DEFENSE MECHANISMS OF FEMALE CHARACTERS IN THE 'MOURNING BECOMES ELECTRA' PLAY BY EUGENE O'NEILL: A PSYCHOANALYSIS STUDY

THESIS

Submitted to the School of Foreign Language – JIA as a partial fulfillment of requirements for the undergraduate degree in English Literature Programme

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ENGLISH LITERATURE PROGRAMME
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Psikologi SASTRA



Karya Sastra, Metode, Teori, dan Contoh Kasus

ALBERTINE MINDEROP

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melalui mimpi ini, Freud melakukan pemindahan yaitu adanya hal yang berlawanan antara ungkapan "mata yang indah" dengan "menolong bukan tanpa pamrih." Keempat, gambaran mimpi kerap kali berhubungan dengan pikiran tersembunyi melalui hubungan analogis, yang disebut Freud *simbol*. Misalnya, raja atau ratu sering melambangkan orang tua si pemimpi, sedangkan pangeran atau putri adalah lambang diri pemimpi sendiri.

Seluruh proses di atas membantu menyamarkan hasrat yang tidak dapat terwujud pada saat sadar sebab hasrat tersebut merupakan sasaran sensor; sedangkan sensor bekerja secara khusus dengan segala hal yang berhubungan dengan seksualitas. Pekerjaan sensor ini disebut Freud *represi*. Karena ada sensor dan represi, di dalam mimpi ada gejala *regresi*, yang membawa kita ke dalam asal kehidupan psikis yaitu masa kanak-kanak, di mana awal munculnya berbagai hasrat.

C. Struktur Kepribadian Menurut Sigmund Freud

Tingkah laku menurut Freud, merupakan hasil konflik dan rekonsiliasi ketiga sistem kepribadian tersebut. Faktor-faktor yang memengaruhi kepribadian adalah faktor historis masa lampau dan faktor kontemporer, analoginya faktor bawaan dan faktor lingkungan dalam pembentukan kepribadian individu.

Selanjutnya Freud membahas pembagian psikisme manusia: *id* (terletak di bagian taksadar) yang merupakan reservoir pulsi dan menjadi sumber energi psikis. *Ego* (terletak di antara alam sadar dan taksadar) yang bertugas sebagai penengah yang mendamaikan tuntutan pulsi dan larangan superego. *Superego* (terletak sebagian di bagian sadar dan sebagian lagi di bagian taksadar) bertugas mengawasi dan menghalangi pemuasan sempurna pulsi-pulsi

tersebut yang merupakan hasil pendidikan dan identifikasi pada orang tua.

Freud mengibaratkan *id* sebagai raja atau ratu, *ego* sebagai perdana menteri dan *superego* sebagai pendeta tertinggi. *Id* berlaku seperti penguasa absolut, harus dihormati, manja, sewenang-wenang dan mementingkan diri sendiri; apa yang diinginkannya harus segera terlaksana. *Ego* selaku perdana menteri yang diibaratkan memiliki tugas harus menyelesaikan segala pekerjaan yang terhubung dengan realitas dan tanggap terhadap keinginan masyarakat. *Superego*, ibaratnya seorang pendeta yang selalu penuh pertimbangan terhadap nilai-nilai baik dan buruk harus mengingatkan si *id* yang rakus dan serakah bahwa pentingnya perilaku yang arif dan bijak.

Id merupakan energi psikis dan naluri yang menekan manusia agar memenuhi kebutuhan dasar seperti misalnya kebutuhan: makan, seks menolak rasa sakit atau tidak nyaman. Menurut Freud, *id* berada di alam bawah sadar, tidak ada kontak dengan realitas. Cara kerja *id* berhubungan dengan prinsip kesenangan, yakni selalu mencari kenikmatan dan selalu menghindari ketidaknyamanan.

Bisa dibayangkan betapa mengerikan dan membahayakan seandainya diri kita terdiri dari *id* semata. Seorang anak yang berkembang, belajar bahwa ia tidak berperilaku sesukanya dan harus mengikuti aturan yang diterapkan orang tuanya. Seorang anak yang ingin memenuhi tuntutan dan keinginan yang kuat dari suatu realitas, akan membentuk struktur kepribadian yang baru, yaitu *ego*.

Ego terperangkap di antara dua kekuatan yang bertentangan dan dijaga serta patuh pada prinsip realitas dengan mencoba memenuhi kesenangan individu yang dibatasi oleh realitas. Seseorang penjahat, misalnya, atau seorang yang hanya ingin memenuhi kepuasan diri sendiri, akan tertahan dan terhalang oleh realitas kehidupan yang

dihadapi. Demikian pula dengan adanya individu yang memiliki impuls-impuls seksual dan agresivitas yang tinggi misalnya; tentu saja nafsu-nafsu tersebut tak akan terpuaskan tanpa pengawasan. Demikianlah, *ego* menolong manusia untuk mempertimbangkan apakah ia dapat memuaskan diri tanpa mengakibatkan kesulitan atau penderitaan bagi dirinya sendiri. *Ego* berada di antara alam sadar dan alam bawah sadar. Tugas *ego* memberi tempat pada fungsi mental utama, misalnya: penalaran, penyelesaian masalah dan pengambilan keputusan. Dengan alasan ini, *ego* merupakan pimpinan utama dalam kepribadian; layaknya seorang pimpinan perusahaan yang mampu mengambil keputusan rasional demi kemajuan perusahaan. *Id* dan *ego* tidak memiliki moralitas karena keduanya ini tidak mengenal nilai baik dan buruk

Struktur yang ketiga ialah *superego* yang mengacu pada moralitas dalam kepribadian. *Superego* sama halnya dengan 'hati nurani' yang mengenali nilai baik dan buruk *(conscience)*. Sebagaimana *id*, *superego* tidak mempertimbangkan realitas karena tidak bergumul dengan hal-hal realistik, kecuali ketika impuls seksual dan agresivitas *id* dapat terpuaskan dalam pertimbangan moral. Jelasnya, sebagai berikut: misalnya *ego* seseorang ingin melakukan hubungan seks secara teratur agar karirnya tidak terganggu oleh kehadiran anak; tetapi *id* orang tersebut menginginkan hubungan seks yang memuaskan karena seks memang nikmat. Kemudian *superego* timbul dan menengahi dengan anggapan merasa berdosa dengan melakukan hubungan seks.

D. Dinamika Kepribadian

Freud memandang manusia sebagai suatu sistem energi yang rumit karena pengaruh filsafat deterministik dan positivistik yang marak di

PSYCHOANALYSIS IN TRANSITION

A Personal View

Merton M. Gill

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Kriegman (1992), adaptive relations with the environment have innate roots too. There is even a hint of the latter in Freud's late concept of hereditary elements in the ego as well as in the id. I myself use the concept of the body as a more general term to encompass the sexual and aggressive drives in psychoanalytic theory, now shorn of the specific classical, physicochemical, Freudian metapsychology.

That sexuality has innate roots in the body is obvious. Whether or not there is an innate fund of aggressive energy that demands discharge is a debated point. In any case, the capacity to express aggression is innate.

Psychoanalytic theory is more inclined to discuss the innate in terms of sexuality rather than of the body more generally. Freudian analysts regard their view of sexuality in general and infantile sexuality in particular as what separates analysis from all other systems of psychology. While the Freudian view of sexuality is often misunderstood, it remains true that sexuality is accorded a basic and overriding importance in Freudian theory. Freudianism has been castigated as a perverse, even obscene, doctrine. Freudians maintain that their view of sexuality is far broader than the conventional view. This broader conception may be considered in two aspects. One is that Freudians do not conceive of sexuality in simple bodily terms but rather as "psychosexuality," that is, as a complex amalgam of bodily features and psychological attitudes. There are passages in which Freud explicitly equates sexuality with the very broad concept of love. On the other hand, another way in which the Freudian concept of sexuality is extended is in the view that sexuality begins with the beginning of life and goes through several pregenital stages. Though the claim was disputed by Sulloway (1983), Freudians and others have long held that both the empirical discovery and the conceptual systematization of infantile sexuality are among Freud's greatest achievements. Freud proposed the well-known epigenetic—that is, constitutionally determined—developmental sequence of sexuality's beginning from birth and moving, according to the successively dominant bodily zones, through the oral, anal, phallic, and genital phases. These psychosexual stages are primarily conceived of as the discharge of a particular kind of libidinal energy. While the discharge takes place in relation to an object, this object need not be a person nor even a part of the external world, except insofar as the subject's own body, which may be the object, is considered part of the external world. The first three

FREUD AND BEYOND

A HISTORY OF MODERN PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT

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

STEPHEN A. MITCHELL AND MARGARET J. BLACK

BEYOND

A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought

STEPHEN A. MITCHELL

MARGARET J. BLACK

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PREFACE

what is psychoanalysis?

Movies and cartoons offer images of a patient lying on a couch, speaking endlessly into a vacuum, while a silent, colorless, older gentleman with a beard takes notes. Many people who are unfamiliar with psychoanalysis fear it as a coward's way out, an admission of defeat, a ceding of control and authority to a stranger.

But what of those who have benefited from or who practice psychoanalysis? Their voices are not often heard. The problem is that psychoanalytic concepts derive from and are concerned most fundamentally with the experience of the analytic process, an intensely emotional, highly charged, deeply personal experience for both participants. From the inside, in the eyes of those who practice and study psychoanalysis as well as those who have undergone a "successful" (i.e., personally meaningful) analysis, the world of psychoanalysis is a rich and intriguing place. Its basic concepts and modes of thought are imbued with an experiential vividness, a conceptual clarity, and a continual practical applicability to the day-to-day conduct of their lives. Psychoanalytic thought helps knit together different domains of experience: past and present, waking and sleeping, thinking and feeling, interpersonal events and the most private fantasies.

To the psychoanalytically informed mind, analytic concepts provide useful tools for expanding, consolidating, and enriching one's own life and one's relationships with others. Yet it is hard to convey this to someone who has not experienced it. To those for whom psychoanalysis is not a lived reality, psychoanalytic concepts can seem odd, abstract, alien, and out of reach. It is sometimes hard to believe they are, themselves, derived from actual human experience.

But there is more to it than that. Answering the question "What is

psychoanalysis?" is more complicated than it would otherwise need to be because of four major myths about psychoanalysis that have wide currency in both the popular and scholarly spheres. Psychoanalysts themselves have contributed greatly to the perpetuation of these misleading notions.

Myth #1: Psychoanalysis Is Largely the Work of One Man.

For the first five decades in the history of psychoanalytic thought (up until Freud's death in 1939), it would have been tenable to argue that psychoanalysis was largely the invention of Freud's singular genius. Freud regarded psychoanalysis as a form of treatment, but also as a new branch of science. He carefully tended his creation, and it grew up around him. Those taught and analyzed by Freud were justifiably impressed with his early discoveries; they admired him and let him take the lead. Freud also regarded psychoanalysis as a quasi-political movement, and proved himself a dominant leader, wary of opposition, often reading others' creativity and originality as signs of disloyalty.

Alfred North Whitehead's claim that Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to Plato was an interpretive leap. But Freud's presence so infused early psychoanalysis that it has become tradition among many psychoanalytic writers to begin articles with a devout account of the ways Freud had already covered or believed or certainly would have believed the very ideas the author is about to develop. Thus authors of highly original contributions have often presented their work literally as mere footnotes to Freud. And major figures in the early decades of psychoanalysis Jung, Adler, Ferenczi, Rank-were expelled from the Freudian mainstream as their ideas diverged significantly from established doctrine.

But since 1.939, there has been no Freud to adjudicate competing claims concerning the truly psychoanalytic. Consequently, psychoanalytic thought has been released to flow more naturally. Where there was one channel, now there are many. Where there was one tradition, now there are multiple schools, technical terminologies, and forms of clinical practice. Psychoanalysis is no longer the work of one individual.

Myth #2: Contemporary Psychoanalysis, in Both Theory and Clinical

(family therapy, couples therapy, cognitive and behavioral approaches, Gestalt psychotherapy, and short-term dynamic psychotherapy).

The extension of psychoanalysis beyond the clinical setting has been even more impressive. Throughout Freud's often lonely and combative lifetime, psychoanalysis occupied, even at its most influential, a beleaguered minority position in relation to society and culture at large. Today, Freud's contributions are so broadly accepted, so tightly woven into the fabric of our culture and our experience of ourselves, that, in the broadest sense, we are all "Freudians."

Psychoanalysis is not only a professional and scientific discipline within our culture, but a form of thought, an approach to human experience, that has become constitutive of our culture and pervades the way we have come to experience ourselves and our minds. Major features of Freud's own contributions that were highly controversial in his time have become commonplace ideas in our world: unconscious motivation and meaning, the infinite variability of forms of sexuality, the formative power of early events, the centrality of oedipal themes in family life, the sexual and sensual dimensions of infantile and childhood experiences, the efficiency of the mind in disavowing unpleasant truths, and so on.

From a literary point of view, the critic Harold Bloom (1986) has argued that Freud's "conceptions ... have begun to merge with our culture, and indeed now form the only Western mythology that contemporary intellectuals have in common." And in the very different but equally contemporary world of artificial intelligence, Douglas Hofstadter and Daniel Dennett (1981) point to Freud as the pioneer whose vision of mind has led in directions never imaginable in his day:

> [W]hen Freud initially hypothesized the existence of unconscious mental processes, his proposal met widely with stark denial and incomprehension.... Freud's expansion of the bounds of the thinkable revolutionized clinical psychology. It also paved the way for the more recent development of "cognitive" experimental psychology. We have come to accept without the slightest twinge of incomprehension a host of claims to the effect that sophisticated hypothesis testing, memory searching, inference-in short, information processing-occurs within us

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Theories of Personality

Tenth Edition

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THEORIES OF PERSONALITY

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Levels of Mental Life

Freud's greatest contribution to personality theory is his exploration of the unconscious and his insistence that people are motivated primarily by drives of which they have little or no awareness. To Freud, mental life is divided into two levels, the **unconscious** and the **conscious.** The unconscious, in turn, has two different levels, the unconscious proper and the **preconscious.** In Freudian psychology the three levels of mental life are used to designate both a process and a location. The existence as a specific location, of course, is merely hypothetical and has no real existence within the body. Yet, Freud spoke of *the* unconscious as well as unconscious processes.

Unconscious

The unconscious contains all those drives, urges, or instincts that are beyond our awareness but that nevertheless motivate most of our words, feelings, and actions. Although we may be conscious of our overt behaviors, we often are not aware of the mental processes that lie behind them. For example, a man may know that he is attracted to a woman but may not fully understand all the reasons for the attraction, some of which may even seem irrational.

Because the unconscious is not available to the conscious mind, how can one know if it really exists? Freud felt that its existence could be proved only indirectly. To him the unconscious is the explanation for the meaning behind dreams, slips of the tongue, and certain kinds of forgetting, called *repression.* Dreams serve as a particularly rich source of unconscious material. For example, Freud believed that childhood experiences can appear in adult dreams even though the dreamer has no conscious recollection of those experiences.

Unconscious processes often enter into consciousness but only after being disguised or distorted enough to elude censorship. Freud (1917/1963) used the analogy of a guardian or censor blocking the passage between the unconscious and the preconscious and preventing undesirable anxiety-producing memories from entering awareness. To enter the conscious level of the mind, these unconscious images first must be sufficiently disguised to slip past the *primary censor,* and then they must elude a *final censor* that watches the passageway between the preconscious and the conscious. By the time these memories enter our conscious mind, we no longer recognize them for what they are; instead, we see them as relatively pleasant, nonthreatening experiences. In most cases, these images have strong sexual or aggressive motifs, because childhood sexual and aggressive behaviors are frequently punished or suppressed. Punishment and **suppression** often create feelings of anxiety, and the anxiety in turn stimulates **repression,** that is, the forcing of unwanted, anxiety-ridden experiences into the unconscious as a defense against the pain of that anxiety.

Not all unconscious processes, however, spring from repression of childhood events. Freud believed that a portion of our unconscious originates from the experiences of our early ancestors that have been passed on to us through hundreds of generations of repetition. He called these inherited unconscious images our

phylogenetic endowment (Freud, 1917/1963, 1933/1964). Freud's notion of phylogenetic endowment is quite similar to Carl Jung's concept of the collective unconscious (see Chapter 4). However, one important difference exists between the two concepts. Whereas Jung placed primary emphasis on the collective unconscious, Freud relied on the notion of inherited dispositions only as a last resort. That is, when explanations built on individual experiences were not adequate, Freud would turn to the idea of collectively inherited experiences to fill in the gaps left by individual experiences. Later we will see that Freud used the concept of phylogenetic endowment to explain several important concepts, such as the Oedipus complex and castration anxiety.

Unconscious drives may appear in consciousness, but only after undergoing certain transformations. A person may express either erotic or hostile urges, for example, by teasing or joking with another person. The original drive (sex or aggression) is thus disguised and hidden from the conscious minds of both persons. The unconscious of the first person, however, has directly influenced the unconscious of the second. Both people gain some satisfaction of either sexual or aggressive urges, but neither is conscious of the underlying motive behind teasing or joking. Thus the unconscious mind of one person can communicate with the unconscious of another without either person being aware of the process.

Unconscious, of course, does not mean inactive or dormant. Forces in the unconscious constantly strive to become conscious, and many of them succeed, although they may no longer appear in their original form. Unconscious ideas can and do motivate people. For example, a son's hostility toward his father may masquerade itself in the form of ostentatious affection. In an undisguised form, the hostility would create too much anxiety for the son. His unconscious mind, therefore, motivates him to express hostility indirectly through an exaggerated show of love and flattery. Because the disguise must successfully deceive the person, it often takes an opposite form from the original feelings, but it is almost always overblown and ostentatious. (This mechanism, called a *reaction formation,* is discussed later in the section titled Defense Mechanisms.)

Preconscious

The preconscious level of the mind contains all those elements that are not conscious but can become conscious either quite readily or with some difficulty (Freud, 1933/1964).

The contents of the preconscious come from two sources, the first of which is conscious perception. What a person perceives is conscious for only a transitory period; it quickly passes into the preconscious when the focus of attention shifts to another idea. These ideas that alternate easily between being conscious and preconscious are largely free from anxiety and in reality are much more similar to the conscious images than to the unconscious urges.

The second source of preconscious images is the unconscious. Freud believed that ideas can slip past the vigilant censor and enter into the preconscious in a disguised form. Some of these images never become conscious because if we recognized them as derivatives of the unconscious, we would experience increased levels

of anxiety, which would activate the final censor to repress these anxiety-loaded images, forcing them back into the unconscious. Other images from the unconscious do gain admission to consciousness, but only because their true nature is cleverly disguised through the dream process, a slip of the tongue, or an elaborate defensive measure.

Conscious

Consciousness, which plays a relatively minor role in psychoanalytic theory, can be defined as those mental elements in awareness at any given point in time. It is the only level of mental life directly available to us. Ideas can reach consciousness from two different directions. The first is from a **perceptual conscious** system, which is turned toward the outer world and acts as a medium for the perception of external stimuli. In other words, what we perceive through our sense organs, if not too threatening, enters into consciousness (Freud, 1933/1964).

The second source of conscious elements is from within the mental structure and includes nonthreatening ideas from the preconscious as well as menacing but well-disguised images from the unconscious. As we have seen, these latter images escaped into the preconscious by cloaking themselves as harmless elements and evading the primary censor. Once in the preconscious, they avoid a final censor and come under the eye of consciousness. By the time they reach the conscious system, these images are greatly distorted and camouflaged, often taking the form of defensive behaviors or dream elements.

In summary, Freud (1917/1963, pp. 295–296) compared the unconscious to a large entrance hall in which many diverse, energetic, and disreputable people are milling about, crowding one another, and striving incessantly to escape to a smaller adjoining reception room. However, a watchful guard protects the threshold between a large entrance hall and a small reception room. This guard has two methods of preventing undesirables from escaping from the entrance hall—either turn them back at the door or throw out those people who earlier had clandestinely slipped into the reception room. The effect in either case is the same; the menacing, disorderly people are prevented from coming into view of an important guest who is seated at the far end of the reception room behind a screen. The meaning of the analogy is obvious. The people in the entrance hall represent unconscious images. The small reception room is the preconscious and its inhabitants represent preconscious ideas. People in the reception room (preconscious) may or may not come into view of the important guest who, of course, represents the eye of consciousness. The doorkeeper who guards the threshold between the two rooms is the primary censor that prevents unconscious images from becoming preconscious and renders preconscious images unconscious by throwing them back. The screen that guards the important guest is the final censor, and it prevents many, but not all, preconscious elements from reaching consciousness. The analogy is presented graphically in Figure 2.1.



FIGURE 2.1 ***Levels of Mental Life.***

Provinces of the Mind

For nearly 2 decades, Freud's only model of the mind was the topographic one we have just outlined, and his only portrayal of psychic strife was the conflict between conscious and unconscious forces. Then, during the 1920s, Freud (1923/1961a) introduced a three-part structural model. This division of the mind into three provinces did not supplant the topographic model, but it helped Freud explain mental images according to their functions or purposes.

To Freud, the most primitive part of the mind was *das Es,* or the "it," which is almost always translated into English as **id;** the second division was *das Ich*, or



FIGURE 2.2 ***Levels of Mental Life and Provinces of the Mind.***

the "I," translated as **ego;** and the final province was *das Uber-Ich,* or the "over-I," which is translated as **superego.** These provinces or regions have no territorial existence, of course, but are merely hypothetical constructs. They interact with the three levels of mental life so that the ego cuts across the various topographic levels and has conscious, preconscious, and unconscious components, whereas the superego is both preconscious and unconscious and the id is completely unconscious. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the provinces of the mind and the levels of mental life.

The Id

At the core of personality and completely unconscious is the psychical region called the id, a term derived from the impersonal pronoun meaning "the it," or the not-yet-owned component of personality. The id has no contact with reality, yet it strives constantly to reduce tension by satisfying basic desires. Because its sole function is to seek pleasure, we say that the id serves the **pleasure principle.**

A newborn infant is the personification of an id unencumbered by restrictions of ego and superego. The infant seeks gratification of needs without regard for what is possible (that is, demands of the ego) or what is proper (that is, restraints of the superego). Instead, it sucks when the nipple is either present or absent and gains pleasure in either situation. Although the infant receives life-sustaining food only by sucking a nurturing nipple, it continues to suck because its id is not in contact with reality. The infant fails to realize that thumb-sucking behavior cannot sustain life. Because the id has no direct contact with reality, it is not altered by the passage of time or by the experiences of the person. Childhood wish impulses remain unchanged in the id for decades (Freud, 1933/1964).

Besides being unrealistic and pleasure seeking, the id is illogical and can simultaneously entertain incompatible ideas. For example, a woman may show conscious love for her mother while unconsciously wishing to destroy her. These opposing desires are possible because the id has no morality; that is, it cannot make value judgments or distinguish between good and evil. However, the id is not immoral, merely amoral. All of the id's energy is spent for one purpose—to seek pleasure without regard for what is proper or just (Freud, 1923/1961a, 1933/1964).

In review, the id is primitive, chaotic, inaccessible to consciousness, unchangeable, amoral, illogical, unorganized, and filled with energy received from basic drives and discharged for the satisfaction of the pleasure principle.

As the region that houses basic drives (primary motivates), the id operates through the **primary process.** Because it blindly seeks to satisfy the pleasure principle, its survival is dependent on the development of a **secondary process** to bring it into contact with the external world. This secondary process functions through the ego.

The Ego

The ego, or I, is the only region of the mind in contact with reality. It grows out of the id during infancy and becomes a person's sole source of communication with the external world. It is governed by the **reality principle,** which it tries to substitute for the pleasure principle of the id. As the sole region of the mind in contact with the external world, the ego becomes the decision-making or executive branch of personality. However, because it is partly conscious, partly preconscious, and partly unconscious, the ego can make decisions on each of these three levels. For instance, a woman's ego may *consciously* motivate her to choose excessively neat, well-tailored clothes because she feels comfortable when well dressed. At the same time, she may be only dimly (i.e., *preconsciously*) aware of previous experiences of being rewarded for choosing nice clothes. In addition, she may be *unconsciously* motivated to be excessively neat and orderly due to early childhood experiences of toilet training. Thus, her decision to wear neat clothes can take place in all three levels of mental life.

When performing its cognitive and intellectual functions, the ego must take into consideration the incompatible but equally unrealistic demands of the id and the superego. In addition to these two tyrants, the ego must serve a third master—the external world. Thus, the ego constantly tries to reconcile the blind, irrational claims of the id and the superego with the realistic demands of the external world.

Finding itself surrounded on three sides by divergent and hostile forces, the ego reacts in a predictable manner—it becomes anxious. It then uses repression and other *defense mechanisms* to defend itself against this anxiety (Freud, 1926/1959a).

According to Freud (1933/1964), the ego becomes differentiated from the id when infants learn to distinguish themselves from the outer world. While the id remains unchanged, the ego continues to develop strategies for handling the id's unrealistic and unrelenting demands for pleasure. At times the ego can control the powerful, pleasure-seeking id, but at other times it loses control. In comparing the ego to the id, Freud used the analogy of a person on horseback. The rider checks and inhibits the greater strength of the horse but is ultimately at the mercy of the animal. Similarly, the ego must check and inhibit id impulses, but it is more or less constantly at the mercy of the stronger but more poorly organized id. The ego has no strength of its own but borrows energy from the id. In spite of this dependence on the id, the ego sometimes comes close to gaining complete control, for instance, during the prime of life of a psychologically mature person.

As children begin to experience parental rewards and punishments, they learn what to do in order to gain pleasure and avoid pain. At this young age, pleasure and pain are ego functions because children have not yet developed a conscience and ego-ideal: that is, a superego. As children reach the age of 5 or 6, they identify with their parents and begin to learn what they should and should not do. This is the origin of the superego.

The Superego

In Freudian psychology, the superego, or above-I, represents the moral and ideal aspects of personality and is guided by the **moralistic** and **idealistic principles** as opposed to the pleasure principle of the id and the realistic principle of the ego. The superego grows out of the ego, and like the ego, it has no energy of its own. However, the superego differs from the ego in one important respect—it has no contact with the outside world and therefore is unrealistic in its demands for perfection (Freud, 1923/1961a).

The superego has two subsystems, the **conscience** and the **ego-ideal.** Freud did not clearly distinguish between these two functions, but, in general, the conscience results from experiences with punishments for improper behavior and tells us what we *should not do,* whereas the ego-ideal develops from experiences with rewards for proper behavior and tells us what we *should do.* A primitive conscience comes into existence when a child conforms to parental standards out of fear of loss of love or approval. Later, during the Oedipal phase of development, these ideals are internalized through identification with the mother and the father. (We discuss the Oedipus complex in a later section titled Stages of Development.)

A well-developed superego acts to control sexual and aggressive impulses through the process of *repression.* It cannot produce repressions by itself, but it can order the ego to do so. The superego watches closely over the ego, judging its actions and intentions. Guilt is the result when the ego acts—or even intends to act—contrary to the moral standards of the superego. Feelings of inferiority arise when the ego is unable to meet the superego's standards of perfection. Guilt, then,



FIGURE 2.3 ***The Relationship among Id, Ego, and Superego in Three Hypothetical Persons.***

is a function of the conscience, whereas inferiority feelings stem from the ego-ideal (Freud, 1933/1964).

The superego is not concerned with the happiness of the ego. It strives blindly and unrealistically toward perfection. It is unrealistic in the sense that it does not take into consideration the difficulties or impossibilities faced by the ego in carrying out its orders. Not all its demands, of course, are impossible to fulfill, just as not all demands of parents and other authority figures are impossible to fulfill. The superego, however, is like the id in that it is completely ignorant of, and unconcerned with, the practicability of its requirements.

Freud (1933/1964) pointed out that the divisions among the different regions of the mind are not sharp and well defined. The development of the three divisions varies widely in different individuals. For some people, the superego does not grow after childhood; for others, the superego may dominate the personality at the cost of guilt and inferiority feelings. For yet others, the ego and superego may take turns controlling personality, which results in extreme fluctuations of mood and alternating cycles of self-confidence and self-deprecation. In a healthy individual, the id and superego are integrated into a smooth functioning ego and operate in harmony and with a minimum of conflict. Figure 2.3 shows the relationships among id, ego, and superego in three hypothetical persons. For the first person, the id dominates a weak ego and a feeble superego, preventing the ego from counterbalancing its incessant demands of the id and leaving the person nearly constantly striving for pleasure regardless of what is possible or proper. The second person, with strong feelings of either guilt or inferiority and a weak ego, will experience many conflicts because the ego cannot arbitrate the strong but opposing demands of the superego and the id. The third person, with a strong ego that has incorporated many of the demands of both the id and the superego, is psychologically healthy and in control of both the pleasure principle and the moralistic principle.

LOIS TYSON

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Freud (1856–1939), whose theory of the psyche often is referred to today as *classical psychoanalysis*. We must remember that Freud evolved his ideas over a long period of time, and many of his ideas changed as he developed them. In addition, much of his thinking was, as he pointed out, speculative, and he hoped that others would continue to develop and even correct certain of his ideas over time. So the attempt in this chapter is to outline those areas of classical psychoanalytic theory that are particularly useful to literary criticism and to show how this view of human behavior is relevant to our experience of literature. Later in the chapter, we'll also take a brief look at the more recent work of nontraditional psychoanalytic theorist Jacques Lacan.[1]

The origins of the unconscious

When we look at the world through a psychoanalytic lens, we see that it is comprised of individual human beings, each with a psychological history that begins in childhood experiences in the family and each with patterns of adolescent and adult behavior that are the direct result of that early experience. Because the goal of psychoanalysis is to help us resolve our psychological problems, often called disorders or dysfunctions (and none of us is completely free of psychological problems), the focus is on patterns of behavior that are destructive in some way. I say patterns of behavior because our repetition of destructive behavior reveals the existence of some significant psychological difficulty that has probably been influencing us for some time without our knowing it. In fact, it is our not knowing about a problem—or, if we do know we have a problem, not realizing when it is influencing our behavior—that gives it so much control over us. For this reason, we must begin our discussion with the concept central to all psychoanalytic thinking: the existence of the unconscious.

