each oval is a word, having its own capacity for reference, but each is also linked to other words in the same language, like a cell in a network. His discussion of this point is excellent and we cannot really do it justice here, except to recommend the reader to the original. His well-known examples include a comparison of English sheep and French mouton. In some cases they can be used to refer in a similar way but their meaning differs because they are in different systems and therefore have different ranges: in English there is an extra term mutton, used for meat, while the French word can be used for both the animal and the meat. Thus, the meaning of a word derives both from what it can be used to refer to and from the way its semantic scope is defined by related words. So the meaning of chair in English is partly defined by the existence of other words like stool. Similarly, the scope of red is defined by the other terms in the color system: brown, orange, yellow, and so on. The same point can be made of grammatical systems: Saussure pointed out that plural doesn't "mean" the same in French, where it is opposed to singular, as it does in Sanskrit or Arabic, languages which, in addition to singular, have dual forms, for exactly two entities. In the French system, plural is "two or more," in the other systems, "three or more."

1.6.2 Utterances, sentences, and propositions

These three terms are used to describe different levels of language. The most concrete is **utterance**: an utterance is created by speaking (or writing) a piece of language. If I say *Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny*, this is one utterance. If another person in the same room also says *Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny*, then we would be dealing with two utterances.

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
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of symbolic behavior or of communication-systems. It is also the symbolic nature of text and textual representations. Semiotics involves the study not only of what we refer to as 'signs' in everyday speech, but of anything which 'stands for' something else. In a semiotic sense, signs take the form of words, images, sounds, gestures and objects. According to An Introduction to Literary Studies:

Semiotic methods of analysis which originated in literary criticism have been applied in anthropology, the study of popular culture (e.g., advertisements), geography, architecture, film, and art history. The majority of these approaches emphasize the systemic character of the object under analysis. Buildings, myths, or pictures are regarded as systems of signs in which elements interact in ways analogous to letters, words, and sentences. For this reason, these divergent disciplines are often subsumed under the umbrellaterm semiotics (the science of signs). (Klarer 28)

Semiotics is often employed in the analysis of texts (although it is far more than just a mode of textual analysis). Whenever a text is examined, the three things are important—the first is the structure of text (from structure or surface organization of text), the second is what it means on the surface and the third is the real meaning (hidden meaning), which underlie the surface organization in the text. There is a difference between the surface meaning and reality. Semiotics is the study of symbols and it has three components—the first one is the relation to the organization or formal structure that is syntax, the second one is the surface meaning which is the part of semantics and the third one is the hidden or intended meaning, also called pragmatic meaning. Pragmatics is such that the meaning on surface may or may not be underlying.

The role of context is always important in the study of the use of pragmatics. Pragmatics studies the ways that context affects meaning. The two primary forms of context important to pragmatics are 'linguistic context' (the context of language) and 'situational context' (the context of situation). Linguistic context is the discourse that precedes the phrase or sentence to be interpreted whereas the situational context includes knowledge of world; including the speaker, the hearer, third parties and their beliefs. If take one example; "Ramesh is thirsty" both the words 'Ramesh' and 'thirsty' have certain linguistic meaning (or surface meaning) and it is in the state of being something. When these words combine, they give semiotic meaning or linguistic meaning or surface meaning. Pragmatics studies more than the surface meaning that is, it studies the real or intended meaning.

Situational context refers to every non-linguistic factor that affects the meaning of a phrase. An example of situational context can be seen in the phrase "It's cold in here," which can either be a simple statement of fact or a request to turn up the heat, depending on, among other things, whether or not it is believed to be in the listener's power to affect the temperature. It depends on the intention and expectation from the speaker to the hearer. Therefore, the situation demands a particular kind of sentence and this speech situation has three things: place, purpose and people. Here situation is the realization of the context. J.R. Firth, English linguist, is noted for drawing attention to the context-dependent nature of meaning with his notion of "context of situation." He believed that whatever anyone said must be understood in the context of the situation. As utterances occur in real-life context, Firth argued that their meaning derived just as much from the particular situation in which they occurred as from the string of sounds uttered. In his article "The Technique of semantics" (1935), he proposes to use the term 'semantics' to describes his whole approach to language, which is to link all levels of linguistic analysis with their contexts and situations. OXFORD STUDIES IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS

The Pragmatics of Politeness

Geoffrey Leech

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56 Pragmatics, indirectness, and neg-politeness

3.1 A Problem-solving View of Pragmatics: S's Problem and H's Problem

The foundation stone of modern pragmatics is arguably Grice's definition (1957) of nonnatural meaning (meaningNN),² or "speaker's meaning," as distinct from sentence meaning. (Alternatively the former can be labeled "pragmatic meaning" to distinguish it from "semantic meaning," as discussed in the Appendix, section A1.1.) Grice's formulation was as follows:

"A meant_{sx} something by x" is roughly equivalent to "A uttered x with the intention of inducing a belief by means of the recognition of this intention." —Grice (1957: 219)

This can be considered a formulaic encapsulation of person-to-person communication by means of language. Two key points are first that pragmatic meaning resides in the communicative intention of S, and second that the interpretation of this meaning depends on the recognition (by H or some third party) of the intention.³ However, as we have seen, this communicative intention is by no means directly retrievable from the sense of the utterance alone. Inference, by which H reconstructs the intention from what is said (making use of contextual assumptions, regulative principles such as the CP, etc.), is fundamental to the pragmatic process of interpretation. Communication is therefore concerned with intentions or goals (from S's point of view) and inferences about intentions or goals (from H's point of view).

