

factory: it is self-evidently true that nobody is literally an island, and being so obvious is what makes that proposition hardly worth communicating. In some circumstances – for instance when reading poetry – a figurative interpretation might be the first preference, if one can be found. As always when interpreting what people say or write, one chooses among possibilities with the aim of finding a contextually appropriate reading.

I define a **figurative interpretation** as an explicature (a Stage 2 interpretation) that involves treating one or more words as if they had meanings different from their literal ones. Context is used not only as a foundation for inferring which referents are being talked about and which senses of ambiguous expressions are likely to be the intended ones, but also to decide whether any meanings should be replaced to yield figurative explicatures. The reason why a particular figurative interpretation is chosen as better than other interpretations that the listener or reader can think of may be that a literal interpretation is somehow deviant (untrue, too obvious, or empty of content, for instance); alternatively – or additionally – the context may be one that favours figurative usage. (Stage 3, implicature – also introduced in Chapter 1 – is a further constraint: the explicature – among the available ones – whether literal or figurative, that yields the most plausible implicatures will be preferred.)

Figures of speech should also be distinguished from **idioms** (introduced in Chapter 1). The difference is pithily put by Grant and Bauer (2004: 49): ‘figures of speech can be interpreted according to general cognitive principles, while idioms have to be learnt.’ In the rest of this chapter there will be illustrations of interpretation according to general pragmatic principles, and the principles will be taken up again, in a more theoretical way, in Chapter 8.

Also outside the category of figurative usage, as defined two paragraphs earlier, is the innovative creation of new words, because newly-minted words do not yet have established literal meanings. Though not figurative, such coinages are often imaginative, for example “NHS staff were *underwhelmed* by the government’s proposals”. The word *underwhelm*



An Introduction to English Semantics and Pragmatics

Patrick Griffiths

Although we, as listeners, begin with a phonetic message, once we have grasped the semantic content we retain only the sense of the message (Clark and Clark 1977:49). People frequently give an accurate account of something that has been said but almost always they re-tell it in words that are different from the original message. The account is not an exact repetition of what was said unless the message is fairly short. Thus, as listeners, we begin by identifying the phonetic message and through the phonetic message identify the semantic message.

So much for perception and identification. Now consider interpretation. Comprehension is not just taking in words or even sense-groups. As listeners we use our background information to interpret the message. As Fillmore (1979:78) puts it, we need to know not only what the speaker says but also what he is talking about, why he bothers to say it, and why he says it the way he does. We have to relate what is being said to what was said previously—relate new information that is coming at us to the information that preceded it. The utterance in our illustration, above, must be part of a larger discourse, and the listener grasps the meaning of ‘the answer (to what?)’ and ‘the information (about what?)’ by relating these to what has been said before. The listener has to decide, from the conversation or from knowledge of the speaker, whether the place of residence of the speaker’s friend is relevant. The listener has to decide if the speaker is joking, being sarcastic, or is entirely serious, and such judgements and interpretations have to be made within a brief span of time. When we are reading, our interpretation of what the author wants to tell us depends on our background knowledge of the topic, and we probably will be more successful in comprehending if we find the author’s style somewhat familiar and to our liking. From the other side, speakers who make themselves understood have to have some notion of what their addressees already know and what the addressees can infer and fill in. Writers have to decide for what potential audience they are writing and how much these potential readers can contribute to the process of comprehending.



Introducing English Semantics

Charles W. Kreidler

some people would like semantics to pursue the study of meaning in a wide sense of 'all that is communicated by language'; others (among them many modern writers within the framework of general linguistics) limit it in practice to the study of logical or conceptual meaning in the sense discussed in Chapter 1. Semantics in the former, wider sense can lead us once again into the void from which Bloomfield retreated with understandable misgivings – the description of all that may be the object of human knowledge or belief. On the other hand, we can, by carefully distinguishing types of meaning, show how they all fit into the total composite effect of linguistic communication, and show how methods of study appropriate to one type may not be appropriate to another.

On this basis, I shall break down 'meaning' in its widest sense into seven different ingredients, giving primary importance to logical meaning or (as I shall prefer to call it) **CONCEPTUAL MEANING**, the type of meaning I was discussing earlier in connection with 'semantic competence'. The six other types I shall consider are connotative meaning, social meaning, affective meaning, reflected meaning, collocative meaning, and thematic meaning.