Do you remember the song "You Can't Always Get What You Want" by the Rolling Stones? The idea expressed is "You can't always get what you want, but you get what you need." This formulation, with the addition of two words, gives us the key to thinking psychoanalytically: "You can't always get what you *consciously* want, but you get what you *unconsciously* need." The notion that human beings are motivated, even driven, by desires, fears, needs, and conflicts of which they are unaware—that is, unconscious—was one of Sigmund Freud's most radical insights, and it still governs classical psychoanalysis today.

The *unconscious* is the storehouse of those painful experiences and emotions, those wounds, fears, guilty desires, and unresolved conflicts we do not want to know about because we feel we will be overwhelmed by them. The unconscious comes into being when we are very young through the *repression,* the expunging from consciousness, of these unhappy psychological events. However, repression

sex only with women who are "not like Mom." In other words, because I unconsciously associate sexual desire with desire for my mother, sexual desire makes me feel guilty and dirty, and for this reason I can enjoy it only with "bad girls," who are themselves guilty and dirty and whom I don't associate with Mom. This view often creates a seduce-and-abandon pattern of behavior toward women. When I seduce a "bad girl," I must abandon her (sooner or later) because I cannot allow myself to be permanently attached to someone so unworthy of marriage, that is, unworthy of being classified with my mother. When I seduce a "good girl," two things happen: (1) she becomes a "bad girl" and, like other "bad girls," unworthy of my permanent commitment, and (2) I feel so guilty for "soiling" her (which is like "soiling" Mom) that I must abandon her to avoid my guilt. The point is that, for both women and men, only by recognizing the psychological motivations for our destructive behavior can we hope to begin to change that behavior.

The defenses, anxiety, and core issues

Our unconscious desires not to recognize or change our destructive behaviors—because we have formed our identities around them and because we are afraid of what we will find if we examine them too closely—are served by our *defenses*. Defenses are the processes by which the contents of our unconscious are kept in the unconscious. In other words, they are the processes by which we keep the repressed repressed in order to avoid knowing what we feel we can't handle knowing. Defenses include *selective perception* (hearing and seeing only what we feel we can handle), *selective memory* (modifying our memories so that we don't feel overwhelmed by them or forgetting painful events entirely), *denial* (believing that the problem doesn't exist or the unpleasant incident never happened), *avoidance* (staying away from people or situations that are liable to make us anxious by stirring up some unconscious—i.e., repressed—experience or emotion), *displacement* ("taking it out" on someone or something less threatening than the person who caused our fear, hurt, frustration, or anger), and *projection* (ascribing our fear, problem, or guilty desire to someone else and then condemning him or her for it, in order to deny that we have it ourselves).

Perhaps one of the most complex defenses is *regression,* the temporary return to a former psychological state, which is not just imagined but relived. Regression can involve a return either to a painful or a pleasant experience. It is a defense because it carries our thoughts away from some present difficulty (as when *Death of a Salesman*'s Willy Loman flashes back to his past in order to avoid the unpleasant realities of his present life). However, it differs from other defenses in that it carries with it the opportunity for *active reversal*, the acknowledgment and working through of repressed experiences and emotions, because we can

Personality Theories

Barbara Engler

International Edition



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The stature and distinguished contributions of Sigmund Freud place him at the forefront of contemporary personality theorists. He continues to be seen both as a heroic figure and as a flawed individual (Roth, 1998; Breger, 2000; Jacobs, 2008). For over forty years, Freud meticulously studied dimensions of human nature. Developing the technique of free association, he reached far into the depths of his own unconscious life and that of others. In the process, he created psychoanalysis, a unique method of research for understanding the human individual. He discovered psychological processes such as repression, resistance, transference, and infantile sexuality, many of which are still focused on today. He developed the first comprehensive method of studying and treating neurotic problems. His controversial position in the history of intellectual thought clearly justifies an extended study of his ideas.

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939)

Biographical Background

Sigmund Freud was born in 1856 in Freiburg, Moravia (a small town in what became Czechoslovakia), to a Jewish wool merchant and his young wife. Sigmund was born in a caul—that is, a small portion of the fetal sac covered his head at birth. According to folklore, this was a sign that he would be famous. Freud did not practice religion as an adult, but he remained very conscious of his Jewish origin. His mother, twenty-one at the time of her favored first son's birth, was loving and protective. Freud's father, Jacob, was forty-one, almost twice as old as his wife. Jacob was stern and authoritarian, but his son respected him. Only later, through his self-analysis, did Freud realize that his feelings toward his parents were mixed with fear and hate, respect and love.

When Sigmund was eleven months old, a brother, Julius, was born, but he died eight months later. A sister, Anna, arrived when Freud was two and a half. Later, four other sisters and a brother completed the family. When Freud was very young, he was very fond of his nanny and impressed by her religious teachings of Catholicism. Nevertheless, shortly after Anna was born, the nanny was suddenly fired for having stolen from the family. Sigmund was also born an uncle. His father, a widower, had two grown sons by his former marriage, and Freud's elder half brother had a child. Freud and his nephew John, who was one year older than he, were close childhood companions. Freud was to view their early relationship as very significant to his later development. Many have thought that Freud's unusual family constellation set the stage for his later theory of the Oedipus complex.

At the age of four, Sigmund and his family moved to Vienna, where he was to live for almost eighty years. Although he was critical of Vienna, he did not leave the city until it was overwhelmed by Nazis in 1938, the year before he died. Freud was a conscientious student. His parents encouraged his studies by giving him special privileges and expecting the other children to make sacrifices on behalf of their older brother. He was the only member of the family who had his own room; he studied by oil lamp while the others had to use candles. A natural student, Freud entered high school a year earlier than normal and stood at the head of the class for most of his days at the Sperl Gymnasium. He was good at languages and was an avid reader, being particularly fond of Shakespeare.

As a child, Freud had dreams of becoming a general or a minister of state, but in reality professional choice was severely restricted for a Jew in Vienna. He thought of becoming a lawyer but instead began medical studies at the University of Vienna in 1873 and graduated eight years later. His studies there took longer than usual because he took his time with those areas that were of particular interest to him. He never intended to practice medicine, being more interested in physiological research; practical considerations, including occupational barriers to Jewish people and the desire to marry, led him to establish a practice as a clinical neurologist in 1881. While still a student, he made substantial and noteworthy contributions



Hans Casparius/Hulton/Getty Images

Sigmund Freud was the founder of psychoanalysis, which emphasizes the importance of unconscious forces.

to research, publishing his findings on the nervous system of fish and the testes of the eel. He developed a method of staining cells for microscopic study and as a physician explored the anesthetic properties of cocaine. (cf. Frixione, 2003; Kalb, 2006). Because he initially had no reason to believe that there were dangers connected with cocaine, he was somewhat indiscriminate in using it himself and in recommending it to others. After the addictive character of the drug was discovered, Freud stopped using it about 1896. Cocaine claimed many physicians as casualties in the 1880s and 1890s (Markel, 2011).

Because the private practice on which Freud depended for a living brought him patients suffering from primarily neurotic disorders, his attention became focused on the problem and study of neurosis. *Neurosis* refers to an emotional disturbance, but the disturbance is usually not so severe as to prevent the individual who has it from functioning in normal society. As Freud's goal was a complete theory of humanity, he hoped that his study of neurosis would eventually provide a key to the study of psychological processes in general. He studied in Paris with the French psychiatrist Jean Charcot. On his return from Paris, Freud became influenced by Joseph Breuer, a Viennese physician and friend, who encouraged his patients to talk freely about their symptoms. Breuer and Freud worked together in writing up some of their cases in *Studies in Hysteria* (1895). Freud's further investigations with Breuer's "talking cure" led to his own development of free association and later psychoanalytic techniques.

In 1900 Freud published *The Interpretation of Dreams.* Initially, the book was ignored by all but a few. Nevertheless, Freud's reputation grew, and he began to attract a following. He also encountered a lot of criticism; some even said his work was pornographic. A psychoanalytic society was founded by Freud and his colleagues, and many of Freud's disciples later became noted psychoanalysts: Ernest Jones (his biographer), A. A. Brill, Sandor Ferenczi, and Karl Abraham. Originally, Carl Jung and Alfred Adler were also close associates, but later they left Freud's psychoanalytic movement to develop and stress other ideas.

In 1909, G. Stanley Hall, noted psychologist and president of Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, invited Freud and his associate, Carl Jung, to present a series of lectures. It was Freud's first and only visit to the United States. These lectures contained the basic elements of Freud's theory of personality, and their delivery marked the change of psychoanalysis from a small Viennese movement to one of international scope and recognition.

Freud's work, however, was by no means over. He continued to develop and revise his psychoanalytic theory until his death. By the end of his life, psychoanalytic concepts had been applied to and were influencing almost every cultural construct of humanity. Freud's published works fill twenty-four volumes in the *Standard English Edition.** He died in London in 1939 at age eighty-three, on the Jewish Sabbath and Day of Atonement, after many years of suffering from cancer of the jaw, with what would be called today physician aid in dying (Edmundson, 2007; Schneider & Berke, 2011).

*New revision of the *Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* is currently in the process by W.W. Norton.

Thinking Critically

Memories: True or False?

Freud's revision of his seduction theory is pertinent to the current debate over "false memories," forgotten childhood events that are remembered in the course of therapy. Loftus (1993) observes that patients often leave therapy with memories of abuse that they did not have on entering therapy. She asks whether the memories reflect actual events or the suggestions of the therapist. Some children do endure real situations of incest or sexual abuse, and such situations can have a pervasive negative effect on a child's personality development. What is an issue, however, is the factualness of memories recovered in therapy—some of which have led to alienation from and even lawsuits against alleged perpetrators. Our memories are not camcorders that record events exactly as they occur. Rather, our memories are reconstructions of the past based on present clues, and they can be altered as data are introduced, discovered, reconceived, or even distorted. The problem, therefore, is that recovered memories, be they positive or negative, may or may not be true.

You can get a clearer idea of how our memories are reconstructions by comparing your recollection of past events with those of your siblings or other family members. You may discover that your version of formative (or not so formative) events in your life is considerably different from how others recall them. Indeed, there may be some key events that you or another family member recalls that others have no memory of whatsoever.

Can you think of past events that you now perceive very differently from before? What led you to change your perception? Perhaps a more important question is, Does your reconstruction play a constructive or destructive role today in your personal development and in your relationships with others?

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much, and he wants to love her as fully as possible. He senses that Mommy and Daddy have a special kind of relationship, which he wants to imitate. He becomes frustrated because he cannot imagine what the relationship is all about or perform it in a similar manner. At the same time, he wants his mother's love in return, but he views love quantitatively as a fixed amount. It is as if his mother's love constitutes an apple. Each kiss or sign of attention that his father receives indicates that a big, juicy chunk has been bitten out of that apple, so that less remains for him. He cannot conceive of love as qualitative or as able to increase to fill a void. Viewing love as a quantity, the child perceives his father as a rival who prevents him from obtaining the full love that he desires from his mother. This perception creates wishes and impulses about getting rid of the father, an activity the child is powerless to carry out.

The child's feelings are very intense and conflicting, besides being too difficult for the child to cope with directly on a conscious level. Furthermore, the feelings create guilt because the child's sentiments toward his father are hostile but also affectionate. The child finds it difficult to cope with ambivalent feelings of love and hostility directed toward the same person. His rivalry culminates in **castration anxiety,** which means that he fears physical retaliation from his father, in particular that he will lose his penis.

The Oedipus complex is resolved as follows. First, the son gives up his abortive attempts to possess his mother and begins to identify with his father in terms of sexual gender. In identifying with the same-sex parent, he adopts the moral codes and injunctions of his father. This introjection of the parent's standards of good conduct leads to the development of a social conscience, which assists him in dealing with his forbidden impulses. By identifying with his father, the boy can through his imagination vicariously retain his mother as his love object, because he has incorporated those characteristics of his father that his mother loves. Although he may not have his mother in fact, he can

wait until he grows up and then look for a woman who reminds him in some ways of Mom.

The little girl undergoes a similar complex. Freud deliberately did not give it a separate name, because he wished to emphasize the universality of the Oedipal situation. Others, however, have referred to the feminine version as the **Electra complex.** The primary love object for girls is also the mother. Yet girls, on discovering the genitals of the opposite sex, abandon the mother and turn to the father instead, making possible the Oedipal situation in reverse. The disappointment and shame that they feel upon viewing the "superior" penis leads to jealousy of the male, **penis envy,** a sense of inferiority, and a feeling of resentment and hatred toward the mother, who is held responsible for the effected castration. Reluctantly, the girl identifies with her mother, incorporates her values, and optimally makes the transition from her inadequate penis, the clitoris, as her chief erogenous zone, to the vagina. Eventually, her desire for a penis expresses itself in a desire to have a baby boy. Because the female Oedipus complex is secondary, Freud suggests that it is resolved differently from that of the male; thus the woman's ego-ideal (discussed later in the section "The Id, Ego, and Superego") is closer to its emotional origins, and she appears to have less capacity for sublimation. The role that the girl adopts for herself is one that has been outlined for her by her society.

Latency Period

After the phallic stage, Freud believed that there is a period of comparative sexual calm from the age of about seven to puberty. During the **latency period,** psychic forces develop that inhibit the sexual drive and narrow its direction. Sexual impulses, which are unacceptable in their direct expression, are channeled and elevated into more culturally accepted levels of activity, such as sports, intellectual interests, and peer relations. Freud was relatively silent about the latency period. He did not consider it a genuine psychosexual stage because nothing dramatically new emerges. Today, the latency period as such is questioned by most critics, who suggest it is more correct to observe that children continue to express their sexuality and learn to hide it from disapproving adults.

Genital Stage

With the onset of puberty, the infantile sexual life is transformed into its adult form. The **genital stage** emerges at adolescence when the genital organs mature. There is a rebirth of sexual and aggressive desires, and the sexual drive, which was formerly autoerotic, is redirected to seeking gratification from genuine interaction with others. During the latency period, children prefer the company of same-sex peers; however, in time the object of the sexual drive shifts to members of the opposite sex. According to Freud, the genital stage is the end point of a long journey, from autoerotic sexual activity to the cultural norm of heterosexual activity. Freud believed that mature individuals seek to satisfy their sexual drives primarily through genital, reproductive activity with members of the opposite sex.

Mature people satisfy their needs in socially approved ways. They accommodate themselves to, function within, and seek to uphold the laws, taboos, and standards of their culture. These implications are clearly spelled out for both males and females. The hallmarks of maturity can be summed up in the German expression *lieben und arbeiten,* "to love and to work." The mature person is able to love in a sexually approved way and also to work productively in society.

The Effects of the Psychosexual Stages

The lingering effects of the psychosexual stages are revealed in various adult character types or traits. If the libido is prevented from obtaining optimal satisfaction during one

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accepted when it was first proposed. Contemporary psychologists do not accept Freud's theory in its entirety, but they tend to agree that people's ideas, goals, and motives can at times operate outside conscious awareness.

Later developments in twentieth-century psychology

Despite the important contributions of Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis, until World War II psychology was dominated by behaviorism, particularly in the United States. After the war, interest in psychology increased. Sophisticated instruments and electronic equipment became available, and a wider range of problems could be examined. It became evident that earlier theoretical approaches were too restrictive.

This viewpoint was strengthened by the development of computers in the 1950s. Computers were able to perform tasks – such as playing chess and proving mathematical theorems – that previously could be done only by human beings. They offered psychologists a powerful tool for theorizing about psychological processes. In a series of papers published in the late 1950s, Herbert Simon (who was later awarded a Nobel prize) and his colleagues described how psychological phenomena could be simulated with a computer. Many psychological issues were recast in terms of **information-processing models**, which viewed human beings as processors of information and provided a more dynamic approach to psychology than behaviorism. Similarly, the information-processing approach made it possible to formulate some of the ideas of Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis more precisely. Earlier ideas about the nature of the mind could be expressed in concrete terms and checked against actual data. For example, we can think of the operation of memory as analogous to the way a computer stores and retrieves information. Just as a computer can transfer information from temporary storage in its internal memory chips (RAM) to more permanent storage on the hard drive, so, too, our working memory can act as a way station to long-term memory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971a; Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1992).

Another important influence on psychology in the 1950s was the development of modern linguistics. Linguists began to theorize about the mental structures required to comprehend and speak a language. A pioneer in this area was Noam Chomsky, whose book *Syntactic Structures*, published in 1957, stimulated the first significant psychological analyses of language and the emergence of the field of psycholinguistics.

At the same time, important advances were occurring in neuropsychology. Discoveries about the brain and nervous system revealed clear relationships between neurological events and mental processes. In recent decades, advances in biomedical technology have enabled rapid progress in research on these relationships. In 1981 Roger Sperry was awarded a Nobel prize for demonstrating the links between specific regions of the brain and particular thought and behavioral processes, which we discuss in Chapter 2.

The development of information-processing models, psycholinguistics, and neuropsychology has produced an approach to psychology that is highly cognitive in orientation. Although its principal concern is the scientific analysis of mental processes and structures, cognitive psychology is not exclusively concerned with thought and knowledge. As illustrated throughout this book, this approach has been expanded to many other areas of psychology, including perception, motivation, emotion, clinical psychology, personality, and social psychology.

In sum, during the twentieth century the focus of psychology came full circle. After rejecting conscious experience as ill-suited to scientific investigation and turning to the study of overt, observable behavior, psychologists are once again theorizing about covert aspects of the mind, this time with new and more powerful tools.

INTERIM SUMMARY

- The roots of psychology can be traced to the 4th and 5th centuries B.C. One of the earliest debates about human psychology focused on the question of whether human capabilities are inborn or acquired through experience (the nature–nurture debate).
- Scientific psychology was born in the late nineteenth century with the idea that mind and behavior could be the subject of scientific analysis. The first experimental laboratory in psychology was established by Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig in 1879.
- Among the early 'schools' of psychology in the twentieth century were structuralism, functionalism, behaviorism, Gestalt psychology, and psychoanalysis.
- Later developments in twentieth-century psychology included information-processing theory, psycholinguistics, and neuropsychology.

CRITICAL THINKING QUESTIONS

1. What assumptions about human nature underlie the various historical approaches to psychology?
2. Considering these underlying assumptions, which of the historical approaches are compatible with one another? Which are incompatible?

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CHAPTER SUMMARY

1. Psychology is the scientific study of behavior and mental processes.

2. The roots of psychology can be traced to the 4th and 5th centuries B.C. The Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle posed fundamental questions about the mind, and Hippocrates, the 'father of medicine', made many important observations about how the brain controlled other organs. One of the earliest debates about human psychology focused on the question of whether human capabilities are inborn (the nature view) or acquired through experience (the nurture view).

3. Scientific psychology was born in the late nineteenth century with the idea that mind and behavior could be the subject of scientific analysis. The first experimental laboratory in psychology was established by Wilhelm Wundt at the University of Leipzig in 1879.

4. Among the early 'schools' of psychology in the twentieth century were structuralism (the analysis of mental structures), functionalism (studying how the mind works so that an organism can adapt to and function in its environment), behaviorism (the study of behavior without reference to consciousness), Gestalt psychology (which focuses on the patterns formed by stimuli and on the organization of experience), and psychoanalysis (which emphasizes the role of unconscious processes in personality development and motivation).

5. Later developments in twentieth-century psychology included information-processing theory, psycholinguistics, and neuropsychology.

6. The study of psychology can be approached from several perspectives. The biological perspective relates actions to events taking place inside the body, particularly the brain and nervous system. The behavioral perspective considers only external activities that can be observed and measured. The cognitive perspective is concerned with mental processes, such as perceiving, remembering, reasoning, deciding, and problem solving, and with relating these processes to behavior. The psychoanalytic perspective emphasizes unconscious motives stemming from sexual and aggressive impulses. The subjectivist perspective focuses on how people actively construct and interpret their social worlds, which is expected to vary by culture, personal history, and current motivational state. A particular topic often can be analyzed from more than one of these perspectives.

7. The biological perspective differs from the other viewpoints in that its principles are partly drawn from biology. Often, biological researchers attempt to explain psychological principles in terms of biological ones; this is known as reductionism. Behavioral phenomena are increasingly being understood at both the biological and psychological levels.

8. Among the major subfields of psychology are biological psychology, experimental psychology, developmental psychology, social and personality psychology, clinical and counseling psychology, school and educational psychology, and industrial and engineering psychology. Many new areas of inquiry gaining momentum in twenty-first-century psychology span traditional subfields and disciplines. These new areas include cognitive neuroscience (as well as affective and social cognitive neuroscience), evolutionary psychology, cultural psychology, and positive psychology.

9. Doing psychological research involves generating a hypothesis and then testing it by using a scientific method. When applicable, the experimental method is preferred because it seeks to control all variables except the ones being studied and can thus test hypotheses about cause and effect. The independent variable is the one that is manipulated by the experimenter; the dependent variable (usually some measure of the participant's behavior) is the one being studied to determine whether it is affected by changes in the independent variable. In a simple experimental design, the experimenter manipulates one independent variable and observes its effect on one dependent variable. An essential element of experimental design is the random assignment of participants to experimental and control groups.

10. In many experiments the independent variable is something that is either present or absent. The simplest experimental design includes an experimental group (with the hypothesized cause present for one group of participants) and a control group (with the hypothesized cause absent for another group of participants). If the manipulation of the independent variable results in a statistically significant difference in the dependent variable between the experimental and control groups, we know that the experimental condition had a reliable effect, and the difference is not due to chance factors or a few extreme cases.

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Ken Gray,
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Introduction to Psychology

College of DuPage Digital Press

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- Whether you will be the same person 15, 25, or 50 years from now? And if you will be different, how you will be different?
- Why some people have satisfying relationships and others seem to jump from one bad relationship to the next?
- Why some people hate?
- Why people fall in love?
- Whether and how advertising really works?
- Whether you get enough sleep, and what happens if you do not?
- What, exactly, depression, anxiety disorders, and other psychological disorders are and why some people develop them but others do not?

Us too. That is why we decided to study psychology.

Psychology is defined as the science of behavior and mental processes. This is a broad definition because, as you will see in this course, psychology is a very broad discipline. The two main parts of the definition are (1) the subject matter, namely behavior and mental processes, and (2) the methods used to study them, which are the methods of science. This first unit of the book deals with the role of science in psychology, so we will have a chance to tell you about that very soon.

First, however, a brief description of the other part of the definition, behavior and mental processes, is in order. A **behavior** is any observable response in an organism, usually a person (although some psychologists study other animals). If you see two people walking down the hall together holding hands, you are observing behavior (several behaviors, actually). Likewise, a person insulting or injuring a rival is a behavior. So is answering a survey question, running to get out of the rain, eating, crying, sleeping, and so on. In short, anything a person does is a behavior and is a legitimate part of the subject matter of psychology. Behavior does not always require observation with the naked eye, by the way. As long as the response can be reliably measured, it counts as a behavior. For example, when you are nervous, your palms sweat. The sweat increases the electrical conductivity of your hand; it is called galvanic skin response, and it can be measured. Electrical activity in the brain, too, can be measured, so it counts as a behavior.

In the first part of the 20th century in the United States, psychology was almost purely the science of behavior. Modern psychologists try not to just measure behavior but also to figure out which **mental processes**, or functions within the brain, are responsible for producing the observed behavior. To give you a simple example, suppose you observe two people walking down the hall holding hands. As a casual observer, you might guess, or infer, from this behavior that they like each other. Liking cannot be observed directly but is taken to be a mental process associated with the observed behavior, holding hands. Although the concepts that psychologists use are a bit more complex, and the observations they make more careful and planned, their inferences of mental processes are basically the same thing that we do in our everyday lives.

Psychology is the subject the three authors of this textbook chose to devote our professional lives to decades ago. We chose it, in part, because the topics we were studying in our undergraduate psychology courses were so personally meaningful. Quite simply, we began to notice, and even use, the material from psychology courses in our everyday lives. That, in a nutshell, is our most important goal for this book, to highlight the relevance of psychology in your lives. This book, then, is organized around themes that we hope you will find personally meaningful. We will introduce you to the fascinating and complex world of psychology by dividing the topics that psychologists study into six themes relevant to everyday life, each one a unit of the textbook:

- Unit One. Thinking Like a Psychologist
- Unit Two. Understanding and Using Principles of Memory, Thinking, and Learning
- Unit Three. Understanding Human Nature
- Unit Four. Developing Throughout the Lifespan
- Unit Five. Getting Along in the Social World
- Unit Six. Achieving Physical and Mental Well-Being

part, the smallest part of personality, consists of the thoughts that are in your mind right now. The **preconscious** part is the potential thoughts that are not currently in consciousness but that you can bring into consciousness at will. For example, think about what you ate at your last meal. As you did so, you moved that information from preconsciousness to consciousness. The **unconscious** part, which Freud believed to be the largest part of personality, consists of thoughts that cannot be brought into consciousness. Freud likened the conscious and preconscious to the tip of an iceberg. He believed that the unconscious, as the major part of personality, has an extraordinary influence on human behavior.

conscious: the part of the personality consisting of current thoughts

preconscious: the part of the personality consisting of thoughts that are not conscious but can be brought into consciousness

unconscious: the part of the personality consisting of thoughts that are not conscious and cannot be brought into consciousness

According to Freud, conflicts between biological desires and social demands play a key role in the development and maintenance of our personality. Each of us has a limited reserve of psychological energy available for both the resolution of conflicts and everyday functioning. If too much energy is used up on the conflicts, there will not be enough left over for healthy everyday adjustment. One key way that psychological energy can be tied up over the long term is through **fixation**. Fixation occurs when an individual gets stuck in a childhood stage because of poor resolution of the conflict when it first occurred. As a result, they have to devote psychological energy to these same conflicts throughout life. Freud suggested that a number of specific personality characteristics accompany fixations at different childhood stages.

Adult Personality, Adjustment, and Defense Mechanisms

In adulthood, the painful struggles of childhood, along with the still massive biological impulses, are locked away in the unconscious; they are repressed, to use Freud's term. Unfortunately, we did not say they are safely locked away. These impulses are constantly swirling around in the unconscious, looking for an opportunity to be expressed. It is the adult personality's job to keep those id impulses where they belong, in the unconscious. When the personality feels as if it is beginning to lose control like this, the person experiences anxiety. To help control that anxiety, **defense mechanisms** are used to keep the unwanted impulses from reaching consciousness. These are some of the most important defense mechanisms:

- **Repression.** You can think of repression, the most basic defense mechanism, as a kind of motivated forgetting of conflict. For example, a teenager may be unable to remember a serious fight she had with her brother when they were younger. The goal of all defense mechanisms is either to repress the id impulses or to release them safely.
- **Denial**. One strategy that the ego might use is simply to deny that the unwanted impulse exists. For example, a student who is sexually attracted to his biology professor might deny that he is. Of course, people deny things that are true all the time; it is called lying. The property that makes denial a defense mechanism is that it operates in the unconscious, and the person is unaware that he or she is using it.
- **Projection**. The ego seeks relief by believing that unwanted or threatening impulses actually apply to other people instead. For example, if you have frequent aggressive impulses, you may complain that other people are aggressive drivers.
- **Reaction formation**. The ego escapes anxiety by doing the complete opposite of the unwanted impulse. A man

whose id leads him to want to look at pornography may become a crusader against it. The common notion of homophobia is a version of reaction formation. According to the reaction formation explanation of homophobia, men who secretly fear that they are gay are extremely biased against other gay men.

- **Sublimation**. The ego redirects the unwanted impulses into socially acceptable activities. For example, aggressive impulses can be turned into competitiveness in sports or in business activities.
- **Displacement**. Sometimes the ego can find relief from anxiety by redirecting an unwanted impulse toward a safer target. For example, instead of punching your instructor when he gives an unfair exam, you may come home and yell at your boyfriend, girlfriend, or spouse.

Keep in mind that defense mechanisms must be unconscious; if you were conscious of using them to repress some unwanted impulse, they would have already failed. This is our biggest objection to the concept. It does seem very likely that people engage in defense mechanism-like behavior, but they are largely aware of what they are doing. Psychologists refer to these consciously employed behaviors as coping strategies (Lazarus, 1974). For example, when people are guilty of displacement, they often realize that they are taking out their anger on an inappropriate target.

defense mechanisms: strategies that the ego uses to relieve anxiety that results from unwanted impulses

fixation: when an early-life conflict is resolved poorly, the id gets stuck in a psychosexual stage, and the adult ego must use energy to continue to try to resolve it throughout life

Other Criticisms of Freudian Concepts

Sigmund Freud's greatest contribution to personality psychology has been through his influence on other psychologists—that is, his agenda-setting—much the way that Jean Piaget and Erik Erikson influenced developmental psychology. For nearly 75 years after Freud began formulating his ideas, almost all research and theory in personality was a reaction to the psychoanalytic approach.

Critics of the psychoanalytic approach have noted that although any fact that happens to be true can be explained in psychoanalytic terms, Freud's theory cannot be used to generate testable predictions. Thus, the psychoanalytic approach is missing one of the two essential properties of a scientific theory. Theories must organize observations—and the psychoanalytic approach certainly excels at this—but they also must be able to generate hypotheses. In order for a hypothesis to be testable and useful, it must have the potential to prove the theory wrong, and a "theory" that can explain any fact fails that test. For example, based on a friend's traumatic episode with his mother when he was a baby, you might predict that he would harbor bad feelings toward his mother. If your friend claims that he has a great relationship with his mother, however, you can say that he is using one of the defense mechanisms: denial or reaction formation. In short, there is no potential fact that could conceivably prove the psychoanalytic approach wrong, making it unusable as a scientific theory.

One of the biggest problems with the psychoanalytic theory is the concept of repression. Remember, according to Freud, the conscious and preconscious parts of our personality are only the tip of the iceberg; the rest consists of massive amounts of impulses, thoughts, and memories that cannot be brought into consciousness because they are repressed. The impulses that are repressed are forced into the unconscious precisely because they are too upsetting to experience consciously. According to Freud, repression was "the cornerstone, on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests" (1914). Well, the cornerstone is not particularly stable. Consider memories that Freud would say have been repressed. The events in question must have been extremely emotionally arousing in order to activate the



THIS IS A BORZOI BOOK

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overview / Frustration can arise from an environmental thwarting of one's desires, or it may result from an internal motivational conflict. In any case, the result is one of a large number of possible reactions to frustration and conflict. Some are constructive in their effects, as when the individual redoubles his efforts or realistically redefines the conflict situation. Others are disruptive; inappropriate aggression or even general behavioral disturbance are examples of this. Additionally, there may be indirect effects of frustration and conflict, foremost among which is anxiety.