A third key point is that there is no way of being sure that what S meant (i.e., intended to communicate) is precisely recovered by H. There are a number of reasons for this, but the chief one is that the inference process is not a fail-safe deductive process.⁴ What I have referred to as "commonsense reasoning"—technically *abductive* reasoning—is based on certain assumptions (including the assumption that S is following the CP), which cannot be verified by H. Much of this reasoning is probabilistic. We all know that communication (even between people who speak the same language fluently and know one another well) is subject to misunderstanding,

² Grice (1957) chose the term nonnatural meaning to distinguish this (typically linguistic) sense of meaning from the sense of meaning that can be used of natural phenomena, for example, *Those brown* leaves mean that the shrub is dying. In this latter sense, there is an assumed entailment relation between "That shrub has brown leaves" and "That shrub is dying." (See the discussion of Gricean meaning in Jaszczolt 2002; 207–209).

³ For an argument against Gricean intention "at the heart of pragmatics," see Arundale (2008). Culpeper (2011a: 69) argues that communicative intentionality is a scalar property, meaning there are stronger intentions and weaker intentions—a position with which I concur, and which makes Gricean intentionality easier to accept. It is partly because of this unclarity, however, that I prefer to use *goal* (a term that can be more easily applied to unconscious as well as conscious dispositions) rather than *intention*.

⁴ Contrast the essentially deductive model of pragmatic reasoning adopted in Relevance Theory by Sperber and Wilson (1986/1995: 93–108), a model that has more recently been modified; see the account of relevance-theoretic comprehension processing in Wilson and Sperber (2004: 613–617).

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
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Methods and scope

1.4 Why study speech acts?

I said in the last section that I hypothesize that speaking a language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior. I did not attempt to prove that hypothesis, rather I offered it by way of explanation of the fact that the sort of knowledge expressed in linguistic characterizations of the kind exemplified is possible. In a sense this entire book might be construed as an attempt to explore, to spell out some of the implications of, and so to test that hypothesis. There is nothing circular in this procedure, for I am using the hypothesis of language as rule-governed intentional behavior to explain the possibility of, not to provide evidence for, linguistic characterizations. The form that this hypothesis will take is that speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating; and, secondly, that these acts are in general made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements.

The reason for concentrating on the study of speech acts is simply this: all linguistic communication involves linguistic acts. The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or word or sentence in the performance of the speech act. To take the token as a message is to take it as a produced or issued token. More precisely, the production or issuance of a sentence token under certain conditions is a speech act, and speech acts (of certain kinds to be explained later) are the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication. A way to come to see this point is to ask oneself, what is the difference between regarding an object as an instance of linguistic communication and not so regarding it? One crucial difference is this. When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume is that the noise or mark was produced by a being or beings more or less like myself and produced with certain kinds of intentions. If I regard the noise or mark as a natural phenomenon like the wind in the trees or a stain on the paper, I exclude it from the class of linguistic communication, even though the noise or mark may be



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B. Jenis-jenis Metode Penelitian

Jenis-jenis metode penelitian dapat diklasifikasikan berdasarkan, tujuan, dan tingkat kealamiahan (*natural setting*) obyek yang diteliti. Berdasarkan tujuan, metode penelitian dapat diklasifikasikan menjadi penelitian dasar (*basic research*), penelitian terapan (*applied research*) dan penelitian pengembangan (*research and development*). Selanjutnya berdasarkan tingkat kealamiahan, metode penelitian dapat dikleompokkan menjadi metode penelitian eksperimen, survey dan naturalistik. Hal ini dapat digambarkan seperti gambar 1.1 berikut.

Gay (1977) menyatakan bahwa sebenarnya sulit untuk membedakan antara penelitian murni (dasar) dan terapan secara terpisah, karena keduanya terletak pada satu garis kontinum. Penelitian dasar bertujuan untuk mengembangkan teori dan tidak memperhatikan kegunaan yang langsung bersifat praktis. Penelitian dasar pada umumnya dilakukan pada laboratorium yang kondisinya terkontrol dengan ketat. Penelitian terapan dilakukan dengan tujuan menerapkan, menguji, dan mengevaluasi kemampuan suatu teori yang diterapkan dalam memecahkan masalah-masalah praktis. Jadi penelitian murni/dasar berkenaan dengan penemuan dan pengembangan ilmu. Setelah ilmu tersebut digunakan untuk memecahkan masalah, maka penelitian tersebut akan menjadi penelitian terapan.

Jujun S. Suriasumantri (1985) menyatakan bahwa penelitian dasar atau murni adalah penelitian yang bertujuan menemukan pengetahuan baru yang sebelumnya belum pernah diketahui, sedangkan penelitian terapan adalah bertujuan untuk memecahkan masalah-masalah kehidupan praktis.

Dalam bidang pendidikan. Borg and Gall (1988) menyatakan bahwa, penelitian dan pengembangan (*research and development/R&D*), merupakan metode penelitian yang digunakan untuk mengembangkan atau memvalidasi produk-produk yang digunakan dalam pendidikan dan pembelajaran.

Penelitian dan pengembangan merupakan "jembatan" antara penelitian dasar (basic research) dengan penelitian terapan (applied research), di mana penelitian dasar bertujuan untuk "to discover new knowledge about fundamental phenomena" dan applied research bertujuan untuk menemukan pengetahuan yang secara praktis dapat diaplikasikan.