Conceptual Meaning

CONCEPTUAL MEANING (sometimes called 'denotative' or 'cognitive' meaning) is widely assumed to be the central factor in linguistic communication, and I think it can be shown to be integral to the essential functioning of language in a way that other types of meaning are not (which is not to say that conceptual meaning is the most important element of every act of linguistic communication). My chief reason for assigning priority to conceptual meaning is that it has a complex and sophisticated organization of a kind which may be compared with, and cross-related to, similar organization on the syntactic and phonological levels of language. In particular, I would like to point to two structural principles that seem to lie at the basis of all linguistic patterning: the principle of **CONTRASTIVENESS** and the principle of **STRUCTURE**. Contrastive features underlie the classification of sounds in phonology,

Geoffrey Leech

SEMANTICS

The Study of Meaning
Second edition - revised and updated

**'Integrated, coherent and
stimulating...discusses
all the important current
issues in semantics'—
*Language in Society***



language of which he is not a native speaker, so that his intuitions are likely to be unclear or second-hand.

If the results are to be truly representative of a linguistic community, such tests have to be presented in a way that can be understood by people with no technical knowledge of the language. For example, it would be little use facing a random collection of adult English speakers with the question 'Does sentence *X* entail sentence *Y*?', but it might well be worth while to ask them 'If sentence *X* is true, does sentence *Y* have to be true?' Hence the value of reducing questions of conceptual meaning to questions about truth and falsehood: notions that are familiar to everyone. Here are two examples of such tests, the first designed to test entailment and inconsistency, the second to test tautology and contradiction:

Entailment and Inconsistency Test

{ *X*: George is my half-brother
 { *Y*: George is my brother

Instructions:

Assuming *X* is true, judge whether *Y* is true or not.

If you think *Y* must be true, write 'YES'.

If you think *Y* cannot be true, write 'NO'.

If you think *Y* may or may not be true, write 'YES/NO'.

If you don't know which answer to give, write '?'.

The responses 'YES' and 'NO' in this test are taken to be diagnostic of entailment and inconsistency respectively.

Tautology and Contradiction Test

My half-brother is my brother

Instructions:

If the statement would be true whatever the situation, write 'YES'.

If the statement would be false whatever the situation, write 'NO'.

If the statement could be true or false, write 'YES/NO'.

If you don't know which answer to give, write '?'.

Here again it is the first two responses ('YES' and 'NO') which are diagnostic: they indicate tautology and contradiction respectively.

From my earlier remarks on behavioural experiments (pp. 72–3), one would not expect a 100 per cent confirmation from such tests; *ad hoc* metaphorical interpretations and other 'nuisance factors' inevitably interfere. However, a predominance of 80 per cent or more in one direction or another can be taken to be a fairly strong confirmation of a basic statement. Here are examples of such results:

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language without referring to it. A 'language' which communicated by other means than by conceptual meaning (e.g. a 'language' which communicated solely by means of expletive words like *Oh! Ah! Oho! Alas!* and *Tally ho!*) would not be a language at all in the sense in which we apply that term to the tongues of men.

Connotative Meaning

More of what is distinctive about conceptual meaning will appear when we contrast it with CONNOTATIVE MEANING. Connotative meaning is the communicative value an expression has by virtue of what it *refers to*, over and above its purely conceptual content. To a large extent, the notion of 'reference' overlaps with conceptual meaning. If the word *woman* is defined conceptually by three features (+HUMAN, -MALE, +ADULT), then the three properties 'human', 'adult', and 'female' must provide a criterion of the correct use of that word. These contrastive features, translated into 'real world' terms, become attributes of the referent (that which the word refers to). But there is a multitude of additional, non-criterial properties that we have learnt to expect a referent of *woman* to possess. They include not only physical characteristics ('biped', 'having a womb'), but also psychological and social properties ('gregarious', 'subject to maternal instinct'), and may extend to features which are merely *typical* rather than *invariable* concomitants of womanhood ('capable of speech', 'experienced in cookery', 'skirt-or-dress-wearing'). Still further, connotative meaning can embrace the 'putative properties' of the referent, due to the viewpoint adopted by an individual, or a group of people or a whole society. So in the past woman has been burdened with such attributes ('frail', 'prone to tears', 'cowardly', 'emotional', 'irrational', 'inconstant') as the dominant male has been pleased to impose on her, as well as with more becoming qualities such as 'gentle', 'compassionate', 'sensitive', 'hard-working'. Obviously, connotations are apt to vary from age to age and from society to society. A hundred years ago, 'non-trouser-wearing' must have seemed a thoroughly definitive connotation of the word *woman* and its translation equivalents in European languages, just as in many non-western societies today womankind is associated with attributes foreign to our own way of thinking. It is equally obvious that connotations will vary, to some extent, from individual to individual within the same speech community: to an English-speaking misogynist *woman* will have many uncomplimentary associations not present in the minds of speakers of a more feminist persuasion.