Defense mechanisms represent attempts by the individual to reduce, at least for the moment, such feelings of anxiety. These mechanisms, if they are to serve their function, must be unconscious, that is, the person is not aware of using them; and, by definition, these mechanisms involve a certain degree of distortion or denial of one's true self or of external reality. As such, they ultimately cannot be fully adaptive. The various commonly employed mechanisms—repression, reaction-formation, rationalization, insulation, and projection, which are here selected for discussion—are very likely learned in childhood, and an individual's choice of a preferred mechanism (or mechanisms) tends to reflect what was "suggested" and what "worked" in his family environment throughout development.

Defense mechanisms do serve to protect the self against anxiety—that is their "purpose." As they necessarily involve a certain degree of maladaptiveness vis-à-vis self and external reality, they inevitably represent something less than ideal adjustments to conflict situations. But in so far as they perform their primary function—to guard the *ego* against too-painful threats—they tend to endure through their too-frequent and effective operation. Since they do "work," the individual is unlikely to expose himself to the reality he so fears, and thereby risks no challenge to his "preferred" defense mechanisms.

Phebe Cramer

The Development of Defense Mechanisms

Theory, Research, and Assessment



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1
The Concept of Defense

We take it as a given that the functioning of the defense mechanisms . . . is triggered as a response to painful affects arising from drive-induced conflicts and from the vicissitudes of object relations.

Lichtenberg and Slap (1972), p. 781

Defense Mechanisms, Defense Behavior, and Consciousness

Since the presentation of the concept of defense by Sigmund Freud in 1894, the idea that the human mind may delude or deceive itself has gained widespread acceptance. We are familiar with the point of view that people defend themselves by failing to recognize painful events or feelings, and that people may be defensive about acknowledging interpersonal inadequacies. Despite this general understanding of defense, a number of issues frequently need clarification. It is to these issues that this chapter is devoted.

To begin, it is important to distinguish between the *concept* of defense mechanism, on the one hand, and the manifestation of defense behaviors, on the other (Wallerstein, 1967, 1985). Defense mechanisms are "constructs that denote a way of functioning of the mind" (Wallerstein, 1985, p. 222), while "defenses . . .are the specific behaviors, affects or ideas, that serve defensive purposes" (Wallerstein, 1985, p. 222). There is general agreement that the purpose of the defenses is to prevent other ego functions from being disrupted or disorganized by excessive negative affect, such as anxiety or guilt.

The importance of the distinction between defense mechanisms—an inferred mode of mental functioning—and defense behavior becomes apparent in connection with a second issue of whether or not defenses, or defense mechanisms, are conscious. This issue arises in the context of

trying to understand how defense mechanisms function. If their purpose is to delude so as to protect the ego, then such delusion can be effective only if the individual is unaware of its occurrence (i.e., if the defense is unconscious). This conclusion, however, raises the problem of how, if the defense is unconscious, it may be known or studied.

The distinction between defense mechanisms and defense behaviors helps clarify this problem. Defense mechanisms, as theoretical abstractions used to describe the way the mind works, cannot be conscious. Defense mechanisms are theoretical constructs used to make assumptions about how the mind works. Like Piaget's concepts of assimilation or conservation (Piaget, 1952), they are useful abstract formulations to explain behavior that might otherwise be unintelligible. On the other hand, defense behaviors—that is, behaviors that serve defensive purposes—may be conscious or unconscious.

But even this last statement needs further clarification. To say that a defense is unconscious may mean (a) the person is unaware of the actual behavior that constitutes the defense (e.g., is unaware of a thought); or (b) the person, while aware of the behavior, is unaware that it is serving a defensive purpose; or (c) the person is unaware of the impulse or affect that prompted the defense (Gill, 1963; Wallerstein, 1967). Any or all of these three may be unconscious, but if the defense is to become conscious, it will be the content of the behavior, of the purpose, or of the impulse or affect that will become conscious, rather than the working of the mind that produced this content—that is, the defense mechanism. Of course, once the purpose of (b) or the underlying impulse or affect of (c) become conscious, the defense no longer serves its concealing function and is likely to be abandoned.

It is when at least conditions (b) and (c) are unconscious that the investigator may best observe the functioning of defense behavior. Although the person displaying the defense may or may not be conscious of his own behavior, its defensive function could be apparent to another observer. In this way, the question of how a defense can be unconscious but still subject to observation is answered. As with any mental process, we do not observe its theoretically assumed operation directly. We use that assumption to understand the products of the operation. In the case of defense mechanisms, the defense behavior is available for conscious observation while the purpose of the defense as well as the drive or affect behind it may be unconscious.

There are, of course, some conscious defensive reactions, such as trying not to think of unpleasant things, suppression of upsetting feelings, or self-control. On a conscious level, these reactions serve a function similar to defense mechanisms and cast some light on their nature. To some extent, defense mechanisms may be thought of as "homologous" to conscious defensive reactions (Loewenstein, 1967, p. 804).

History of the Concept of Defense

The discovery that the human mind can keep certain painful thoughts and feelings hidden (i.e., unavailable to consciousness) occurred early in Freud's explorations of psychopathology (Freud, 1894). The history of the concept of defense in Freud's writings has been traced by Sjoback (1973) and van der Leeuw (1971), and is briefly summarized here.

Until about 1900, Freud considered defense to be a mental function, one of the several faculties of the mind. Within this conception, the defense function could be used by all forms of psychic material; there were no specific defense mechanisms. Thus, any type of psychic material might be used to "screen," or conceal, other material. The purpose of the defense function was related to the painful feelings and affects of patients. It was to avoid the experience of pain that the defense function was called into play.

From 1900 until the publication of the *Ego and the Id* (Freud, 1923a), the concept of defense was important primarily in terms of its relationship to the drives. Freud's focus during this time was on inner psychic reality, and especially the unconscious drives; in his theory, the importance of affect and of external reality had lessened. During this period, the function of the defense was thought of as a counterforce against the push of the drives for discharge. In the psychoanalytic terminology of that time, the defense served as an anticathexis.

With the publication of *The Ego and the Id*, Freud introduced his model of personality as consisting of three structures—id, ego, and superego. This structural model was amplified by Freud in "Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety" (1926), in which the ego was considered an independent, functional organization with its own activities. The concept of defense as a general function was considered again, with defense now conceptualized as an ego function. Furthermore, it was suggested that various defense mechanisms may carry out this ego function, the purpose of which was always to protect the ego against instinctual demands.

The Motives for Defense: Anxiety, Guilt, and Loss

The first systematic theory of defense mechanisms was provided by Anna Freud in her 1936 book, *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense*, in which she reconciled her father's earlier and later views about the defense function. As she explained it, defense against painful feelings and affects and defense against the drives are based on the same motives and serve the same purpose. In both cases, defense mechanisms protect the ego by "warding off" anxiety and guilt feelings.

These two motives for defense—anxiety and guilt—are taken up by Fenichel (1945) in his extensive discussion of the defense mechanisms.

PROTECTING the SELF

Defense Mechanisms in Action

PHEBE CRAMER

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DISTINCTION FROM COPING MECHANISMS

Using defense mechanisms is one way that people protect themselves from psychological upset. However, other strategies are available for this purpose, and people can usually describe these methods. When experiencing stress, an individual may consciously try to ignore it, focus on something else, find a solution, or seek assistance from others. These and other conscious attempts to reduce anxiety are referred to as *coping mechanisms*. Although they are similar to defense mechanisms in their purpose, there are important theoretical differences between the two concepts.

I have suggested (Cramer, 1998c, 2000a) that there are two critical differences between coping and defense mechanisms.[2] First, coping mechanisms involve a conscious, purposeful effort, whereas defense mechanisms occur without conscious effort and without conscious awareness (i.e., they are unconscious). Second, coping strategies are carried out with the intent of managing or solving a problem situation, whereas defense mechanisms occur without conscious intentionality. In this way, defenses function to change an internal psychological state but may have no effect on external reality and so may result in nonveridical perception—that is, in reality distortion.[3]

Both defense mechanisms and coping strategies are aroused by situations involving psychological disequilibrium. In this sense they are similar in that both are adaptational processes. Further, if the purpose of coping mechanisms is to (1) decrease negative affect, (2) return to baseline functioning as quickly as possible, and (3) solve or manage the problem (Aldwin, Sutton, & Lackman, 1996), then defense mechanisms may be seen as similar with regard to points 1 and 2. Defense mechanisms function (1) to ward off excessive anxiety or other disruptive negative affect, so as (2) to restore a comfortable level of functioning. It is with the third purpose of coping—to solve or manage a problem—that differences between coping and defense are seen. Coping strategies intentionally engage in activity that will address the problem (which includes diminishing negative affect). Defense mechanisms also function to diminish negative affect, but they do so without the conscious intent or awareness of the person. In addition, coping strategies sometimes address the problem by acting directly on the problematic situation, thereby reducing negative affect, whereas defenses are focused on changing internal states (negative affect) rather than external reality.

Three other differences between coping and defense mechanisms should also be considered, although these are not so much critically defining differences as they are a matter of emphasis. The first of these differences involves the question of whether the use of these mechanisms is best explained by situational or dispositional factors. Coping mechanisms are

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF NEUROSIS

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THE SUPEREGO IN NEUROTIC CONFLICTS

The superego, of course, brings some complication into the picture. The conflict *ego vs. id* would in some neuroses more correctly be written *ego + superego vs. id,* and in others *ego vs. id + superego.*

After the superego has been established, it is responsible to a great extent for the decision as to which discharges are permitted and which are negated. The warding-off ego acts under the command of the superego, and wherever it is not simple anxiety but guilt feelings that motivate the defense, the formulation *ego + superego vs. id* is correct.

On the other hand, in many neuroses (especially in compulsion neuroses and, to an extreme degree, in depressions) the ego defends itself against guilt feelings. All the defense mechanisms usually employed in the fight against instincts may also become directed against the "anti-instincts" originating in the superego. In such cases, the ego develops a double countercathexis, one against the instincts and another one against the superego. And the warded-off guilt feelings may in turn break through against these defenses in a distorted form, in the same way as instincts do: *ego vs. id + superego* (*see* pp. 290 ff. and 397 ff.).

Again we may summarize: The superego may participate on either side in the neurotic conflict, but the formulation remains valid: the neurotic conflict takes place between the ego and the id.

ANXIETY AS MOTIVE FOR DEFENSE

Let us recapitulate what already has been stated about the motivations of neurotic conflicts (*see* pp. 51 f.). The infant, unable to attain satisfaction by his own efforts, necessarily often gets into traumatic situations, from which the first idea arises that instincts may be dangerous. Then more specific experiences show that instinctual acts may actually be dangerous; this impression may be warranted, or may be based on an animistic misinterpretation. The ego turns against instincts because it believes—correctly or incorrectly—them to be dangerous. Thus the problem of anxiety is the essence of any psychology of neurotic conflicts (618).

The primary anxiety, or the first experiences out of which later anxiety develops, is a manifestation of unmastered tension. It is an automatic occurrence that takes place whenever the organism is flooded with excitement; the symptoms of the traumatic neurosis show that it is not limited to infancy. This primary or traumatic anxiety occurs automatically, makes its appearance as panic, and is experienced by the ego passively; it can be understood partly as the way in which the unmastered tension makes itself felt and partly as an expression of vegetative emergency discharges.

Later on, the ego learns to use previously automatic archaic reactions for its purposes. The ego's judgment of impending danger brings the organism into

a state similar to that of a trauma, but of lower intensity. The "tamed" anxiety, thus developed by the ego in the case of danger, may be called an anxiety signal, for it is used to indicate the necessity for starting defensive action (618). That component of anxiety appropriate to danger situations, preparation for defense, arises from the fact that it is the ego that uses anxiety; what is inappropriate, the fact that anxiety sometimes blocks the pertinent attitude, is due to the circumstance that the ego has no other material at hand than an archaic automatic mechanism.

Thus in the last analysis, all anxiety is a fear of experiencing a traumatic state, of the possibility that the organization of the ego may be overwhelmed by excitation. However, after the ego is developed enough to control instinctual actions and to bring about gratifications, the instinctual impulses ought not to be frightening anymore. If they still are, it is due to the fact that fears over loss of love or of castration have induced the ego to block the normal course of its excitements, thus creating an insufficiency of discharge (431).

Sometimes, as has been stated, the ego's capacity to tame anxiety fails. The judgment that was intended to avert a traumatic state may actually induce it. This happens in the anxiety spells of anxiety hysterias, but it also happens in normal persons when they react to danger with paralyzing panic. The ego's intention to give an anxiety signal fails when the person in whom the failure occurs is, as a result of previous repressions, in a dammed-up state; the slight anxiety added by the judgment of danger acts like a lighted match in a powder keg.

Among a group of persons subjected to the same real danger, those are more likely to react with panic who have no opportunity to master their tension in any other way. Such opportunity may be blocked by external circumstances; it is easier to master anxiety while some task is to be fulfilled or some motions can be made than if one is forced to wait quietly. Or the opportunity may be blocked by internal circumstances, by a state of "readiness for anxiety," due either to antecedent strain or to previous repressions. This also holds true for children, whose reaction, besides, is also dependent on that of the grownups around them (541).

This triple stratification of anxiety may be summarized in a short table:

ANXIETY

(1) Trauma	Anxiety automatic and unspecific
(2) Danger	Anxiety in the service of the ego, affect created by anticipation, controlled and used as a warning signal
(3) Panic	Ego control fails, affect becomes overwhelming, regression to state (1); anxiety spell in anxiety hysteria

The same triple stratification of anxiety will be found again in all other affects.

Should the anxiety signal be designated as a countercathexis? This seems warranted because it is initiated by the ego and based on an active anticipation of some future possibility. On the other hand it is the expression of an automatic occurrence in the depth of the organism as a consequence of the ego's reaction; it is not created by the ego; it is, rather, used by it. In this sense, the anxiety signal is a typical example of the dialectic nature of countercathexis in general. The forces the ego uses against the instincts are derivatives of the instincts themselves.

GUILT FEELINGS AS MOTIVE FOR DEFENSE

The neurotic conflict becomes more complicated when anxiety is replaced by guilt feelings. Guilt feelings represent a topically defined anxiety, the anxiety of the ego toward the superego.

Guilt feeling proper—that is, the feeling "I have done wrong," a painful judgment about some past occurrence which has the character of remorse—must be distinguished from feelings of conscience which do not judge the past but the future: "I should do this," or "I should not do that." This part of conscience has a *warning* function and directs future actions of the personality.

Having designated the ego's judgment "Do not do that, otherwise something terrible may happen" as the root of "danger anxiety," we now may assume that the warning conscience feeling is a special case of the same ego function: "Do not do this, otherwise some specific terrible thing may happen."

What is this specific thing? What does "punishment by the superego" or "loss of the superego's love" actually mean? Obviously, that type of pain is feared which is actually felt, to a greater or less degree, in guilt feeling proper. The warning function of conscience expresses the ego's tendency to avoid the pains of intense guilt feelings. These pains constitute a specific displeasure, the avoidance of which is the aim of the conscientious person. As long as a real punishment is feared, or hell is thought of as a threatening reality, there is no true conscience yet, for the tendency to avoid punishment and hell does not differ from tendencies developed by other anxiety signals. In "conscience" the fear is internalized, and the danger threatens *from within*. Fear is felt not only lest something terrible occur within the personality but also lest there be a loss of certain pleasurable feelings, such as well-being, protection, and security, which were hitherto present. This feared loss may be characterized as a loss of self-esteem, the most extreme degree of which is a feeling of annihilation.

To summarize, the warning conscience says: "Avoid this or that action, otherwise you will experience a feeling of annihilation." Guilt feeling proper is more

or less a materialization of this threat, which in turn may be used to avoid future similar actions, which might even intensify the feeling of annihilation.

This feeling of annihilation must be characterized as a cessation of the narcissistic supplies which were initially derived from the affection of some external person and later from the superego.

The consideration that what the normal conscience tries to avoid has actually happened in melancholia makes the melancholic feeling of annihilation comparable with the paralyzing panic in the third type of anxiety. The table of triple stratification given for anxiety may also be applied to the problems of guilt feeling. Conscience and warning guilt feelings correspond to the second state (to the warning "danger anxiety"), the melancholic feeling of annihilation to the third state, panic. But what corresponds to the first state of "trauma"?

In anxiety, the first state was the unspecific painful experience which the infant had to undergo in a traumatic state. In the case of guilt feeling the situation must be similar, but more specific. The assumption that here the feeling of a "danger from within" is not so much based on a general "traumatic tension" but on specific feelings of hunger can be supported by many clinical experiences about the connection between guilt feelings and oral strivings, to be discussed more fully later (*see* p. 136). Thus a new triple stratification may be formulated for guilt feeling:

GUILT FEELING

(1) Trauma	Feeling of hunger or annihilation automatic
(2) Danger	"Annihilation" in the service of the ego, affect created by anticipation, controlled and used as a warning signal
(3) Panic	Ego control fails, affect becomes overwhelming, regression to state (1); "annihilation" spell in melancholia

Now an important complication must be added: the primary actual hunger is for milk. Later on, narcissistic supplies are missed in the same way in a kind of mental hunger.

Total lack of narcissistic supplies makes even grown-up people apathetic and pseudo depressed—in extreme cases they may even try to satisfy their hunger by a regression into a state of hallucinatory wish fulfillment. This apathy is the model of what subsequent guilt feelings tend to warn of.

When the ego is sufficiently developed to form a judgment that there is danger of a cessation of essential narcissistic supplies, the aim of its signal, "annihilation

ANNA FREUD

THE EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENCE



KARNAC BOOKS

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pulse modified by some defensive measure on the part of the ego. The task of the analytic observer is to split up the picture, representing as it does a compromise between the separate institutions, into its component parts: the id, the ego, and, it may be, the superego.

INROADS BY THE ID AND BY THE EGO CONSIDERED AS MATERIAL FOR OBSERVATION

In all this we are struck by the fact that the inroads from the one side and from the other are by no means equally valuable from the point of view of observation. All the defensive measures of the ego against the id are carried out silently and invisibly. The most that we can ever do is to reconstruct them in retrospect: we can never really witness them in operation. This statement applies, for instance, to successful repression. The ego knows nothing of it; we are aware of it only subsequently, when it becomes apparent that something is missing. I mean by this that, when we try to form an objective judgment about a particular individual, we realize that certain id impulses are absent which we should expect to make their appearance in the ego in pursuit of gratification. If they never emerge at all, we can only assume that access to the ego is permanently denied to them, i.e., that they have succumbed to repression. But this tells us nothing of the process of repression itself.

The same is true of successful reaction formation, which is one of the most important measures adopted by the ego as a permanent protection against the id. Such formations appear almost unheralded in the ego in the course of a child's development. We cannot always say that the ego's

attention had previously been focused on the particular contrary instinctual impulse which the reaction formation replaces. As a rule, the ego knows nothing of the rejection of the impulse or of the whole conflict which has resulted in the implanting of the new characteristic. Analytic observers might easily take it for a spontaneous development of the ego, were it not that definite indications of obsessional exaggeration suggest that it is of the nature of a reaction and that it conceals a long-standing conflict. Here again, observation of the particular mode of defense does not reveal anything of the process by which it has been evolved.

We note that all the important information which we have acquired has been arrived at by the study of inroads from the opposite side, namely, from the id to the ego. The obscurity of a successful repression is only equalled by the transparency of the repressive process when the movement is reversed, i.e., when the repressed material returns, as may be observed in neurosis. Here we can trace every stage in the conflict between the instinctual impulse and the ego's defense. Similarly, reaction formation can best be studied when such formations are in the process of disintegration. In such a case the id's inroad takes the form of a reinforcement of the libidinal cathexis of the primitive instinctual impulse which the reaction formation concealed. This enables the impulse to force its way into consciousness, and, for a time, instinctual impulse and reaction formation are visible within the ego side by side. Owing to another function of the ego—its tendency to synthesis—this condition of affairs, which is particularly favorable for analytic observation, lasts only for a few moments at a time. Then a fresh conflict arises between id derivative and ego activity, a conflict to decide which of the two is to keep the upper

element, which belongs to the id, and a defense mechanism, which we must attribute to the ego—in the most instructive cases, to the ego of the same infantile period in which the id impulse first arose. Not only do we fill in a gap in the patient's memory of his instinctual life, as we may also do when interpreting the first, simple type of transference, but we acquire information which completes and fills in the gaps in the history of his ego development or, to put it another way, the history of the transformations through which his instincts have passed.

The interpretation of the second type of transference is more fruitful than that of the first type, but it is responsible for most of the technical difficulties which arise between analyst and patient. The latter does not feel the second kind of transference reaction to be a foreign body, and this is not surprising when we reflect how great a part the ego plays—even though it be the ego of earlier years—in its production. It is not easy to convince him of the repetitive nature of these phenomena. The form in which they emerge in his consciousness is ego syntonic. The distortions demanded by the censorship were accomplished long ago and the adult ego sees no reason for being on its guard against their making their appearance in his free associations. By means of rationalization he easily shuts his eyes to the discrepancies between cause and effect which are so noticeable to the observer and make it evident that the transference has no objective justification. When the transference reactions take this form, we cannot count on the patient's willing cooperation, as we can when they are of the type first described. Whenever the interpretation touches on the unknown elements of the ego, its activities in the past, that ego is wholly opposed to the work of analysis. Here evidently we have the

eral designation for all the techniques which the ego makes use of in conflicts which may lead to a neurosis, while we retain the word 'repression' for the special method of defence which the line of approach taken by our investigations made us better acquainted with in the first instance" (p. 163). Here we have direct refutation of the notion that repression occupies a unique position among the psychic processes, and a place is made in psychoanalytic theory for others which serve the same purpose, namely, "the protection of the ego against instinctual demands." The significance of repression is reduced to that of a "special method of defence."

This new conception of the role of repression suggests an inquiry into the other specific modes of defense and a comparison of those so far discovered and described by psychoanalytic investigators.

The same appendix to *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* contains the conjecture to which I alluded in the last chapter, namely, that "further investigations may show that there is an intimate connection between special forms of defence and particular illnesses, as, for instance, between repression and hysteria" (p. 164). Regression and reactive alteration of the ego (reaction formation), isolation and "undoing" what has been done are all cited as defensive techniques employed in obsessional neurosis.

A lead having thus been given, it is not difficult to complete the enumeration of the ego's defensive methods as described in Freud's other writings. For instance, in "Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality" (1922), introjection, or identification, and projection are mentioned as important defensive methods employed by the ego in morbid affections of this type and are characterized as "neurotic

she suffered from passionate penis envy, relating to her elder and her younger brother, and from jealousy, which was repeatedly excited by her mother's successive pregnancies. Finally, envy and jealousy combined in a fierce hostility to her mother. But, since the child's love fixation was no less strong than her hatred, a violent defensive conflict with her negative impulses succeeded an initial period of uninhibited unruliness and naughtiness. She dreaded lest the manifestation of her hate should cause her to lose her mother's love, of which she could not bear to be deprived. She also dreaded that her mother would punish her and she criticized herself most severely for her prohibited longings for revenge. As she entered upon the period of latency, this anxiety situation and conflict of conscience became more and more acute and her ego tried to master her impulses in various ways. In order to solve the problem of ambivalence she displaced outward one side of her ambivalent feeling. Her mother continued to be a love object, but, from that time on, there was always in the girl's life a second important person of the female sex, whom she hated violently. This eased matters: her hatred of the more remote object was not visited with the sense of guilt so mercilessly as was her hatred of her mother. But even the displaced hatred was a source of much suffering. As time went on, it was plain that this first displacement was inadequate as a means of mastering the situation.

The little girl's ego now resorted to a second mechanism. It turned inward the hatred, which hitherto had related exclusively to other people. The child tortured herself with self-accusations and feelings of inferiority and, throughout childhood and adolescence right into adult life, she did everything she could to put herself at a disadvantage and

injure her interests, always surrendering her own wishes to the demands made on her by others. To all outward appearance she had become masochistic since adopting this method of defense.

But this measure, too, proved inadequate as a means of mastering the situation. The patient then entered on a process of projection. The hatred which she had felt for female love objects or their substitutes was transformed into the conviction that she herself was hated, slighted or persecuted by them. Her ego thus found relief from the sense of guilt. The naughty child, who cherished wicked feelings against the people around her, underwent a metamorphosis into the victim of cruelty, neglect, and persecution. But the use of this mechanism left upon her character a permanent paranoid imprint, which was a source of very great difficulty to her both in youth and adult years.

The patient was quite grown up when she came to be analyzed. She was not regarded as ill by those who knew her, but her sufferings were acute. In spite of all the energy which her ego had expended upon its defense she had not succeeded in really mastering her anxiety and sense of guilt. On any occasion when her envy, jealousy, and hatred were in danger of activation, she invariably had recourse to all her defense mechanisms. But her emotional conflicts never came to any issue which could set her ego at rest and, apart from this, the final result of all her struggles was meager in the extreme. She succeeded in maintaining the fiction that she loved her mother, but she felt herself to be full of hatred and on this account she despised and mistrusted herself. She did not succeed in preserving the sense of being loved; it had been destroyed by the mechanism of projection. Nor did she succeed in escaping the punishments which she had

feared in childhood; by turning her aggressive impulses inward she inflicted upon herself all the suffering which she had formerly anticipated in the form of punishment by her mother. The three mechanisms of which she had made use could not prevent her ego from being in a perpetual state of uneasy tension and vigilance, nor relieve it of the exaggerated demands made upon it and the sense of acute torment from which it suffered.

Let us compare these processes with the corresponding relations in hysteria or obsessional neurosis. We will assume that the problem is the same in each case: how to master that hatred of the mother which springs from penis envy. Hysteria solves it by means of repression. The hatred of the mother is obliterated from consciousness and any possible derivatives which seek entry into the ego are vigorously warded off. The aggressive impulses associated with hatred and the sexual impulses associated with penis envy may be transformed into bodily symptoms, if the patient possesses the capacity for conversion and somatic conditions are favorable. In other cases the ego protects itself against the reactivation of the original conflict by developing a phobia and avoiding the occasions of trouble. It imposes restrictions upon its activity, thus evading any situation which might lead to a return of the repressed impulses.

In obsessional neurosis, as in hysteria, hatred of the mother and penis envy are in the first instance repressed. Subsequently the ego secures itself against their return by means of reaction formations. A child who has been aggressive toward her mother develops an excessive tenderness toward her and is worried about her safety; envy and jealousy are transformed into unselfishness and thoughtfulness for others. By instituting obsessional ceremonials and vari-

CHAPTER 5

Orientation of the Processes of Defense According to the Source of Anxiety and Danger

The instinctual dangers against which the ego defends itself are always the same, but its reasons for feeling a particular irruption of instinct to be dangerous may vary.

MOTIVES FOR THE DEFENSE AGAINST INSTINCTS

Superego Anxiety in the Neuroses of Adults

The defensive situation with which we have been longest familiar in analysis and of which our knowledge is most thorough is that which forms the basis of neurosis in adults. The position here is that some instinctual wish seeks to enter consciousness and with the help of the ego to attain

gratification. The latter would not be averse to admitting it, but the superego protests. The ego submits to the higher institution and obediently enters into a struggle against the instinctual impulse, with all the consequences which such a struggle entails. The characteristic point about this process is that the ego itself does not regard the impulse which it is fighting as in the least dangerous. The motive which prompts the defense is not originally its own. The instinct is regarded as dangerous because the superego prohibits its gratification and, if it achieves its aim, it will certainly stir up trouble between the ego and the superego. Hence the ego of the adult neurotic fears the instincts because it fears the superego. Its defense is motivated by superego anxiety.

So long as our attention is confined to the defense against instinct set up by adult neurotics we shall regard the superego as a redoubtable force. In this context it appears as the originator of all neuroses. It is the mischief-maker which prevents the ego's coming to a friendly understanding with the instincts. It sets up an ideal standard, according to which sexuality is prohibited and aggression pronounced to be antisocial. It demands a degree of sexual renunciation and restriction of aggression which is incompatible with psychic health. The ego is completely deprived of its independence and reduced to the status of an instrument for the execution of the superego's wishes; the result is that it becomes hostile to instinct and incapable of enjoyment. The study of the situation of defense as revealed in the neurosis of adults impels us to pay very special attention in our therapeutic work to the analysis of the superego. A diminution in its power, a modification of its severity or—as some will go the length of saying—its total abolition

is bound to relieve the ego and to lessen the neurotic conflict, at any rate in one direction. This notion of the superego as the root of all neurotic evil inspires high hopes of a prophylaxis of the neuroses. If neurosis is produced by the severity of the superego, then those who bring up children have only to avoid everything which may contribute to the formation of a superego of excessive strictness. They must see to it that their educational methods, which are later internalized by the superego, are always gentle; the parents' example, which the superego makes its own by the process of identification, must be the expression of their real human weaknesses and their tolerant attitude toward the instincts, instead of a pretense of an overstrict moral code which it is quite impossible to put into practice. Again, the child's aggressiveness must have an outlet in the outside world, so that it does not become dammed up and turned inward, for, if it does, it will endow the superego with cruel characteristics. If education succeeds in this, we should suppose that the human beings thus launched in life would be free from anxiety, exempt from neurosis, capable of enjoyment, and no longer torn by inner conflicts. But, in practice, the hope of extirpating neurosis from human life[1] is found by educators to be illusory, while from the theoretical point of view it is shattered as soon as we take our next step in analytic research.

Objective Anxiety in Infantile Neurosis

The study of defense in infantile neurosis (Freud, 1926, pp. 108-109) teaches us that the superego is by no means

[1] The most uncompromising exponent of this view is Wilhelm Reich, but there are many who share his opinion.

an indispensable factor in the formation of the neuroses. Adult neurotics seek to ward off their sexual and aggressive wishes in order not to come into conflict with the superego. Little children treat their instinctual impulses in the same way in order not to transgress their parents' prohibitions. The ego of a little child, like that of an adult, does not combat the instincts of its own accord; its defense is not prompted by its feelings in the matter. It regards the instincts as dangerous because those who bring the child up have forbidden their gratification and an irruption of instinct entails restrictions and the infliction or threat of punishment. Castration anxiety produces in young children the same result as that produced in adult neurotics by anxiety of conscience; the infantile ego fears the instincts because it fears the outside world. Its defense against them is motivated by dread of the outside world, i.e., by objective anxiety.