It will be clear that in talking about connotation, I am in fact talking

Social and Affective Meaning

We turn now to two aspects of communication which have to do with the situation in which an utterance takes place. SOCIAL MEANING is that which a piece of language conveys about the social circumstances of its use. In part, we 'decode' the social meaning of a text through our recognition of different dimensions and levels of style within the same language. We recognize some words or pronunciations as being dialectal, i.e. as telling us something of the geographical or social origin of the speaker; other features of language tell us something of the social relationship between the speaker and hearer: we have a scale of 'status' usage, for example, descending from formal and literary English at one end to colloquial, familiar, and eventually slang English at the other.

One account (Crystal and Davy, *Investigating English Style*) has recognized, among others, the following dimensions of socio-stylistic variation (I have added examples of the categories of usage one would distinguish on each dimension):

Variation according to:

DIALECT (The language of a geographical region or of a social class)

TIME (The language of the eighteenth century, etc.)

PROVINCE (Language of law, of science, of advertising, etc.)

STATUS (Polite, colloquial, slang, etc., language)

MODALITY (Language of memoranda, lectures, jokes, etc.)

SINGULARITY (The style of Dickens, of Hemingway, etc.)

Although not exhaustive, this list indicates something of the range of style differentiation possible within a single language. It is not surprising, perhaps, that we rarely find words which have both the same conceptual meaning and the same stylistic meaning. This observation has frequently led people to declare that 'true synonyms do not exist'. If we understand synonymy as complete equivalence of communicative effect, it is indeed hard to find an example that will disprove this statement. But there is much convenience in restricting the term 'synonymy' to equivalence of conceptual meaning, so that we may then contrast conceptual synonyms with respect to their varying stylistic overtones:

| | | | |
|---|-------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| { | steed (poetic) | { | domicile (very formal, official) |
| | horse (general) | | residence (formal) |
| | nag (slang) | | abode (poetic) |
| | gee-gee (baby language) | | home (general) |

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
Factors such as intonation and voice-timbre – what we often refer to as ‘tone of voice’ – are also important here. The impression of politeness in (3) can be reversed by a tone of biting sarcasm; sentence (4) can be turned into a playful remark between intimates if delivered with the intonation of a mild request.

Affective meaning is largely a parasitic category in the sense that to express our emotions we rely upon the mediation of other categories of meaning – conceptual, connotative, or stylistic. Emotional expression through style comes about, for instance, when we adopt an impolite tone to express displeasure (as in (4) above), or when we adopt a casual tone to express friendliness. On the other hand, there are elements of language (chiefly interjections, like *Aha!* and *Yippee!*) whose chief function is to express emotion. When we use these, we communicate feelings and attitudes without the mediation of any other kind of semantic function.

Reflected and Collocative Meaning

Two further, though less important types of meaning involve an interconnection on the lexical level of language.

First, REFLECTED MEANING is the meaning which arises in cases of multiple conceptual meaning, when one sense of a word forms part of our



| | |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| { cast (literary, biblical) | { diminutive (very formal) |
| { throw (general) | { tiny (colloquial) |
| { chuck (casual, slang) | { wee (colloquial, dialectal) |

The style dimension of 'status' is particularly important in distinguishing synonymous expressions. Here is an example in which the difference of status is maintained through a whole sentence, and is reflected in syntax as well as in vocabulary:

- (1) They *chucked* a stone at the cops, and then did a *bunk* with the loot.
- (2) After *casting* a stone at the police, they *absconded* with the money.

Sentence (1) could be said by two criminals, talking casually about the crime afterwards; sentence (2) might be said by the chief inspector in making his official report. Both could be describing the same happening, and their common ground of conceptual meaning is evident in the difficulty anyone would have in assenting to the truth of one of these sentences, and denying the truth of the other.

In a more local sense, social meaning can include what has been called the **ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE** of an utterance (see pp. 321-3): for example, whether it is to be interpreted as a request, an assertion, an apology, a threat, etc. The function an utterance performs in this respect may be only indirectly related to its conceptual meaning. The sentence *I haven't got a knife* has the form and meaning of an assertion, and yet in social reality (e.g. if said to the waiter in a restaurant) it can readily take on the force of a request such as 'Please bring me a knife'.