When we discover that objective anxiety causes the infantile ego to develop the same phobias, obsessional neuroses, hysterical symptoms, and neurotic traits as occur in adults in consequence of their superego anxiety, the power of that institution naturally sinks in our estimation. We realize that what we ascribed to it should really have been put down simply to the anxiety itself. In the formation of neurosis it seems to be a matter of indifference to what that anxiety relates. The crucial point is that, whether it be dread of the outside world or dread of the superego, it is the anxiety which sets the defensive process going. The symptoms which enter consciousness as the ultimate result of this process do not enable us to determine which type of anxiety in the ego has produced them.

If we study this second defense situation—defense against

the instincts from the motive of objective anxiety—we shall form a high estimate of the influence which the outside world exerts on children and accordingly we shall once more conceive hopes of an effective prophylaxis of neurosis. It is pointed out that little children nowadays suffer from a degree of objective anxiety which is quite unnecessary. The punishments which they fear may be inflicted upon them, if they gratify their instincts, are for the most part altogether obsolete in our present stage of civilization. Castration is no longer practiced in retribution for prohibited sexual indulgence, nor are acts of aggression punished by mutilation. But, all the same, there is still in our educational methods a faint resemblance to the barbaric punishments of earlier times, just enough to arouse some dim apprehensions and fears, residues handed on by inheritance. Optimists take the point of view that it should be possible to avoid these remote suggestions of threats of castration and measures of violence, even now adumbrated, if not in the disciplinary methods actually employed, at least in the manner and voice of adults. Those who hold this view hope that the connection between modern education and these age-old fears of punishment may be finally severed. Surely, they say, the child's objective anxiety would then diminish and a radical change would take place in the relation between his ego and his instincts, which would mean the final cutting away of much of the ground from under infantile neurosis.

Instinctual Anxiety (Dread of the Strength of the Instincts)

As before, however, psychoanalytic experience destroys the prospect of an effective prophylaxis. The human ego by its

fantile ego to avoid unpleasure by directly resisting external impressions belong to the sphere of normal psychology. Their consequences may be momentous for the formation of the ego and of character, but they are not pathogenic. When this particular ego function is referred to in clinical analytic writings, it is never treated as the main object of investigation but merely as a by-product of observation.

Let us return to the animal phobia of Little Hans. Here we have a clinical example of simultaneous defensive processes directed respectively inward and outward. We are told that the little boy's neurosis was based on impulses quite normally associated with the oedipus complex.[1] He loved his mother and out of jealousy adopted an aggressive attitude toward his father, which secondarily came into conflict with his tender affection for him. These aggressive impulses roused his castration anxiety—which he experienced as objective anxiety—and so the various mechanisms of defense against the instincts were set in motion. The methods employed by his neurosis were *displacement*—from his father to the anxiety animal—and *reversal* of his own threat to his father, that is to say, its transformation into anxiety lest he himself should be threatened by his father. Finally, to complete the distortion of the real picture, there was *regression* to the oral level: the idea of being bitten. The mechanisms employed fulfilled perfectly their purpose of warding off the instinctual impulses; the prohibited libidinal love for his mother and the dangerous aggressiveness toward his father vanished from consciousness. His castration anxiety in relation to his father was bound in the symptom of a fear of horses, but, in accord-

[1] See the description in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926).

and reasonable insight to resign himself to these objective frustrations, possibly consoling himself with promises of gratification at some very remote future date or at any rate accepting this unpleasure, as he finally accepted the facts of his infantile instinctual life when once he had consciously recognized them.

From the detailed account of Little Hans's history given in "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy" (1909) we learn that the outcome of these objective frustrations was, in fact, a very different one. At the end of his analysis Hans related two daydreams: the fantasy of having a number of children whom he looked after and cleansed in the water-closet; and, directly afterward, the fantasy of the plumber who took away Hans's buttocks and penis with a pair of pincers, so as to give him larger and finer ones. The analyst (who was Hans's father) had no difficulty in recognizing in these fantasies the fulfillment of the two wishes which had never been fulfilled in reality. Hans now had—at least in imagination—a genital organ like that of his father and also children with whom he could do what his mother did with his little sister.

Even before he produced these fantasies, Little Hans had lost his agoraphobia and now, with this new mental achievement, he at last recovered his good spirits. The fantasies helped him to reconcile himself to reality, just as his neurosis had enabled him to come to terms with his instinctual impulses. We note that conscious insight into the inevitable played no part here. Hans *denied reality by means of his fantasy*; he transformed it to suit his own purposes and to fulfill his own wishes; then, and not till then, could he accept it.

Our study of the defensive processes revealed in the

the objective painful facts and performed a hypercathexis of the fantasy in which these were reversed, so that the pleasure which they derived from imagination triumphed over the objective unpleasure.

It is difficult to say when the ego loses the power of surmounting considerable quantities of objective unpleasure by means of fantasy. We know that, even in adult life, daydreams may still play a part, sometimes enlarging the boundaries of a too narrow reality and sometimes completely reversing the real situation. But in adult years a daydream is almost of the nature of a game, a kind of by-product with but a slight libidinal cathexis; at most it serves to master quite trifling quantities of discomfort or to give the subject an illusory relief from some minor unpleasure. It seems that the original importance of the daydream as a means of defense against objective anxiety is lost when the earliest period of childhood comes to an end. For one thing, we conjecture that the faculty of reality testing is objectively reinforced, so that it can hold its own even in the sphere of affect; we also know that, in later life, the ego's need for synthesis makes it impossible for opposites to coexist; perhaps, too, the attachment of the mature ego to reality is in general stronger than that of the infantile ego, so that, in the nature of the case, fantasy ceases to be so highly prized as in earlier years. At any rate it is certain that in adult life gratification through fantasy is no longer harmless. As soon as more considerable quantities of cathexis are involved, fantasy and reality become incompatible: it must be one or the other. We know, too, that for an id impulse to make an irruption into the ego and there to obtain gratification by means of hallucination spells, for an adult, psychotic disease. An ego which at-

CHAPTER 7

Denial in Word and Act

For some years the infantile ego is free to get rid of unwelcome facts by denying them, while retaining its faculty of reality testing unimpaired. It makes the fullest possible use of this power, not confining itself exclusively to the sphere of ideas and fantasy, for it does not merely think, it acts. It utilizes all manner of external objects in dramatizing its reversal of real situations. The denial of reality also is, of course, one of the many motives underlying children's play in general and games of impersonation in particular.

I am reminded here of a little book of verses by an English writer, in which the juxtaposition of fantasy and fact in the life of its child hero is described in a particularly delightful way. I refer to *When We Were Very Young*, by A. A. Milne. In the nursery of this three-year-old there are four chairs. When he sits on the first, he *is* an explorer, sailing up the Amazon by night. On the second he is a lion, frightening his nurse with a roar; on the third he is a captain, steering his ship over the sea. But on the fourth, a

child's high chair, he *tries to pretend* that he is simply himself, just a little boy. It is not difficult to see the author's meaning: the elements for the construction of a pleasurable world of fantasy lie ready to the child's hand, but his task and his achievement are to recognize and assimilate the facts of reality.

It is a curious thing that adults are so ready to make use of this very mechanism in their intercourse with children. Much of the pleasure which they give to children is derived from this kind of denial of reality. It is quite a common thing to tell even a small child "what a big boy" he is and to declare, contrary to the obvious facts, that he is as strong "as Father," as clever "as Mother," as brave "as a soldier" or as "tough" as his "big brother." It is more natural that, when people want to comfort a child, they resort to these reversals of the real facts. The grown-ups assure him, when he has hurt himself, that he is "better now" or that some food which he loathes "isn't a bit nasty" or, when he is distressed because somebody has gone away, we tell him that he or she will be "back soon." Some children actually pick up these consolatory formulae and employ a stereotyped phrase to describe what is painful. For instance, one little girl of two years used, whenever her mother left the room, to announce the fact by a mechanical murmur of "Mummy coming soon." Another (English) child used to call out in a lamentable voice, whenever he had to take nasty medicine, "like it, like it"—a fragment of a sentence used by his nurse to encourage him to think that the drops tasted good.

Many of the presents brought to children by grown-up visitors minister to the same illusion. A small handbag or a tiny sunshade or umbrella is intended to help a little girl

a better word, described the behavior of these children as obsessional. To the superficial observer it has indeed a very great resemblance to the symptoms of obsessional neurosis. If, however, we examine the children's actions more closely, we see that they are not obsessional in the strict sense of the term. Their structure is entirely different from that which we know to be characteristic of neurotic symptoms in general. It is true that, as in the formation of the latter, the process leading up to them begins with some objective frustration or disappointment, but the ensuing conflict is not thereupon internalized: it preserves its connection with the outside world. The defensive measure to which the ego has recourse is aimed not against the instinctual life but directly at the external world which inflicts the frustration. Just as, in the neurotic conflict, perception of a prohibited instinctual stimulus is warded off by means of repression, so the infantile ego resorts to denial in order not to become aware of some painful impression from without. In obsessional neurosis the repression is secured by means of a reaction formation, which contains the reverse of the repressed instinctual impulse (sympathy instead of cruelty, bashfulness instead of exhibitionism). Similarly, in the infantile situations which I have described, the denial of reality is completed and confirmed when in his fantasies, words or behavior, the child reverses the real facts. The maintenance of obsessional reaction formations demands the constant expenditure of energy which we call anticathexis. A similar expenditure is necessary in order that the child's ego may maintain and dramatize his pleasurable fantasies. The masculinity of the brothers of the little girl whose case I have quoted was constantly paraded before her eyes: with equal regularity she responded with the assurance, "I have got

CHAPTER 9

Identification with the Aggressor

It is comparatively easy to discover the defense mechanisms to which the ego habitually resorts, so long as each is employed separately and only in conflict with some specific danger. When we find denial, we know that it is a reaction to external danger; when repression takes place, the ego is struggling with instinctual stimuli. The strong outward resemblance between inhibition and ego restriction makes it less certain whether these processes are part of an external or an internal conflict. The matter is still more intricate when defensive measures are combined or when the same mechanism is employed sometimes against an internal and sometimes against an external force. We have an excellent illustration of both these complications in the process of identification. Since it is one of the factors in the development of the superego, it contributes to the mastery of instinct. But, as I hope to show in what follows, there are

of cathexis together with less expenditure (discharge) of them" (Freud, 1911, p. 221). This intellectualization of instinctual life, the attempt to lay hold on the instinctual processes by connecting them with ideas which can be dealt with in consciousness, is one of the most general, earliest, and most necessary acquirements of the human ego. We regard it not as an activity of the ego but as one of its indispensable components.

Once more we have the impression that the phenomena here comprised in the notion of "intellectualization at puberty" simply represent the exaggeration, under the peculiar conditions of a sudden accession of libido, of a general ego attitude. It is merely the increase in the quantity of libido which attracts attention to a function of the ego performed by it at other times as a matter of course, silently, and, as it were, by the way. If this is so, it means that the intensification of intellectuality during adolescence—and perhaps, too, the very marked advance in intellectual understanding of psychic processes which is always characteristic of an access of psychotic disease—is simply part of the ego's customary endeavor to master the instincts by means of thought.

Here, I think, we may note a secondary discovery to which this train of thought has led us. If it is true that an increase in libidinal cathexis invariably has the automatic effect of causing the ego to redouble its efforts to work over the instinctual processes intellectually, this would explain the fact that instinctual danger makes human beings intelligent. In periods of calm in the instinctual life, when there is no danger, the individual can permit himself a certain degree of stupidity. In this respect instinctual anxiety has the familiar effect of objective anxiety. Objective danger

disturbance took place, the anxiety of conscience and sense of guilt which arose out of the relation of the ego to the superego were the former's most powerful allies in its struggle with the instincts. At the beginning of puberty there is often evidence of a transient attempt to effect a hypercathexis of all the contents of the superego. This is probably the explanation of the so-called "idealism" of adolescence. We now have the following situation: asceticism, itself due to an increase in instinctual danger, actually leads to the rupture of the relation with the superego and so renders inoperative the defensive measures prompted by superego anxiety, with the result that the ego is still more violently thrown back to the level of pure instinctual anxiety and the primitive protective mechanisms characteristic of that level.

Self-isolation and a turning away from love objects are not, however, the only tendencies which come into play in the object relations of adolescents. Many new attachments take the place of the repressed fixations to the love objects of childhood. Sometimes the individual becomes attached to young people of his own age, in which case the relation takes the form of passionate friendship or of actually being in love; sometimes the attachment is to an older person, whom he takes as his leader and who is clearly a substitute for the abandoned parent objects. While they last, these love relations are passionate and exclusive, but they are of short duration. Persons are selected as objects and abandoned without any consideration for their feelings, and others are chosen in their place. The abandoned objects are quickly and completely forgotten, but the form of the relation to them is preserved down to the minutest detail and is generally reproduced, with an exactness which almost suggests obsession, in the relation to the new object.

Besides this striking faithfulness to the love object we

How far does the ego follow its own laws in its defense against the instincts and how far is it influenced by the character of the instincts themselves? Perhaps some light may be thrown on this problem by a comparison with an analogous process, that of *dream distortion*. The translation of latent dream thoughts into the manifest dream content is carried out at the behest of the censor, i.e., the representative of the ego in sleep. But the dream work itself is not performed by the ego. Condensation, displacement, and the many strange modes of representation which occur in dreams are processes peculiar to the id and are merely utilized for the purpose of distortion. In the same way the various measures of defense are not entirely the work of the ego. Insofar as the instinctual processes themselves are modified, use is made of the peculiar properties of instinct. For instance, the readiness with which such processes can be *displaced* assists the mechanism of *sublimation*, by which the ego achieves its purpose of diverting the instinctual impulses from their purely sexual goal to aims which society holds to be higher. Again, in securing repressions by means of *reaction formation* the ego avails itself of the instinct's capacity for *reversal*. We may conjecture that a defense is proof against attack only if it is built up on this twofold basis—on the one hand, the ego and, on the other, the essential nature of instinctual processes.

But, even when we admit that the ego has not an entirely free hand in devising the defense mechanisms which it employs, our study of these mechanisms impresses us with the magnitude of its achievement. The existence of neurotic symptoms in itself indicates that the ego has been overpowered, and every return of repressed impulses, with its sequel in compromise formation, shows that some plan for

PSYCHOLOGY

from
inquiry
to
understanding

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PSYCHOLOGY'S PAST AND PRESENT: WHAT A LONG, STRANGE TRIP IT'S BEEN

1.7 Identify the major theoretical frameworks of psychology.
1.8 Describe different types of psychologists and identify what each of them does.
1.9 Describe the two great debates that have shaped the field of psychology.
1.10 Describe how psychological research affects our daily lives.

How did psychology emerge as a discipline, and has it always been plagued by pseudoscience? The scientific approach to the study of the mind, brain, and behavior emerged slowly, and the field's initial attempts displayed many of the weaknesses that pseudoscientific approaches possess today. Informal attempts to study and explain how our minds work have been with us for thousands of years. But psychology as a science has existed for only about 130 years, and many of those years were spent refining techniques to develop research methods that were free from bias (Coon, 1992). Throughout its history, psychology has struggled with many of the same challenges that we confront today when reasoning about psychological research. So, it's important to understand how psychology evolved as a scientific discipline—that is, a discipline that relies on systematic research methods to avoid being fooled.


Explore the Psychology Timeline on **mypsychlab.com**

Psychology's Early History

We'll start our journey with a capsule summary of psychology's bumpy road from nonscience to science (a timeline of significant events in the evolution of scientific psychology can be seen in **FIGURE 1.8** on page 28). Explore



For many centuries, the field of psychology was difficult to distinguish from philosophy. Most academic psychologists held positions in departments of philosophy (psychology departments didn't even exist back then) and didn't conduct experimental research. Instead, they mostly sat and contemplated the human mind from the armchair. In essence, they relied on common sense.

Wilhelm Wundt (*right*) in the world's first psychology laboratory. Wundt is generally credited with launching psychology as a laboratory science in 1879.

Yet beginning in the late 1800s, the landscape of psychology changed dramatically. In 1879, Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) developed the first full-fledged psychological laboratory in Leipzig, Germany. Most of Wundt's investigations and those of his students focused on basic questions concerning our mental experiences: How different must two colors be for us to tell them apart? How long does it take us to react to a sound? What thoughts come to mind when we solve a math problem? Wundt used a combination of experimental methods, including reaction time procedures, and a technique called **introspection**, which required trained observers to carefully reflect and report on their mental experiences. Introspectionists might ask participants to look at an object, say an apple, and carefully report everything they saw. In many respects, the pioneering work of Wundt marked the beginnings of psychology as a science. Soon, psychologists elsewhere around the world followed Wundt's bold lead and opened laboratories in departments of psychology.

Before becoming a science, psychology also needed to break free from another influence: spiritualism. The term "psychology" literally means the study of the "psyche," that is, spirit or soul. In the mid and late 1800s, Americans became fascinated with spirit mediums, people who claimed to contact the dead, often during séances (Blum, 2006). These were group sessions that took place in darkened rooms, in which mediums attempted to "channel" the spirits of deceased individuals. Americans were equally enchanted with psychics, individuals who claimed to possess powers of mind reading and other extrasensory abilities (see Chapter 5). Many famous psychologists of the day invested a great deal of time and effort in the search for these paranormal capacities (Benjamin & Baker, 2004; Blum, 2006).

They ultimately failed, and psychology eventually developed a respectful distance from spiritualism. It did so largely by creating a new field: the psychology of human error and self-deception. Rather than asking whether extrasensory powers exist, a growing number of psychologists in the late 1800s began to ask the equally fascinating question of how people can fool themselves into believing things that aren't supported by evidence (Coon, 1992)—a central theme of this book.

FICTOID

MYTH: Some psychics can "channel" messages from dead people to their loved ones and friends.

REALITY: Maybe, but unlikely. No psychic channeler has ever passed a carefully controlled scientific test (Hyman, 2003).

introspection
method by which trained observers carefully reflect and report on their mental experiences

Most dream dictionaries available in bookstores imply that there are universal meanings for dream symbols. Even most psychoanalysts reject this claim.

threatening, it "commands" the ego to plaster over these wishes with symbols. We sometimes draw these symbols from our distant past, but in other cases we draw them from what Freud called the "day residue," the accumulation of events we experienced on the day of the dream. So rather than having an explicit dream about a romantic encounter with a classmate, a male might dream of driving a car through a tunnel, a favorite Freudian symbolic representation of sex.

But beware: Popular psychology books notwithstanding, most Freudians don't regard dream symbols as universal. If we peruse the section of our local bookstores devoted to dreams, we'll find several dictionaries of dream symbols. One such dictionary (Schoenewolf, 1997) offers the following rules for interpreting dream symbols: a duck, icicle, spear, umbrella, or tie symbolizes the penis; a pocket, tunnel, jug, or gate symbolizes the vagina; and a kangaroo symbolizes sexual vitality (please don't ask us to explain this one). These and other dream dictionaries (Ackroyd, 1993) vastly oversimplify Freudian theory, because Freudians believe that different symbols can mean different things to different dreamers.

ANXIETY AND THE DEFENSE MECHANISMS A principal function of the ego, according to Freud, is to contend with threats from the outside world. When danger arises, the ego experiences anxiety, signaling it to undertake corrective actions. Sometimes these actions are straightforward, like jumping out of the way of an oncoming car. In other cases, though, we can't do much to correct the situation, so we must change our *perception* of it.



In these cases, the ego engages in **defense mechanisms**: unconscious maneuvers intended to minimize anxiety. The concept of defense mechanisms has crept into our everyday language ("Stop being so defensive"). Contrary to popular belief, Freud held that defense mechanisms are essential for psychological health. Indeed, the person lacking any defense mechanisms would be at the mercy of uncontrollable anxiety. Nonetheless, an excessive reliance on one or two defense mechanisms, Freud insisted, is pathological. Freud and his daughter, Anna, who became a prominent psychoanalyst in her own right, outlined the principal defense mechanisms (A. Freud, 1937). We'll present a brief tour of them here (see **TABLE 14.4**). Explore

Explore Defense Mechanisms on **mypsychlab.com**

defense mechanisms
unconscious maneuvers intended to minimize anxiety

repression
motivated forgetting of emotionally threatening memories or impulses

- **Repression**, the most critical defense mechanism in psychoanalytic theory, is the *motivated forgetting* of emotionally threatening memories or impulses. Unlike the types of forgetting we discussed in Chapter 7, repression is presumably triggered by anxiety: We forget because we want to forget. According to Freud, we repress unhappy memories of early childhood to avoid the pain they produce. This repression leads us to experience *infantile amnesia* (see Chapter 7), the inability to remember anything prior to about age three (Fivush & Hudson, 1990). Early childhood, Freud contended, is too anxiety provoking for us to remember fully. We now know this explanation is unlikely, because investigators have identified infantile amnesia in other animals, including mice and rats (Berk, Vigorito, & Miller, 1979; Richardson, Riccio, & Axiotis, 1986). A committed Freudian could presumably argue that mice and other rodents also repress traumatic memories of early childhood (perhaps memories of seeing too many cats?), but Occam's razor renders this explanation implausible.

occam's razor

DOES A SIMPLER EXPLANATION FIT THE DATA JUST AS WELL?

- In contrast to repression, which is the motivated forgetting of distressing internal experiences, **denial** is the motivated forgetting of distressing *external* experiences. We most often observe denial in people with psychotic disorders, such as schizophrenia (see Chapter 15), although individuals undergoing extreme stress occasionally engage in denial, too. It's not uncommon, for example, for the relatives of individuals who have recently died in a tragic accident to insist that their loved ones must somehow, somewhere, be alive.
- **Regression** is the act of returning psychologically to a younger age, typically early childhood, when life was simpler and safer. Older children who've long since stopped sucking their thumbs sometimes suddenly resume thumb sucking under stress.

denial
motivated forgetting of distressing external experiences

regression
the act of returning psychologically to a younger age, and typically simpler and safer, age

TABLE 14.4 Major Freudian Defense Mechanisms and an Example of Each.

DEFENSE MECHANISM	DEFINITION	EXAMPLE
Repression	Motivated forgetting of emotionally threatening memories or impulses	A person who witnesses a traumatic combat scene finds himself unable to remember it.
Denial	Motivated forgetting of distressing experiences	A mother who loses a child in a car accident insists her child is alive.
Regression	Returning psychologically to a younger and safer time	A college student starts sucking his thumb during a difficult exam.
Reaction-formation	Transforming an anxiety-producing experience into its opposite	A married woman who's sexually attracted to a coworker experiences hatred and revulsion toward him.
Projection	Unconscious attribution of our negative qualities onto others	A married man with powerful unconscious sexual impulses toward females complains that other women are always "after him."
Displacement	Directing an impulse from a socially unacceptable target onto a more acceptable one	A golfer angrily throws his club into the woods after he misses an easy putt.
Rationalization	Providing reasonable-sounding explanations for unreasonable behaviors or failures	A political candidate who loses an election convinces herself that she didn't really want the position after all.
Intellectualization	Avoiding the emotions associated with anxiety-provoking experiences by focusing on abstract and impersonal thoughts	A woman whose husband cheats on her reassures herself that "according to evolutionary psychologists, men are naturally sexually promiscuous, so there's nothing to worry about."
Identification with the aggressor	Adopting the psychological characteristics of people we find threatening	A college basketball player who initially fears his tyrannical coach comes to admire him and adopts his dictatorial qualities.
Sublimation	Transforming a socially unacceptable impulse into an admired and socially valued goal	A boy who enjoys beating up on other children grows up to become a successful professional boxer.

- **Reaction-formation** is the transformation of an anxiety-provoking emotion into its opposite. The observable emotion we see actually reflects the opposite emotion the person feels unconsciously. Freud contended that we can infer the presence of reaction-formation by the intensity with which the person expresses the emotion, as this emotion displays an exaggerated or "phony" quality.

  In a remarkable study, Henry Adams and his colleagues found that males with high levels of *homophobia*—a dislike (not technically a fear, as the word implies) of homosexuals—showed significantly *greater* increases in penile circumference than males with low levels of homophobia in response to sexually explicit videotapes of homosexual stimuli, such as men engaging in sex with other men (Adams, Wright, & Lohr, 1996). This finding is tantalizingly consistent with the Freudian concept of reaction-formation; some homophobics may harbor unconscious homosexual impulses that they find unacceptable and transform them into a conscious dislike of homosexuals. Still, there's an alternative explanation: Anxiety can increase sexual arousal and perhaps trigger penile erections (Barlow, Sakheim, & Beck, 1983). So future investigators will need to rule out this rival hypothesis.

- **Projection** is the unconscious attribution of our negative characteristics to others. According to psychoanalysts, people with paranoia are projecting their unconscious hostility onto others. Deep down they want to harm others, but because they can't accept these impulses they perceive others as wanting to harm them.

reaction-formation
transformation of an anxiety-provoking emotion into its opposite

projection
unconscious attribution of our negative characteristics to others

ruling out rival hypotheses
HAVE IMPORTANT ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FINDINGS BEEN EXCLUDED?

? In this photograph from a 2008 game, frustrated player Prince Fielder throws his bat to the ground after popping out. Freudians would say that Fielder is engaging in which defense mechanism? (See answer upside down at bottom of page.)

FIGURE 14.3 "Sour Grapes." According to psychoanalysts, rationalization often involves a psychological minimization of previously desired outcomes. This etching from Aesop's fables illustrates one example of rationalization, namely, the famous "sour grapes" phenomenon: The fox, who can't reach the previously desired grapes, tells himself, "These grapes are much too green and sour. Even if I could reach them, I would not eat them."

Answer: Displacement

- Closely related to projection is **displacement**, in which we direct an impulse from a socially unacceptable target onto a safer and more socially acceptable target. After a frustrating day at work, we may pound our fist against the punching bag at the gym rather than into the faces of our annoying coworkers.
- **Rationalization** provides a reasonable-sounding explanation for our unreasonable behaviors or for failures. Some people who receive *posthypnotic suggestions* (see Chapter 5) to perform bizarre actions engage in rationalizations to explain these actions. A subject given a posthypnotic suggestion to bark like a dog after emerging from hypnosis may do so. When the hypnotist asks him why he barked, he may rationalize his behavior: "Hmmm ... I was just thinking about how much I missed my dog, so I felt like barking" (see **FIGURE 14.3**). A related defense mechanism, *intellectualization*, allows us to avoid anxiety by thinking about abstract and interpersonal thoughts (refer back to Table 14.4).
- **Identification with the aggressor** is the process of adopting the characteristics of individuals we find threatening: "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em." Anna Freud (1937) observed identification with the aggressor in concentration camp survivors, some of whom seemed to assume their guards' personality characteristics. Identification with the aggressor may underlie some cases of *Stockholm syndrome*—named after a 1973 hostage crisis in Stockholm, Sweden, in which some hostages developed emotional attachments toward their captors (Kuleshnyk, 1984). Nevertheless, journalists and pop psychologists have often used this term loosely to refer to any friendships that hostages forge with their captors (McKenzie, 2004), which may have little or nothing to do with identification with the aggressor.
- **Sublimation** transforms a socially unacceptable impulse into an admired goal. George Vaillant's (1977) book, *Adaptation to Life,* which is a 40-year longitudinal study of Harvard University graduates, features several striking examples of sublimation. Among them is the story of a man who set fires in childhood and went on to become chief of his local fire department.

Stages of Psychosexual Development

No aspect of Freud's theory is more controversial than his model of psychosexual development. Nor has any aspect of his theory been more widely criticized as pseudoscientific (Cioffi, 1998). According to Freud, personality development proceeds through a series of stages. He termed these stages *psychosexual* because each focuses on an **erogenous zone**, or sexually arousing zone of the body. Although we're accustomed to thinking of our genitals as our primary sexual organs, Freud believed that other bodily areas are sources of sexual gratification in early development. Contrary to prevailing wisdom at the time, Freud insisted that sexuality begins in infancy. He maintained that the extent to which we resolve each stage successfully bears crucial implications for later personality development (see **TABLE 14.5**). He believed that individuals can become *fixated*, or "stuck," in an early stage of development. Fixations can occur because children were either deprived of sexual gratification

TABLE 14.5 Freud's Stages of Psychosexual Development.

STAGE	APPROXIMATE AGE	PRIMARY SOURCE OF SEXUAL PLEASURE
Oral	Birth to 12–18 months	Sucking and drinking
Anal	18 months to 3 years	Alleviating tension by expelling feces
Phallic*	3 years to 6 years	Genitals (penis or clitoris)
Latency	6 years to 12 years	Dormant sexual stage
Genital	12 years and beyond	Renewed sexual impulses; emergence of mature romantic relationships

*Includes Oedipus and Electra complexes.

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envy." These ideas have always been doubtful, and they have few defenders today.

The Latent Period

From about age 5 or 6 until adolescence, Freud said, most children enter a **latent period** in which they *suppress their psychosexual interest.* At this time, they play mostly with peers of their own sex. The latent period is evidently a product of European culture and does not appear in all societies.

The Genital Stage

Beginning at puberty, young people *take a strong sexual interest in other people.* This is known as the **genital stage.** According to Freud, anyone who has fixated a great deal of libido in an earlier stage has little libido left for the genital stage. But people who have successfully negotiated the earlier stages now derive primary satisfaction from sexual intercourse.

Evaluation of Freud's Stages

It is undeniable that infants get pleasure from sucking, that toddlers go through toilet training, that older children begin to notice their genitals, and that adolescents become interested in sexual contact with other people. However, the idea of fixation at various stages, central to much of Freud's thinking, is difficult to test (Grünbaum, 1986; Popper, 1986). In fact, Freud resisted any attempt to test his ideas experimentally, insisting that the only relevant data were the observations he made during psychoanalytic sessions. Many of his followers have held the same position, and the result has been alienation from the rest of psychology (Chiesa, 2010).

2. If someone has persistent problems with independence and dependence, Freud would suggest a fixation at which psychosexual stage?

Answer

2. Freud would interpret this behavior as a fixation at the oral stage.

Structure of Personality

Personality, Freud claimed, consists of three aspects: id, ego, and superego. (Actually, he used German words that mean *it, I,* and *over-I.* A translator used Latin equivalents instead of English words.) The **id** consists of *sexual and other biological drives* that demand immediate gratification. The **ego** is *the rational, decision-making aspect of the personality.* It resembles the concept of central executive or executive functioning, discussed in Chapter 7 (Bornstein & Becker-Matero, 2011). The **superego** contains *the memory of rules and prohibitions we learned from our parents and others,* such as, "Nice little boys and girls don't do that." If the id produces sexual desires that the superego considers repugnant, the result is guilty feelings. Most psychologists today find it difficult to imagine the mind in terms of three warring factions, although all would agree that people sometimes have conflicting impulses.



3. What behavior would Freud expect of someone with an unusually strong superego?

Answer

3. Someone with an unusually strong superego would be unusually inhibited and dominated by feelings of guilt.

Defense Mechanisms against Anxiety

According to Freud, *the ego defends itself against anxieties by relegating unpleasant thoughts and impulses to the unconscious mind.* Among the **defense mechanisms** that the ego employs are repression, denial, rationalization, displacement, regression, projection, reaction formation, and sublimation. He saw these as normal processes that sometimes went to extremes. His daughter, Anna, developed and elaborated descriptions of these mechanisms.

Repression

The defense mechanism of **repression** is *motivated removal of something to the unconscious*—rejecting unacceptable thoughts, desires, and memories. For example, someone who has an unacceptable sexual impulse might become unaware of it. Freud maintained that people repress painful, traumatic memories. Repressed material is removed from consciousness but not forgotten. Freud once compared a repressed thought to a rowdy person expelled from a polite room who continues banging on the door, trying to get back in.

Is repression real? The evidence for it is shaky. As discussed in Chapter 7, most people remember well their most miserable experiences, unless they were very young at the time. Laboratory attempts to demonstrate repression have produced, at best, weak and ambiguous evidence (Holmes, 1990). People can and often do intentionally suppress unwanted thoughts and memories (Erdelyi, 2006). That is, they simply refuse to think about them. However, intentional suppression is not repression. According to most research, people who intentionally suppress unpleasant memories *improve* their psychological adjustment. They do not experience the distorted perceptions and pathological behaviors Freud saw as linked to repression (Rofé, 2008). The evidence suggests much reason to be skeptical of Freud's concept of repression.

Denial

The refusal to believe unpleasant information ("This can't be happening") is **denial.** Whereas repression is the motivated removal of information from consciousness, denial is an assertion that the information is incorrect, generally accompanied by a wish-fulfilling fantasy. For example, someone with an alcohol problem may insist, "I'm not an alcoholic. I can take it or leave it." Someone whose marriage is headed for divorce may insist that all is going well. People who are about to get fired may believe that they are highly successful on the job.

Rationalization

When people *attempt to show that their actions are justifiable,* they are using **rationalization.** For example, a student who wants to go to the movies says, "More studying won't do me any good anyway." Someone who takes unfair

advantage of another says, "Learning to deal with disappointment will make him a better person."

Displacement

By diverting a behavior or thought away from its natural target toward a less threatening target, **displacement** lets people engage in the behavior with less anxiety. For example, if you are angry with your employer or your professor, you might yell at someone else.

Regression

A *return to a more immature level of functioning,* **regression** is an effort to avoid the anxiety of the current situation. By adopting a childish role, a person returns to an earlier, more secure, way of life. For example, after a new sibling is born, an older child may cry or pout. An adult who has just gone through a divorce or lost a job may move in with his or her parents.

Projection

Attributing one's own undesirable characteristics to other people is known as **projection**. If someone tells you to stop being angry, you might reply, "I'm not angry! You're the one who's angry!" Suggesting that other people have your faults might make the faults seem less threatening. For example, someone who secretly enjoys pornography might accuse other people of enjoying it. However, the research finds that people using projection do not ordinarily decrease their anxiety or their awareness of their own faults (Holmes, 1978; Sherwood, 1981).

Reaction Formation

To avoid awareness of some weakness, people sometimes use **reaction formation** to *present themselves as the opposite of what they really are.* In other words, they go to the opposite extreme. A man troubled by doubts about his religious faith might try to convert others to the faith. Someone with unacceptable aggressive tendencies might join a group dedicated to preventing violence.

Sublimation

The transformation of sexual or aggressive energies into culturally acceptable, even admirable, behaviors is **sublimation**. According to Freud, sublimation lets someone express an impulse without admitting its existence. For example, painting and sculpture may represent a sublimation of sexual impulses. Someone may sublimate aggressive impulses by becoming a surgeon. Sublimation is the one proposed defense mechanism that is associated with socially constructive behavior. However, if the true motives of a painter are sexual and the true motives of a surgeon are violent, they are well hidden indeed.



4. Match these Freudian defense mechanisms with the situations that follow: regression, denial, projection, rationalization, reaction formation, displacement, and sublimation.

a. A man who is angry with his neighbor goes deer hunting.
b. A smoker insists there is no convincing evidence that smoking impairs health.
c. Someone who secretly enjoys pornography campaigns to outlaw pornography.
d. A man who beats his wife writes a book arguing that people have an instinctive need for aggressive behavior.
e. Someone who has difficulty dealing with others resorts to pouting and crying.
f. A boss takes credit for an employee's idea because "If I get the credit, our department will look good and all employees will benefit."
g. Someone with an impulse to shout obscenities writes novels.

Answers

4. a. displacement; b. denial; c. reaction formation; d. projection; e. regression; f. rationalization; g. sublimation.

Evaluating Freud

How much credit should we give Freud? He was right that people have conflicting impulses, but that idea was hardly original with him. Yes, people have unconscious thoughts and feelings. However, that idea too had been around before Freud. Freud's elaboration on that idea was to say that the unconscious developed mostly from repressed sexual thoughts, such as boys' fear of losing the penis and girls' wish to have a penis (Borch-Jacobsen & Shamdasani, 2012; Kramer, 2006). The part that is original to Freud is the part that is most doubtful. Later psychologists discovered unconscious processes in implicit memories, subliminal perception, and so forth, but these processes are far different from the type of unconscious processes Freud emphasized.

Freud did introduce a few new ideas that have stood the test of time, such as his recognition of **transference**: *You might react to your therapist, or your husband or wife, or other people in a particular way because they remind you of someone else, especially your parents.* Transference was an important insight that many therapists today find helpful. Still, Freud's main lasting contribution is that he popularized psychotherapy. Others had done psychotherapy before him, but he made it seem *interesting.* Many psychotherapists today, including some who acknowledge no allegiance to Freud, try to help their clients understand where their conflicts and emotional reactions come from. They help their clients think about their developmental history and what it means. In that way, Freud deserves credit, even if most of his specific theories fail to impress.

The Freud Museum

The idea behind the psychoanalytic couch is for the client to relax and say everything that comes to mind. This was Freud's couch.

Personality Theories:
Critical Perspectives

Albert Ellis
&
Mike Abrams
with Lidia D. Abrams

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notably in the *Republic* and another dialogue called the *Parmenides*, that there exist perfect abstract exemplars of every earthly category called ideas, forms, or **archetypes**. Our ability to know that a plant is a plant comes from recollecting or remembering our inborn knowledge of these archetypes, in this case, "plantness." The archetypes are beyond space and time and represent a higher degree of reality than the individual physical objects that they inform. The psychological **nativism** of Plato dominated the first 1,500 years of the Christian era and led to such notions as the idea that children not exposed to any language would spontaneously speak Hebrew.

During the Age of Reason, the French philosopher René Descartes, who also had a doctrine of innate ideas, asserted that certain essential concepts like God, infinity, and substance must be innate because experience could provide no model or example for them to be learned. Locke and other empiricists diverged widely from this notion. They took the position that experience is the sole source of all knowledge. Locke wrote, "Let us suppose the Mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of character, without any ideas. How comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from Experience" (Fullerton, 1906, pp. 209–210). The notion that all ideas or abstract concepts come from sensory experience presents certain problems. After all, our eyes and ears can supply us only with sensations rather than organized ideas. On the other hand, our mind is not a disorganized jumble of sensations; ideas are organized into meaningful units. How is this organization achieved? The British empiricists proposed that some imaginary "mental string" held together the sensations or the "images" of the sensations, which aggregated to form an idea. These mental strings were formed by **associations.** Any two sensations that share certain features—let us say any two sensations that occur together, such as the taste and smell of a freshly cut orange—will become associated. Once two sensations are associated, the occurrence of one will evoke the memory of the other. According to these empiricist philosophers, associations are also formed between successive sensations. Thus, the ordering of ideas is also explained by associations.

Associationism became the logical foundation of the behavioral schools of psychology, which we will summarize shortly. But before behaviorism became established as a major psychological school, another was incubating—psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis: The First Comprehensive Model of Personality

Psychoanalysis is the most widely disseminated and best-known school of thought in psychology; thus, this discussion is somewhat longer than most of the other schools.

Psychoanalysis can trace its origins to the work of many people who proposed that both thought and motivation can take place outside of conscious awareness. One of these was Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893), a French physician who was the director of the Salpêtrière hospital in Paris. His students included such luminaries as Pierre Janet (1859–1947), a pioneer in the study of the post-traumatic and dissociative disorders; and Sigmund Freud, whose name was to become virtually synonymous with psychoanalysis. Charcot was known for his studies of hysterics—people (mostly women) who fainted or exhibited other dramatic physical symptoms that were believed to have a psychological basis. The term **hysteria** is no longer used as a clinical diagnosis. Notably, Charcot believed hysterical symptoms originated from unconscious conflicts that were usually sexual in nature.

Pierre Janet also studied people with hysterical symptoms and used the term **subconscious** to localize the source of their conflicts. Janet believed that subconscious thought is pathological and therefore a sign of mental dysfunction. He proposed the concept of integration as a goal for the healthy personality. According to Janet, hysterics, in contrast to healthy people, have failed to integrate all the different aspects of their personality. People with healthy personalities have all of their mental processes integrated and available to consciousness. Janet's perspective was in stark contrast to that of Freud, who asserted that the majority of mental processing takes place in the unconscious.

We can mark the birth of psychoanalysis with the publication of Freud and Breuer's *Studies on Hysteria* in 1895 (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1957). This work was a collection of case studies of people whom Freud and Breuer had treated. As the title indicated, the two physicians set out to examine the inner workings of hysteria. In short, their cases were set forth to provide evidence that unconscious processes were the basis of psychological disorders.

Despite the apparent originality of *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1957), Freud and Breuer were actually synthesizing the work of many of their peers and predecessors, who had previously theorized that processes outside of awareness seem to guide human behavior. Freud's invention of the concept of the dynamic unconscious was his most original contribution to psychology. Freud brought the notion of an unconscious to life by suggesting that neurotic and even normal behavior results from motivational forces kept from conscious awareness. This position is in sharp contrast with those of contemporaries like Janet, who believed that the subconscious consisted of mental processes that would normally be conscious but were quarantined, or subject to **dissociation**, as a result of neurosis. Freud's theories were complex and comprehensive, including outlines of the stages of human and cultural evolution as well as individual development. These stages are briefly described here.

Freud's Stages of Psychosexual Development. An essential component of Freud's psychoanalytic approach is his theory of childhood development. To Freud, a child's psychological development is based on the quest for pleasure and the reduction of unsatisfied drives. He proposed in 1905, in a book translated into English in 1949 as *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (Freud, 1949c), that all children pass through five identical stages on their way to adulthood with varying degrees of success. The first stage is the **oral stage** (0–2 years), in which the focus of pleasure is located in the mouth. The next is the **anal stage** (2–4 years), in which sexual or libidinous pleasure is associated with defecation and control of the anal sphincter. The next stage the child enters is the **phallic stage** (4–7 years), in which the sexual drive is focused on the genitals. A **latency stage** (7–12 years) follows, in which the child's sexual drives are suppressed. The next and final stage is the **genital stage** (13 years +), in which the human being begins to desire members of the opposite sex and eventually participates in sexual intercourse (Freud, 1905/1949c). These and related theories, which are fundamental to contemporary personality theory, are examined in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

The Oedipus Complex. Freud's theory of childhood development is based on a construct derived from a Greek myth, the story of Oedipus, the mythical king of Thebes. According to the legend, Oedipus unknowingly kills his father, Laius, and marries his mother, Jocasta. Freud appropriates the ancient story to describe a developmental phase, usually resolved by the end of the phallic stage, in which male infants experience sexual feelings for their mother

MECHANISMS OF EGO DEFENSE

The ego develops a number of strategies that assist it to ward off the irrational demands of the id and allow it to function in the world of reality. The impulses are kept unconscious by defense mechanisms, which are also unconscious. This lack of conscious awareness of defenses is a particularly important point because some observers see defense mechanisms in the behavior of others on a regular basis. For example, we all tend to deny painful aspects of our lives to varying extents. Many of us can be seen by others to project blame or regress to less mature levels of development under severe pressure. The key issue is not whether defenses are employed in daily life but whether they are operated by entities within us that are outside of our awareness. Freud did not consider the ego defenses as volitional or intentional. Rather, these mechanisms are by their very nature unconscious and beyond our control. The Freudian scholar Matthew Erdelyi (2001) points out that Freud originally envisioned ego defenses as conscious or unconscious and only later defined them as exclusively unconscious.

Exactly how deep in the unconscious the defense mechanisms lie is debatable; nevertheless, they are often far easier to see in others than in ourselves. In fact, they are often transparently obvious in others to an extent that makes their operations laughable. An example would be that of a drunk driver pulled over by a highway patrol officer who denies that he has been drinking, even though his speech is slurred, he smells of alcohol, and he can barely stand up. Freud would say that the defenses have this one-way quality because they are designed to fool not others, only ourselves. Notably, Sigmund Freud himself only hinted at the existence of the more elaborate defense mechanisms. The actual naming and elaborate explanations of these mechanisms come from the writings of his daughter, Anna Freud. We will discuss a few of these as they have become inextricably associated with Freudian theory.

Repression

Freud believed that we all use repression as a defense against anxiety while rarely if ever being aware we are doing so. Repression is a fundamental primal defense that serves the ego by defending it from impulses from the id that threaten its psychological stability. When a wish or desire that we cannot consciously recognize without experiencing anxiety or other distress approaches consciousness, it is pushed into the unconscious mind by a self-regulating censoring mechanism, in this view. Freud first elaborated on this idea in the book he co-authored with Josef Breuer, *Studies in Hysteria*:

> Now I already knew from the analysis of similar cases that before hysteria can be acquired for the first time one essential condition must be fulfilled: an idea must be *intentionally repressed from consciousness* and excluded from associative modification. In my view this intentional repression is also the basis for the conversion, whether total or partial, of the sum of excitation. The sum of excitation, being cut off from psychical association, finds its way all the more easily along the wrong path to a somatic innervation. The basis for repression itself can only be a feeling of unpleasure, the incompatibility between the single idea that is to be repressed and the dominant mass of ideas constituting the ego. The repressed idea takes its revenge, however, by becoming pathogenic. (Breuer & Freud, 1895/1957, p. 116)

the ambivalent feeling of love and hatred which the patient unconsciously felt for his mother. (Freud, 1938, p. 19)

Sublimation is the foundation of all creativity, aesthetics, and societal progress. Freud considered all productive endeavors to be the fruit of sublimated, or converted, sexual or aggressive impulses. In sublimation, the individual repressing these drives releases them by radically changing their expression into creation, invention, artistic appreciation, charity, worship, or other laudable endeavors. For example, someone who feels sad about the end of a relationship might decide to go to a play, movie, or opera about a romantic tragedy, or perhaps write a poem or paint a picture that represents sorrow or loss, as a way of sublimating anger related to the lost relationship. In a specific instance, the English poet Alfred Lord Tennyson was saddened in 1833 by the sudden death of his closest friend, who was also engaged to marry Tennyson's sister. Over the next 17 years Tennyson wrote a series of 133 poems in response to his friend's death; the poems were published in 1850 as a collection titled *In Memoriam.* In coping with his own grief, Tennyson wrote some often-quoted lines that still comfort many bereaved people:

I hold it true, whate'er befall;
I feel it, when I sorrow most;
'Tis better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all.

Sublimation, in short, is the source of emotional energy underlying many great works of art or medical or scientific research; it is a defense mechanism that allows people to channel pain in socially productive as well as personally beneficial ways.

Freud proposed that a balanced individual has an ego that can discharge the greatest portion of its pent-up psychic energy in meritorious ways. The reader should recall that in Freud's system, inability to release pent-up psychic energy results in anxiety, psychopathological symptoms, or aberrant behavior.

FREUD'S PSYCHOSEXUAL STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

Any full theory of personality will usually include an account of human development, and Freud's theory was quite complete in this regard. He proposed five developmental stages that all humans pass through from childhood to adulthood (Freud, 1905/2000). Each stage is defined by a specific focus for the person's libidinal or sexual energy. As we move from stage to stage, most of our sexual energy is redirected from a less mature focus to a more mature one, from the mouth to the anus, for example. Conflicts, inadequate satisfaction, or excessive pleasure at any point during these stages can lead to something called a fixation, in which the target of the sexual energy remains attached to an object associated with a lower level of maturity. For example, a person might remain focused on the pleasures associated with the mouth; they are then said to be orally fixated. The reader should note that Freud thought fixations could result from frustration as well as too much stimulation; thus, an oral fixation could result from being weaned too soon as well as from being allowed to nurse too long.

Intellectualization

Intellectualization is a defense mechanism that strips away the emotional content of a situation or experience. People appear to be reacting to the event in a purely analytical way devoid of passion or emotion, thus separating the threat from the negative feelings that it would normally cause. An example of intellectualization concerns a patient who was told by his primary physician that he had cancer. He immediately began to do large amounts of research on his form of cancer, the treatments for it, the success rates of each form of treatment, and the names and locations of specialists who had published studies of his type of cancer. A related form of intellectualization is the use of jargon or specialized terminology as a way of distancing oneself from the emotional implications of one's situation. To return to the case of the cancer patient, he began to use technical words like *carcinoma* or *malignant neoplasm* when talking about his disease and using the chemical names of the drugs used in his chemotherapy.

Another form of intellectualization is the use of euphemisms for unpleasant realities, such as saying that someone has *passed away* rather than *died* or that a sick or injured animal was *put to sleep* rather than *euthanized*. In one survey of British doctors, a sizable number reported that they used euphemisms rather than direct communication when telling patients that they had a terminal illness (Todd & Still, 1993). One need not be "challenged" or "special" to see that the use of euphemisms for various disabilities or diseases is common, as in the use of the phrase "special education."

Rationalization

Rationalization is a widely practiced defense that would provide clear evidence of the cogency of psychoanalytic theory, were it not for the fact that many of us are quite aware when we are rationalizing. When people rationalize, they excuse their inappropriate or inadequate behavior by offering an explanation that is more acceptable than the real and unconscious (or partially conscious) motive. This defense leads them to deny feelings associated with a failure, rejection, or similar emotional setback. For example, if an executive fails at her dream of becoming the chief executive officer of a corporation, she may rationalize it by stating that she is happy not to have been burdened with such a taxing job. Another example of rationalization is the person who justifies the purchase of a large and expensive truck or sport utility vehicle on the grounds that he needs the extra space for hauling equipment or taking the family on trips, when the real motivation is to impress others with a display of wealth or to intimidate other drivers on the highway (Bradsher, 2002, pp. 120–123).

Reaction Formation

Freud considered **reaction formation** to be a more primitive version of sublimation. Sublimation is a defense mechanism in which a wish that cannot be directly expressed is diverted toward socially or morally acceptable behavior. The fine arts and the performing arts offer many people satisfying opportunities for sublimation.

In contrast to healthy sublimation, however, reaction formation is a harsh and primitive form of sublimation that turns an unacceptable or anxiety-provoking impulse into its opposite. Freud describes the difference as follows:

> A lower form of sublimation is the suppression through reaction formation, which, as we have found, begins early in the latency period of infancy, and may continue throughout

> life in favorable cases. What we call the character of the person is built up to a large extent from the material of sexual excitations; it is composed of impulses fixed since infancy and won through sublimation, and of such structures as are destined to suppress effectually those perverse feelings which are recognized as useless. The general perverse sexual disposition of childhood can therefore be esteemed as a source of a number of our virtues, insofar as it incites their creation through the formation of reactions. (Freud 1938, pp. 625–626)

Unlike sublimation, in reaction formation, people's conscious experience of their impulse is reversed in such a way that the individual is aware of exactly the opposite feeling. Followers of Freud typically attribute this reversal to the influence of the superego's standards. But the point of a reaction formation is that in feeling the exact opposite of our true feelings, we get to express our true forbidden desires, but in disguised form. Thus, a mother feels resentment against her child for thwarting her career plans. It is unacceptable to her to express her hostility directly, so she becomes an overly "loving" mother to the extent that she smothers her child's life through overprotection. She may say such things as, "I'm not letting you play with the other children because you will get hurt."

Other examples of reaction formation would include anti-pornography crusaders who accumulate huge collections of pornography "only to show people how bad it is," or animal rights activists who harass medical researchers. In one instance, an activist of this type posted a letter to a scientist that said the activist would laugh out loud when he heard about what he hoped would be a long painful death of the scientist (Masserman, 1961).

Sublimation

According to Freud, sublimation is the most mature and functional defense mechanism:

> Sublimation, too, gives justification for broadening the concept of sex; for investigation of cases of the type mentioned conclusively show that most of our so-called feelings of tenderness and affection, which color so many of our activities and relations in life, originally form part of pure sexuality, and are later inhibited and deflected to higher aims. Thus, I have in mind a number of benevolent people who contributed much of their time and money to the protection and conservation of animals, who were extremely aggressive in childhood and ruthless Nimrods as adults. Their accentuated aggression originally formed a part of their childhood sexuality; then, as a result of training, it was first inhibited and directed to animals, and later altogether repressed and changed into sympathy. Now and then, we encounter cases in which repression and sublimation do not follow each other in regular succession, owing to some weakness or *fixation* which obstructs the process of development. This may lead to paradoxical situations. For example, a man, who was notorious as a great lover of animals, suffered while riding his favorite pony from sudden attacks during which he beat the animal mercilessly until he was exhausted, and then felt extreme remorse and pity for the beast. He would then dismount, pat the horse, appeasing him with lumps of sugar, and walk him home—sometimes a distance of three or four miles. We cannot here go into any analysis of this interesting case; all we can say is that the horse represented a mother symbol, and that the attacks, in which cruelty alternated with compassion, represented

THE WISDOM OF THE EGO



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Projection differs from displacement in that the *object* is turned into the *subject* and not simply into some less threatening object. The distinctions between projection and its more mature relatives, reaction formation and altruism, have already been touched upon in my contrast between Hitler and Mother Theresa. With both altruism and projection the user presumes to know how someone feels and the *object* is made *self.* But the altruist differs from the paranoid in that the altruist is right. In both altruism and reaction formation, but not in projection, conscience is exaggerated.

Fantasy

Peggy might publicly declare her deep religious conviction and retreat to her bedroom for the summer. But there she might gaze at her boyfriend's photograph and write steamy love

poetry, which she would not send to him. In her mind's eye she would rehearse imagined delights discovered in a book of Kama Sutra woodcuts and acted out by her promiscuous girlfriends. Although separated from her boyfriend, she would feel none of the grief that she would have suffered had she accepted her father's offer of a summer in Europe. Her boyfriend's absence would evoke no grief, and her fantasies of lust would evoke no guilt. No demons would assail her. The imagined sexual exploits, however unfamiliar, would evoke no more anxiety than a toddler feels when piloting his parent's parked car. Indeed, fantasy entails no internal consequences at all except to light up the world of our mind. But to her boyfriend Peggy would appear eccentric and aloof. He would feel the loneliness from which Peggy, the dreamer, was immune.

Schizoid fantasy allows the user to indulge in

autistic retreat for the purpose of conflict resolution and gratification. In fantasy we can face down both tigers and lovers in safety; we can steal diamonds from Tiffany's without guilt. The plain brown wrapper of our imagination lets us rehearse and practice for what lies ahead without becoming even a little bit mad, depressed, or anxious. In fantasy the only essential is to keep real people from intruding upon our minds. Thus, the wish that we make when blowing out the candles of our birthday cake can come true only if we keep it a secret. Children are adamant about keeping private the details of their imaginary friends.

Unlike mere wishes, schizoid fantasies serve to gratify unmet needs for relationships—relationships in which murder, seduction, and infantile gratification can be carried out with wanton abandon. The subject, the object, the idea,

ANNA FREUD

a life dedicated to children

Uwe Henrik Peters

For my daughters, Eva and Caroline

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Preface to the English-language Edition

When I met Anna Freud for the first time, she slowly looked me over from head to toe and said, "You look like an SS man." One sometimes finds oneself in such a situation, especially if one comes into contact with people who had to flee Nazi Germany. (It does not even help to belong to the younger generation that had nothing to do with the war.) Anna Freud's customary frankness is evident in these surprising words. Interestingly, what appeared to be an expression of distrust was at the same time the introduction to lengthy and candid talks. This small scene reveals how deep were the wounds that were inflicted on her by Nazi rule and her expulsion from her country.

I have often been asked how much Anna Freud actually contributed to this biography. She remained true to her resolve that psychoanalysis and not her person should be the focus of interest: that is why she never agreed to support anybody who wanted to write about her. Nevertheless, she helped with some information and even contributed some pictures over the years. She read the biography and made several notes with regard to facts and actual events, without intruding into the portrayal or giving the book the characteristics of an official biography. Diaries and letters, which are normally the core of every historical portrayal of a person, could not be consulted as a result. That would have been impossible anyway in this biography, written while she was still alive. In any case, the work of a psychologist unwillingly unveils major parts of his personality.

Since the first publication of this book, many things have changed. After a short illness, Anna Freud died on October 8, 1982. Shortly before that, on November 11, 1979, her friend and companion Dorothy Burlingham had died. This book had a happy consequence in the short time between its publication and Anna Freud's death. In 1981, Anna Freud was awarded an honorary doctorate by the University of Frankfurt. Actually, 1980 would have been the more fitting and symbolic year, because fifty years previously she had accepted the Goethe Prize in Frankfurt on behalf of her father, who was prevented from attending because of his illness. The Peace Prize of the German book trade, which is awarded at the Frankfurt Book Fair each year, is the honor she actually deserved for her active contribu-

Among the 109 names on the list, Anna Freud's was also the only one for whom there was such unanimous agreement. While this is understandable among the psychoanalysts who were interviewed, it is remarkable that Anna Freud—neither a physician nor therefore a psychiatrist, and, moreover, a woman—should also head the list of psychiatrists. What other male-dominated profession has named a woman as its leading representative?

It is also interesting that the two relatively short lists include the names of three of Anna Freud's colleagues: Heinz Hartmann, Robert Waelder, and Helene Deutsch.

Such a list, if it existed in the German-speaking world, would be quite different. In West Germany, Anna Freud's name raises at most the question of her possible connection with Sigmund Freud. A smaller and better-informed group sees in her a remote, almost mythical figure who has already taken on historical dimensions. There is no doubt that in German and Austrian psychiatry Anna Freud is not considered a prominent personality, though she lived and worked in Vienna until 1938 and then for more than forty years continued her work in nearby London.

Anna Freud's appearance at international conventions was always a climax. She received honorary doctorates from many universities, primarily American ones, as well as one from the University of Vienna, but neither a West German nor an East German university awarded her such a distinction.* Anna Freud was an honorary member of the American Psychoanalytic Association; of the psychoanalytic societies of Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Topeka, and Western New England. But she belonged to no German association. She thus seems to belong primarily to American and English intellectual history, although her intellectual roots developed within German culture.

Anna Freud represented the history of psychoanalysis in both her person and her age. As old as psychoanalysis, she was the living representative of her father's work. She occasionaly received honors intended for him, and she also bore animosities aimed at him. Her own significant work is now widely disseminated in English.

There has hardly been a personality in this century who has led such an intensely public life while revealing so few of its private details. Personally, Anna Freud always withdrew behind psychoanalysis, as well as behind her own and her father's work. A description of her work together with her life would therefore be incompatible with her sensibility. In this she was not very different from her father. When Dr. Roy Winn of Sydney asked him to write a "more intimate biography," Sigmund Freud replied: "I don't think anyone would learn much from such a publication. Personally I ask nothing more from the world than that it should leave me in peace and devote its interest to psychoanalysis instead."[2]

From the scattered information I have gathered on Anna Freud I have sketched the history of her life and introduced her principal works. I hope that with

*Until 1981; see p. xi above.

Extrapolated inferences and interpretations, applied to Freud himself rather than to the theme he conceived, appear to this author contrived and inappropriate. This is also true of a detailed essay Heinz Politzer wrote, shortly before his own death, on "The Theme of the Three Caskets."

> In Freud's case the situation can again be reversed and thus the denouement restored. In 1912 he became aware that he would lose to his "crown prince," Carl Gustav Jung. What he could very well have wished but couldn't have known yet, in the year he wrote "The Theme of the Three Caskets," was that he would attract in his Cordelia the executor of his will and the incarnate heir of the psychoanalytic movement.[3]

But this reiterated identification of Anna with Cordelia does violence to the actual circumstances, despite its beautiful consonance with the Lear saga. Even if Anna Freud assumed an increasingly important place in her father's life, and soon also achieved a great reputation in the psychoanalytic movement, this author doubts that Freud consciously discerned these connections. Freud allowed all his children, including Anna, to pursue their own inclinations. Nor can Anna Freud be seen as "the incarnate heir of the psychoanalytic movement," for this would imply a disregard of her own outstanding achievements.

Freud often compared Anna to another mythological figure, Antigone.[4] Oedipus, King of Thebes, fathers Antigone by Jocasta, unaware that the latter is his mother. Later Antigone not only cares and provides for her old father, but follows him in exile to Colonus, in Attica, and after his death returns to Thebes. Here too there seems to be an obvious connection, which Freud himself also had in mind. Since Antigone represents the ideal of selfless love in the Greek saga, especially toward her father and siblings, the relationship between Anna Freud and the discoverer of the Oedipus complex seems to bear out this even deeper interpretation, in particular because it points toward the future. The comparison is thoroughly apposite. Even if Anna Freud never gave up London as her home after she emigrated, she nonetheless visited Vienna, her intellectual home, in 1971, thus again becoming a part of it. At the instigation of the Viennese psychoanalyst Eva Laible, Anna Freud received a medallion on this occasion on which Freud's Anna–Antigone saying had been engraved. This gift attests not only to great psychoanalytic acumen but to a deep historical understanding, for at that moment the mythological circle was closed.