From this it is only a small step to the consideration of how language reflects the personal feelings of the speaker, including his attitude to the listener, or his attitude to something he is talking about. **AFFECTIVE MEANING**, as this sort of meaning can be called, is often explicitly conveyed through the conceptual or connotative content of the words used. Someone who is addressed: 'You're a vicious tyrant and a villainous reprobate, and I hate you for it!' is left in little doubt as to the feelings of the speaker towards him. But there are less direct ways of disclosing our attitude than this: for example, by scaling our remarks according to politeness. With the object of getting people to be quiet, we might say either:

- (3) I'm terribly sorry to interrupt, but I wonder if you would be so kind as to lower your voices a little.

or:

- (4) Will you belt up.

a taboo meaning. Since their popularization in senses connected with the physiology of sex, it has become increasingly difficult to use terms like *intercourse*, *ejaculation*, and *erection* in 'innocent' senses without conjuring up their sexual associations. This process of taboo contamination has accounted in the past for the dying-out of the non-taboo sense of a word: Bloomfield explained the replacement of *cock* in its farmyard sense by *rooster* as due to the influence of the taboo use of the former word, and one wonders if *intercourse* is now following a similar path.

COLLOCATIVE MEANING consists of the associations a word acquires on account of the meanings of words which tend to occur in its environment. *Pretty* and *handsome* share common ground in the meaning 'good-looking', but may be distinguished by the range of nouns with which they are likely to co-occur or (to use the linguist's term) collocate:


| | | | | | |
|--------|---|---------|----------|---|------------|
| pretty | { | girl | handsome | { | boy |
| | | boy | | | man |
| | | woman | | | car |
| | | flower | | | vessel |
| | | garden | | | overcoat |
| | | colour | | | airliner |
| | | village | | | typewriter |
| | | etc. | | | etc. |

The ranges may well, of course, overlap: *handsome woman* and *pretty woman* are both acceptable, although they suggest a different kind of attractiveness because of the collocative associations of the two adjectives. Further examples are quasi-synonymous verbs such as *wander* and *stroll* (*cows may wander*, but may not *stroll*) or *tremble* and *quiver* (*one trembles with fear*, but *quivers with excitement*). Not all differences in potential co-occurrence need to be explained as collocative meaning: some may be due to stylistic differences, others to conceptual differences. It is the incongruity of combining unlike styles that makes 'He mounted his *gee-gee*' or 'He got on his *steed*' an improbable combination. On the other hand, the acceptability of 'The donkey ate *hay*', as opposed to 'The donkey ate *silence*', is a matter of compatibility on the level of conceptual semantics (on such 'selection restrictions', see pp. 137-42). Only when explanation in terms of other categories of meaning does not apply do we need to invoke the special category of collocative meaning: on the other levels, generalizations can be made, while

Associative Meaning: a Summary Term

Reflected meaning and collocative meaning, affective meaning and social meaning: all these have more in common with connotative meaning than with conceptual meaning; they all have the same open-ended, variable character, and lend themselves to analysis in terms of scales or ranges, rather than in discrete either-this-or-that terms. They can all be brought together under the heading of ASSOCIATIVE MEANING, and to explain communication on these levels, we need employ nothing more sophisticated than an elementary 'associationist' theory of mental connections based upon contiguities of experience. We contrast them all with conceptual meaning, because conceptual meaning seems to require the postulation of intricate mental structures which are specific to language and to the human species.

Associative meaning contains so many imponderable factors that it can be studied systematically only by approximative statistical techniques. In effect, Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum proposed a method for a partial analysis of associative meaning when they published their ambitiously titled book *The Measurement of Meaning* in 1957. Osgood and his co-authors devised a technique (involving a statistical measurement device, the Semantic Differential) for plotting meaning in terms of a multi-dimensional semantic space, using as data speakers' judgements recorded in terms of seven-point scales. The scales are labelled by contrasting adjective pairs, such as *happy-sad*, *hard-soft*, *slow-fast*, so that a person may, for example, record his impression of the word *bagpipe* on a form in the following way:



Statistically, the investigators found that particular significance seemed to lie in three major dimensions, those of evaluation (*good-bad*), potency (*hard-soft*), and activity (*active-passive*). It is clear, even from this very brief sketch, that the method can provide no more than a *partial* and *approximate* account of associative meaning: *partial* because it entails a selection from indefinitely many possible scales, which in any case would only provide for associative meaning in so far as it is explicable in scalar terms; *approximate* because of the statistical sampling, and because a seven-point scale constitutes a cutting-up of a continuous scale

similar in its crudity to that of cutting up the spectrum into seven primary colours. This is not to disparage the Semantic Differential technique as a means of quantifying associative meaning: the lesson to be learned is, in fact, that it is only by such relatively insensitive tools as this that associative meaning can be systematically studied: it does not lend itself to determinate analyses involving yes-no choices and structures of uniquely segmentable elements.