It seems insufficient, however, to consider the father–daughter relationship merely from the paternal point of view. What did he mean to her? Most people take a daughter's devotion to her father for granted, hence hardly worth consideration. What then is the daughter's relationship to her siblings, who normally compete for their parents' love? In the case of Anna Freud, the question must focus particularly on her sister Sophie, who was closest to her in age.

While the father and others lavished loved on Sophie because she was beautiful, delicate, and feminine, and perhaps also because she was sickly, the youngest

> The cross of honor with crimson band
> Lay on my heart that bound me,
> Then put the musket in my hand
> And strap my saber around me.
>
> Then I will lie and listen and wait,
> A sentinel down in the grass there,
> Till I hear the roar of the guns and the great
> Thunder of hoofs as they pass there.
>
> The Emperor will come and the columns will wave,
> The swords will be flashing and rending,
> And I will rise full-armed from the grave,
> My Emperor, my Emperor defending![6]

The content of the song provoked discussions among the two friends, who identified with the two soldiers. The girls seem to have completely missed the exaggerated political overtones. Although Sigmund Freud was still alive at that time, it is not difficult to identify Freud the father with the emperor whom the soldiers are to protect even from their graves. The debates between the young girls revolved mostly around the lines "What matters wife? What matters child?/With far greater cares I'm shaken," which Anna Freud especially liked. Trude Baderle was not only horrified that a girl would identify with the most masculine of all male professions—military life—but it seemed equally incomprehensible and shocking to her that family life would be renounced for the sake of higher goals. Life later fulfilled the "life plan" expressed by the song and the friends' discussions. Anna Freud dedicated her life to high goals, which included defending her father. Her friend, on the other hand, opted for husband, child, and a middle-class existence.

Anna Freud showed interest in her father's work rather early. Their walks along Lake Garda, when Anna was fourteen years old, were the first occasion for long "professional conversations." Freud spoke to his daughter about psychoanalysis, and also about single case histories which impressed her so deeply that she told her girlfriend about them in detail.[7] During the following years Anna Freud became increasingly close to her father, especially because of psychoanalysis.

The relationships of the two sisters Anna and Sophie to their father were therefore of an entirely different nature. Sophie stirred boundless admiration in Anna with the same qualities that captivated others: her beauty and femininity. If one looks at the sisters' photographs from that period, however, the discrepancy between their beauty is not as apparent. It is possible that the calm regularity of Anna's features adumbrated the intellectual figure in her, conveying more than Sophie's photographs. Opinions on this matter were very different then, particularly those of Anna Freud herself. She exacted, in all earnestness, a promise from her girlfriend that the latter would take care of Sophie in case something happened to Anna. She later extended this concern to little Heinele, Sophie's son and Freud's

Training Analysis and the Postwar Period

Between 1918 and 1921, Anna Freud studied psychoanalysis with her father. This process later occasioned lively comment. Paul Roazen, for example, remarked maliciously that "this may be the most obvious example that Freud arrogated to himself special rights for which he would have probably sharply censured other analysts."[1]

Such an attitude misrepresents the status psychoanalytic training had at that time. Training analysis in the current sense was not yet common. Physicians and nonphysicians alike came to Freud or to other analysts as patients, and later became practicing analysts themselves. Today therapeutic analysis is something quite different. The sharp distinction between therapeutic and training analysis has technically disappeared, since psychoanalysts presuppose that every human being suffers from some kind of neurosis. During Freud's time, on the other hand, analyst and analysand either did not discuss personal problems when the analysand was "healthy," or they spoke about them while taking a walk. That is how Max Eitingon became a psychoanalyst after taking many walks with Freud.[2] There was often only a mutual exchange of dreams, which the participants analyzed to the best of their abilities—as, for example, Freud and C. G. Jung did on their boat trip to America. It is well known that this exchange of dreams brought about the first discord between them.

Hermann Nunberg was the the first to propose that each analyst should himself be analyzed, at the Budapest congress of 1918:

> At the Congress of the International Psycho-Analytic Association in Budapest in 1918, Freud suddenly announced that I had an important statement to make. Taken by surprise, I had to improvise, and made the motion that every analyst be analyzed. This was opposed by [Otto] Rank and [Viktor] Tausk. I was puzzled by their opposition; the motives behind it still remain unknown to me. It was only in 1926, at the Congress in Bad Homburg, which was chaired by Karl Abraham, that this motion was carried. It was then that training analysis was introduced. From then on it became obligatory for anyone who wanted to carry out analytical treatment himself.[3]

Freud against all external attacks and thus allow him to pursue the building of psychoanalytic theory undisturbed. Jones's detailed description of the Committee's creation and history informs the reader, among other things, about the close connection between two areas of psychoanalysis still considered important: theory and organization (psychoanalytic therapy would be the third area). The purpose of the meetings was to further the consolidation of theory and to defend it against unwarranted attacks.

The first Committee members were Ferenczi, Abraham, Jones, Hanns Sachs, and Rank. In 1913, each of them received an antique Greek gem from Freud's collection, which they then set in gold rings. During the war, the Committee had to suspend some of its activities. Anton von Freund was to be accepted as its sixth member in 1919. But his illness and death cancelled the plan, and Eitingon was accepted instead. That Anna Freud delivered the ring to Eitingon was not fortuitous. In the same year she had also received the Committee membership ring from her father, and in 1924, after Rank's withdrawal, she "officially" became a member.

Despite its external difficulties, 1920 was a crucial year for Anna Freud. Henceforth her life would be insolubly bound to psychoanalysis. If until 1920 she had been primarily a teacher and secondarily a student of psychoanalysis, now, at the age of twenty-four, Anna Freud had to be considered fully a psychoanalyst. On January 26, 1920, her sister Sophie Halberstadt succumbed to the influenza epidemic that was then raging in Europe. The words in which Freud communicated his feelings and the event to Ferenczi have often been quoted since in similar situations: "As a confirmed unbeliever I have no one to accuse and realize that there is no place where I could lodge a complaint. . . . Deep down I sense a bitter, irreparable narcissistic injury. My wife and Annerl are profoundly affected in a more human way."[10]

These words are certainly appropriate. The shock the mother and sister felt differed from the father's; it was more human, hence finally surmountable. Given the adverse circumstances, only the eldest sister, Mathilde, and her husband, Robert Hollitscher, were able to attend the funeral in Hamburg. The usual railroad traffic had been halted, but they were able to board another, so-called children's train.[11] Sigmund and Anna Freud were able to visit Halberstadt in Hamburg only after the August vacation. Eitingon joined them there later to travel with them to The Hague.

The Sixth International Psychoanalytic Congress was held in The Hague in September 1920. Participants from Budapest, Vienna, and Berlin had difficulties meeting the travel expenses. But the necessary money could be taken from the donation of Eitingon's brother-in-law, and Anna Freud was thus able to attend, even after a short stopover in Hamburg.

At this conference, attended by fifty-seven participants, the question of a psychoanalytic diploma was first discussed. The necessity for a diploma arose because a great deal of "wild analysis" was being practiced under the name of psychoanalysis, particularly in the United States. It is interesting that at such an early stage

At the business meeting of June 13, 1922, Anna Freud was accepted as a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. In his correspondence with Andreas-Salomé, Freud expressed special joy at the event. At the urging of the new member—Anna Freud—Andreas-Salomé was also accepted as a member at the very next meeting, held on June 21, 1922. On the same evening Anna Freud wrote to her friend, informing her of the acceptance. Andreas-Salomé effusively expressed her gratitude for being exempted from an admission lecture.[4] Although always ready for a discussion, she proved strangely incapable of giving a lecture. In his next letter, Freud alluded to the exemption, and, to vindicate Andreas-Salomé, claimed that she had in any case influenced his daughter's lecture: "Shortly beforehand your shadow was to be seen flitting across the stage in the shape of Anna's really excellent lecture."[5]

While Freud traveled to Badgastein on June 30, Anna Freud went to Göttingen, where she arrived on July 6 to spend the summer vacation again with Andreas-Salomé. Her mother stopped briefly in Göttingen on August 3 and 4, and mother and daughter then traveled to Obersalzberg. Freud had moved to lodgings in the Hochgebirgskurheim on August 1, and most of his family gradually joined him.[6] At the end of September they arrived in Berlin, where the Committee met on September 23 and the International Psychoanalytic Congress was held on September 25–27. Anna Freud attended the congress in Lou Andreas-Salomé's company, but did not present a paper.

Beginning an Independent Practice

In 1964, Anna Freud briefly described her early psychoanalytic practice. Her first patients suffered from: 1) *globus hystericus*; 2) a fully developed compulsion neurosis: an adolescent girl surrounded her mother with compulsive care and almost killed her by wrapping her in warm shawls (finally the police had to be called to release the mother); 3) work disturbance; and 4) phobia. Later Anna Freud listed more disturbances: psychic traumas, seduction, perversion, delinquency, mania, and schizophrenia, which had been referred to her with the diagnosis of "neurosis."[1]

The beginning of Anna Freud's analytic practice also prompted a rearrangement of the apartment at 19 Berggasse. She received her own consulting room, which was located next to her bedroom and across from her father's consulting

considerable parts of the upper and lower right jaw, of the right soft gum, and of the mucous membrane of the cheek and tongue. The required prosthesis became an unremitting torture for Freud, and only Anna completely mastered the extremely complicated technique of insertion and removal.

The family suffered a further heavy blow of fate when Heinele—Anna Freud's nephew and the son of Sophie, who had died four years earlier—died of tubercular encephalitis in Freud's apartment on June 19. Freud had developed an intimate attachment to his grandchild, as he indicated to Katá and Lajos Levy in a very moving letter punctuated by repeated attempts at self-detachment. No doubt, the ever-present fact of life's transience was borne in on the Freud family with horrible clarity during the summer of 1923, in fact *after* Freud had written his most important works on his theory of the death instinct. Such was the first year of Anna Freud's independent practice as a psychoanalyst.

We have run somewhat ahead of events. The summer between the first excision and the radical surgery should have been a period of recovery and relaxation for Freud as much as for his wife and daughter. Indeed, Anna traveled with her father to Badgastein and from there to Lavarone in the southern Tyrol, where they stayed at the Hotel du Lac. Freud's condition deteriorated so much, however, that his daughter urged him to send for Felix Deutsch, who immediately made the correct diagnosis and initiated all the necessary arrangements for what was to take place later that year. The Committee had meanwhile convened nearby in San Cristoforo; Anna Freud and Felix Deutsch walked there and back together. Though obviously suspicious, Anna Freud didn't yet know what her father's illness was. We are indebted to Jones for the account of how, on their way back from San Cristoforo, Anna Freud attempted to get more precise information from Felix Deutsch. She tested him by hinting that she could extend the visit to Rome, which she and her father had planned for that month. When Deutsch vehemently objected and insisted that she cancel the trip, Anna Freud knew the truth.[3]

The trip to Rome, originally planned for 1912, had always held symbolic significance for Freud. Jones suspected that Freud considered this his last opportunity to show Rome to his daughter, and therefore decided to take the trip despite his doctor's severe reservations. If Jones was correct, then Freud was indeed right. Except for small outings to Vienna's surroundings and several indispensable professional and medical trips to Berlin, the trip to Rome was his last before he was forced by the Nazis to emigrate to England. Father and daughter traveled in early September to Verona, which they had already visited together. From there they took the night coach to Rome. The incident in the train, often mentioned later, again clearly showed what Anna Freud's new duties were. When a stream of blood gushed from Freud's mouth, probably because a piece of tissue had loosened, she courageously helped stop the bleeding. This second and last long trip bound father and daughter to one another irrevocably, precisely also because both were able, notwithstanding their distress, to abandon themselves entirely to the charm of the city. In

That Anna Freud had moved into the role of the privileged or—if you will—the especially burdened nurse from the very beginning is all too understandable, and has often been emphasized. It was Jones who most clearly described her new role as an expression of her strong bond with her father:

> From the onset of his illness to the end of his life Freud refused to have any other nurse than his daughter Anna. He made a pact with her at the beginning that no sentiment was to be displayed; all that was necessary was to be performed in a cool, matter-of-fact fashion, with the absence of emotion characteristic of a surgeon. This attitude, her courage and firmness, enabled her to adhere to the pact even in the most agonizing situations.[2]

Indeed, Anna Freud accepted the duty fate had clearly intended for her, and for sixteen years fulfilled it without any hesitation. During this rehabilitation period, the genuinely extraordinary and good relationship between Sigmund and Anna Freud matured in its historical depth and significance, and became decisive for Anna Freud's life. If we describe her as the favorite daughter in this context—which she actually was not—we in fact minimize her real merit. She not only became a nurse, but put herself entirely in the service of her father's scientific work. She took dictation, wrote manuscripts, and presented Freud's lectures at congresses. After the onset of his illness, Freud did not attend any psychoanalytic congresses, and attended only one meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. For the most part he became invisible to the public, which caused a number of curious psychoanalysts who visited Vienna to complain, since they had hoped to meet him. When written contact was insufficient, and personal, verbal comments were required, Anna Freud became her father's mouthpiece. Out of consideration for his state of health, she did not even attend the International Psychoanalytic Congress in 1924, although the meetings were held, from April 21 to April 23, in nearby Salzburg. Freud had influenza and to recover spent Easter at the Semmering rest house on Vienna's outskirts. As indicated a letter he wrote to Lou Andreas-Salomé on March 14, 1924, Freud had planned to attend this congress.

Notwithstanding the difficult situation, Anna Freud was able to pursue her own scientific work. Even if she had merely receded behind her father personally and devoted herself exclusively to the management and publication of *his* work, her personal worth would not have suffered. World literature tells of many wives and daughters of famous men who gained high recognition by devoting decades of their lives to the augmentation of their husband's or father's fame. Dostoevsky's second wife, Anna, published a diary on her life with Dostoevsky.[3] Tolstoy's daughters took over the management of their father's work.[4] Erika Mann is another example of a daughter who, for the sake of her father's work, set her own talents aside.

Anna Freud's attitude to her father and his work invites a clear comparison. Robert Byck, who compiled Freud's essays on cocaine in one volume,[5] laid bare their historical development and added other works on the subject. (Central in this work was the discovery of cocainization, discovered through the anesthesia of the

in this case the adult becomes childish; and it does not mean wanting to be liked by the children, for in this case he becomes hypocritical and aimless.[17]

Current education is paying ever greater attention to the model of the Baumgarten Nursery. Many of the present trends had already been realized there, even if for a brief period. Bernfeld, like many other educators, considered himself a socialist, but certainly not in the contemporary sense.

The well-functioning school, which turned three hundred neglected children into civilized human beings within a few months, failed as a result of mismanagement. The Joint Distribution Committee, which managed the money that flowed in from Jewish aid organizations in the United States, strongly interfered with the educational program, and modern techniques could therefore no longer be implemented. Bernfeld resigned and withdrew altogether. It was Anna Freud's opinion that Bernfeld became a skeptic after the Baumgarten Nursery failed.[18]

Only in 1921, after the Baumgarten Nursery was dismantled, did Bernfeld begin to practice psychoanalysis and treat patients. He nonetheless remained unusually interested in all public events and wrote about them, not scientifically, but with a light hand and a personal and honest touch.

During her youth, Anna Freud had allowed herself to be fascinated by Bernfeld, and over the decades kept alive the spirit that emanated from him and the Baumgarten Nursery. On no occasion did she forget to mention him and his achievements, yet she criticized his writings[19] as speculative. Bernfeld emigrated in 1934, first to the south of France, where he did not receive a work permit, and then to the United States, where he was accepted, as were so many other Europeans, by the Menningers in Topeka (see pp. 221–24 below). Later Bernfield was predominantly interested in history. He wrote a series of books about the young Freud which are still widely read. His ideas ranged from the student movement and education to the potentialities of psychoanalysis. But to describe him as a child psychoanalyst would be a mistake.

Ada Müller-Braunschweig; Alice Balint; Isidor Sadger

The only two essays in psychoanalysis Ada Müller-Braunschweig wrote appeared in 1928 and 1930,[20] and hence cannot be regarded as a contribution to the foundations of Freudian theory. Anna Freud imparts a great deal of honor to this woman by including her among the precursors of her own field.

Almost the same can be said about the few essays of Alice Balint, the first wife of Michael Balint. Born in 1898, Alice Balint was Anna Freud's contemporary. After World War I, she completed her training in Berlin, and in 1923 became a member of the German Psychoanalytic Society. Later she moved to Budapest, where she was close to Ferenczi until his death. Her essays concern educational

psychology and ethnology. By managing exchange lectures among child analysts from Vienna and Berlin, she achieved a certain merit in the area of child analysis. She died on August 9, 1939, at the age of forty-one, shortly after her emigration to England.[21]

That Anna Freud should include Isidor Sadger among early child psychoanalysts is surprising. Sadger was a very prolific writer who published a number of works every year. His specialty, however, was sexual pathology, and he described case histories of the utmost perversion, not always without moral indignation. It is known that Freud was not entirely happy with Sadger's zeal in this respect. Freud once wrote to Jung of "Sadger, that congenital fanatic of orthodoxy, who happens by mere accident to believe in psychoanalysis rather than in the law given by God on Sinai-Horeb."[22] And in 1919, in planning a yearbook of psychoanalysis and psychopathological research, to which Sadger contributed two essays,[23] Freud wrote with unusual coarseness: "Sadger's writing is insufferable, he would only mess up our nice book."[24] Sadger suffer a tragic fate. Though he withdrew from the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society as early as 1934, he did not emigrate but remained in Vienna throughout the period of Nazi despotism. He has been considered missing since World War II.

Anna Freud referred to Isidor Sadger's early works, in which he discussed test anxiety and student suicide, the problems of unloved children, early childhood anxieties, and sexuality.[25] Again, the issue was not child psychoanalysis, but observations and reflections derived from the application of Freud's theories to certain subjects.

The Bornstein Sisters

We know rather little about the Bornstein sisters, who so often received honorable mentions from Anna Freud, mainly because they almost never expressed opinions about their own work. Even about Berta ("Bertl") Bornstein, the better known of the two, there is scarcely any information. She was born in September 1900 and moved with her family from Krakow to Berlin in the 1920's. She became a social worker and, under the influence of Otto Fenichel, became acquainted with psychoanalysis. She and her younger sister Steff became well known as "the Bornsteins." They belonged to the Berlin group and worked not only with Otto Fenichel, but with Edith Jacobson and Annie Reich, and with the latter two conducted a "child seminar," similar to the one Anna Freud later led in Vienna. Anna Freud and Berta Bornstein met in Berlin when Anna Freud, due to her father's illness, spent several long periods of time there. Berta Bornstein then moved to Vienna and participated in Anna Freud's seminars there. Berta Bornstein's special talent lay in her communication with children less than three years old. According to Anna Freud, her special merit was her teaching—against Anna Freud's own recommendation—the

The London Anti–Anna Freud Symposium

On May 4 and 18, 1927, Anna Freud attended a symposium on child analysis organized by the British Psychoanalytic Society. The point was not, as is common in scientific symposia, to exchange experiences and thoughts, but to criticize and disparage Anna Freud's book, *Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis*. Speakers were those who later belonged to the Melanie Klein school: Joan Riviere, M. N. Searl, and Ella Sharpe. Edward Glover, who was Ernest Jones's representative, and Jones himself were the closing speakers. The rejoinders, of which Melanie Klein's lecture alone constituted three-fifths, were almost as long as Anna Freud's book itself. Still, Klein's lecture differed from her early writings in many respects. With a transparent style that distinctly conveyed the technique of child psychoanalysis, she reached a level she never mastered again.

Even if we wonder whether Jones might not have lent a hand, we must nonetheless understand that it was Anna Freud's book that first stimulated Klein to felicitously present her own ideas.

Klein opened the symposium with a historical introduction, pointing out that the history of child psychoanalysis began with Sigmund Freud's case of Little Hans. In making this presentation, she falsely claimed that Little Hans's father knew nothing about his son's psychoanalytic therapy. Anna Freud herself asked: "How could such error have occurred? The patient's history clearly shows that the father himself carried out the analysis, i.e., provided the interpretations."[1] The father, Max Graf, not only knew about his son's analysis, but was even a member of the Vienna psychoanalytic group, though he himself never practiced psychoanalysis. Klein then mentioned the merits of Hermine Hug-Hellmuth and finally those of her own work, referring to her essay of "The Development of a Child" (1921) as her *first* publication, although it was, in fact, her second.

According to Klein's statements, then, Anna Freud was not a pioneer but a latecomer to child psychoanalysis. All subsequent authors accepted this version, and we have already seen how Anna Freud, by preferring to keep her work and herself in shadows, reinforced this historical view.

Klein then proceeded to tear Anna Freud's statements to pieces, using psycho-

in the field of child analysis. After the war began, she therefore faced the difficult task of professional and private, linguistic and cultural reorientation. The task that finally became hers has since become world-renowned under the name of the Hampstead Nurseries.

The Wartime Hampstead Nurseries

The wartime children's nursery was opened in October 1940, during the first phase of the German bombing raids. As these became more frequent, finally destroying large parts of London and other large English cities, they also affected the children. Many lost not only their homes but also their parents. It was the cause of such children that Anna Freud embraced.

At first she received money from private sources to alleviate the children's most immediate needs. A house at 13 Wedderburn Road in Hampstead was made available on a loan basis, a Swedish organization provided furniture, and Anna Freud was able to have a relatively safe semisubterranean air-raid shelter built. It was thus possible to begin to admit children. In March 1941, when the money had been exhausted, other financial support enabled the work to be carried on for several more months. Finally, following the intervention of Eric G. Muggeridge, an American organization, the Foster Parents' Plan for War Children, assumed the total costs until several months after the war, during which time an interruption in support threatened the home only once. Two more homes were opened with this money, the young children's nursery at 5 Netherhall Gardens in London (Hampstead) for children who could not be sent to the country without their mothers, and New Barn, a country home in Essex.

The initially small number of children gradually rose to 90. A total of 190 children found shelter at the Hampstead Nurseries over the span of several years. Prompted by the American donors, Anna Freud submitted monthly reports which were also valued for their description of daily life in the wartime children's nurseries. Though Anna Freud wrote that she sometimes found those obligations irksome, she did have sufficient time for them during the long nights of air raids. The collected reports published after the war convey, precisely through their regularity, a continuous picture of both the events and Anna Freud's everyday life during the war.[1] Anna Freud's gift for exact observation and for objective yet sympathetic description has made this one of the most interesting books on war ever published. Strangely, it has thus far been withheld from German readers. Michael Schroeder

> mean little to him by now. He has not seen his mother for 18 months and he did not recognize a photo of her shown to him the other day.
>
> On our urging his father now sends him postcards with messages which Tony enjoys greatly and carries about with him.[8]

In 1945 the war came to an end. After five years of existence, the Hampstead Nurseries were no longer needed. The children could return to their families. With the dismantling of the nurseries on November 1, 1945, Anna Freud completed her task.

The monthly reports on Anna Freud's days at the Hampstead Nurseries were not the only writings published during this time. During the war it had become necessary to publish the insights gained from recent experiences, which could be efficiently applied to the manifold problems of children who had lost their families. In 1942, Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham therefore wrote a report *Young Children in War-Time: A Year's Work in a Residential War Nursery*. A second publication by Anna Freud and Burlingham, *Infants Without Families: The Case For and Against Residential Nurseries*, appeared in 1944. The complete reports on the Hampstead Nurseries were published in English in Volume III of Anna Freud's writings. Later there were further publications. In her book on twins, Burlingham also reported in detail on Mary and Madge, the identical twins she took care of in the Hampstead Nurseries.[9] Others have reported on the later developments of various children who had been accommodated in the nurseries.[10]

While active in the Hampstead Nurseries during the war, Anna Freud also devoted steadfast attention to adult analysis,[11] but she had little time for organizational tasks within psychoanalytic associations during that period. Nonetheless, debates on the correct theoretical and practical paths of psychoanalysis obviously did not flag, according to Melitta Schmideberg,[12] and continued even during the London blitz. But neither Anna Freud nor Ernest Jones was able to summon the strength to raise cardinal theoretical problems during those times. In May 1943, however, Anna Freud gave a lecture based on her activities at the Hampstead Nurseries entitled "On the Early Social Behavior of Children: An Introductory Report on Several Observations." Following conflicts within the British Psychoanalytic Society, whose details we shall not dwell on here, Edward Glover resigned in 1944 as general secretary of the International Psychoanalytic Association. Anna Freud again assumed those duties until Grete Bibring relieved her following the elections of 1949.

The Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic

In 1952, a children's clinic for psychoanalytic therapy was annexed to the training institute for child therapy that was founded in 1947. Thus, the institution created by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham, and which claimed a large part of their energies, attained its final format—The Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic. The establishment of the clinic was made possible by a grant that provided the money to purchase the building. Anna Freud was initially the only director and Liselotte Frankl the chief psychiatrist, while A. Bonnard, Josephine Stross, and Willie Hoffer worked as consulting physicians.

As a charitable institution, the Hampstead Clinic obviously remained further dependent on donations for its sustenance. Every year several hundred thousand pounds sterling had to be raised. The money came from the Psychoanalytic Research and Development Fund, the Grant Foundation, and the Taconomic Foundation, all in New York; from the Field Foundation; and from several other, predominantly American, sources. In 1956, the purchase of a new house made a broader range of activities possible. Another house was added in 1967.

Two codirectors now worked with Anna Freud at the clinic: Clifford Yorke and Hansi Kennedy. Work at the Hampstead Clinic was divided into four principal areas:

1. *The clinic as center of the organization*. This was under the medical directorship of Clifford Yorke. Its main function consisted in the psychoanalytic treatment of children, with usually fifty to seventy children being treated at any one time. This included complete analyses of five hours per week, with the staff's full awareness of the long duration therapy requires. This work could be accomplished only because a large number of psychoanalysts were available and because trainee analysts—depending on their level of competence—also assumed the treatment of some of the children. The clinic distinguished between the following groups of children: a) children with typical infantile neuroses, suitable for treatment by supervised trainees; b) children with disturbances in progress, with whom it was attempted to prevent more severe stages; c) severely disturbed children who had been referred by other clinics; d) children particularly interesting for research, for ex-

Preface

1. Arnold Rogow, *The Psychiatrists* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 109.
2. Freud to Roy Winn, cited in *Jones*, III, 179.

1895, The Year of Anna Freud's Birth

1. *Standard Edition*, vol. II.
2. *Standard Edition*, vols. IV–V.
3. Anna Freud refutes this: "Sophie was never my father's 'favorite daughter.' In the beginning it was rather my sister Mathilde who had the closest relationship to him." (Communication to the author.) Freud's relationship to his eldest daughter has in fact never been investigated closely enough. She had hardly anything to do with psychoanalysis. But she had an extraordinary practical sense and was socially adept, and hence a valuable member of the psychoanalytic organization. With each of his daughters, Freud had a totally different relationship.
4. *Fliess*, December 3, 1895, p. 136.
5. Communication to the author.
6. Lucy Freeman, *The Story of Anna O.* (New York: Walker, 1972).
7. *Standard Edition*, vols. VIII, VI.

Vienna, 1895

1. E. Stransky, "Aus einem Gelehrtenleben um die Jahrhundertwende: Rückschau, Ausblick, Gedanken" ["A Pundit's Life around the Turn of the Century: Review, Outlook, Reflections"]. The manuscript is in the archives of the Institute for the History of Medicine of the University of Vienna, catalogue number 2065.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Jonathan Miller, ed., *Freud: The Man, His World, His Influence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).
4. Hermann Bahr, *Ver Sacrum*, No. 1, January 1898.
5. Cf. Christian M. Nebenhay, *Gustav Klimt. Sein Leben nach zeitgenössischen Berichten und Quellen* ["Gustav Klimt: His Life from Contemporary Reports and Sources"] (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1976).
6. "Psychoanalysis and Libido Theory," *Standard Edition*, XVIII, 242. Cf. also Martin Grotjahn, *The Language of the Symbol* (Los Angeles: Mara Books, 1971).
7. Cf. Johanne Peters, ed., *Alexander Blok* (Mainz: Hase und Koehler, 1972), and *Symbole der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung im lyrischen Werk A. A. Bloks* ["Symbols of Sensuous Perception in the Lyrical Work of A. A. Blok"] (Kiehl: Diss, 1968).

Childhood and Youth

1. The German includes two words for "strawberry," one of them the dialectical *Hochbeere*.
2. "Dreams as Wish Fulfillments," *Standard Edition*, IV, 130.
3. *Standard Edition*, V, 643–44.
4. *Ibid.*, XV, 132.
5. *Letters*, August 20, 1898, p. 238.
6. *Fliess*, August 1, 1899, p. 289.
7. *Ibid.*, January 16, 1899, p. 274.
8. *Ibid.*, June 27, 1899, p. 284.
9. *Ibid.*, July 3, 1899, p. 284.
10. Anna Freud: "I never attended an upper elementary school for the middle class, only elementary school." (Communication to the author.) The statements made here about her school attendance are based on written information from the Austrian Federal Ministry for Education and Art, on the basis of available information. It must therefore remain moot whether the documents of the Ministry for Education are incorrect or whether Anna Freud's memory failed her.
11. Communication to the author.
12. *Writings*, VI, 102. "Regression as a Principle in Mental Development," *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, XXVII (1963), 126–39; a variation appears in *Writings*, VI, 93–107.
13. *Jones*, II, 55.

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



C.R. Kothari

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the term *Ex post facto research* for descriptive research studies. The main characteristic of this method is that the researcher has no control over the variables; he can only report what has happened or what is happening. Most *ex post facto research* projects are used for descriptive studies in which the researcher seeks to measure such items as, for example, frequency of shopping, preferences of people, or similar data. *Ex post facto studies* also include attempts by researchers to discover causes even when they cannot control the variables. The methods of research utilized in descriptive research are survey methods of all kinds, including comparative and correlational methods. In *analytical research*, on the other hand, the researcher has to use facts or information already available, and analyze these to make a critical evaluation of the material.

(ii) *Applied vs. Fundamental:* Research can either be applied (or action) research or fundamental (to basic or pure) research. *Applied research* aims at finding a solution for an immediate problem facing a society or an industrial/business organisation, whereas *fundamental research* is mainly concerned with generalisations and with the formulation of a theory. "Gathering knowledge for knowledge's sake is termed 'pure' or 'basic' research."[4] Research concerning some natural phenomenon or relating to pure mathematics are examples of fundamental research. Similarly, research studies, concerning human behaviour carried on with a view to make generalisations about human behaviour, are also examples of fundamental research, but research aimed at certain conclusions (say, a solution) facing a concrete social or business problem is an example of applied research. Research to identify social, economic or political trends that may affect a particular institution or the copy research (research to find out whether certain communications will be read and understood) or the marketing research or evaluation research are examples of applied research. Thus, the central aim of applied research is to discover a solution for some pressing practical problem, whereas basic research is directed towards finding information that has a broad base of applications and thus, adds to the already existing organized body of scientific knowledge.

(iii) *Quantitative vs. Qualitative:* Quantitative research is based on the measurement of quantity or amount. It is applicable to phenomena that can be expressed in terms of quantity. Qualitative research, on the other hand, is concerned with qualitative phenomenon, i.e., phenomena relating to or involving quality or kind. For instance, when we are interested in investigating the reasons for human behaviour (i.e., why people think or do certain things), we quite often talk of 'Motivation Research', an important type of qualitative research. This type of research aims at discovering the underlying motives and desires, using in depth interviews for the purpose. Other techniques of such research are word association tests, sentence completion tests, story completion tests and similar other projective techniques. Attitude or opinion research i.e., research designed to find out how people feel or what they think about a particular subject or institution is also qualitative research. Qualitative research is specially important in the behavioural sciences where the aim is to discover the underlying motives of human behaviour. Through such research we can analyse the various factors which motivate people to behave in a particular manner or which make people like or dislike a particular thing. It may be stated, however, that to apply qualitative research in

[4] Pauline V. Young, *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*, p. 30.

Prof. Dr. Sugiyono

METODE PENELITIAN KUANTITATIF KUALITATIF DAN R&D

ALFABETA

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(QS 83 Al-Muthaffifin Ayat 1)

Para pembajak, penyalur, penjual, pengedar dan **PEMBELI BUKU BAJAKAN** adalah bersekongkol dalam alam perbuatan **CURANG.** Kelompok genk ini saling membantu memberi peluang hancurnya citra bangsa,"merampas" dan "memakan" hak orang lain dengan cara yang bathil dan kotor. Kelompok "makhluk" ini semua ikut berdosa, hidup dan kehidupannya tidak akan diridhoi dan dipersempit rizkinya oleh **ALLAH SWT.**

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C. Observasi

Observasi sebagai teknik pengumpulan data mempunyai ciri yang spesifik bila dibandingkan dengan teknik yang lain, yaitu wawancara dan kuesioner. Kalau wawancara dan kuesioner selalu berkomunikasi dengan orang, maka observasi tidak terbatas pada orang, tetapi juga obyek-obyek alam yang lain.

Sutrisno Hadi (1986) mengemukakan bahwa, observasi merupakan suatu proses yang kompleks, suatu proses yang tersusun dari pelbagai proses biologis dan psikhologis. Dua di antara yang terpenting adalah proses-proses pengamatan dan ingatan.

Teknik pengumpulan data dengan observasi digunakan bila, penelitian berkenaan dengan perilaku manusia, proses kerja, gejala-gejala alam dan bila responden yang diamati tidak terlalu besar.

Dari segi proses pelaksanaan pengumpulan data, observasi dapat dibedakan menjadi *participant observation* (observasi berperan serta) dan *non participant observation,* selanjutnya dari segi instrumentasi yang digunakan, maka observasi dapat dibedakan menjadi observasi terstruktur dan tidak terstruktur.

1. Observasi Berperan serta (*Participant observation*)

Dalam observasi ini, peneliti terlibat dengan kegiatan sehari-hari orang yang sedang diamati atau yang digunakan sebagai sumber data penelitian. Sambil melakukan pengamatan, peneliti ikut melakukan apa yang dikerjakan oleh sumber data, dan ikut merasakan suka dukanya. Dengan observasi partisipan ini, maka data yang diperoleh akan lebih lengkap, tajam, dan sampai mengetahui pada tingkat makna dari setiap perilaku yang nampak.

Dalam suatu perusahaan atau organisasi pemerintah misalnya, peneliti dapat berperan sebagai karyawan, ia dapat mengamati bagaimana perilaku karyawan dalam bekerja, bagaimana semangat kerjanya, bagaimana hubungan satu karyawan dengan karyawan lain, hubungan karyawan dengan supervisor dan pimpinan, keluhan dalam melaksanakan pekerjaan dan lain-lain

2. Observasi Nonpartisipan

Kalau dalam observasi partisipan peneliti terlibat langsung dengan aktivitas orang-orang yang sedang diamati, maka dalam observasi nonpartisipan peneliti tidak terlibat dan hanya sebagai pengamat independen. Misalnya dalam suatu Tempat Pemungutan Suara (TPS), peneliti dapat mengamati bagaimana perilaku masyarakat dalam hal mengunakan hak pilihnya, dalam interaksi dengan panitia dan pemilih yang lain. Peneliti mencatat, menganalisis dan selanjutnya dapat membuat kesimpulan tentang perilaku masyarakat dalam pemilihan umum. Pengumpulan data dengan

meningkatkan keabsahan penelitian akan lebih terjamin, karena peneliti betul-betul melakukan pengumpulan data.

e. Mencatat hasil wawancara

Hasil wawancara segera harus dicacat setelah selesai melakukan wawancara agar tidak lupa bahkan hilang. Karena wawancara dilakukan secara terbuka dan tidak berstruktur, maka peneliti perlu membuat rangkuman yang lebih sistematis terhadap hasil wawancara. Dari berbagai sumber data, perlu dicatat mana data yang dianggap penting, yang tidak penting, data yang sama dikelompokkan. Hubungan satu data dengan data yang lain perlu dikontruksikan, sehingga menghasilkan pola dan makna tertentu. Data yang masih diragukan perlu ditanyakan kembali kepada sumber data lama atau yang baru agar memperoleh ketuntasan dan kepastian.

3. Teknik Pengumpulan data dengan Dokumen

Dokumen merupakan catatan peristiwa yang sudah berlalu. Dokumen bisa berbentuk tulisan, gambar, atau karya-karya monumental dari seseorang. Dokumen yang berbentuk tulisan misalnya catatan harian, sejarah kehidupan (*life histories*), ceritera, biografi, peraturan, kebijakan. Dokumen yang berbentuk gambar, misalnya foto, gambar hidup, sketsa dan lain-lain. Dokumen yang berbentuk karya misalnya karya seni, yang dapat berupa gambar, patung, film, dan lain-lain. Studi dokumen merupakan pelengkap dari penggunaan metode observasi dan wawancara dalam penelitian kualitatif. Dalam hal dokumen Bogdan menyatakan "*In most tradition of qualitative research, the phrase personal document is used broadly to refer to any first person narrative produced by an individual which describes his or her own actions, experience and belief*"

Hasil penelitian dari observasi atau wawancara, akan lebih kredibel/ dapat dipercaya kalau didukung oleh sejarah pribadi kehidupan di masa kecil, di sekolah, di tempat kerja, di masyarakat, dan autobiografi. *Publish autobiographies provide a readiley available source of data for the discerning qualitative research (Bogdan).* Hasil penelitian juga akan semakin kredibel apabila didukung oleh foto-foto atau karya tulis akademik dan seni yang telah ada. *Photographs provide strikingly descriptive data, are often used to understant the subjective and is product are frequeltly analyzed inductive.*

Tetapi perlu dicermati bahwa tidak semua dokumen memiliki kredibilitas yang tinggi. Sebagai contoh banyak foto yang tidak mencerminkan keadaan aslinya, karena foto dibuat untuk kepentingan tertentu. Demikian juga autobiografi yang ditulis untuk dirinya sendiri, sering subyektif.

JOHN W. CRESWELL • J. DAVID CRESWELL



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The Three Approaches to Research

In this book, three research approaches are advanced: (a) qualitative, (b) quantitative, and (c) mixed methods. Unquestionably, the three approaches are not as discrete as they first appear. Qualitative and quantitative approaches should not be viewed as rigid, distinct categories, polar opposites, or dichotomies. Instead, they represent different ends on a continuum (Creswell, 2015; Newman & Benz, 1998). A study *tends* to be more qualitative than quantitative or vice versa. **Mixed methods research** resides in the middle of this continuum because it incorporates elements of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.

Often the distinction between **qualitative research** and **quantitative research** is framed in terms of using words (qualitative) rather than numbers (quantitative), or better yet, using closed-ended questions and responses (quantitative hypotheses) or open-ended questions and responses (qualitative interview questions). A more complete way to view the gradations of differences between them is in the basic philosophical assumptions researchers bring to the study, the types of research strategies used in the research (e.g., quantitative experiments or qualitative **case studies**), and the specific methods employed in conducting these strategies (e.g., collecting data quantitatively on instruments versus collecting qualitative data through observing a setting). Moreover, there is a historical evolution to both approaches—with the quantitative approaches dominating the forms of research in the social sciences from the late 19th century up until the mid-20th century. During the latter half of the 20th century, interest in qualitative research increased and along with it, the development of mixed methods research. With this background, it should prove helpful to view definitions of these three key terms as used in this book:

- *Qualitative research* is an approach for exploring and understanding the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem. The process of research involves emerging questions and procedures, data typically collected in the participant's setting, data analysis inductively building from particulars to general themes, and the researcher making interpretations of the meaning of the data. The final written report has a flexible structure. Those who engage in this form of inquiry support a way of looking at research that honors an inductive style, a focus on individual meaning, and the importance of reporting the complexity of a situation.
- *Quantitative research* is an approach for testing objective **theories** by examining the relationship among variables. These variables, in turn, can be measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered data can be analyzed using statistical procedures. The final written report has a set structure consisting of introduction, literature and theory, methods, results, and discussion. Like qualitative researchers, those who engage in this form of inquiry have assumptions about testing theories deductively, building in protections against bias, controlling for alternative or counterfactual explanations, and being able to generalize and replicate the findings.
- *Mixed methods research* is an approach to inquiry involving collecting both quantitative and qualitative data, integrating the two forms of data, and using distinct designs that may involve philosophical assumptions and theoretical frameworks. The core assumption of this form of inquiry is that the integration of qualitative and quantitative data yields additional insight beyond the information provided

EUGENE O'NEILL'S *MOURNING BECOMES ELECTRA*: A CLASSICAL TRAGEDY IN MODERN PERSPECTIVE

Ahmed H. Ubeid

Ph.D. English literature

University of Anbar- Iraq

Abstract

Mourning Becomes Electra is O'Neill's most recognized play in which he modernizes a Greek famous trilogy of Aeschylus' Oresteia. It is presented in 1931, the time of Depression when millions became unemployed and hungry. America, the land of prosperity and opportunity, was now the bitter land of dissatisfaction. Hard times affect artists and intellectuals to seek causes and to express social concern. Many writers moved to shout out against a system that could produce the kind of poverty and general chaos. While the other dramatists in their work faced the controversial issues of the time, O'Neill was becoming more introspective. Though he was deeply saddened by the plight of the poor, O'Neill nevertheless avoided sociological attacks or propaganda in his play. He was becoming more and more interested in private worlds, even if they found in universal myths. Working harder than ever, ambitiously vying with the Greek dramatists for size in drama, he presented to America and the world perhaps the best play of the thirties, Morning Becomes Electra. Certainly the play possessing the greatest tragic depth, it is far different from the plays produced shouts of protest against hard times, and more lasting.

In this trilogy, Homecoming, The Hunted and The Haunted, O'Neill has gone back to one of the world's greatest classical tragic stories of Aeschylus' Oresteia. He retells the story of Agamemnon, Clytemnestra, Orestes and Electra and the theme of the Furies with an almost contemporary rearrangement and interpretation. He dramatizes his conviction that the Greek concept of fate could be replaced by the modern notion of psychological, especially Freudian, determination. The Mannons are

driven to their self-destructive behaviour by inner needs and compulsions they can neither understand nor control. The play is not an exemplification of the Greek religious problem of fate, for O'Neill has reconceived the old doctrine of nemesis in terms of modern biological and psychological doctrine of cause and effect. The concept of fate is interpreted in modern psychological terms that render it more acceptable to modern audience.

Structural Approach and Plot Development

In a similar manner to its Greek prototype, O'Neill chooses to set the tragic action into motion before going in depth with the first part of the trilogy. In the previous generation, as Lavinia (the Mannon's daughter) exchanged a speech with Seth(the Mannon's gardener) telling him, what she knew about her grandfather, that Abraham dispossesses his brother, David Mannon because he falls in love and marries a Canuck nurse named Marie Brantome, whom she was Abraham's desire. To legitimize their child, Abraham does not only dismiss them both out of the house, but he actually razes the family home to the ground and builds a new one for "he wouldn't live where his brother had disgraced the family."(*1.1.17.27*) *[1]As a result, David's son, Adam Brant seeks vengeance on the Mannon Family for his father and mother's tragic suffering and death. He does that by seducing Christine Mannon away from her husband, the present head of the Mannon family, Ezra, whose return from the Civil War is expected in *Homecoming*, the first part of the trilogy.

The choice of the Civil War as a background for the play is very appropriate. It is an even suitably remote from the present, possessing, thereby, a "sufficient mask

*[1] O'Neill's *Mourning Becomes Electra*. Singh, J. ed. 2003. All subsequent quotations are taken from this edition, number of the play, act, page and the line (s) will appear after each quotation.

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Mourning Becomes Electra: Morbid Psychology under the "Mask"

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ABSTRACT

By giving his main characters all with the "life-like mask", Eugene O'Neill in his play Mourning Becomes Electra aims to reveal the morbid psychology behind that people at that time were facing. O'Neill deepens the tragic effect of excessively emotional self-restraint by intentionally making the conflict happen between family members in a puritanical family, and further making it become a family's doomed and repeated fate. O'Neill presents the awkward situation but he fails to presents the way out; he indeed leaves the remedy to his audience.

Key Words: mask; morbid psychology; emotional self-restrain; family; fate.

Eugene O'Neill's play *Mourning Becomes Electra* is a tragedy which centers itself on a family's walking towards its devastation, with all its family members eventually end up either with death or self-seclusion. At the very beginning of O'Neill's creation, he in his first note for the play asked himself: "is it possible to get modern psychological approximation of Greek sense of fate into such a play, which an intelligent audience of today, possessed of no belief in gods or supernatural, could accept and be moved by"? (O'Neill, 1926:530) O'Neill's intention for the play is to craft a Greek-like tragedy resulted from a seemingly unavoidable psychological fate. In his play, he considers the psychological fate more of the results of human beings themselves than by supernatural beings as what Greek tragedies might present. It is indeed the tragic morbid psychology men set for themselves that afterwards make them suffer from it, and more miserably, repeat it.

O'Neill reveals the tragic psychological fate in the play by making his characters appear on the stage all with the same "life-like mask", a mask used to hide and pretend their true inner selves. When Lavinia denies the buried secret of her family, Adam Brant boldly accuses her of "liking all Mannons, you're a coward when it comes to facing the truth about themselves"(I.I, p.12). As Brant openly points out, the Mannon family, instead of collapsing from the exterior forces, disintegrates from its inner inherited morbid psychology as a matter of fact. Due to their inborn "life-like masks", it is extremely arduous for a Mannon member to unveil his or her "mask" in order to face the true self, and it is clear that characters in the play are always struggling to restrain their inner feelings. With the suppression of the natural overflow of human feelings, Mannon members are growing increasingly detached and indifferent towards each other, and the "masks" they are walking with seemingly can only be taken of when the fate of family comes to its very end.

The tragic effect of the "life-like mask" is accentuated when Eugene O'Neill directly places the intense conflicts in a puritanical elite family in New England, which traditionally has much emphasis on self-restraint. Though literary critics focus much on O'Neill's denouncement on the puritanical idea, the audience the play targets are not merely those puritans, but the whole public. O'Neill has noticed the wired phenomenon existing in the society and he through his play wants to express his deep concern for the awkward existence human beings are encountering.

The scene of the play is set in a family, intentionally to make the tragedy near to every

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From Hatred to Love: Development of a Literary Topos in Eugene O'Neill's *Mourning Becomes Electra* (1931)*

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ABSTRACT:
In the present article, the classical literary topos of 'love out of hatred' is introduced and its development in Eugene O'Neill's American tragedy Mourning Becomes Electra *(1931) is studied. This topos comprises four stages: a declaration of hatred, quarrels between the parties, progressive emotional attachment and, finally, a confession of love.*

* The authors are grateful to the two anonymous referees for their critical suggestions, and to Graham Clarke for the stylistic revision of this article. Any remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors.

The topos is traced back to the story of Achilles and Briseis in book one of Homer's Iliad. *While the storyline of O'Neill's* Mourning Becomes Electra *is expressly based on the classical Orestes-Electra narratives, the play creatively incorporates this classical topos. Moreover, the recontextualization of literary topoi is an unconscious literary process whereby a topos, as a living expression of human experience, continues to develop in modern literature. O'Neill's trilogy combines architextual and hypertextual relationships to classical texts through deliberately taking inspiration from Aeschylus's* Oresteia *and incorporating the syntax of 'love out of hatred' as a classical topos.*

KEYWORDS*: Literary Topoi; Love and Hatred; Classical Reception;* Mourning Becomes Electra*; Eugene O'Neill.*

Del odio al amor: desarrollo de un tópico literario en *A Electra le sienta bien el luto* (1931) de Eugene O'Neill

RESUMEN:

En el presente artículo se presenta el tópico literario clásico 'amor a partir del odio' y se estudia su desarrollo en la tragedia estadounidense A Electra le sienta bien el luto *(1931) de Eugene O'Neill. Este tópico comprende cuatro fases, a saber, una declaración de odio, rencillas entre las partes, apego afectivo progresivo y, finalmente, una confesión de amor. La historia del 'amor a partir del odio' se remonta al episodio de Aquiles y Briseida en el libro 1 de la* Ilíada *de Homero. Si bien la trama de* A Electra le sienta bien el luto *de O'Neill está deliberadamente basada en las narraciones clásicas de Orestes-Electra, la obra incorpora creativamente este tópico clásico. Además, la recontextualización de los tópicos literarios es un proceso literario inconsciente mediante el cual un tópico clásico, como elemento vivo de la experiencia humana, se actualiza en la cultura moderna. La trilogía de O'Neill establece simultáneamente relaciones hipertextuales y architextuales con los textos clásicos: reproduce expresamente el esquema narrativo de la* Orestíada *de Esquilo (nexo hipertextual) e incorpora la estructura del tópico clásico 'amor a partir del odio' (nexo architextual).*

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Tópicos literarios; Amor y odio; Recepción clásica; A Electra le sienta bien el luto; Eugene O'Neill.*

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The Tragic Lives of Oedipus Complex and Electra Complex Sufferers in Eugene O'Neill's *Mourning Becomes Electra*

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyse the tragic lives of Oedipus and Electra Complex sufferers in Eugene O'Neill's "Mourning Becomes Electra". The writer applies psychoanalytical theory which fits with the characters psychological condition. The writer uses a descriptive qualitative analysis as the method to analyse. This study analyses Oedipus and Electra Complexes sufferers from characters in a drama entitled Mourning Becomes Electra that leads tragedy in a family and ends the tragic death. In this analysis, the writer finds out that the psychological conditions of those Oedipus and Electra Complex sufferers contribute to their tragic lives.

1. Introduction

In life, everything does not always go as smoothly as expected. Sometimes, what people expect is not in accordance with reality in life. People may hope that something goes well and properly. On the other hand, people will not be able to reject reality. In life, sometimes, things happen beyond what people can imagine. It is uncontrollable, and it may be unbearable, but it will be all right if people have prepared themselves for anything that can happen. People should not expect everything to run perfectly because life is not perfect, and God has made the best plan. People meet and interact with people around them. In the interaction, they may meet other people who seem fine, but they may not be fine mentally. It may be caused by the fact that certain people face problems in their lives, and these problems can be caused by traumatic childhood experience. This kind of struggle is the basis of nearly every literature featuring humanity (Amin, 2020; Yudar et al., 2019).

Furthermore, this writing will analyse the tragic lives of the Oedipus Complex and Electra Complex sufferers in Eugene O'Neill's Mourning Becomes Electra. This work is chosen because it deals with a family whose children show deviant behaviour in which two children have a mental disorder that continues to deviant behaviour and leads to tragic lives. The tragic lives brought Mourning to the family. One afternoon at the end of spring in front of Mannon's house, Brigadier General Ezra Mannon was back from war. Lavinia, Ezra's daughter just came, with her mother Christine, from New York. When she unpacked, Lavinia planned to confront her mother about her adultery on the trip. She was sick with her mother's betrayal to her father. Before she could even unpack, the family gardener Seth, demanded to speak with her. He asked if she still planned to marry Captain Brant when Lavinia said that she did, Seth said that Captain Brant, when Lavinia said that she did, Seth said that Captain Brant was probably related to her and that she couldn't marry him.

Eugene O'Neill in full Eugene Gladstone O'Neill was born on October 16th, 1888 in the U.S., New york. He died on November 27th, 1953, in Boston, Massachusetts. He is one of the famous American dramatists and winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1936. "His masterpiece, Long Day's Journey into Night (produced posthumously 1956), is at the apex of a long string of great plays, including Beyond the Horizon (1920), Strange Interlude (1928), Ah! Wilderness (1933), and The Iceman Cometh (1946)."

O'Neill started to write confidently. With his father's help, five of his one-act plays were published in 1914. Then O'Neill joined George Pierce Baker's playwriting class at Harvard University in Massachusetts. O'Neill planned to return to Harvard in the fall of 1915 but ended up instead at the " hell hole," a hotel and bar in New York City, where he drank heavily and produced nothing. He next joined the Province town Players in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, whose production of his plays about the sea, including Bound East for Cardiff, made him well known 1918. Then in 1918 O'Neill married Agnes Boulton. They had a son named Shane and a daughter named Oona.

Parallel to that idea, this analysis will analyse the tragic lives of the characters who suffer from Oedipus Complex and Electra Complex.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Psychoanalysis Overview

Psychoanalysis theory Orin had the desire to possess his mother because he loved his mother. In addition, Christine also had a big desire to possess him as a mother, which was introduced by Sigmund Freud. His name has become

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

Reading Plays

Drama, unlike the other literary genres, is a staged art. Plays are written to be performed by actors before an audience. But the plays we wish to see are not always performed. We might have to wait years, for example, to see a production of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* or August Wilson's *Fences.* A reasonable alternative is to read these and other plays with attention to both their theatrical and literary dimensions.

As a literary genre, drama has affinities with fiction and poetry. Like fiction, drama possesses a narrative dimension: a play often narrates a story in the form of a plot. Like fiction, drama relies on dialogue and description, which takes the form of *stage directions,* lines describing characters, scenes, or actions with clues to production. Unlike fiction, however, in which a narrator often mediates between us and the story, there is usually no such authorial presence in drama. Instead, we hear the words of the characters directly.

Although drama is most like fiction, it shares features with poetry as well. Plays may, in fact, be written in verse: Shakespeare wrote in *blank verse* (unrhymed iambic pentameter), Molière in rhymed couplets. Plays, like lyric poems, are also overheard: we listen to characters expressing their concerns as if there were no audience present. Poems also contain dramatic elements. The dramatic lyrics and monologues of Robert Browning and some of the poems of John Donne portray characters speaking and listening to one another.

Plays may be vehicles of persuasion. Henrik Ibsen and Bernard Shaw frequently used the stage to dramatize ideas and issues. For most of his plays Shaw wrote prefaces in which he discussed the plays' dominant ideas. In drama, ideas possess more primacy than they do in poetry and fiction, something to which critics of the genre testify. Aristotle, for example, made *thought* one of his six elements of drama; Eric Bentley, a modern critic, entitled one of his books *The Playwright as Thinker.*

But if we look exclusively to the literary aspects of drama, to its poetic and fictional elements, and to its dramatization of ideas, we may fail to appreciate its uniquely theatrical idiom. To gain this appreciation we should read drama

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Types of Drama

Some plays elicit laughter, others evoke tears. Some are comic, others tragic, still others a mixture of both. The comic view celebrates life and affirms it; it is typically joyous and festive. The tragic view highlights life's sorrows; it is typically brooding and solemn. Tragic plays end unhappily, often with the death of the hero; comedies usually end happily, often with a celebration such as a marriage. Both comedy and tragedy contain changes of fortune, with the fortunes of comic characters turning from bad to good and those of tragic characters from good to bad.

The two major dramatic modes, *tragedy* and *comedy,* have been represented traditionally by contrasting masks, one sorrowful, the other joyful. Actors once wore such masks. The masks represent more than different types of plays: they also stand for contrasting ways of looking at the world, aptly summarized in Horace Walpole's remark, "the world is a comedy to those who think and a tragedy to those who feel." That is, when you think about the contradictions in a situation it may seem funny, but when you feel them, it is sad.

TRAGEDY

In the *Poetics,* Aristotle described **tragedy** as "an imitation of an action that is serious, complete in itself, and of a certain magnitude." This definition suggests that tragedies are solemn plays concerned with grave human actions and their consequences. The action of a tragedy is complete—it possesses a beginning, a middle, and an end. Elsewhere in the *Poetics,* Aristotle notes that the incidents of a tragedy must be causally connected. The events have to be logically related, one growing naturally out of another, each leading to the inevitable catastrophe, usually the downfall of the hero.

Some readers of tragedy have suggested that, according to Aristotle, the catastrophe results from a flaw in the character of the hero. Others have contended that the hero's tragic flaw results from fate or coincidence, from

CHARACTER

If we read plays for their plots—to find out what happens—we also read them to discover the fates of their **characters.** We become interested in dramatic characters for varying, even contradictory, reasons. They may remind us in some ways of ourselves; they may appeal to us because they differ from us. They may represent alternative directions we might have taken, alternative decisions we might have made. Although fictional characters cannot be directly equated with actual people, they are usually recognizably human, and as such, subject to the changing conditions of fate and circumstance.

Characters bring plays to life. First and last we attend to characters: to how they look and what their appearance tells us about them; to what they say and what their manner of saying it expresses; to what they do and how their actions reveal who they are and what they stand for. We may come to know them and respond to them in ways we come to know and respond to actual people, all the while realizing that characters are imaginative constructions, literary imitations of human beings. Even though characters in plays are not real people, their human dimension is impossible to ignore since actors portray them, and their human qualities engage us. Nonetheless, it is helpful to remain mindful of the distinction between dramatic characters and actual people so that we do not expect them always to behave realistically, and so we do not expect playwrights to tell us more about them than we need to know.

Characters in drama can be classified as major and minor, static and dynamic, flat and round. A *major character* is an important figure at the center of the play's action and meaning. Supporting the major character are one or more secondary or *minor characters,* whose function is partly to illuminate the major characters. Minor characters are often *static* or unchanging: they remain essentially the same throughout the play. *Dynamic* characters, on the other hand, exhibit some kind of change—of attitude, of purpose, of behavior. Another way of describing static and dynamic characters is as *flat* and *round* characters. Flat characters reveal only a single dimension, and their behavior and speech are predictable; round characters are more individualized, reveal more than one aspect of their human nature, and are not predictable in behavior or speech.

The **protagonist** is the main character in a play. Generally introduced to the audience very early, this is the character that the author expects should most engage our interest and sympathies. Protagonists do not have to be especially courageous or intelligent, nor do they need to be physically attractive or admirable. However, they do have to *want* something, and they have to want it intensely. In short, the most important feature of a protagonist is a desire, or an *objective.* The objective will be clear not long after the introduction of a protagonist. For instance, in Lady Gregory's *The Rising of the Moon,* we realize almost immediately that the sergeant wants to capture the revolutionary. Although the protagonist might redefine the objective through the course of the play, or an irony might develop concerning it, as in this play, the audience, very importantly, must never be confused about a protagonist's main objective. Our interest and absorption in a play depend largely on our understanding the

objective and its importance to the protagonist, and to the plot, especially, as in this play, when a new objective (*not* wanting to capture the man) finally emerges.

Clearly, the protagonist's relentless pursuit of an objective is critical to a play's success. After all, if the protagonist is not passionate about an objective, how can the audience be interested in the outcome of the play or the play itself? We watch to see if protagonists will reach their objectives, and we consider, along with them, their strategies and actions, anticipating responses from other characters. The *climax* is that point in the play when we discover whether the protagonist achieves the objective or not. Of course, secondary characters will also have objectives, but they should never obscure the protagonist's objective. The foundation of the play rests on the protagonist's objective.

The **antagonist** is the character or force against which the protagonist struggles. The antagonist may be another character, a culture and its laws or traditions, natural elements, or the protagonist divided against himself. In *The Rising of the Moon,* the sergeant's objective is to capture the wanted man. The antagonist or chief impediment to his achieving this objective is the wanted man himself, the ballad-singer. As the play develops, we realize that the sergeant is ambivalent; that is, he both wants to capture his antagonist, and he wants the antagonist to escape.

If the protagonist and his or her objective are the most important elements in the construction of a play, the antagonist follows close behind. Without an antagonist or obstacles in the protagonist's way, there would be no conflict and no drama. To create the necessary tension to sustain an audience's interest, the dramatist must be sure that the protagonist and antagonist are fairly evenly matched. If one is much stronger than the other and if the outcome is never in doubt, there will not be enough tension to sustain interest. In this way, a play is not unlike an athletic contest. Audience interest is peaked when the winner is uncertain. Also, while it is critical to a play to have just one protagonist and one objective, there can be more than one obstacle, or antagonist, impeding the protagonist's objective without threatening the unity or effect of the play.

Character is the companion of plot; the plot of a play involves the actions of its characters. Another way of defining plot is simply as characters in action (or *inter*-action). And in the same way that a play's plot must be unified, so a character must be coherent. This means that all aspects of the character—speech, dress, gesture, movement—must work together to suggest a focused and unified whole. Our sense of characters' identity and personality are derived essentially from four things: (1) their actions—what they do; (2) their words—what they say and how they say it; (3) their physical attributes—what they look like; (4) the responses of other characters to them—what others say or do to or about them. Of these, however, our sense of a character's coherence derives mainly from his or her speech and actions. From these we gain a sense of who characters are and what they are like.