Another important observation about the Semantic Differential is that it has been found useful in psychological fields such as personality studies, 'attitude measurement', and psychotherapy, where differences in the reactions of individuals are under scrutiny, rather than the common core of reactions that they share. This upholds what I said earlier in particular reference to connotative meaning: that whereas conceptual meaning is substantially part of the 'common system' of language shared by members of a speech community, associative meaning is less stable, and varies with the individual's experience.

Thematic Meaning

The final category of meaning I shall attempt to distinguish is **THEMATIC MEANING**, or what is communicated by the way in which a speaker or writer organizes the message, in terms of ordering, focus, and emphasis. It is often felt, for example, that an active sentence such as (1) has a different meaning from its passive equivalent (2), although in conceptual content they seem to be the same:

- { (1) Mrs Bessie Smith donated the first prize.
- { (2) The first prize was donated by Mrs Bessie Smith.

Certainly these have different communicative values in that they suggest different contexts: the active sentence seems to answer an implicit question 'What did Mrs Bessie Smith donate?', while the passive sentence seems to answer an implicit question 'Who was the first prize donated by?' or (more simply) 'Who donated the first prize?'. That is, (1), in contrast to (2), suggests that we know who Mrs Bessie Smith is (perhaps through a previous mention). The same truth conditions, however, apply to each: it would be impossible to find a situation of which (1) was an accurate report while (2) was not, or vice versa.

Thematic meaning is mainly a matter of choice between alternative grammatical construction, as in:

- { (3) A man is waiting in the hall.
- { (4) There's a man waiting in the hall.

SEVEN TYPES OF MEANING

| | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|
| | 1. CONCEPTUAL MEANING <i>or Sense</i> | Logical, cognitive, or denotative content. |
| ASSOCIATIVE MEANING | 2. CONNOTATIVE MEANING | What is communicated by virtue of what language refers to. |
| | 3. SOCIAL MEANING | What is communicated of the social circumstances of language use. |
| | 4. AFFECTIVE MEANING | What is communicated of the feelings and attitudes of the speaker/writer. |
| | 5. REFLECTED MEANING | What is communicated through association with another sense of the same expression. |
| | 6. COLLOCATIVE MEANING | What is communicated through association with words which tend to occur in the environment of another word. |
| | 7. THEMATIC MEANING | What is communicated by the way in which the message is organized in terms of order and emphasis. |

I have here used *SENSE* as a briefer term for 'conceptual meaning', (or 'meaning' in the narrower sense), and will feel free to use it for clarity and convenience from now on. For 'meaning' in the wider sense which embraces all seven types listed, it is useful to have the alternative term **COMMUNICATIVE VALUE**.

Meaning

While semantics is the study of meaning in language, there is more interest in certain aspects of meaning than in others. We have already ruled out special meanings that one individual might attach to words or what TSA agents believe words mean, as in Ben Bergen's story quoted earlier. We can go further and make a broad distinction between **conceptual meaning** and **associative meaning**.

Conceptual meaning covers those basic, essential components of meaning that are conveyed by the literal use of a word. It is the type of meaning that dictionaries are designed to describe. Some of the basic components of a word like *needle* in English might include "thin, sharp, steel instrument." These components would be part of the conceptual meaning of *needle*. However, different people might have different associations or connotations attached to a word like *needle*. They might associate it with "pain," or "illness," or "blood," or "drugs," or "thread," or "knitting," or "hard to find" (especially in a haystack), and these associations may differ from one person to the next. These types of associations are not treated as part of the word's conceptual meaning.

One way in which the study of basic conceptual meaning might be helpful would be as a means of accounting for the "oddness" we experience when we read sentences such as the following:

The hamburger ate the boy.

The table listens to the radio.

The horse is reading the newspaper.