Drama lives in the encounter of characters; its action is interaction, which frequently involves *conflict*. Dramatic characters come together and affect each other, making things happen by coming into conflict. Drama, in fact, is essentially the creation, development, and resolution of conflicts between and within

characters. For it is in conflict that characters reveal themselves, advance the plot, and dramatize the meaning(s) of plays.

We can illustrate something of our approach to character by again looking briefly at the characters in Lady Gregory's *The Rising of the Moon.* The two policemen are clearly minor characters, necessary primarily for the plot, though they also serve to reveal the character of the sergeant. In the first scene, for example, we notice how differently the sergeant responds than his men. Policemen B and X seem more casual, less concerned about the danger of the situation and more concerned with the details of finding places to post the placards. The sergeant is shown to be more experienced at the job and more aware of what is at stake. More important, however, is the relationship—or conflict—that develops between the sergeant, the protagonist, and the wanted man, his antagonist. As it turns out, neither is what he seems to be. The sergeant does not uphold the law and arrest the man; the man does not live up to his reputation as a dangerous killer. Both have opportunities to act within their expected roles, but neither does. Each surprises the other; both surprise us and perhaps themselves as well. The conflict between them remains a potential conflict rather than an actual one.

The most significant moment of character revelation occurs as the sergeant muses about fate. He imagines his life having turned out differently, with himself as a hunted criminal and the fugitive as a policeman hunting him. The sergeant sees the connection rather than the differences between himself and the revolutionary. This perception leads him to a radically different sense of his responsibility toward the man and toward their countrymen. In a small way, the sergeant helps to bring about the wanted man's prediction that "the small [will] rise up and the big fall down," largely because a part of the sergeant believes this should occur. The sergeant is thus shown to be a more complex man than he seems initially—though his practical, orthodox side appears with his final question: "I wonder, now, am I as great a fool as I think I am?"

DIALOGUE

Our discussion of character and conflict brings us to a critical aspect of dramatic characters—their speech, or **dialogue.** Although generally we use the word *dialogue* to refer to all the speech of a play, strictly speaking, dialogue involves two speakers and **monologue** to the speech of one. An important dramatic convention of dialogue is the use of a soliloquy to express a character's state of mind. A **soliloquy** is a speech given by a character as if alone, even though other characters may be on stage. A soliloquy represents a character's thoughts so the audience can know what he or she is thinking at a given moment. Soliloquies should be distinguished from **asides,** which are comments made directly to the audience in the presence of other characters, but without those other characters hearing what is said. Unlike a soliloquy, an aside is usually a brief remark.

Dialogue is more than simply the words characters utter. It is also itself action, since characters' words have the power to affect each other as well as to

The final type of irony found in plays is called dramatic irony. *Dramatic irony* involves a discrepancy between what characters know and what readers or viewers know. Playwrights often let us know things that their characters do not. We know, for example, that the ballad-singer is the man the sergeant seeks even though for a while the sergeant himself does not know it. And we know that the ballad-singer is hiding behind a barrel nearby while the sergeant dismisses his two police assistants. Our ironic knowledge of these things increases our pleasure in the play's situation and action. And our awareness of our knowledge enhances our appreciation of the dramatist's skill.

When a dramatist's work is pervaded by ironies in these various forms, we may characterize such pervasiveness as an ironic point of view. The persistent use of irony we may call an ironic vision. A play like Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* is informed by an ironic vision, as is Sophocles' work overall. In such plays, the dramatist's ironic vision infuses the plot, pervades the dialogue, and surfaces repeatedly in its other dramatic elements.

THEME

From experiencing a play and examining the various elements of a play we derive a sense of its significance and meaning. We use the word **theme** to designate the main idea or point of a play stated as a generalization. Because formulating the theme of a play involves abstracting from it a generalizable idea, the notion of theme inevitably moves away from the very details of character and action that give the play its life. This is not to suggest that it is not rewarding or useful to attempt to identify a central idea or set of ideas from plays, but only that we should be aware of the limitations of our doing so.

First, we should distinguish the ideas that may appear *in* a play from the idea *of* a play. The meaning of a play—its central, governing, or animating idea—is rarely identifiable as an explicit social, political, or philosophical idea manifest in the dialogue. Rather, a play's idea or meaning is almost always implicit, bound up with and derivable from the play's whole structure, character interactions, dialogue, and staging. One of the dangers of reading plays without attending sufficiently to their theatrical dimensions is that we may overgeneralize and reduce their meaning to a single, overly simplified idea. Since the theme of a play grows out of the relationships among its concrete details, any statement of it that omits significant aspects of a play's dramatic elements will inevitably represent too severe a limitation and even a distortion of the play's meaning. Any statement of theme inevitably only approximates a play's meaning rather than fully characterizing or embodying it, so we need to be careful. And then, even when we speak of multiple themes (as we should, since plays often suggest a multiplicity of ideas), we are still concerned only with one aspect of meaning—the intellectual. As we have always suggested, a play's meaning (or the meaning of any literary work) encompasses emotional apprehension as well as intellectual comprehension.

As readers or viewers of drama, we tend to reach for theme as a way of organizing our responses to a play, of coming to terms with what it implies about

verse from one ballad, the sergeant supplies it, indicating still another way in which he, the wanted man, and the common people are joined together.

A playwright's stage directions will sometimes help us see and hear things such as these as we read. But with or without stage directions, we need to use our aural as well as our visual imaginations. An increased imaginative alertness to the sights and sounds of a play, while no substitute for direct physical apprehension, can nonetheless help us approximate the experience of a dramatic performance. It can also enhance our appreciation of the dramatist's craftsmanship and increase our understanding of the play.

SYMBOLISM AND IRONY

Symbolism

In our discussion of the staging of *The Rising of the Moon,* and in our observations about its dialogue and conflict, we touched briefly and implicitly on two additional aspects of drama: symbolism and irony. A **symbol** can be defined simply as any object or action that means more than itself; it represents something beyond its literal self. Objects, actions, clothing, gestures, dialogue—all may have symbolic meaning. A rose, for example, might represent beauty, love, or transience (or all three at once). A tree might represent a family's roots and branches. A soaring bird might stand for freedom. Light—depending on its quality—might symbolize hope or knowledge or mystery or life. These symbolic associations, however, are not necessary or automatic, since the meaning of any symbol is controlled by its context and function in a particular dramatic scene, and is rather open-ended, too.

How, then, do we know if a particular detail is symbolic? How do we decide whether to leap beyond the literal action or dialogue into a symbolic interpretation? There is no simple rule for this. Like any interpretive connection we make in reading, the decision to view something as symbolic depends partly on our skill in reading and partly on whether the dramatic context invites and rewards a symbolic interpretation. The following questions can be used to guide your thinking about literary symbols:

1. Is the object, action, gesture, or dialogue important to the play? Is it described in detail? Does it occur more than once, or does it occur at a climactic or significant moment in the play?
2. Does the play seem to warrant our granting its details more significance than their immediate literal meaning? Why?
3. Does a symbolic interpretation make sense? Does it account for the literal details without either ignoring or distorting them? Does it add to our understanding?

There will be occasions when we are uncertain whether or not a particular object, action, or utterance is symbolic. And there will be times when, though we are fairly confident that we are dealing with a symbol, we are not confident about just what it represents. Interpretation is an art, not a science. Interpretive

uncertainty reflects the complexity and variability with which dramatists use symbols and the fact that most complex symbols resist definitive explanation (as does life itself).

Consider, for example, the symbolic force of the revolutionary songs that the ballad-singer sings in *The Rising of the Moon.* At the end of the play he sings a song about "The Rising of the Moon." What does the moon's rising stand for in the context of the play? Consider also the symbolic importance of the scene in which the sergeant and the ballad-singer sit back-to-back on the barrel, looking out in opposite directions. To what extent does this action symbolize their differences or similarities of attitude, belief, and situation? And when they jump together off the barrel, can this be construed as a symbolic representation of their decision to overlook their differences?

Irony

Irony is not so much an element of a dramatic text as a pervasive quality in it. Irony may appear in plays in three basic ways: in their language, in their incidents, or in their point of view. In whatever forms it emerges, **irony** almost always arises from a contrast or discrepancy between what is said and what is meant, or between what happens and what has been expected to happen.

Simple verbal irony comes from saying the opposite of what is meant. When someone says, "That was a brilliant remark," and we know that it was anything but brilliant, we feel and understand the speaker's ironic intention. In such a relatively simple instance there is usually no problem in perceiving the irony. In more complex situations, however, the identification of an action or a remark as ironic can be much more difficult. At the end of *The Rising of the Moon,* after the sergeant has let the ballad-singer escape, he asks himself whether he was a fool for doing so. The sergeant's question is subtly ironic, since once we accept his action and understand the sympathy that motivates it, we do not expect him to express such doubts concerning it. His words seem to indicate the opposite of what they actually say, with our understanding being that he is not a fool at all.

Another type of irony is *irony of circumstance* (sometimes called *irony of situation*), in which a playwright creates a discrepancy between what characters think is the case and what actually is the case. You will find examples of irony of circumstance in many of the plays in this book, including *Hamlet, Othello, A Doll House, Trifles,* and *The Gap.* Irony of circumstance appears forcefully in *The Rising of the Moon,* since what we expect to happen is actually not what happens at all; the opposite, in fact, is what occurs. It appears, initially, that the sergeant is out to capture the fugitive, but he abandons his opportunity to do so. It appears that the fugitive is dangerous and will act to protect himself, but instead he persuades through his speech and his song. And it appears that these two men have really nothing in common, but it turns out that they have very much in common, indeed, most importantly, their shared sense of idealism. In these and other ways, the action of the play creates ironic situations that form the heart of its dramatic action.

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BY

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UNIVERSITY OF THIQAR

COLLEGE OF EDUCATION FOR HUMANITIES

DEPARTMENT OF ENGLISH

2. Tragedy

Tragedy traces the career and downfall of an individual, and shows in this downfall both the capacities and the limitations of human life. Apart of these, definitions of tragedy are both difficult and unsatisfactory. The tragic as distinguished from the comic is a matter of the point of view from which the dramatist looks at his material. Another valid way of looking at tragedy is to recognize the difference in the kind of emotional response that the two forms of literature excite in us, the audience. Such emotional response, ranges between unhappiness, in tragedy, and happiness in comedy. Tragedy is concerned with eternal values; comedy with temporal.

The constituent elements of tragedy, as said earlier, are: plot, character, thought, spectacle, diction and music. These elements are said to pursue the imitation of the action to purgate the audience's emotions of pity and fear which is the function or tragedy to Aristotle. Aristotle, depending upon the plot types, differentiates four kinds of tragedies: complex tragedies which are wholly recognition; tragedies of suffering; character tragedies and tragedies depending, upon spectacle.

In *The Poetics*, Aristotle made certain description comments which came to be known as the dramatic **unities of action, time** and **space** and thus considered rules for the proper construction of tragedies. As for the unity of time, Aristotle remarks that the usual practice of tragedy was to confine itself, so far as possible, to the action of twenty –four years. The unity of place obliges the dramatist not to allow the action to take place in two remote places having the stricture of time in consideration. The dramatist has also to concentrate on one plot and should have no sub-plots, i. e. unity of action. Likewise, the action should take place within 24 hours. In fact, violation of such unities is

4. Comedy

As said earlier, comedy-tragedy distinction depends on both the point of view of both the playwright and the audience, and the type emotional response created in the audience - this ranges between happiness and unhappiness. Most frequently, comedy arouses and vicariously satisfies the human instinct for mischief.

As Aristotle, in *The Poetics*, concentrates on tragedy, comedy was never subject to the same attempt to impose rules concerning its conventions. Nevertheless, most comedies from the Elizabethan until the present time share certain features: They do not concentrate on the fortunes of an individual but interest is spread over a group of people;

LITERATURE

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Sixth Edition

Includes 1995 MLA Guidelines

X. J. Kennedy
Dana Gioia

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3 Character

From popular fiction and drama, both classic and contemporary, we are acquainted with many stereotyped characters. Called **stock characters,** they are often known by some outstanding trait or traits: the *bragging* soldier of Greek and Roman comedy, the Prince *Charming* of fairy tales, the *mad* scientist of horror movies, the *loyal* sidekick of Westerns, the *greedy* explorer of Tarzan films, the *brilliant but alcoholic* brain surgeon of medical thrillers on television. Stock characters are especially convenient for writers of commercial fiction: they require little detailed portraiture, for we already know them well. Most writers of the literary story, however, attempt to create characters who strike us not as stereotypes but as unique individuals. Although stock characters tend to have single dominant virtues and vices, characters in the finest contemporary short stories tend to have many facets, like people we meet.

A **character,** then, is presumably an imagined person who inhabits a story—although that simple definition may admit to a few exceptions. In George Stewart's novel *Storm*, the protagonist is the wind; in Richard Adams's *Watership Down*, the main characters are rabbits. But usually we recognize, in the main characters of a story, human personalities that become familiar to us. If the story seems "true to life," we generally find that its characters act in a reasonably consistent manner, and that the author has provided them with **motivation:** sufficient reason to behave as they do. Should a character behave in a sudden and unexpected way, seeming to deny what we have been told about his nature or personality, we trust that he had a reason and that sooner or later we will discover it. This is not to claim that *all* authors insist that their characters behave with absolute consistency, for (as we shall see later in this chapter) some contemporary stories feature characters who sometimes act without apparent reason. Nor can we say that, in good fiction, characters never change or develop. In *A Christmas Carol*, Charles Dickens tells how Ebeneezer Scrooge, a tightfisted

miser, reforms overnight, suddenly gives to the poor, and endeavors to assist his clerk's struggling family. But Dickens amply demonstrates why Scrooge had such a change of heart: four ghostly visitors, stirring kind memories the old miser had forgotten and also warning him of the probable consequences of his habits, provide the character (and hence the story) with adequate motivation.

To borrow the useful terms of the English novelist E. M. Forster, characters may seem **flat** or **round,** depending on whether a writer sketches or sculptures them. A flat character has only one outstanding trait or feature, or at most a few distinguishing marks: for example, the familiar stock character of the mad scientist, with his lust for absolute power and his crazily gleaming eyes. Flat characters, however, need not be stock characters: in all of literature there is probably only one Tiny Tim, though his functions in *A Christmas Carol* are mainly to invoke blessings and to remind others of their Christian duties. Some writers, notably Balzac, who peopled his many novels with hosts of characters, try to distinguish the flat ones by giving each a single odd physical feature or mannerism—a nervous twitch, a piercing gaze, an obsessive fondness for oysters. Round characters, however, present us with more facets—that is, their authors portray them in greater depth and in more generous detail. Such a round character may appear to us only as he appears to the other characters in the story. If their views of him differ, we will see him from more than one side. In other stories, we enter a character's mind and come to know him through his own thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. By the time we finish reading Katherine Mansfield's "Miss Brill" (in Chapter Two), we are well acquainted with the central character and find her amply three-dimensional.

Flat characters tend to stay the same throughout a story, but round characters often change—learn or become enlightened, grow or deteriorate. In William Faulkner's "Barn Burning" (Chapter Five), the boy Sarty Snopes, driven to defy his proud and violent father, becomes at the story's end more knowing and more mature. (Some critics call a fixed character **static;** a changing one, **dynamic.)** This is not to damn a flat character as an inferior work of art. In most fiction—even the greatest—minor characters tend to be flat instead of round. Why? Rounding them would cost time and space; and so enlarged, they might only distract us from the main characters.

"A character, first of all, is the noise of his name," according to novelist William Gass.[1] Names, chosen artfully, can indicate natures. A simple illustration is the completely virtuous Squire Allworthy, the foster father in *Tom Jones* by Henry Fielding. Subtler, perhaps, is the custom of giving a character a name that makes an **allusion:** a reference to some famous person, place, or thing in history, in other fiction, or in actuality. For his central characters in *Moby-Dick*, Herman Melville chose names from the Old Testament, calling his tragic and domineering Ahab after a Biblical tyrant who came to a bad end, and his wandering narrator Ishmael after a Biblical outcast. Whether or not it includes an allusion, a good name often reveals the character of the character. Charles Dickens, a vigorous and richly suggestive christener, named a charming confidence man Mr.

[1] "The Concept of Character in Fiction," in *Fiction and the Figures of Life* (New York: Knopf, 1970).

Questions

1. Who is the person in this poem? The mature poet? The poet as a child? Some fictitious character?
2. What do you understand to be the speaker's attitude toward religion at the present moment?

Experiment: *Reading with and without Biography*

Read the following poem and state what you understand from it. Then consider the circumstances in which it probably came to be written. (Some information is offered in a note on page 622.) Does the meaning of the poem change? To what extent does an appreciation of the poem need the support of biography?

William Carlos Williams (1883–1963)*

The Red Wheelbarrow 1923

so much depends
upon

a red wheel
barrow

glazed with rain 5
water

beside the white
chickens.

Irony

To see a distinction between the poet and the words of a fictitious character—between Robert Browning and "My Last Duchess"—is to be aware of **irony:** a manner of speaking that implies a discrepancy. If the mask says one thing and we sense that the writer is in fact saying something else, the writer has adopted an **ironic point of view.** No finer illustration exists in English than Jonathan Swift's "A Modest Proposal," an essay in which Swift speaks as an earnest, humorless citizen who sets forth his reasonable plan to aid the Irish poor. The plan is so monstrous no sane reader can assent to it: the poor are to sell their children as meat for the tables of their landlords. From behind his falseface, Swift is actually recommending not cannibalism but love and Christian charity.

A poem is often made complicated and more interesting by another kind of irony. **Verbal irony** occurs whenever words say one thing but mean something else, usually the opposite. The word *love* means *hate* here: "I just *love* to stay home and do my hair on a Saturday night!" If the verbal irony is conspicuously bitter, heavy-handed, and mocking, it is **sarcasm:** "Oh, he's

7 Symbol

In F. Scott Fitzgerald's novel *The Great Gatsby*, a huge pair of bespectacled eyes stares across a wilderness of ash heaps, from a billboard advertising the services of an oculist. Repeatedly entering into the story, the advertisement comes to mean more than simply the availability of eye examinations. Fitzgerald has a character liken it to the eyes of God; he hints that some sad, compassionate spirit is brooding as it watches the passing procession of humanity. Such an object is a **symbol:** in literature, a thing that suggests more than its literal meaning. Symbols generally do not "stand for" any one meaning, nor for anything absolutely definite; they point, they hint, or, as Henry James put it, they cast long shadows. To take a large example: in Herman Melville's *Moby-Dick*, the great white whale of the book's title apparently means more than the literal dictionary-definition meaning of an aquatic mammal. He also suggests more than the devil, to whom some of the characters liken him. The great whale, as the story unfolds, comes to imply an amplitude of meanings: among them the forces of nature and the whole created universe.

This indefinite multiplicity of meanings is characteristic of a symbolic story and distinguishes it from an **allegory,** a story in which persons, places, and things form a system of clearly labeled equivalents. In a simple allegory, characters and other ingredients often stand for other definite meanings, which are often abstractions. You met such a character in the last chapter: Faith in Hawthorne's "Young Goodman Brown." Supreme allegories are found in some biblical parables ("The kingdom of Heaven is like a man who sowed good seed in his field . . . ," Matthew 13:24–30).[1] A classic allegory is the medieval play *Everyman*, whose hero represents us all, and who, deserted by false friends called Kindred and Goods, faces the judgment of God accompanied only by a faithful friend called Good Deeds. In John Bunyan's seventeenth-century *Pilgrim's*

[1] A **parable** is a brief story that teaches a lesson. Some (but not all) parables are allegories.

directs him into a more comfortable path (a wrong turn), and the residents of a town called Fair Speech, among them a hypocrite named Mr. Facing-both-ways. Not all allegories are simple: Dante's *Divine Comedy*, written in the Middle Ages, continues to reveal new meanings to careful readers. Allegory was much beloved in the Middle Ages, but in contemporary fiction it is rare. One modern instance is George Orwell's long fable *Animal Farm*, in which (among its double meanings) barnyard animals stand for human victims and totalitarian oppressors.

Symbols in fiction are not generally abstract terms like *love* or *truth*, but are likely to be perceptible objects (or worded descriptions that cause us to imagine them). In William Faulkner's "A Rose for Emily" (Chapter Two), Miss Emily's invisible watch ticking at the end of a golden chain not only indicates the passage of time, but suggests that time passes without even being noticed by the watch's owner, and the golden chain carries suggestions of wealth and authority. Often the symbols we meet in fiction are inanimate objects, but other things also may function symbolically. In James Joyce's "Araby" (Chapter Five), the very name of the bazaar, Araby—the poetic name for Arabia—suggests magic, romance, and *The Arabian Nights*; its syllables (the narrator tells us) "cast an Eastern enchantment over me." Even a locale, or a feature of physical topography, can provide rich suggestions. Recall Ernest Hemingway's "A Clean, Well-Lighted Place" (Chapter Five), in which the café is not merely a café, but an island of refuge from night, chaos, loneliness, old age, and impending death.

In some novels and stories, symbolic characters make brief cameo appearances. Such characters often are not well-rounded and fully known, but are seen fleetingly and remain slightly mysterious. In *Heart of Darkness*, a short novel by Joseph Conrad, a steamship company that hires men to work in the Congo maintains in its waiting room two women who knit black wool—like the classical Fates. Usually such a symbolic character is more a portrait than a person—or somewhat portraitlike, as Faulkner's Miss Emily, who twice appears at a window of her house "like the carven torso of an idol in a niche." Though Faulkner invests Miss Emily with life and vigor, he also clothes her in symbolic hints: she seems almost to personify the vanishing aristocracy of the antebellum South, still maintaining a black servant and being ruthlessly betrayed by a moneymaking Yankee. Sometimes a part of a character's body or an attribute may convey symbolic meaning: a baleful eye, as in Edgar Allan Poe's "The Tell-Tale Heart" (page 61).

Much as a symbolic whale holds more meaning than an ordinary whale, a **symbolic act** is a gesture with larger significance than usual. For the boy's father in Faulkner's "Barn Burning" (Chapter Five), the act of destroying a barn is no mere act of spite, but an expression of his profound hatred for anything not belonging to him. Faulkner adds that burning a barn reflects the father's memories of the "waste and extravagance of war"; and further adds that "the element of fire spoke to some deep mainspring" in his being. A symbolic act, however, doesn't have to be a gesture as large as starting a conflagration. Before setting out

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

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Stoppard's (1937–) *Travesties* (1974) and *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead* (1966) or Samuel Beckett's (1906–89) *Waiting for Godot* (1952). Political theater, characterized by social criticism, together with the movements which have already been mentioned, has become very influential. Important American examples are Clifford Odets' (1906–1963) Marxist workers' play *Waiting for Lefty* (1935) and Arthur Miller's (1915–) parable *The Crucible* (1953) about the political persecutions during the McCarthy era.

Because of the element of performance, drama generally transcends the textual dimension of the other two major literary genres, fiction and poetry. Although the written word serves as the basis of drama, it is, in the end, intended to be transformed into a performance before an audience. In order to do justice to this change of medium, we ought to consider *text, transformation,* and *performance* as three interdependent levels of a play.

text
dialogue
monologue
plot
setting
stage direction

transformation	**performance**
directing	actors
stage	methods
props	facial expressions
lighting	gestures
	language

a)
Text

Since many textual areas of drama—character, plot, and setting—overlap with aspects of fiction which have already been explained, the following section will only deal with those elements specifically relevant to drama per se. Within the textual dimension of drama, the spoken word serves as the foundation for dialogue (verbal

commimication between two or more characters) and **monologue** (**soliloquy**). The **aside** is a special form of verbal communication on stage in which the actor "passes on" to the audience information which remains unknown to the rest of the characters in the play.

The basic elements of plot, including exposition, complication, climax, and denouement, have already been explained in the context of fiction. They have their origin in classical descriptions of the ideal course of a play and were only later adopted for analyses of other genres. In connection with plot, the **three unities** of time, place, and action are of primary significance. These unities prescribe that the time span of the action should roughly resemble the duration of the play (or a day at the most) and that the place where the action unfolds should always remain the same. Furthermore, the action should be consistent and have a linear plot (see Chapter 2, §1: Fiction). The three unities, which were supposed to characterize the structure of a "good" play, have been falsely ascribed to Aristotle. They are better identified for the most part as adaptations of his *Poetics* in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These rigid rules for the presentation of time, setting, and plot were designed to produce the greatest possible dramatic effect. Shakespeare's plays, which have always held a very prominent position in English literature, only very rarely conformed to these rules. This is why the three unities were never respected in English-speaking countries as much as they were elsewhere in Europe.

Indirectly related to the three unities is the division of a play into **acts** and **scenes**. Elizabethan theater adopted this structure from classical antiquity, which divided the drama into five acts. In the nineteenth century, the number of acts in a play was reduced to four, and in the twentieth century generally to three. With the help of act and scene changes, the setting, time, and action of a play can be altered, thereby allowing the traditional unity of place, time, and action to be maintained within a scene or an act.

The theater of the absurd, like its counterpart in fiction, consciously does away with traditional plot structures and leads the spectator into complicated situations which often seem absurd or illogical. The complication often does not lead to a climax, resolution, or a logical ending. In this manner, the theater of the absurd, like many post-modern novels or films, attempts artistically to portray the general feeling of uncertainty of the postwar era. Samuel

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Richard Taylor

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gestures along with statuesque posing give the sense of an extremely heroic and superhuman personage, while casual, unstudied and random movement reminds us of everyday life. Illusionistic acting depends on the re–creation of life–like speeches and movement, of finding an exact counterpart in inflection and gesture for the idea or feeling to be expressed, and of playing together with other actors in a convincing approximation of normal intercourse. Anti–illusionistic acting frankly recognises the artificiality of stage convention and requires the actor to play directly to the audience, declaiming lines even at the edge of the stage: ranting and raving, sometimes chanting and even singing in order to achieve a heightened and exaggerated effect.

Between these two extremes there is a kind of middle ground where any combination of technique might occur. For example, actors might faithfully reproduce normal, human events but slightly stylise the dialogue, movement and gesture, thus suggesting that the audience comment on the action rather than allow themselves to be carried away by it. Instead of being caught up sympathetically in character and situation, the audience is constantly reminded that the action is being re–created for a purpose and is challenged to think about that purpose, to exercise its faculties of criticism. Another possibility is to combine slight stylisation of acting technique with strange or unnatural actions, as in Wole Soyinka's *Dance of the Forests* (1960) where ghosts and figures of myth or folklore are introduced together with contemporary characters in order to raise issues concerning ethnic identity and traditional culture. Characters who are little more than personifications of ideas are very useful when presenting and investigating ideas and they normally require stylised acting techniques in order to be distinguished from 'real' characters.

Setting

In addition to casting and acting techniques there are many other aspects of stage presentation which affect drama. Setting is the physical location or psychological climate for action, and the way in which an expressive setting is achieved in the theatre is as important as the literary style in which direct descriptions of a novel's setting are written. Costume, stage properties, playing

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

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AANG FATIHUL ISLAM

A GUIDE FOR THE UNDERSTANDING OF BASIC LITERATURE

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B. Action/Plot

The event of a play isthe story as opposed to the theme; what happens rather than what it means. The plot must have some sort of unity and clarity by setting up a pattern by which each action initiating the next rather than standing alone without connection to what came before it or what follows. In the plot of a play, characters are involved in conflict that has a pattern of movement. The action and movement in the play begins from the initial entanglement, through rising action, climax, and falling action to resolution.

C. Characters

These are people presented in the play that are involved in the perusing plot. Each character should have its own distinct personality, age, appearance, beliefs, socio-economic background, and language.

D. Language

The choices of words are made by the playwright and the enunciation of the actors of the language. Language and dialog delivered by the characters moves the plot and action along, provides exposition, and defines the distinct characters. Each playwright can create their own specific style in relationship to language choices they use in establishing character and dialogue.

E. Music

Music can encompass the rhythm of dialogue and speeches in a play or can also mean the aspects of the melody and music compositions as with musical theatre. Each theatrical presentation delivers music, rhythm and melody in its own distinctive manner. Music is not a part of every play. But, music can be included to mean all sounds in a production. Music can expand to all sound effects, the actor's voices, songs, and instrumental music played as underscore in a play. Music creates patterns and establishes tempo in theatre. In the aspects of the musical the songs are used to push the plot forward and move the story to a higher level of intensity. Composers and lyricist work together with playwrights to strengthen the themes and ideas of the play. Character's wants and desires can be strengthened for the audience through lyrics and music.

1. *Point of Attack*

The moment of the play at which the main action of the plot begins. This may occur in the first scene, or it may occur after several scenes of exposition. The point of attack is the main action by which all others will arise. It is the point at which the main complication is introduced. Point of attack can sometimes work hand in hand with a play's inciting incident, which is the first incident leading to the rising action of the play. Sometimes the inciting incident is an event that occurred somewhere in the character's past and is revealed to the audience through exposition.

2. Exposition

Exposition is important information that the audience needs to know in order to follow the main story line of the play. It is the aspects of the story that the audience may hear about but that they will not witness in actual scenes. It encompasses the past actions of the characters before the play's opening scenes progress.

3. Rising Action

Rising action is the section of the plot beginning with the point of attack and/or inciting incident and proceeding forward to the crisis onto the climax. The action of the play will rise as it set up a situation of increasing intensity and anticipation. These scenes make up the body of the play and usually create a sense of continuous mounting suspense in the audience.

4. The Climax/Crisis

All of the earlier scenes and actions in a play will build technically to the highest level of dramatic intensity. This section of the play is generally refered to as the moment of the plays climax. This is the moment where the major dramatic questions rise to the highest level, the mystery hits the unraveling point, and the culprits are revealed. This should be the point of the highest stage of dramatic intensity in the action of the play. The whole combined actions of the play generally lead up to this moment.

5. Resolution/Obligatory Scene

The resolution is the moment of the play in which the conflicts are resolved. It is the solution to the conflict in the play, the answer

to the mystery, and the clearing up of the final details. This is the scene that answers the questions raised earlier in the play. In this scene the methods and motives are revealed to the audience.