We should first note that the oddness of these sentences does not derive from their syntactic structure. According to the basic syntactic rules for forming English sentences (presented in Chapter 8), we have well-formed structures.

| | | |
|----------------------|------------|----------------|
| NP | V | NP |
| <i>The hamburger</i> | <i>ate</i> | <i>the boy</i> |

This sentence is syntactically good, but semantically odd. Since the sentence *The boy ate the hamburger* is perfectly acceptable, we may be able to identify the source of the problem. The components of the conceptual meaning of the noun *hamburger* must be significantly different from those of the noun *boy*, allowing one, not the other, to "make sense" with the verb *ate*. Quite simply, the kind of noun used with *ate* must denote an entity that is capable of "eating." The noun *hamburger* doesn't have this property and the noun *boy* does.

GEORGE YULE

**THE STUDY OF
LANGUAGE**

FIFTH EDITION

minds of readers or listeners, allowing them to express themselves in new and innovative ways. Figurative language is intended to make someone's speech more beautiful and sound gorgeous by including powerful words with complete meanings.

Song Lyric

According to Abrams (2009), in the most common sense of the word, a lyric is a short poem that is written by a single person who talks about a state of mind, a thought process, or how they feel. In one piece of writing, song lyrics will be used as a flash story. Lyrics are any short piece of literature written in the form of an audio conversation between one person and another who talks about their thoughts, feelings, and state of mind.

Simile

The definitions of simile and metaphor are nearly identical. Both of them make a comparison between two very different things. A simile is a word or phrase that explicitly compares two things, such as like, as, than, comparable, resemble, or looks (Perrine, 1977, p. 61). A simile is the most basic form of figurative language, and it is frequently used in poetry. A simile compares two objects that use the terms "like" or "as" to describe them.

Metaphor

It is a type of analogy in which two distinct elements are briefly contrasted without using a connective phrase like, as, or comparable (Perrine, 1977, p. 61). Perrine believes that metaphor and simile are linked. They are distinguished from one another through the use of connective words. This metaphorical phrase compares two opposite items by identifying or substituting one for the other.

Personification

It is a figurative language that gives human characteristics to an animal, an object, or an idea. As defined, it is a subtype of metaphor, an implied comparison in which the metaphorical term of the comparison is always a human individual (Perrine, 1977). It's a contrast between

inanimate objects and people. personification brings words to life. it clarifies a certain thing in the reader's imagination.

Apostrophe

Perrine (1977) explained that an apostrophe is used to address someone absent, deceased, or nonhuman as if they were there and could repeat what is being said. It has a lot in common with personification. Furthermore, Abrams (2009, p. 313) believes that the apostrophe consists of directly addressing an absent person or an abstract or non-human object.

Synecdoche

The use of a component to represent the whole is known as synecdoche (Perrine, 1977, p. 67). Synecdoche is divided into two components Pars pro-toto and Totem pro-parte. Totem pro-parte is when the whole item stands for its part, while pars pro-toto is when a portion stands for the whole. Furthermore, according to (DiYanni, 2004, p. 63), synecdoche is a type of metaphorical language in which a part of something is used to refer to the whole.

Metonymy

Perrine (1977, p. 67) defines metonymy as a figure of speech in which something nearly related is used to represent what is genuinely meant. Metonymy is the usage of a term or phrase that is closely linked with the object that is truly meant. According to (Abrams, 2009, p. 120) metonymy is a literal phrase that is used to refer to other terms that have a general experiential association. Furthermore, DiYanni (2004) defined metonymy as the substitution of a thing's characteristic for the object itself.

Symbol

A symbol is defined as something that has a deeper meaning than its literal meaning (Perrine, 1977, p. 81). The easiest way to understand a symbol is to think of it as an implied metaphor. Anything that indicates anything is referred to as a symbol. All words are symbols, in other words. The term symbol is only used in literary contexts to refer to a word or phrase that denotes an item or event that, in turn, represents something or has a spectrum of meaning beyond

Hyperbole / Overstatement

Hyperbole is an exaggeration employed to emphasize the truth, (Perrine, 1977, p. 120). According to Abrams (2009, p. 149), hyperbole is an exaggerated exaggeration of reality that can be utilized for serious or satirical purposes. A blatant exaggeration is referred to as hyperbole. Hyperboles are frequently employed to emphasize a point. Hyperboles must be interpreted in context.

Understatement

It is the opposite of the author's hyperbole to make the situation less important. It says less than it means and may exist in what one says and how one says it (Perrine, 1977, p. 102). Abrams (2009, p. 149) stated that understatement is a term to represent something as much less in magnitude or importance than what it is.

Irony

Irony is the opposite of what is said and what it is meant (Perrine, 1977, p. 103). In addition, Abrams (2009) stated that irony is the statement in which the speaker's meaning has sharply different meanings than the speaker implies.